SISTEMA MULTILATERAL
X
SISTEMAS REGIONAIS
X
Desalinhamentos cambiais
DESAFIOS PARA O BRASIL
Centro do Comércio Global e do Investimento – CCGI
EESP/FGV
Profa. Vera Thorstensen
O Multissistema do Comércio Global
2
Regras Multilaterais
OMC (DSB), FMI, BM, OCDE, UNCTAD, FAO,
OMPI
Regras Preferenciais
Acordos Regionais, Bilaterais e Não
Recíprocos
Regras
Nacionais
UE, EUA, China, Índia,
África do Sul…
Brasil
Sistema dos Estados x Sistema das Transnacionais
3
Regras Multilaterais
Influência das Transnacionais
OMC (DSB), FMI, BM, OCDE, UNCTAD, FAO,
OMPI
• Multilateral
Regras Preferenciais
Acordos Regionais, Bilaterais e Não Recíprocos
Regras Nacionais
UE, EUA, China, Índia,
África do Sul…
• Plurilateral
• Preferencial
• Regulação nacional
Brasil
Sistema dos Estados x Sistema das Transnacionais
4
Lógica dos Estados
• Comércio de bens
• Tarifas, quotas
• AD, CVM, salvaguardas
• Regras de origem
Lógica das Transnacionais
• “Trade in tasks” (cadeias de valor)
• Sem Tarifas, AD, CVM, Salv., ou
RO preferenciais
• Investimento, concorrência,
Propriedade Intelectual
• Subsídios
• Harmonização de padrões
(TBT/SPS/privados)
• SOLUÇÃO
CONTROVÉRSIAS
• ARBITRAGEM
DESAFIOS
5
ACORDOS PREFERENCIAIS
A Evolução dos APCs no mundo
Fonte: OMC
APCs firmados e em negociação pelos países da Am. Latina
7
Chile
Austrália
Canadá
Chile
China
Cingapura
Colômbia
Coréia do Sul
EFTA
EUA
Índia
Japão
México
Nova Zelândia
Peru
Turquia
UE
Aliança
Pacífico
TPP
Firmado
Em negociação
Colômbia Equador
México
Peru
Bolívia
Venezuela
-
*
-
Fontes: Sítios virtuais dos ministérios e secretarias de comércio exterior dos países
selecionados / elaboração CCGI / *ratificação pendente
APCs do Mercosul
Acordo
Data de
Assinatura
Data de Entrada
em Vigor
Mercosul – Índia
25.01.2004
01.06.2009
Mercosul – Israel
18.12.2007
39.04.2010
Mercosul – SACU*
03.04.2009
-
Mercosul – Egito
02.08.2010
-
Mercosul – Palestina
20.12.2011
-
*União Aduaneira do Sul da África (África do Sul, Botsuana, Lesoto, Namíbia e Suazilândia)
Fonte: Mercosul
Volume de Comércio: Brasil e parceiros dos APCs
Exportações
Importações
País
US$ FOB
Participação
no total (%)
US$ FOB
Participação
no total (%)
Egito
2.711.858.469
1,12
251.416.679
0,11
Índia
5.576.930.397
2,30
5.042.842.814
2,26
Israel
376.063.459
0,16
1.143.543.923
0,51
Palestina
22.479.493
0,01
87.644
-
1.792.960.861
0,74
852.462.301
0,38
SACU
Fonte: Secex, 2012
APCs em negociação
Acordo
Marrocos
Status
Acordo-Quadro prevendo a negociação de uma zona de livre comércio assinado em 2004
Conselho de Cooperação do Acordo-Quadro prevendo a negociação de uma zona de livre comércio assinado em 2005,
Golfo – CCG*
última reunião de negociação em 2012
SACU e Índia
Negociação de um APC baseado nos acordos já existentes
Sistema de Integração Centro- Projeto lançado em 2004, realização de reuniões exploratórias até 2010
Americana – SICA**
Paquistão
Acordo-Quadro prevendo a negociação de uma zona de livre comércio assinado em 2006
Jordânia
Acordo-Quadro prevendo a negociação de uma zona de livre comércio assinado em 2008
Turquia
Acordo-Quadro prevendo a negociação de uma zona de livre comércio assinado em 2010
União Européia
Relançamento das negociações em 2010, consulta pública pela Secex em 2012 para
atualização do posicionamento do setor privado brasileiro (Circular Secex n.44/12)***
Canadá
Abertura de consultas pela Secex, em 2012, sobre eventual lançamento de negociações
(Circular Secex n.45/12).
*Omã, Emirados Árabes Unidos, Arábia Saudita, Qatar, Bahrein e Kuwait
**Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicarágua e Panamá.
*** As negociações para a negociação de um APC com a União Européia foram lançadas em 1994 e interrompidas em 2004.
Fonte: Ministério das Relações Exteriores
Volume de Comércio: Brasil e parceiros dos APCs em negociação
País
Marrocos
Conselho de Cooperação do
Golfo – CCG
Sistema de Integração CentroAmericana - SICA
Paquistão
Jordânia
Turquia
UE
Canadá
Fonte: Secex, 2012
Exportação
Vol. (US$)
Part. (%)
Importação
Vol. (USS)
Part. (%)
872.306.154
0,36
1.281.171.583
0,57
7.630.448.591
3,15
5.247.439.709
2,35
1.450.388.863
0,60
562.072.694
0,25
192.875.684
0,08
92.331.983
0,04
215.640.783
0,09
1.933.138
---
1.207.133.102
0,50
964.114.176
0,43
48.859.641.610
20,14
47.661.649.903
21,36
3.079.926.642
1,27
3.072.137.103
1,38
Modelagem
EUA
UE
China
AS
Simulações de APCs para o Brasil:
Impacto no PIB setorial em %
EUA
Agronegócio
Carnes bovinas, eqüinas e ovinas
Outros produtos de carne
Óleos e gorduras vegetais
Laticínios
Arroz processado
Açúcar
Outros produtos alimentícios
Bebidas e tabaco
Agricultura
Arroz com casca
Trigo
Grãos de cereais
Vegetais, frutas e castanhas
Sementes oleaginosas
Cana-de-açúcar
Fibras vegetais
Outras culturas agrícolas
Gado, ovelhas e cavalos
Outros produtos animais
Leite não pasteurizado
Lã e matérias primas
Número de setores sensíveis
UE-27
China
América do
Sul
+
+
+
++
+
-
++++
++++
--+
++++
++++
-
-+++
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-
+
+
+
+
+++
+
+
+
++
6
+
-+++
+++
--++++
---++++
++++
+++
8
++
++++
+
++
++++
+
--+
++
7
+
+
+
+
+
10
(+) ou (-) (ganhos e
perdas abaixo de
1%)
(++) ou (--) (ganhos
e perdas entre 1% e
2%)
(+++) ou (---)
(ganhos e perdas
entre 2% e 3%)
(++++) ou (----)
(ganhos e perdas
acima de 3%)
Fonte: CMEA/ FGV
Simulações de APCs para o Brasil:
Impacto no PIB setorial em %
EUA
Indústria Brasileira
Extrativa
Silvicultura
Pesca
Carvão
Petróleo
Gás
Outros minerais
Manufatura
Têxteis
Vestuário
Couro
Produtos de madeira
Papel
Derivados de petróleo/carvão
Químico, borracha/plástico
Outros produtos minerais
Metais ferrosos
Metais (outros)
Produtos/metal (outros)
Veículos motor/peças
Equipamentos/transporte/outros
Equipamentos eletrônicos
Outros/Máquina
Outros manufaturados
Número de setores sensíveis
UE-27
China
América do Sul
+
+
+
+
-
--+
------
+
+++
-
-
+
+
+++
+
+
-++
+
--11
------------------------------------21
--------++
++
++
++
-----++++
----------15
+
+
+
+
--+
+++
-+
15
(+) ou (-) (ganhos e
perdas abaixo de 1%)
(++) ou (--) (ganhos e
perdas entre 1% e 2%)
(+++) ou (---) (ganhos e
perdas entre 2% e 3%)
(++++) ou (----) (ganhos
e perdas acima de 3%)
Fonte: CMEA/FGV
Modelagem
Brasil – EUA, UE, Can, Mex, Chin, Ind, AS
Tipos: c/ e s/ Argentina
c/ e s/ Vem
Variações:
- sem e com câmbio
- sem e com BNT
16
EXCHANGE RATES AND
TRADE
OBSERVATORY ON EXCHANGE RATES
SÃO PAULO SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
FGV-SP 2013
Prof. Vera Thorstensen, Prof. Emerson Marçal, Prof. Lucas
Ferraz
Big Mac Index – 1/2013 e 7/2013
17
IMF Estimates of Exchange Rate Misalignments (6/2012)
Pilot External Sector Report
18
IMF Estimates of Exchange Rate Misalignments (6/2013)
Pilot External Sector Report
19
Misalignment from FEER – Cline and Williamson
20
Exchange rate misalignments 2010 - 2012
(Shin, Johansen, Engle-Granger)
21
FGV
22
Exchange Rate Misalignments FGV
2012
Petersen x IMF x FGV (REER)
23
Brazil: real exchange rate, fundamentals and exchange
rate misalignments (annually)
24
Real Effecitive Exchange Rate
Fundamentals
100
80
60
1970
30
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Exchange Rate Misalignment
20
10
0
-10
-20
1970
1975
1980
Sources: Misalignment estimates – Observatory on Exchange Rate - EESP/FGV (2013)
BRASIL
Taxa de câmbio Real, Fundamentos e Desalinhamento
cambial (trimestral - 6/13)
25
175
Fundamentos
Taxa de Câmbio Real
150
125
100
75
1980
40
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Desalinhamento Cambial
20
0
-20
1980
1985
BRASIL: Desalinhamento cambial
Diversas metodologias
26
60
Modelo I
Modelo III
Média dos Modelos
50
Modelo II
Modelo IV
Modelo V
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
US: real exchange rate, fundamentals and exchange
rate misalignments (annually)
27
Real Effective Exchange Rate
Estimated Fundamentals
140
120
100
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Estimated Exchange Rate Misaligment
0.2
0.1
0.0
-0.1
1970
1975
1980
Sources: Misalignment estimates – Observatory on Exchange Rate - EESP/FGV (2012)
China: real exchange rate, fundamentals and
exchange rate misalignments (annually)
28
200
China Real Effective Exchange Rate
China Fundamentals
150
100
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Exchange Rate Misalignment
50
0
-50
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sources: Misalignment estimates – Observatory on Exchange Rate - EESP/FGV (2013)
European Area: Exchange Rate Misalignments
(2009 – 2011)
29
FGV
“Tariffication” of exchange rate misalignments
30
To exam the impact of exchange rate misalignments on trade, one possibility is to
transform a misaligment into a tariff and then to adjust the import tariff of each
country, through a “tariffication” exercise.
An overvalued exchange rate has the effect of reducing or nullifying the import tariffs
of the overvalued country, creating an incentive to imports from third countries.
An undervalued exchange rate, on the other hand, will give an incentive to exports
from the undervalued country. A country’s undervalued currency will have the effect
of increasing its import tariffs, sometimes above the bound levels at the WTO.
The equation used to “tarifficate” the effects of exchange rate misalignments is
presented in the next slide
Tariffication of Exchange Rates
31
Simulations regarding the effects of exchange rate
misalignments on selected Tariff Profiles
32
Using the “tariffication methodology”, one can represent the effects of exchange rate
misalignments on a country Tariff Profile.
The Tariff Profile is comprised of bound tariffs and applied tariffs
Bound tariffs are the tariffs negotiated at the WTO as the maximum permitted level of
an import tariff.
Applied tariffs are the import tariffs actually applied by a country and notified to the
WTO
After applying the “tariffication methodology” the results are adjusted bound and
applied tariffs that represent the actual level of protection of a given country.
In the following slides we present the simulations for Brazil, US and EU Tariff
Profiles, considering the effects of the exchange rate misalignments of selected
countries.
Impacts of Exchange Rates on China Tariff Profile
China devaluation in 2012 (17%)
33
Impacts of Exchange Rates on China Tariff Profile
(2012)
34
Ch-Brazil (37%), Ch-Germany (13%), Ch-US (12%) Bilateral
Misalignments
Impacts of Exchange Rates on US Tariff Profile
US devaluation in 2012 (5%)
35
Impacts of Exchange Rates on US Tariff Profile (2012)
US-Brazil (25%), US-Spain (9,5%), US-China (12%) Bilateral
Misalignments
36
Impacts of Exchange Rates on Brazil Tariff Profile
Brazil Overvaluation in 2012 (20%)
37
Impacts of Exchange Rates on Brazil Tariff Profile
Brazil-China (37%), Brazil-US (25%), Brazil-Germany (24%)
Bilateral Misalignments in 2012
38
Impacts of Exchange Rates on EU Tariff Profile
Brazil (40%), US (7%), China (14%) Misalignments in 2011 and
Brazil (15%) in 06/2012
39
Conclusions
40
- Countries with overvalued exchange rates (Brazil) have their
negotiated tariffs reduced or nullified.
- Countries with undervalued exchange rates (USA, China) grant
subsidies to their exports and their applied tariffs surpass the bound
levels agreed at the WTO.
- Substantial and persistent exchange rate misalignments significantly
affect or nullify most WTO rules:
tariffs, antidumping, countervailing measures, safeguards, rules of
origin, regional agreements, DSB retaliations…
- Problem:
the WTO does not have adequate rules to address the exchange rate
issue
Solutions
41
IMF
- manipulation (Article IV)
WTO
- frustation (Article XV)
Rules relating between exchange rates and trade
42
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Article II:6
(a) The specific duties and charges included in the Schedules relating to contracting
parties members of the International Monetary Fund, and margins of preference in
specific duties and charges maintained by such contracting parties, are expressed
in the appropriate currency at the par value accepted or provisionally
recognized by the Fund at the date of this Agreement. Accordingly, in case this
par value is reduced consistently with the Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund by more than twenty per centum, such specific
duties and charges and margins of preference may be adjusted to take
account of such reduction; provided that the CONTRACTING PARTIES (i.e., the
contracting parties acting jointly as provided for in Article XXV) concur that such
adjustments will not impair the value of the concessions provided for in the
appropriate Schedule or elsewhere in this Agreement, due account being taken of all
factors which may influence the need for, or urgency of, such adjustments.
WTO Rules relating trade and exchange rates
43
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Article XV:4
Contracting parties shall not, by exchange action,
frustrate* the intent of the provisions of this Agreement,
nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund.
* Ad Article XV -Paragraph 4
The word “frustrate” is intended to indicate, for example, that infringements of the letter of any
Article of this Agreement by exchange action shall not be regarded as a violation of that Article if,
in practice, there is no appreciable departure from the intent of the Article. Thus, a contracting
party which, as part of its exchange control operated in accordance with the Articles of Agreement
of the International Monetary Fund, requires payment to be received for its exports in its own
currency or in the currency of one or more members of the International Monetary Fund will not
thereby be deemed to contravene Article XI or Article XIII. Another example would be that of a
contracting party which specifies on an import license the country from which the goods may be
imported, for the purpose not of introducing any additional element of discrimination in its import
licensing system but of enforcing permissible exchange controls.
WTO Rules relating trade and exchange
rates
44
GATT Article XV.1:
The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall seek co-operation
with the International Monetary Fund to the end that the
CONTRACTING PARTIES and the Fund may pursue a coordinated policy with regard to exchange questions
within the jurisdiction of the Fund and questions of
quantitative restrictions and other trade measures
within the jurisdiction of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
WTO Rules relating trade and exchange
rates
45
GATT Article XV.9:
Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude:
(a) the use by a contracting party of exchange controls
or exchange restrictions in accordance with the
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund or with that contracting party's special exchange
agreement with the CONTRACTING PARTIES,
IMF
Rules relating exchange rates and trade
46
IMF’s Articles of Agreement
Article IV: Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements
Section 1. General obligations of members
Recognizing that the essential purpose of the international monetary system is to provide a
framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, services, and capital among countries, and that
sustains sound economic growth, and that a principal objective is the continuing development of
the orderly underlying conditions that are necessary for financial and economic stability, each
member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange
arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates. In particular, each member
shall:
(i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the objective of fostering orderly
economic growth with reasonable price stability, with due regard to its circumstances;
(ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and financial conditions and
a monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic disruptions;
(iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent
effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other
members; and
(iv) follow exchange policies compatible with the undertakings under this Section
IMF
Rules relating exchange rates and trade
47
Principles for Guidance Article IV Section I (2007)
Manipulation
(i) protracted large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange market;
(ii) official or quasi-official borrowing that either is unsustainable or brings unduly high liquidity
risks, or excessive and prolonged official or quasi-official accumulation of foreign assets, for
balance of payments purposes;
(iii) (a) the introduction, substantial intensification, or prolonged maintenance, for balance of
payments purposes, of restrictions on, or incentives for, current transactions or payments, or
(b) the introduction or substantial modification for balance of payments purposes of
restrictions on, or incentives for, the inflow or outflow of capital;
(iv) the pursuit, for balance of payments purposes, of monetary and other financial policies that
provide abnormal encouragement or discouragement to capital flows;
(v) fundamental exchange rate misalignment;
(vi) large and prolonged current account deficits or surpluses; and
(vii) large external sector vulnerabilities, including liquidity risks, arising from private capital flows.
IMF Rules relating exchange rates and trade
48
IMF’s Articles of Agreement
Article IV: Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements
Section 3. Surveillance over exchange arrangements
(a) The Fund shall oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its
effective operation, and shall oversee the compliance of each member with its
obligations under Section 1 of this Article.
(b) In order to fulfill its functions under (a) above, the Fund shall exercise firm
surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members, and shall adopt specific
principles for the guidance of all members with respect to those policies. Each
member shall provide the Fund with the information necessary for such surveillance,
and, when requested by the Fund, shall consult with it on the member’s exchange
rate policies. The principles adopted by the Fund shall be consistent with cooperative
arrangements by which members maintain the value of their currencies in relation to
the value of the currency or currencies of other members, as well as with other
exchange arrangements of a member’s choice consistent with the purposes of the
Fund and Section 1 of this Article. These principles shall respect the domestic social
and political policies of members, and in applying these principles the Fund shall pay
due regard to the circumstances of members.
GATT
49
Guideliness to Art II.6(a) (Approved
by CP)
15 February 1980 (L/4938)
Assume a World with different exchange rate arrangements
. Allow undervalued countries to renegotiate especific tariffs
. CP ask IMF to calculate size of depretiation
. Undervaluation was more than 20%
. Basket of currencies of 85% of imports
. Period of analysis for size of depreciation:
rate of 6 months preciding the request x 6 months
preceding last bound (weighted avarage)
A NEW PROPOSAL
50
- Create a world currency
- Negotiate a fluctuation band
- Solve the conflict bilaterally
Exchange Rate Misalignment Bands
51
4
Normalized PPP - Trade weight world basket
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
United States
Brazil
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
China
France
Germany
India
Italy
Japan
South Korea
Mexico
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Malaysia
+- 2 S.D.
+- 1 S.D.
Jul-12
Apr-11
Jan-10
Oct-08
Jul-07
Apr-06
Jan-05
Oct-03
Jul-02
Apr-01
Jan-00
Oct-98
Jul-97
Apr-96
Jan-95
Oct-93
Jul-92
Apr-91
Jan-90
Oct-88
Jul-87
Apr-86
Jan-85
Oct-83
Jul-82
Apr-81
Jan-80
Oct-78
Jul-77
Apr-76
Jan-75
Oct-73
Jul-72
Apr-71
Jan-70
Oct-68
Jul-67
Apr-66
Jan-65
Oct-63
Jul-62
Apr-61
Jan-60
-4
Brazilian Bilateral Real Exchange Rate Misalignment
80%
60%
% relative to equilibrium
52
Brazil – Bilateral
Misalignments
40%
20%
0%
-20%
-40%
-60%
-80%
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
China
Colombia
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Singapore
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguai
South Africa
Indonesia
Turquia
2012
US – Bilateral Misalignments
53
United States Bilateral Exchange Rate Misalignment
55%
% relative to equilibrium
45%
35%
25%
15%
5%
-5%
-15%
-25%
-35%
-45%
-55%
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Colombia
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Singapore
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguai
South Africa
Indonesia
Turquia
2012
IMF Art. IV
Selected Developed Economies
54
IMF Art. IV
Selected Emerging Economies
55
IMF Art. IV
Selected Poor Economies
56
Conclusions
57
Substantial and persistent exchange rate misalignments affect the
effectiveness of trade instruments negotiated at the WTO. Therefore,
they must be object of WTO regulation
Juridical concept of time x economic concept of time
(time of violation x time for long run equilibrium)
In summary:
The WTO must address the effects of exchange rate misalignments or
misaligned exchange rates will turn the WTO into a juridical and
economic fiction !!!
NOVA QUESTÃO
58
QUEM JULGA AS VIOLAÇÕES DE CAMBIO
?
59
Câmbio e comércio – um antigo
desafio
I am gratified to announce that the Conference at Bretton
Woods has completed successfully the task before it. It
was, as we knew when we began, a difficult task,
involving complicated technical problems. We came here
to work out methods which would do away with the
economic evils – the competitive currency devaluation
and destructive impediments to trade – which preceded
the present war. We have succeeded in that effort.
Henry Morgenthau, Jr., United States Secretary of
the Treasury
President of the Bretton Woods Conference.
60
Bretton Woods e a questão
cambial
O FMI foi criado para garantir a estabilidade
financeira global e evitar o “caos” das
desvalorizações competitivas da década de 1930
Duas preocupações: Balança de pagamentos
(restrições temporárias de capital e comércio) +
câmbio fixo (padrão dólar-ouro – paridades
cambiais)
Os membros deveriam manter taxas de câmbio
em uma banda de 1% do valor definido no Fundo
(Artigo IV original do Acordo do FMI)
61
Bretton Woods e a questão
cambial
Com o fim da regime de paridades fixas (Nixon
Shock), na década de 1970, o Artigo IV foi
modificado para sua atual versão
Não haveria mais um critério objetivo para definir
as obrigações dos membros do Fundo em relação
a suas taxas de câmbio
Os membros poderiam definir se manteriam
câmbios flutuantes ou em paridade com outras
moedas, desde que não as atrelassem ao ouro
Thou shall not manipulate
62
O parâmetro objetivo deu lugar a uma obrigação subjetiva. Os
membros do Fundo não deveriam manipular suas taxas de
câmbio para evitar o ajuste efetivo da balança de pagamentos
nem para conseguir vantagens competitivas desleais sobre
seus pares
Article IV: Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements
Section 1. General obligations of members
Recognizing that the essential purpose of the international monetary
system is to provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of
goods, services, and capital among countries (…) each member shall:
(…)
(iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary
system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment
or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members; (…)
A revolução silenciosa do FMI
63
A obrigação do artigo IV deveria ser fiscalizada por meio do
novo mecanismo de supervisão criado pelo Fundo
FMI rapidamente evolui, tornando-se essencialmente um
garantidor de liquidez para países enfrentando dificuldades
com suas balanças de pagamento
Inclui em suas considerações diversos fatores
macroeconômicos, tolerando e mesmo estimulando
desvalorizações cambiais
FMI é uma organização politizada – dificuldade em identificar
“dolo” e manipuladores
O GATT e a questão cambial
64
Contrário ao que se argumenta, o sistema multilateral
de comércio, desde o GATT preocupa-se com a
questão cambial e seus impactos no comércio
Artigo XV como maior expoente mas não o único
(Artigo II:6, Ad Note ao GATT VI, Currency dumping)
Em especial, o Artigo XV:4 estabelece que:
Contracting parties shall not, by exchange action,
frustrate the intent of the provisions of this Agreement,
nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund
65
O artigo XV e a relação
OMCxFMI
Qual a relação entre o Artigo IV do FMI e o Artigo
XV do GATT?
Qual a diferença entre manipular o câmbio para
conseguir vantagens competitivas desleais e por
ação cambial frustrar os objetivos do comércio?
Qual o papel do FMI em uma eventual disputa na
OMC envolvendo o Artigo XV do GATT?
A resposta a essas questões passa pela análise
de três termos – exchange arrangements;
exchange action; exchange restrictions or controls
66
O artigo XV e a relação
OMCxFMI
A ligação entre o Art. XV do GATT e o Art. IV
do FMI é estabelecida já em seus títulos,
ambos trazendo o termo “exchange
arrangements”
Termo genérico (stricto sensu x lato sensu)
O Artigo XV estabelece diversas obrigações
aos membros e à própria organização sobre a
questão cambial
Obrigação de cooperação
67
Seu §1º traz uma obrigação abrangente de cooperação em
“exchange questions”
1. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall seek co-operation with the
International Monetary Fund to the end that the CONTRACTING
PARTIES and the Fund may pursue a co-ordinated policy with
regard to exchange questions within the jurisdiction of the Fund
and questions of quantitative restrictions and other trade
measures within the jurisdiction of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
Exchange questions X exchange arrangements?
Definição dos campos de atuação:
FMI - exchange questions
WTO quantitative restrictions and other trade measures
Ambos os casos quando estiverem sob sua jurisdição
Obrigação de consulta
68
A 1ª frase de seu §2º traz uma obrigação específica de
consulta
2. In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES are called upon to consider
or deal with problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments
or foreign exchange arrangements, they shall consult fully with the
International Monetary Fund.
Haveria alguma questão envolvendo o Art. XV que não diga
respeito a reservas monetárias, balança de pagamentos ou
arranjos cambiais? Caso exista, não seria obrigatório
consultar (Caso Argentina - Textiles and Apparel, DS56)
Natureza da consulta: Caso India – Quantitative Restrictions
(DS90) - a consulta com base na primeira parte do
parágrafo 2 do Art. XV é uma consulta a expert como
qualquer outra (Art. 13 do DSU – direito do painel de
consultar experts)
Obrigação de aceitar (1)
69
A 1ª parte da 2ª frase do §2º traz a obrigação de aceitar
dados estatísticos
In such consultations, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall accept all
findings of statistical and other facts presented by the Fund
relating to foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balances of
payments
A 2ª parte da 2ª frase do §2º traz a obrigação de aceitar
decisões do FMI relacionadas a sua jurisdição
and shall accept the determination of the Fund as to whether
action by a contracting party in exchange matters is in accordance
with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund
Obrigação de aceitar (2)
70
Ou seja, a prerrogativa do FMI é de dizer se a ação de uma
parte “in exchange matters” está de acordo com o seu
próprio arcabouço jurídico
Justificativa: Personalidade jurídica e ordenamentos jurídicos
distintos - teoria dos (multi)sistemas autônomos de regulação
+ impedir que decisões da OMC contradigam decisões do
FMI (coerência sistêmica)
Finalmente, a 3ª frase do §2º traz obrigação de aceitar
análises específicas
Obrigação de aceitar (3)
71
The CONTRACTING PARTIES in reaching their final decision in cases
involving the criteria set forth in paragraph 2 (a) of Article XII or in
paragraph 9 of Article XVIII, shall accept the determination of the Fund
as to what constitutes a serious decline in the contracting party's
monetary reserves, a very low level of its monetary reserves or a
reasonable rate of increase in its monetary reserves, and as to the
financial aspects of other matters covered in consultation in such
cases.
§2(a) do Art. XII do GATT – restrições para proteger balança
de pagamentos – conceitos de “serious decline in monetary
reserves” e “reasonable rate of increase”
§9 do Art. XVIII – proteção da posição externa de países em
desenvolvimento- conceito de “inadequate monetary
reserves”
Reforçam a interpretação da coerência sistêmica e dados
Demais § do Art. XV do GATT
72
§5º - Obrigação de reportar ao fundo quando “exchange
restrictions on payments and transfers” forem
consideradas contrárias às regras da OMC
§6º - Obrigação dos membros de requererem acessão
ao FMI ou firmar acordo cambial específico com a OMC
§7º - reafirmação do dever de não frustrar o comércio
por ações cambiais no caso de acordos cambiais
específicos
Exceção do Art. XV:9 (1)
73
9. Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude:
(a) the use by a contracting party of exchange controls or exchange
restrictions in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund or with that contracting party's special
exchange agreement with the CONTRACTING PARTIES,
Qual o significado dessa exceção? Apenas ações cambiais
que violem o ordenamento jurídico do FMI violarão o Art XV
do GATT?
Enquanto exceção, o §9º deve ser interpretado
restritivamente.
Importante diferença entre exchange action e exchange
controls e restrictions
Exceção do Art. XV:9 (2)
74
O FMI trata especificamente de exchange controls
referenciando a controle de capital:
Art. VI.1: Requer que membros imponham controles de capital para evitar
uso dos recursos do Fundo
Art. VI. 3: Membros podem controlar capital mas não restringir “payments
for current transactions”.
Art. VIII. 2 (a) : Obrigação dos membros de não restringir “payments and
transfers for current international transactions”
No entanto, há diversas exceções no Acordo do FMI que
permitem controles e restrições. Ex:
Art VI section 3 control of capital transfers, Art VII section 3(b) and
section 4 on control and restriction of exchange operations due to
scarcity of currency; Art VIII section 2(b) on exchange control
cooperation; Art XIV section 2 on exchange restrictions.
São esses controles a que o Art XV:9 faz referência
Exceção do Art. XV:9 (3)
75
Há outros artigos do GATT com exceções e deferências
similares (inclusive “multiple exchange rates”)
Article VII:c on multiple currencies conversion; Ad Note to GATT Article
VIII regarding exchange fees for balance of payment reasons; Article
XIV:1,3 and 5(a) on exceptions to the Rule of Non-discrimination; Ad
Note to Section B of GATT Article XVI on multiple exchange rates
AD NOTE do Art. XV:4 – afirma que “exchange control or
restrictions” que sejam implementadas de acordo com o FMI
não violam o GATT
Nesses casos, como determina o Art. XV:2, é o FMI quem diz
se a parte respeitou o acordo do FMI e por isso não estaria
violando o GATT.
Exceção do Art. XV:9 (4)
76
Controles e restrições cambiais seriam espécies das quais ação cambial
seria o gênero
Caso Rep. Dominicana - Import and Sale of Cigarettes (DS302) – consulta
ao FMI se a medida da Rep. Dominicana estava de acordo com o
ordenamento jurídico do FMI. Resposta:
(I)t does not constitute a multiple currency practice or an exchange restriction notwithstanding
its label (…) the issue of its consistency or inconsistency with the Funds Articles for purpose
of paragraph 8 of the Co-operation Agreement does not arise.
O que mais seriam exchange actions?
Manipulação cambial? Provavelmente frustra o comércio, mas nem toda
frustração advém de uma manipulação
Exchange rate intervention? Discussão corrente no FMI – acumulação de
reservas? Mas também QE?
O que é exchange action?
77
Exchange action X exchange rate action
Ação cambial – controle sobre acesso e conversibilidade de moedas
Ação na taxa de câmbio – intervenção direta ou indireta para afetar a
taxa de câmbio
Tanto o GATT, quanto o acordo do FMI parecem, em
momentos distintos, referir-se a ambos os sentidos.
Ação cambial – Art. XV:1,2,4 e 9 GATT e Art. VI FMI
Ação na taxa de câmbio – Art. XV:4,6 e 7 GATT e Art. IV FMI
O GATS, por sua vez, trata especificamente de ação
cambial (Art. XI – specific commitments, Annex on
Financial Services – “prudential carve out”)
Conclusão
78
OMC determina se uma medida cambial frustra seus
objetivos
Deve consultar com o FMI, aceitar statistical findings e,
no que couber, se a medida respeita as obrigações do
FMI
Outras exchange actions que não exchange restrictions
or control ou multiple currency practices, não precisam
ser analisadas pelo FMI quanto à sua regularidade com
o fundo. Dito de outro modo, mesmo que feitas
respeitando as obrigações do FMI, nada impede que
violem o GATT.
Pergunta: Quais seriam essas outras exchange
actions?