Banco Central e Democracia
Aula 5
Ciencia Politica
CGAE EAESP-FGV
Kurt von Mettenheim
Estrutura da aula
1)
2)
3)
Introdução: banco central e democracia
“Statecrafting Monetary Authority” no Brasil vs ortodoxia
Momentos políticos e oportunidades de evitar crises financeiras
em mercados emergentes.
4) “de uma economia da política para uma ciência política da
construção da autoridade monetária”
Duas anomalias brasileiras:
* BACEN avança depois da estabilidade de preços
* Bancos públicos lideram processo financeiro...
5) Resultados:
a) “depois das tempestades” financeiras Brasil sai bem
b) Brasil no topo da lista (do IIF, Institute for International
Finance) de relacionamento com o mercado e transparência de
informação
Introdução
“You cannot in a democratic society have
an institution which is either fully or
partially disassociated from the electoral
process, and which has the powers that
central banks inherently have.
(Alan Greenspan)
Chapter 6, “On Monetary Authority”
Laurence Whitehead, Democratization.
Oxford University Press, 2002
Pesquisas 
Publicação
Unidade Temática
FAPESP:
A Construção de Autoridade
Monetária no Brasil numa Epóca
de Globalização
Chapter 10 : From the
Economics of Politics to the
Politics of Monetary Policy
Kurt von Mettenheim
The Political Dynamics of Financial Crises in
‘Emerging Market’ Democracies
Laurence Whitehead
Country
Argentina
India
Mexico
Bulgaria
Thailand
South Korea
Venezuela
Russia
Brazil
South Africa
Turkey
Argentina
Brazil
Peak Crisis Year
1989
1991
1995
1996
1997
1997
1998
1998
1999
2001
2001
2001
2002
Nearest Election Dates
May 1989
May/June 1991
August 1994
April 1997
November 1996
November 1997
December 1998
December 1999
October 1998
June 1999
November 2002
October 1999 /April 2003
October 2002
Eight Stage Tree:
Political Opportunities to Avert Crisis
Political Response
Time Line (election=0)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------I
II
Binding
Pre-commitment
⁄
\
Yes
No
Negotiated
Pre-insurance
/
Yes
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
+ 1 to 10 years
+ 3 to 12 months
\
No
Campaign Pact
+ 1 to 4 months
/
\
Yes
No
Market-Friendly
0
Election
/
\
Yes
No
Post Electoral Discipline
- 1 to 4 weeks
/
\
Yes
No
Capitulate to Market
- 1 to 12 weeks
Demands
/
\
Yes
No
International Rescue
- 1 to 4 months
/
\
Yes
No
Financial Crisis
Overshoot
Anytime
Crafting Economic Stabilization:
Political Discretion and Technical Innovation
in the Implementation of the Real Plan
Lourdes Sola & Eduardo Kugelmas
56
51
Fernando Henrique
Lula
Início do Plano Real e do
Impacto Redistributivo
48
46
41
41
36
45
47
23
23
40
37
32
31
29
26
21
54.27
21
27.04
22
17
19
16
abr/94
Fonte: Datafolha/TSE
mai/94
jun/94
jul/94
ago/94
set/94
out/94
Resultado
Rendimento Médio Real
Rendimento Real (base
jul/94)
140
Dez/02
130
120
110
100
90
80
jan/93 jan/94 jan/95 jan/96 jan/97 jan/98 jan/99 jan/00 jan/01 jan/02
Fonte: IBGE-Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego
Trends in Stock of State Debt by Category (R$ Billion)
100
90
80
70
State Banks
60
Bonds
50
Fluctuating
40
External
30
20
Rescheduled
10
0
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Wall Street and Emerging Democracies:
Financial Markets and the Brazilian
Presidential Elections, Javier Santiso
Wall Street Strategists's Recommendations on Brazil Bond Debt 2002
Rating Change
Date
ABNAmro
Neutral from Overweight
May 1st
Goldman Sachs
Neutral from Overweight
May 1st
Santander Investments
Neutral from Overweight
May 3rd
Deutsche Bank
Neutral from Overweight
May 9th
JP Morgan Chase
1st reduction of overweight
2d reduction of overwight
Overweight to marketweight
Moved to Underweight
June 4th
July 1st
July 22th
December 9th
BCP Securities
Sell
August 8th
Morgan Stanley
Downgrade to underperform
August 12th
Salomon Smith Barney
Changes in marcoeconomic forecast
August 20th
UBS Warburg
Increased Overweight
August 30th
Bear Stearns
Cuts to Underweight
September 19th
Merrill Lynch
Moved to Underweight
September 25th
Goldman Sachs
Moved to Underweight
September 27th
Merrill Lynch
Moved back to Marketweight
October 4th 2002
Source: Based on JBIC and Wall Street investment banks reports, 2002.
> 2000 bps EMBI Risk and Default
Countries that Traded North of 2 000 bps
EMBIG Countries which traded above 2 0002 bps spreads and defaulted
Argentina
Russia
Ivory Coast
Ecuador
EMBIG Countries
which traded above 2 0002 bps spreads
and avoided default
Mexico
Venezuela
Bulgaria
Algeria
Nigeria
Pakistan
Ukraine
Brazil
Days Above 2000 bps
before default
38
40
2
163
Days Above 2000 bps
8
94
32
10
308
5
97
35
Default Date
December 2001
October 1998
March 2000
September 1999
Period
March 1995
Spring 95, Aug 98
Summer 94, Spring 95
April 1999
94-95, 2000
September 2000
June 2002, Spring 01
June 2002-October 2002
Source: Own estimations for Brazil; and JP Morgan Chase, Emerging Markets Outlook, August 2, 2002.
View from Wall Street
(April 2003)
Brazil Reform Scorecard in April 2003 According to Merrill Lynch
Reform
Change
Recent Developments
Social Security
Neutral
Presentation 16-17 April
2.5
2.5
5.0
Tax Reform
Neutral
Presentation 16-17 April
2.5
2.5
5.0
Final vote expected by mid April
4.0
1.5
5.5
Already in Congress
3.0
3.0
6.0
2.7
2.5
5.2
Central Bank Autnonomy Positive
Bankrupcy Law
Neutral
Reform Agenda
Compositve Score (2)
Quality Score (1) Progress Score Reform Score
Source: Merrill Lynch, April 2003.
Notes:
(1): The scorecard summarizes the Progress Score, which range a higher score in a scale from 0 to 5 to a reform the closer is
to being approved, and the Quality Score, also evaluated on a sacle from 0 to 5 and with higher points the closer the reform's
current form is to a first best reform.
(2) Reform Agenda Composite Score gives the weighted score of the reforms as per the following weights: social security 50%,
tax 25%, bankrupcy 15%, and Central Bank Autonomy 10%.
View from Wall Street
(December 2003)
Brazil Reform Scorecard in December 2003 According to Merrill Lynch
Reform
Change
Recent Developments
Quality Score
Social Security
Positive
Approved by the Senate 2nd round
3,5
5
8,5
Tax Reform
Positive
Approved by the Sentate 1st round
2
4,8
6,8
Complementary Law expected in 2004
4.0
2
6
3.0
4
7
3,1
4,5
7,6
Central Bank Autnonomy Neutral
Bankrupcy Law
Neutral Approved by Lower House (next Senate)
Reform Agenda
Compositve Score (2)
Source: Merrill Lynch, December 2003.
Progress Score Reform Score
Spread Brazil-Emerging Countries and Electoral Polls bp
1994
45%
520
Vo te r in ten tio n
40% fo r L ula in th e
op in ion po lls
(left)
420
320
35%
220
30%
120
20
25%
03
/0
2 8 1 /9
/0 4
24 1 /9
/0 4
2 2 2 /9
/0 4
18 3 /9
/0 4
13 4 /9
/0 4
09 5/9
/0 4
06 6 /9
/0 4
01 7/9
/0 4
25 8/9
/0 4
2 1 8/9
/0 4
1 8 9 /9
/1 4
1 4 0/9
/1 4
0 9 1 /9
/1 4
2/
94
20%
-80
-180
Spread Brazil-Emerging Countries and Electoral Polls bp.
2002
45%
1400
40%
35%
Voter intention
for Lula in the
opinion polls
(left)
30%
1200
1000
800
600
400
25%
02
/0
18 1/02
/0
05 1/02
/0
21 2/02
/0
11 2/02
/0
3
27 /02
/0
15 3/02
/0
02 4/02
/0
20 5/02
/0
10 5/02
/0
27 6/02
/0
15 6/02
/0
01 7/02
/0
8
19 /02
/0
05 8/02
/0
9/
02
20%
Source: Datafolha, JP Morgan
200
0
Domestic Public De bt Composition
100
Others
Exchange rate indexed
80
60
40
Interest rate indexed
Fixed rate
20
2
20
0
01
20
20
00
9
98
19
9
Source : Banco C entr al do Br azil
19
19
97
6
19
9
19
95
19
94
0
From an Economics of Politics to
the Politics of Monetary Policy in Brazil
2 anomalies
1 = causal direction between price stability and
independent central banking (assumed by
economists and neo-liberal theory) reversed:
advances in central banking in Brazil occurred after
heterodox policies ended inertial inflation during
1993-1994.
2 = after a decade of price stability and financial
liberalisation, the three largest banks in Brazil remain
government owned and run financial institutions.
Fuga de capital, 2001-2002
Bank Assets, US$ billion
Developing Nations
Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------World
Dev. Total Latin Am. Asia
E. Europe Brazil
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2001 I 11 315.5 1 289.9
518.1
388.2
239.3
136.2
II 11 190.9 1 285.6
521.9
375.0
245.9
139.9
III 11 577.2 1 332.4
558.4
375.1
256.0
138.5
IV 11 497.7 1 357.6
562.3
376.6
276.0
142.4
2002 I 11 464.6 1 327.7
528.1
387.7
270.6
134.9
II 12 426.5 1 330.7
487.9
393.6
296.5
123.3
III 12 512.9 1 292.0
449.2
397.8
293.7
105.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Bank for International Settlements, Consolidated Banking Statistics, 2003
Mas o Brasil evita dolarizar...
Domestic Dollarization. 1996
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Bolivia
97.9
Peru
80.5
Hungary*
36.9
Mexico
32.1
Poland
24.1
Chile
14.2
Israel
18.2
Brazil
11.6 (1.5 - 7.4**)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Ize. Alain and Eduardo Levy-Yeyati. 1998
Note: Average dollar deposits/domestic and cross-border deposits
Então têm espaço para:
Políticas Financeiras
PROER, Programa de Reestruturação e Fortalecimento do
Sistema Financeiro (1996);
FGC, Fundo Garantidor de Créditos (1996)
A ampliação do poder de intervenção do Banco Central (Lei
9.447. de 14.3.1997);
PROES, Programa de Incentivo à Redução do Setor Público
Estadual na Atividade Bancária (1996);
PROEF, Programa de Fortalecimento das Instituições
Financeiras Federais (1999);
FGC acalmou clientes bancários
Federal Government Bank Insurance Payments
R$ million Depositors Depositors <20k$
---------------------------------------------------------------------------2001
28.1
8.471
155
2000
5.4
357
205
1999
62.5
7.657
6.480
1998
151.5
35.761
33.428
1997
3.117.4
3.948.696
3.920.794
1996
259.2
146.763
142.941
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Total
3.624.3
4.147.705
4.104.003
PROER liquidou bancos quebrados
Bank Interventions
Buyer
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Banco Econômico
Excel e Caixa EconômicaFederal*
Banco Nacional
Unibanco
Banco Mercantil de Pernb.
Rural
Banco Banorte
Bandeirantes
Banco Bamerindus
HSBC. Caixa** Banco do Brasil (BB)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Departamento de Operações
Bancárias
(1) Julho/1994 a maio/1997
(2) Apenas a carteira imobiliária.
E evitou custo maior de crise
bancária
Fiscal Cost of Banking Crisis. percent GDP
Year of Crisis
Country
Estimated Cost
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1982
Argentina
13.0
1985
Chile
19.6
1985
Colombia
6.0
1994
Venezuela
13.0
1991-93
Finland
8.2
1988-92
Norway
4.5
1991-93
Sweden
4.5
1991
United States
5.1
1995-97
Brazil
0.9
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Rojas-Suarez. Liliana e Weisbrod. Steven R. Banking Crises in Latin America:
Experience and Issues. IADB (1995) and Brazilian Central Bank similar estimate
“Recentralização”= PROES:
O Programa de Incentivo à Redução do Setor Público
Estadual na Atividade Bancária (Proes).
Medida Provisória 1.514. de 7.8.1996.
Banacre, Banco do Estado do Acre S.A.
Banap, Banco do Estado do Amapá S.A.
Bandern, Banco do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte S.A.
BDRN, Banco de Desenvolvimento do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte S.A.
Bemat, Banco do Estado do Mato Grosso S.A
Beron, Banco do Estado de Rondônia S.A.
Minascaixa, Caixa Econômica do Estado de Minas Gerais
Produban, Banco do Estado de Alagoas S.A.
Baner Banco do Estado de Roraima S.A. (liquidated)
Bandepe, Banco do Estado de Pernambuco S.A.
Baneb, Bancoc do Estado de Bahia S.A.
Banerj, Banco do Estado de Rio de Janeiro S.A.
Banestado, Banco do Estado de Paraná S.A.
Bemge, Banco do Estado de Minas Gerais, S.A.
Credireal Banco de Crédito Real de Minas Gerais S.A.
Paraiban Banco do Estado da Paraíba S.A
Banespa, Banco do Estado de São Paulo S.A.
BEA, Banco do Estado de Amazonas S.A.
BEC, Banco do Estado de Ceará S.A.
BEG, Banco do Estado de Goiás S.A.
BEM, Banco do Estado de Maranhão S.A.
BEP, Banco do Estado de Piaui S.A.
BESC, Banco do Estado de Santa Catarina S.A.
Anomalia: BACEN avança depois da
estabilidade de preços, 1994+
BCB antes de 1994 =
atender a demandas para acompanhar o
cumprimento das medidas estabelecidas pelos
diversos planos econômicos
(Plano Cruzado. Plano Bresser. Plano Verão. Plano
Collor Ie Plano Collor II).
• deficiências na estrutura operacional.
• decorrentes da falta de equipamentos de
informática.
• de equipes devidamente treinadas
BACEN medidas
Core Principles for Effective Bank
Supervision, setembro de 1997.
• Regras de prudência bancária
• Limites mínimos de capital para a
constituição de instituições financeiras.
• Limites adicionais de acordo com o grau
de risco da estrutura dos ativos
• Índice de Basileia, 8, BCB 1999 = 11
BACEN medidas cont.
• Inspeção Global Consolidada (IGC).
• A Central de Risco de Crédito. 22.5.1997. = banco de
dados com base em informações prestadas pelas
instituições financeiras sobre obrigações
• E de seus clientes de valores atualmente superiores a R$
5.000.00.
• Rating Resolução 2.12.1999. cada instituição financeira
passou a informar a classificação de cada operação de
crédito. numa lista de 9 níveis de risco. que vai de AA
(melhor classificação) até H (pior classificação).
• SBP = 2002 online realtime balance supervision
Multas aplicadas a bancos pelo Banco Central do Brasil
Bank Fines
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------336 1.288 767 363 353 154 626 991 651*9m
Consultas de bancos ao Centro de Risco do Banco Central do
Brasil
1/2001
2/2001
1/2002
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Risk Centre Use
874.706
1.480.486 4.965.589
Risk Centre Consultation
1.337
7.524
24.663
Estrutura do Banco Central
Workforce
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Decad
82
75
71
55
Decif
163 217 212 208
Defin
128
Defis(2)
1.198 1.095 1.144 827 809 672 Depad(3)
76
70
68
58
109 6
Desin
111 100 97
Desup
601 562 528
Difis
4
3
3
4
4
5
4
3
4
Supervision Total 1.360 1.243 1.286 944 922 846 933 877 965
Central Bank Total 6.401 6.130 5.849 4.733 4.811 4.437 4.650 4.571 4.693
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source:
(2) - Entre 1994 e 1999 inclui as divisões ou núcleos regionais de fiscalização.
(3) - Em 1998 inclui uma divisão regional de processos administrativos.
Nomes...
• Decad, Departamento de Cadastro e
Informações
• Decif, Departamento de Combate Ilícitos
Cambiais e Financeiros
• Defin Departamento de Gestão de Informações
do Sistema Financeiro
• Defis Departamento de Fiscalização
• Depad Departamento de Controle de Processos
• Desin Departamento de Supervisão Indireta
• Desup Departamento de Supervisão Direta
• Difis Diretoria de Fiscalização
Longo caminho...
Credit to Private Sector (% GDP)
1 Simple average of country data. 2 Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 3 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and
Venezuela. Moving average of current and previous year private credit levels to current year GDP.
After the Financial Storms:
BOVESPA Interest Rate Futures Market,
1996-2007
Russia
Asia 

Brazil
9-11
 Lula
Progress in Brazil 2004-2007
Inflation Expectations &
1) Credit % GDP
2) Average Loan Term (days)
Bank Spreads Very High but
Falling
Consumer
Corporate
“Cohabitation” Bank Credit and Stock
Market Growth: IPOs 2000-2006
Resultados, II
IIF
Investor
Relations
Ranking
Data Dissemination Practices
1) Central Government Operations (CGO). Timeliness: 1 month after the end of the
reference period, Periodicity: Monthly MGFS 1986: Identifies countries that use
classification of fiscal statistics according to the IMF's A Manual of Government
Finance Statistic 1986 (MGFS 1986) MGFS 2001: Identifies if government accounting
follows the definicion and classification of the IMF's Government Finance Statistics
Manual, 2001 (MGFS 2001).
2) Central Government Debt (CGD). Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the
reference period Periodicity: Quarterly
3) Amortization Schedule for CGD. Preferably, dissemination of government debt
service presented at least annually for a period of at least five years from the
effective date of the debt data. It is desirable that the annual data should be
supplemented with quarterly data at least for the year immediately ahead.
Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference periodPeriodicity: Quarterly
4) External Debt. Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference period
Periodicity: Quarterly
5) Amortization Schedule for External Debt. It is important that data cover both
public and private sector debt. Preferably, amortization payments presented at least
annually for a period of at least five years from the effective date of the debt data. It
is desirable that the annual data should be supplemented with quarterly data at least
for the year immediately ahead. Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference
period Periodicity: Quarterly
March 8, 2007
IIF Report on Central Bank of Brazil
The investor relations office, Gerin, at the Central Bank of Brazil has enhanced the
content of its website to make information important to investors more easily
accessible.
With these improvements, Gerin has become the first individual office to score 38 out of
38 in prioritized terms. Brazil has been a market leader in investor relations practices
for many years. In 2006, Brazil became the first sovereign to score 38 out of 38 in
prioritized terms.
Brazil operates two investor relations programs. Gerin is operated by the Central Bank of
Brazil (BCB) and a second National Treasury Investor Relations Unit (IRU) is operated
by the Debt Management Office at the National Treasury. The existence of the two
offices has evolved out of organizational changes.
BEST = Brazil: Excellence in Securities Transactions (BEST Brazil) activities. The BEST
Brazil initiative is aimed at promoting the Brazilian capital markets to the international
investor community involving various official agencies including, in addition to the
Treasury and the BCB, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil.
With the inclusion of links to regulatory information, archives, and information regarding
roadshows, Gerin now satisfies three additional criteria for a total of 20. The
prioritized score moved from a total of 34 to a score of 38. Gerin has surpassed
global leaders Korea, Mexico, and the Philippines.
Financial Roads to Social Economies
Public Banking, Monetary Authority
and Social Inclusion
Kurt Mettenheim
Maria Fernanda Freire de Lima
Paper to be presented to the
Society for the Advancement of Social Economics 23rd Meeting,
Transformations of Contemporary Capitalism: Actors, Institutions, Processes.
Research Network N, “Finance and Society”
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 24 June 2011
Arguments
Recent developments in central banking and public banking  possible to radically increase
the pace of financial and social inclusion.
Financial liberalization and bank modernization have led to the realization of competitive
advantages by large public banks.
Citizenship (ATM) cards = innovation to alleviate poverty, promote social inclusion and
increase access to banking.
Basic income policies / Conceptions of citizenship & social justice = alternative model to
microfinance via “entrepreneurship, financial markets and private banks.”
New policies for inclusion of bankless vast majorities in large emerging countries suggest
that views of fiscal dominance, structural constraints to change and zero-sum relations
between central banking, politics and social inclusion need revision.
From the Macroeconomics of Populism
to the Microeconomics of Social Inclusion
“Most economists would agree that, at least in the short run, monetary policy can
significantly influence the course of the real economy”
Bernanke & Gertler “Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy
Transmission.” p. 27
We ask: Can it accelerate social inclusion? (yes)
Past Keynesian and Development
Policies Increase Aggregate Demand.
New Microeconomic Banking
Policies Increase Aggregate Supply
Lifetime Asset Curve IF
>IR + Inequality
Can we wait for financial inclusion
until 2030?
4 scenarios for banking the bankless
Core Principles for Alternative Banking
and Social Inclusion
Core Principles for Alternative Banking
and Social Inclusion, cont.
Supporters & Networks
Institutional Supporters
• Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, New York
• Institute for Money, Technology and Financial Inclusion, UC, Irvine
• King´s College Department of Management, London
• São Paulo Business School, Getulio Vargas Foundation
• Second University of Naples
Networks
• Association of Emerging Market Business Schools, São Paulo Brazil
• Community of European Management Schools, Brussels
• Critical Political Economy Network
• European Association of Co-operative Banks, Brussels
• Global Public Policy Network, London
• International Cooperative Banking Association, Brussels
• Social Science Finance Network, Amsterdam
• Society for Advancement of Social Economics, Philadelphia
• World Savings Bank Institute, Brussels
Desafio: Just do it,
Ciência Política
1) Forma grupos de até 5 pessoas
2) Desenvolve um plano de bancarizar a
populacão brasileira
3) Entrega um plano escrito.