Banco Central e Democracia Aula 5 Ciencia Politica CGAE EAESP-FGV Kurt von Mettenheim Estrutura da aula 1) 2) 3) Introdução “A Construção de Autoridade Monetária” vs ortodoxia (pré-crise!) Momentos políticos e oportunidades de evitar crises financeiras em mercados emergentes. 4) “de uma economia da política para uma ciência política da construção da autoridade monetária” Duas anomalias brasileiras: * BACEN avança depois da estabilidade de preços * Bancos públicos lideram processo financeiro... 5) Resultados: a) “depois das tempestades” financeiras Brasil sai bem b) Brasil no topo da lista (do IIF, Institute for International Finance) de relacionamento com o mercado e transparência de informação 6) Dá para acelerar a inclusão bancária? Introdução Poder de bancos centrais vão contra a democracia… “You cannot in a democratic society have an institution which is either fully or partially disassociated from the electoral process, and which has the powers that central banks inherently have. “ (Alan Greenspan) Chapter 6, “On Monetary Authority” Laurence Whitehead, Democratization. Oxford University Press, 2002 Do pensamento ortodoxo para o pensamento crítico para o novo pensamento sobre autoridade monetária e inclusão social. Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence (Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H. Summers Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25:2, 1993: 151-62. (1436 citações) Banco Central e Crise Metas de Inflação + Controle Fiscal + Independência do Banco Central = ------------------------------------------Estabilidade... (até 2007-8) E, na crise : Regra de Bagehot (Lombard Street, 1873): Empresta muito aos bancos (mas com juros altos...) (Escândalo de LIBOR....) US Government Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcicreports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf O Banco Central Novo: Dá tudo aos bancos! Mercado administra risco? Balanço de Bank of England % PIB Novas Regras? Dodd Frank http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dodd%E2%80%93Frank_Wall _Street_Reform_and_Consumer_Protection_Act US Financial Stability Oversight Council http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/default.aspx UK Independent Commission on Banking http://bankingcommission.independent.gov.uk/ Pesquisas Publicação Unidade Temática FAPESP: A Construção de Autoridade Monetária no Brasil numa Epóca de Globalização Chapter 10 : From the Economics of Politics to the Politics of Monetary Policy Kurt von Mettenheim The Political Dynamics of Financial Crises in ‘Emerging Market’ Democracies Laurence Whitehead Country Argentina India Mexico Bulgaria Thailand South Korea Venezuela Russia Brazil South Africa Turkey Argentina Brazil Peak Crisis Year 1989 1991 1995 1996 1997 1997 1998 1998 1999 2001 2001 2001 2002 Nearest Election Dates May 1989 May/June 1991 August 1994 April 1997 November 1996 November 1997 December 1998 December 1999 October 1998 June 1999 November 2002 October 1999 /April 2003 October 2002 Eight Stage Tree: Political Opportunities to Avert Crisis Political Response Time Line (election=0) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------I II Binding Pre-commitment ⁄ \ Yes No Negotiated Pre-insurance / Yes III IV V VI VII VIII + 1 to 10 years + 3 to 12 months \ No Campaign Pact + 1 to 4 months / \ Yes No Market-Friendly 0 Election / \ Yes No Post Electoral Discipline - 1 to 4 weeks / \ Yes No Capitulate to Market - 1 to 12 weeks Demands / \ Yes No International Rescue - 1 to 4 months / \ Yes No Financial Crisis Overshoot Anytime Crafting Economic Stabilization: Political Discretion and Technical Innovation in the Implementation of the Real Plan Lourdes Sola & Eduardo Kugelmas 56 51 Fernando Henrique Lula Início do Plano Real e do Impacto Redistributivo 48 46 41 41 36 45 47 23 23 40 37 32 31 29 26 21 54.27 21 27.04 22 17 19 16 abr/94 Fonte: Datafolha/TSE mai/94 jun/94 jul/94 ago/94 set/94 out/94 Resultado Rendimento Médio Real Rendimento Real (base jul/94) 140 Dez/02 130 120 110 100 90 80 jan/93 jan/94 jan/95 jan/96 jan/97 jan/98 jan/99 jan/00 jan/01 jan/02 Fonte: IBGE-Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego Trends in Stock of State Debt by Category (R$ Billion) 100 90 80 70 State Banks 60 Bonds 50 Fluctuating 40 External 30 20 Rescheduled 10 0 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Wall Street and Emerging Democracies: Financial Markets and the Brazilian Presidential Elections, Javier Santiso Wall Street Strategists's Recommendations on Brazil Bond Debt 2002 Rating Change Date ABNAmro Neutral from Overweight May 1st Goldman Sachs Neutral from Overweight May 1st Santander Investments Neutral from Overweight May 3rd Deutsche Bank Neutral from Overweight May 9th JP Morgan Chase 1st reduction of overweight 2d reduction of overwight Overweight to marketweight Moved to Underweight June 4th July 1st July 22th December 9th BCP Securities Sell August 8th Morgan Stanley Downgrade to underperform August 12th Salomon Smith Barney Changes in marcoeconomic forecast August 20th UBS Warburg Increased Overweight August 30th Bear Stearns Cuts to Underweight September 19th Merrill Lynch Moved to Underweight September 25th Goldman Sachs Moved to Underweight September 27th Merrill Lynch Moved back to Marketweight October 4th 2002 Source: Based on JBIC and Wall Street investment banks reports, 2002. > 2000 bps EMBI Risk and Default Countries that Traded North of 2 000 bps EMBIG Countries which traded above 2 0002 bps spreads and defaulted Argentina Russia Ivory Coast Ecuador EMBIG Countries which traded above 2 0002 bps spreads and avoided default Mexico Venezuela Bulgaria Algeria Nigeria Pakistan Ukraine Brazil Days Above 2000 bps before default 38 40 2 163 Days Above 2000 bps 8 94 32 10 308 5 97 35 Default Date December 2001 October 1998 March 2000 September 1999 Period March 1995 Spring 95, Aug 98 Summer 94, Spring 95 April 1999 94-95, 2000 September 2000 June 2002, Spring 01 June 2002-October 2002 Source: Own estimations for Brazil; and JP Morgan Chase, Emerging Markets Outlook, August 2, 2002. Spread Brazil-Emerging Countries and Electoral Polls bp. 2002 45% 1400 40% 35% Voter intention for Lula in the opinion polls (left) 30% 1200 1000 800 600 400 25% 02 /0 18 1/02 /0 05 1/02 /0 21 2/02 /0 11 2/02 /0 3 27 /02 /0 15 3/02 /0 02 4/02 /0 20 5/02 /0 10 5/02 /0 27 6/02 /0 15 6/02 /0 01 7/02 /0 8 19 /02 /0 05 8/02 /0 9/ 02 20% Source: Datafolha, JP Morgan 200 0 Domestic Public De bt Composition 100 Others Exchange rate indexed 80 60 40 Interest rate indexed Fixed rate 20 2 20 0 01 20 20 00 9 98 19 9 Source : Banco C entr al do Br azil 19 19 97 6 19 9 19 95 19 94 0 From an Economics of Politics to the Politics of Monetary Policy in Brazil 2 anomalias no Brasil: 1 = a relação entre estabilidade de preços e independência do BACEN é invertido: Avanços no BACEN occorem depois de políticas hetorodoxos acabam com a inflação inercial (1994) 2 = 15 anos depois do Plano Real e abrir o mercado bancário, bancos federais mantêm 40% do mercado... Fuga de capital, 2001-2002 Bank Assets, US$ billion Developing Nations Total --------------------------------------------------------------------------------World Dev. Total Latin Am. Asia E. Europe Brazil ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2001 I 11 315.5 1 289.9 518.1 388.2 239.3 136.2 II 11 190.9 1 285.6 521.9 375.0 245.9 139.9 III 11 577.2 1 332.4 558.4 375.1 256.0 138.5 IV 11 497.7 1 357.6 562.3 376.6 276.0 142.4 2002 I 11 464.6 1 327.7 528.1 387.7 270.6 134.9 II 12 426.5 1 330.7 487.9 393.6 296.5 123.3 III 12 512.9 1 292.0 449.2 397.8 293.7 105.1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Bank for International Settlements, Consolidated Banking Statistics, 2003 Mas o Brasil evita dolarizar... Domestic Dollarization. 1996 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Bolivia 97.9 Peru 80.5 Hungary* 36.9 Mexico 32.1 Poland 24.1 Chile 14.2 Israel 18.2 Brazil 11.6 (1.5 - 7.4**) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Ize. Alain and Eduardo Levy-Yeyati. 1998 Note: Average dollar deposits/domestic and cross-border deposits Então têm espaço para: Políticas Financeiras PROER, Programa de Reestruturação e Fortalecimento do Sistema Financeiro (1996); FGC, Fundo Garantidor de Créditos (1996) A ampliação do poder de intervenção do Banco Central (Lei 9.447. de 14.3.1997); PROES, Programa de Incentivo à Redução do Setor Público Estadual na Atividade Bancária (1996); PROEF, Programa de Fortalecimento das Instituições Financeiras Federais (1999); FGC acalmou clientes bancários Federal Government Bank Insurance Payments R$ million Depositors Depositors <20k$ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------2001 28.1 8.471 155 2000 5.4 357 205 1999 62.5 7.657 6.480 1998 151.5 35.761 33.428 1997 3.117.4 3.948.696 3.920.794 1996 259.2 146.763 142.941 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 3.624.3 4.147.705 4.104.003 PROER liquidou bancos quebrados Bank Interventions Buyer ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Banco Econômico Excel e Caixa EconômicaFederal* Banco Nacional Unibanco Banco Mercantil de Pernb. Rural Banco Banorte Bandeirantes Banco Bamerindus HSBC. Caixa** Banco do Brasil (BB) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Departamento de Operações Bancárias (1) Julho/1994 a maio/1997 (2) Apenas a carteira imobiliária. E evitou custo maior de crise bancária Fiscal Cost of Banking Crisis. percent GDP Year of Crisis Country Estimated Cost --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1982 Argentina 13.0 1985 Chile 19.6 1985 Colombia 6.0 1994 Venezuela 13.0 1991-93 Finland 8.2 1988-92 Norway 4.5 1991-93 Sweden 4.5 1991 United States 5.1 1995-97 Brazil 0.9 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Rojas-Suarez. Liliana e Weisbrod. Steven R. Banking Crises in Latin America: Experience and Issues. IADB (1995) and Brazilian Central Bank similar estimate “Recentralização”= PROES: O Programa de Incentivo à Redução do Setor Público Estadual na Atividade Bancária (Proes). Medida Provisória 1.514. de 7.8.1996. Banacre, Banco do Estado do Acre S.A. Banap, Banco do Estado do Amapá S.A. Bandern, Banco do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte S.A. BDRN, Banco de Desenvolvimento do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte S.A. Bemat, Banco do Estado do Mato Grosso S.A Beron, Banco do Estado de Rondônia S.A. Minascaixa, Caixa Econômica do Estado de Minas Gerais Produban, Banco do Estado de Alagoas S.A. Baner Banco do Estado de Roraima S.A. (liquidated) Bandepe, Banco do Estado de Pernambuco S.A. Baneb, Bancoc do Estado de Bahia S.A. Banerj, Banco do Estado de Rio de Janeiro S.A. Banestado, Banco do Estado de Paraná S.A. Bemge, Banco do Estado de Minas Gerais, S.A. Credireal Banco de Crédito Real de Minas Gerais S.A. Paraiban Banco do Estado da Paraíba S.A Banespa, Banco do Estado de São Paulo S.A. BEA, Banco do Estado de Amazonas S.A. BEC, Banco do Estado de Ceará S.A. BEG, Banco do Estado de Goiás S.A. BEM, Banco do Estado de Maranhão S.A. BEP, Banco do Estado de Piaui S.A. BESC, Banco do Estado de Santa Catarina S.A. Anomalia: BACEN avança depois da estabilidade de preços, 1994+ BCB antes de 1994 = atender a demandas para acompanhar o cumprimento das medidas estabelecidas pelos diversos planos econômicos (Plano Cruzado. Plano Bresser. Plano Verão. Plano Collor Ie Plano Collor II). • deficiências na estrutura operacional. • decorrentes da falta de equipamentos de informática. • de equipes devidamente treinadas BACEN medidas Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision, setembro de 1997. • Regras de prudência bancária • Limites mínimos de capital para a constituição de instituições financeiras. • Limites adicionais de acordo com o grau de risco da estrutura dos ativos • Índice de Basileia, 8, BCB 1999 = 11 BACEN medidas cont. • Inspeção Global Consolidada (IGC). • A Central de Risco de Crédito. 22.5.1997. = banco de dados com base em informações prestadas pelas instituições financeiras sobre obrigações • E de seus clientes de valores atualmente superiores a R$ 5.000.00. • Rating Resolução 2.12.1999. cada instituição financeira passou a informar a classificação de cada operação de crédito. numa lista de 9 níveis de risco. que vai de AA (melhor classificação) até H (pior classificação). • SBP = 2002 online realtime balance supervision Multas aplicadas a bancos pelo Banco Central do Brasil Bank Fines 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------336 1.288 767 363 353 154 626 991 651*9m Consultas de bancos ao Centro de Risco do Banco Central do Brasil 1/2001 2/2001 1/2002 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Risk Centre Use 874.706 1.480.486 4.965.589 Risk Centre Consultation 1.337 7.524 24.663 Estrutura do Banco Central Workforce 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Decad 82 75 71 55 Decif 163 217 212 208 Defin 128 Defis(2) 1.198 1.095 1.144 827 809 672 Depad(3) 76 70 68 58 109 6 Desin 111 100 97 Desup 601 562 528 Difis 4 3 3 4 4 5 4 3 4 Supervision Total 1.360 1.243 1.286 944 922 846 933 877 965 Central Bank Total 6.401 6.130 5.849 4.733 4.811 4.437 4.650 4.571 4.693 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: (2) - Entre 1994 e 1999 inclui as divisões ou núcleos regionais de fiscalização. (3) - Em 1998 inclui uma divisão regional de processos administrativos. Nomes... • Decad, Departamento de Cadastro e Informações • Decif, Departamento de Combate Ilícitos Cambiais e Financeiros • Defin Departamento de Gestão de Informações do Sistema Financeiro • Defis Departamento de Fiscalização • Depad Departamento de Controle de Processos • Desin Departamento de Supervisão Indireta • Desup Departamento de Supervisão Direta • Difis Diretoria de Fiscalização Longo caminho... Crédito para o setor privado, % PIB) 1 Simple average of country data. 2 Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 3 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Moving average of current and previous year private credit levels to current year GDP. Depois das tempestades financeiras: BOVESPA , Mercado Futuro de Swap de Taxa de Juros, 360 dias, 1996-2007 Russia Asia Brazil 9-11 Lula Progresso 2004-2007 Expectativa de Inflação e 1) Crédito como % PIB 2) Prazo médio de emprestimos, dias Spread Bancário campeão do mundo, mas caindo Consumer Corporate “Cohabitação” Crédito de bancos e Mercado: IPOs 2000-2006 Resultados, II IIF Investor Relations Ranking Data Dissemination Practices 1) Central Government Operations (CGO). Timeliness: 1 month after the end of the reference period, Periodicity: Monthly MGFS 1986: Identifies countries that use classification of fiscal statistics according to the IMF's A Manual of Government Finance Statistic 1986 (MGFS 1986) MGFS 2001: Identifies if government accounting follows the definicion and classification of the IMF's Government Finance Statistics Manual, 2001 (MGFS 2001). 2) Central Government Debt (CGD). Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference period Periodicity: Quarterly 3) Amortization Schedule for CGD. Preferably, dissemination of government debt service presented at least annually for a period of at least five years from the effective date of the debt data. It is desirable that the annual data should be supplemented with quarterly data at least for the year immediately ahead. Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference periodPeriodicity: Quarterly 4) External Debt. Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference period Periodicity: Quarterly 5) Amortization Schedule for External Debt. It is important that data cover both public and private sector debt. Preferably, amortization payments presented at least annually for a period of at least five years from the effective date of the debt data. It is desirable that the annual data should be supplemented with quarterly data at least for the year immediately ahead. Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference period Periodicity: Quarterly March 8, 2007 IIF Report on Central Bank of Brazil The investor relations office, Gerin, at the Central Bank of Brazil has enhanced the content of its website to make information important to investors more easily accessible. With these improvements, Gerin has become the first individual office to score 38 out of 38 in prioritized terms. Brazil has been a market leader in investor relations practices for many years. In 2006, Brazil became the first sovereign to score 38 out of 38 in prioritized terms. Brazil operates two investor relations programs. Gerin is operated by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) and a second National Treasury Investor Relations Unit (IRU) is operated by the Debt Management Office at the National Treasury. The existence of the two offices has evolved out of organizational changes. BEST = Brazil: Excellence in Securities Transactions (BEST Brazil) activities. The BEST Brazil initiative is aimed at promoting the Brazilian capital markets to the international investor community involving various official agencies including, in addition to the Treasury and the BCB, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil. With the inclusion of links to regulatory information, archives, and information regarding roadshows, Gerin now satisfies three additional criteria for a total of 20. The prioritized score moved from a total of 34 to a score of 38. Gerin has surpassed global leaders Korea, Mexico, and the Philippines. Financial Roads to Social Economies Public Banking, Monetary Authority and Social Inclusion Kurt Mettenheim Maria Fernanda Freire de Lima Paper to be presented to the Society for the Advancement of Social Economics 23rd Meeting, Transformations of Contemporary Capitalism: Actors, Institutions, Processes. Research Network N, “Finance and Society” Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 24 June 2011 Arguments Recent developments in central banking and public banking possible to radically increase the pace of financial and social inclusion. Financial liberalization and bank modernization have led to the realization of competitive advantages by large public banks. Citizenship (ATM) cards = innovation to alleviate poverty, promote social inclusion and increase access to banking. Basic income policies / conceptions of citizenship & social justice = alternative model to microfinance via “entrepreneurship, financial markets and private banks.” New policies for inclusion of bankless vast majorities in large emerging countries suggest that views of fiscal dominance, structural constraints to change and zero-sum relations between central banking, politics and social inclusion need revision. From the Macroeconomics of Populism to the Microeconomics of Social Inclusion “Most economists would agree that, at least in the short run, monetary policy can significantly influence the course of the real economy” Bernanke & Gertler “Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission.” p. 27 We ask: Can it accelerate social inclusion? (yes) Past Keynesian and Development Policies Increase Aggregate Demand. New Microeconomic Banking Policies Increase Aggregate Supply Lifetime Asset Curve IF >IR + Inequality 4 scenarios for banking the bankless Core Principles for Alternative Banking and Social Inclusion Core Principles for Alternative Banking and Social Inclusion, cont. Supporters & Networks Institutional Supporters • Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, New York • Institute for Money, Technology and Financial Inclusion, UC, Irvine • King´s College Department of Management, London • São Paulo Business School, Getulio Vargas Foundation • Second University of Naples Networks • Association of Emerging Market Business Schools, São Paulo Brazil • Community of European Management Schools, Brussels • Critical Political Economy Network • European Association of Co-operative Banks, Brussels • Global Public Policy Network, London • International Cooperative Banking Association, Brussels • Social Science Finance Network, Amsterdam • Society for Advancement of Social Economics, Philadelphia • World Savings Bank Institute, Brussels Desafio: Just do it, Ciência Política 1) Forma grupos de até 5 pessoas 2) Desenvolve um plano para ‘bancarizar’ a populacão brasileira OU melhorar a gestão de um banco central 3) Entregue um plano escrito.