Bulletin of Portuguese - Japanese Studies
ISSN: 0874-8438
[email protected]
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Portugal
Mihoko, Oka
A great merchant in Nagasaki in 17th century. Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência
Bulletin of Portuguese - Japanese Studies, núm. 2, june, 2001, pp. 37-56
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Lisboa, Portugal
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BPJS, 2001, 2, 37 - 56
A GREAT MERCHANT IN NAGASAKI
IN 17TH CENTURY
Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência
Oka Mihoko
Research Fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science,
Kyoto University
Introduction
In the last few decades, many articles have been devoted to the study of
the Nagasaki merchants and their relationship with ports all over the world.
But only few attempts1 have so far been made for other commercial cities in
Japan involved in overseas trade, for example Sakai and especially Hakata.
Hakata is located on the northern top of Kyûshû Island and flourished as an
important port for overseas trade with China and Korea from ancient times.
In the Middle Ages, a group known as Nengyôji, consisting of some elected
citizen including great merchants, had an autonomous power in town politics.
In other words, Hakata had been “the city of commerce” in Japan.
However, in the missionary documents and letters of 16th century and
th
17 century, the name of Hakata or Facata do not appear as frequently as
Nagasaki or Nangasaque, as they were often written then. The first reason is
that Hakata did not accept Christianity as much as Nagasaki2, and fewer
Christians were living there than in other parts of Kyûshû. However, as merchants, people in Hakata must have been interested in the communication with
people who were coming from Europe because they knew that it bore a large
amount of money. In order to understand the way the merchants in Hakata
involved themselves trade with the Portuguese, it is worth examing the life of
a merchant in Nagasaki, Suetsugu Heizô, and his strategy of management.
1 See, for example, Okamoto Yoshitomo, Nichiô Kôtsushi no Kenkyû (Tokyo, Hara Shobô, 1974),
João Paulo Oliveira e Costa, Hino Hiroshi (trans.), Portugal to Nippon – Nanban no Seiki – (Lisbon,
INCM, 1993).
2 See Takeno Yôko, Hakata no Gôshô (Fukuoka, Ashi Shobô, 1980), pp. 48 – 49.
38
Oka Mihoko
The story of Suetsugu Heizô is one of personal politics in 17 th century
Japan. Heizô II served as the governor of Nagasaki and was directly involved
in mediating trade between Japan and the Portuguese. He capitalized on is
position in politics to improve his financial wealth, proving himself to be a
shrewd businessman. His personal motives were clear when he switched allegiances to the Dutch when the economic system of loans to the Portuguese collapsed under the weight of respondência or high interests on loans.
In spite of the perception of 17th century Japan as a state controlled
country, individuals involved in economics and politics still had power to
nudge events in their favor. The impact of specific personalities in the history
of Japanese foreign trading partners becomes clear. After exploring Heizô II’s
identity and rise to power, I will introduce the concept of respondência or high
interest loans. Following this, I will explore Heizô II’s investments in Macao
as well as the devasting effect the respondência eventually enacted in foreign
trade between Japan, Portugal, China and Netherlands, I will provide a picture of Heizô immediate involvement in the affairs of the time and the personal gains from this.
1. The identity of Heizô II
The name of Suetsugu Heizô is known rather as that of the Nagasaki
governor (Daikan3) than that of a great merchant. I should emphasize from
the beginning that the name “Heizô Suetsugu” is attributed to four men,
Suetsugu Heizô Masanao (I), Suetsugu or Shigefusa Heizô Shigesada (II),
Suetsugu or Shigesada Heizô Shigefusa (III), and Suetsugu Heizô Shigetomo
(IV). That is, “Suetsugu Heizô” stands for four governors in Nagasaki who
were direct descents and this name was taken by them as a hereditary one.
Heizô Masanao is known as the usurper of the position of the Nagasaki
Daikan from António Tôan (Murayama Tôan4) who was a Christian. Heizô
Masanao himself was also a Christian having the baptismal name João5, but
he re-converted to buddhism around 1620 and became a persecutor of
Christianity which he lead in Nagasaki. Though he abandoned his interests in
Christianity he kept intense contacts with Portuguese merchants. Heizô I had
3 Toyotomi Hideyoshi setted this position in 1588, Murayama Tôan was appointed the first as non
samurai. The Bakufu followed this system, and the main role was levying land tax.
4 He seemed to be a clerk in the house of Suetsugu Kôzen (Masanao’s father). After his independence,
he made a fortune in Nagasaki and was appointed to Nagasaki Daikan. For further details of the dispute between Tôan and Heizô II, see C. R. Boxer, The Christian Century in Japan, 1549 – 1650
(Manchester, Carcanet Press, 1993, first printed 1951), pp. 333 – 334.
5 On this subject, seem RAM, 9 – 2679, f. 27.
Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência
39
great influence on this trade and his wealth might have been decisive for a
smooth ongoing of the commerce between Macao and Nagasaki. He had a
strong relationship with Hakata because his father, Suetsugu Kôzen, was from
Hakata and Heizô I’s brother Suetsugu Sôtoku was one of the most influential
merchants in this city. Without this background, he would not have been
successful in Nagasaki.
After Heizô I died in 1630, his son succeeded the heritage and started to
employ his power in the management of trade. However, when researchers
tried to analyze the activities of Heizô II, they were confronted with the problem, “who would be this Heizô II”. The reason why it is so important to
make the figure of Heizô II identified is that he worked in the MacaoNagasaki trade as one of the most important persons. In several local and
historical descriptions, such as Nagasaki Zushi6 and Nagasaki Nenpyô
Furoku Jûi7, Heizô II appears as Shigefusa8. However, Kawashima Motojirô9
has revealed that according to the record (kakochô) of Shuntokuji Temple10
Heizô II must have been Shigesada. Kawashima’s research can be summarized
in the following way. (1) The post mortem name characters of Shigesada (okurina) were carved into the bell of Shuntokuji Temple in 1650; (2) Shigesada’s
death is inscribed as 1647 in kakochô and on his gravestone at the above
named temple; (3) the bell of Suwa Shrine11 was made in 1651 by the contribution of Shigesada. Judging from the above points, it is very clear that
Shigesada must have been dead before 1650, and in 1651 Shigefusa held the
top position at Suetsugu house in Nagasaki.
In addition to the arguments shown by Kawashima, the rebuilding of
Shuntokuji Temple in 1643 is a good example that illustrates that Heizô II was
Shigesada. The articles about this event appear in several historical and local notes
such as Nagasaki Zushi12, Nagasaki Jitsuroku Taisei13 and Nagasaki Nenpyô14. In
these notes, Shigesada Heizô contributed a part of his wealth to rebuilt the temple. It should be therefore concluded, that Heizô II must be Shigesada.
6 JTN eds. Nagasaki Zushi reprinted edition, Nagasaki, JNT, 1991, p. 154.
7 The author has not seen.
8 About the books supporting this explanation, see Yamamoto Hirofumi Quan – ei Jidai (Tokyo,
Yoshikawa Kôbunkan, 1989), p. 49, p. 55. Idem. Sakoku to Kaikin no Jidai (Tokyo, Azekura Shobô,
1995), p. 61.
9 Shuinsen Bôekishi (Osaka, Naigai Shuppan, 1921), pp. 560 – 561.
10 This temple was reconstructed with the money of a contribution by Suetsugu. Suetsugu had been a
representative of supporting members of this temple.
11 Heizô III contributed to construct main building in this shrine.
12 JTN eds. Nagasaki Zushi (reprinted edition, JTN, 1991, pp. 124 – 125.
13 Kyoto University Library, 5 – 15 // na // 23, Vol. 12.
14 Kanai Toshiyuki eds., Nagasaki Nenpyô (Ibun Kaisha, 1988), p. 14.
40
Oka Mihoko
2. The bonds of Respondência and Heizô
Kume Kunitake has collected several maritime financial bonds from the
house of descendants of Suetsugu and Shimai in Hakata and assembled them
in one library of the Univ. of Tokyo15. These bonds show that the families of
Suetsugu and Shimai16 lent out a large quantity of silver to red-seal Ships
(licensed ships of early Tokugawa days), junks from China and “the great
ships from Macao”. In the Suetsugu Documents, six of these bonds show the
debit and credit between Japanese merchants and the Portuguese, and they are
written in Portuguese, besides Chinese characters. A letter from a Portuguese
to Suetsugu Heizô is also included in this collection. Space constraints preclude a discussion of the Shimai Documents, so I would like to concentrate on
the Suetsugu Documents (from here, S.D.).
An important point to note is these documents had been handed down
in the family of Suetsugu in Hakata. In the time of Heizô IV, Shigetomo, the
Suetsugu family was destroyed, because of his involvement in smuggling for
Cambodia in 1676. The property was taken away and a part of the family
which was involved in this illegal trade was exiled to tiny islands. As this time,
a large quantity of documents and bonds were supposed to have been burned
or been lost17. Now we can see the traces of flourishment of this family only
from several local and historical documents about Nagasaki. And also, S.D. is
a precious material to examine the Suestsugu house in Nagasaki.
(1) “Digo eu Rodrigo Sanchez de Paredes cazado e morador em Macao que
he verdade que eu tomei a responder ao sor. Suyetçugu Sotucu morador
em facata sete mil e quinhentos taes de prata de barras por preço de
trinta por cento, os quais vão correndo daqui pera macao, o Risco no
navio capitania nossa Senhora da guia a metade, e a outra a metade no
navio conceição em que vai o feitor do povo repartido ygualmente e de
macao para esta cidade de nangasaque vira o risco repartido ygualmente em todos os navios em que se fizera viagem seginte que do porto
de Macao partirem iuntos em hum dia, e lhe farei ou mandarei fazer
pontual pagamento do proprio e respondencia não vindo porque muyer
minha fazenda e cargo, e não avendo viagem o anno por algum
15 The Historiographical Institute, The University of Tokyo.
16 This family is famous not only as great merchant, but also as promoter of contemporary culture
like tea ceremony (cha no yu).
17 Because of the fire broke out in 1697 in Nagasaki, the mansion of Suetsugu had burnt completely
and it is said that all documents had been lost.
Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência
41
acontecimento, lhe pagarei mais a des por cento como he costume e
declaro que esta prata vai a entregar a Cidade18 por via de feizodono e
que se ella a tomar mandar a fazer este pagamento pello feitor do
povo19 com a devida pontualidade, e ficando em meu poder o farei eu
como asima me obrigo em fe do que me asinei nesto em nangasaque oje
sinco de novembro de seiscentos e vinte e sete annos
Ro. Sanchez de paredes
20
[endorsement] Cto. De sete mil e quinhentos taes que Ro. Sanches tomou a
Responder a Suyetcugu a Rezão de trinta por cento.” 21
Regarding de concept “respondência”22, Takase Kôichirô describes that
respondência means “high interest rates beyond proper interest23”. According to
the bonds contained in S.D., it is possible to regard this tern as part of the economic vocabulary in use at that time in the case of debit and credit without having so strict a meaning. However, I will use Takase’s interpretation and refer to
respondência as a care concerning overly high interest rates. These bonds, called
the nagegane shômon (bond) in Japan, were written in several languages and
have mostly the same written form. This term, nagegane, appears in a historiography of Hakata24 and of Sakai25 with some examples bonds. The word is not
actually contained in any bonds, but the authors of those historiographies
describe that the vocabulary had been used until the middle of the Edo era. Also
in some places of Saikaku Ihara’s work, as in Nihon Eitaigura, this term appears
with the meaning of “large speculation.” Several articles have been devoted to
the origin of nagegane, including the connection with the system of bottomry.
However, much still remains to be investigated. It is not the point of question to
argue actually whether respondência and nagegane have the same significance.
18 In this term itself, it is not clear that it means Nagasaki or Macao. I interpreted from around sentences and the structure of this document.
19 This position means a person next to the Capitão, and he treats negotiation directly at pancada
(official market rate of raw silk).
20 Conhecimento. It means bond.
21 This document is contained in Suetsugu Tsurumatu Shi Shozô Monjo (TDSH, 4171 – 91 – 36), ff.
2 – 3.
22 Many articles have been devoted to analyze this system. For example, C. R. Boxer, The Great Ship
from Amacon (Lisbon, Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1963), Shiba Kentarô “Nagegane
toha Nani, Kaijô Kashitsuke ka Commenda Tôshi ka”, Keizaishi Kenkyû, Vols. 45 – 47 (Tokyo, 1933).
Idem. “Nichi – Ô Bun Nagenane Shômon no Kôsatsu”, Keizaishi Kenkyû, Vols. 17 – 1, 17 – 2 (Tokyo,
1937).
23 Takase K., Hino H. (trans.) “Actividades Económicas dos Jesuitas no Extremo Oriente dos Séculos
XVI e XVII. Especialmente em torno da Usura”, Ryûtsû Keizai Daigaku Ryûtû Jôhô Gakubu Kiyô,
Vol. 2, Nº 2 (Saitama, 1998), pp. 174 – 181.
24 Tsuda Genko, Sekijôshi, (Fukuoka, Chikushi Shidankai, 1921, reprinted edition), p. 126, p. 137, p.
156, pp. 194 – 198.
25 Shigen Kôshi, Zen Sakai Shôshi, (Kyoto, Kôbundô, 1985, reprinted edition), pp. 111 – 113.
42
Oka Mihoko
Let us return to the main subject, the role of Heizô in this kind of debit
and credit.
In the above document (1), Heizô plays the role of mediator between a
Portuguese and a Japanese merchant. Both principle and interest were paid
through Heizô. Heizô’s brother Suetsugu Sôtoku invested the original capital,
and here we get a first glimpe of the blood relation involved. As to the five
other bonds, written in Portuguese, the investors were also relatives of
Suetsugu in Hakata. From this point it is not too difficult to conclude that
there was indeed a kind of blood-related group organizing investments, and
Heizô involved himself into this group. With the exception of document (1),
the others were written after 163226, so “Heizô” had changed from Heizô I,
Masanao to Heizô II, Shigesada.
The investments of Hakata merchants in Portuguese vessels are confirmed from an earlier time. A document (2) kept in the Arquivo Distrital de
Évora gives evidence to this. The text reads:
(2) “[...] he bem notorio e pello conseguinte a V. M. em como nos demos
cantidade de dinheiro a responder a fernão Dorrias por então não ser
tam prohibido este trato de respondencias como o he oje. E he tambem
asas notorio como elle por perdas que teve e a que todos os mercadores
estamos sugeitos nos não mandou pagar porque se ve imposibilitado
para o poder fazer. Pedimos a V. M. o consinta vir a japão pera asim ter
algum remédio e nos esperança de algum tempo sermos pagos, e damos
a V. M. nossa palavra de não bulirmos com elle nem lhe pedirmos que
nos pague senão quando elle boamente puder, antes o ajudaremos com
o que pudermos pera que assi elle seja remediado e nos pagos [...]
Nangasaqui a 3 de Abril de 1626 [...].”27
Seven Japanese signatures by Chinese characters have been inserted after
these sentences; six are of merchants of Hakata ant the other is one person
from Hirado. This document was drafted in 1626, and it is clear that this kind
of investment and exchange between Portuguese and Hakata merchants had
been utilized frequently.
Let us now return to the role of Heizô and look at another document (3)
which is supposed to be related with bond (1).
26 The years noted in bonds are 1632, 1637 and 1638.
27 BPADE, Cód. cxvi / 2-5, ff. 274.
Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência
43
(3) ”O Sr. Suyetcugu feizosama
[...] Eu determinava passar este anno a Japão servindo a Cidade mas
como por sua ordem fui mandado com outros cidadoins ao tutão desta
provincia e nos ditenerão a lhe [até?] agora por não se ter dado fim e
meio aos negócios que são trabalhosos, não pude fazer a viagem; fico
porem com a esperança de pera o ano ir ver a V. M. e servilo como son
obrigado, e como eu não tenho amigo de quem possa esperar mais que
de V. M. lhe peço me façam de procurar por mim e acudir a minha honrra para que a prata que devo ao s.or Sotocodono visto não poder este
ano pellos rezoins ditas dar lhe satisfação, e rezao de mim queira que
pera o anno lha pague com mais des por cento que será melhor que
descobrir minhas faltas, [...]
Cantão a 20 de julho de 638 annos de V. M. servidor
a) Ro. Sanches de paredes” 28
This is contained in S. D. and its structure of investor: Sôtoku, intermediator: Heizô, debtor: Rodrigo Sanchez de Paredes is the name as that of document (1). In this letter, Sanchez asked Heizô confidently for the mediation concerning a debt which had not been cleared off. The structure means documents
(1) and (2) were related, the debt in 1627 might have been delayed to pay back
for more than 10 years. Around the end of the Portuguese trade in Japan, the
problem of a large amount of unrepaid silver lent at respondência was considerable. This question will be discussed in the next chapter. At any rate, it is
obvious that Heizô played an important role in the commerce between the
Suetsugu family in Hakata and Portuguese merchants.
The direct investment by Heizô is not clear in the S. D. As I have mentioned before, these documents had been preserved in the Suetsugu house in
Hakata. It may seem natural that Heizô’s role is only intermediary in these
records, but it seems reasonable to consider hat the merchant who involved
himself in others’ investments may have been interested in increasing his own
wealthy position.
28 TDSH, Suetsuguke Monjo.
44
Oka Mihoko
3. The investments by Heizô II to Macao
Two variations of the same letters sent by Heizô II to Macao exist in the
Real Academia de la Historia in Madrid29 and in the Biblioteca da Ajuda in
Lisbon30. C. R. Boxer31 and Takase Koichirô32 have mentioned the letters in
the Biblioteca da Ajuda, but I confirmed that they were written copies while
the two in Madrid were originals. Unfortunately, when I found out about the
documents in Madrid, they were being prepared for restoration, and it was
impossible to get a reprint or a microfilme. Consequently I have relied on the
manuscripts in the Biblioteca da Ajuda. These letters are initially concerned
with the prohibition of the passage of people related to the missionaries or
Christianity. They then turn their attentions to the silver which Heizô II had
invested in the foregoing years and the quantity of silver for investment in
1634 and 1635.
(4) “[...] Os dez mil taes que mandei por Feitor Agostinho Lobo, dos quais
recebi cinco mil taeis empregados em seda conforme o conhecimento e
este anno queria mandar tão bem os dez mil taeis do meu Bague, mas
por não arriscar em hum navio tanto por isso me determinei de mandar
a mestres como de feito mando e assim me farão V. M. merce de entregar a Bertolameo da Rocha, em sua auzença a Rodrigo Sanches de
Paredes e na de ambos a Antonio de Oliveira Aranha para o emprego.
Este anno tive pouco ganho por ser o emprego ruim e estes cinco mil
taeis mandarão V. M. a Bertolameo da Rocha que empregue em seda
chapi boa, porque não quero nem hum so cate de seda corrente, e este
emprego de cinco mil taeis me farão merce de mandar no navio onde
vier o Capitão Mor, e o emprego dos cinco mil taeis do anno passado
no navio onde vier o Feitor do povo [...].”33
It becomes evident that Heizô II had invested 10,000 taels in 1633, and
he received half of the return in silk in 1634. One may speculate about the risk
he undertook in 1634 with his total investment of 10,000 taels. What needs
attention with this kind of bond is who would take the risk for capital and
cargo. The study of the respondência can also be seen from the perspective of
insurance studies. In other bonds of Suetsugu, it is the investors who took the
29
30
31
32
33
RAH, 9 – 7239, f. 145, ff. 169 – 170.
BAL, Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–11, ff. 615 – 617, ff. 599v. – 601.
C. R. Boxer, The Great Ship from Amacon, pp. 326 – 330.
Takase K., “ On the Consignment Trade between Macao and Nagasaki” Shigaku, Vol. 49 – 4
BAL – Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–11, ff. 615 – 617.
Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência
45
risk in these negotiations. Assumption of the risk was one of the fundamental
elements in the structure of respondência.
(5) “[...] Entreguei ao Feitor sete mil taeis em prata de soma, e trez mil em
prata corrente, peço a V. M. que como sempre a mandem entregar a
Bertolameo da Rocha, e Rodrigo Sanches comprando como elles seda
chali a melhor que houvem ma mandem pelo feitor da viagem seguinte
com o risco na galeota igualmente nos dous navios em que vierem o
capitão e feitor.
Se Bertolameo da Rocha e Rodrigo Sanchez por alguma cauza não
puderem comprar a sobredita seda, peço a V. M. a comprem, e ma mandem em nome dessa cidade. [...]
Ainda que acimo escrevo, que mando sette mil taeis em prata de soma,
com tudo, porque a não pude haver a mandei em corrente, que monta
oito mil seiscentos e cincoenta taeis34 os quais com os outros trêz mil
fazem a quantia de onze mil setecentos e cincoenta taeis, peço a V. M.
que mos mandem empregar como acima digo. 25 de outubro de 1635.”
35
This letter was written on October 25th 1635, the year following the
document (4). The main contents of both do not differ much, but anxiety
about the use of the money and expectations for the Macao government to
take responsibility for the loan had increased. Here the name of Rodrigo
Sanchez appears again, which indicates a confidential relation between Heizô
II and him. In addition to the intense commercial relation shown in the document (3), the above letter indicates the possibility that Sanchez could be a
representative of Heizô II in Macao.
It is worth asking what was the role of the Macao government. It had
worked not only as a medium in charge to treat the silver, but also as the main
organizer of the transaction. Figures as Rodrigo Sanchez and Bartolomeo da
Rocha were only organs serving Heizô II’s negotiation while the main organ
of investment was the Macao government. Heizô II lent silver not to a single
person, but the government of Macao, trusting the Portuguese to take responsibility in any case of trouble. When we return to the Hakata merchants’
bonds in S. D., this becomes clear. It seems that the Hakata merchants had
invested their money in individuals who were supported by the Macao
government. The tables 1 and 2 indicate this clearly.
34 We can see the ratio of the value of soma silver and current silver; 1. 2:1.
35 BAL – Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–11, ff. 599v. – 601 V.
46
Oka Mihoko
Table 1: Debtors of Suetsugu Bonds36
Nº
Lessees
1
Rodrigo Sanchez de Paredes
2
Agostinho Lobo
3
Tristão Tavares, António Maneio
4
Pedro Fernandez de Carvalho
5
Leonard Ferreira, Pedro de Castro
6
João Pereira
Table 2 : Capitão-mor in Portuguese vessels from Macao in the Quanei Period38
1624
Agostinho Lobo
1625
Agostinho Lobo
1626
Luís Paes Pacheco
1627
No Voyage
1628
António Monteiro
1629
António de Oliveira Aranha
1630
No Voyage *Envoy of Dom Gonçalo da Silveira
1631
Lourenço de Lis Velho
1632
Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho
1633
Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho
1634
Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho
1635
No Voyage *Envoy of Dom Gonçalo da Silveira [sic]37
1636
Dom Gonçalo da Silveira
1637
Dom Francisco de Castelo Branco
1638
Dom João Pereira
1639
Vasco Palha de Almeida
Agostinho Lobo came to Japan as capitão-mor in 1624 and 1625, and in
1632 as feitor. Tristão Tavares had been a secretary in the Macao Parliament
and he seems to be a relative of Manuel Tavares Bocarro, who made a big fortune with weapons. Pedro Fernandez de Carvalho was feitor during the last
voyage from Macao to Nagasaki in 1638 and the capitão-mor was Dom João
36 TDSH, Suetsuguke Monjo and Suetsugu Tsurumatu Shi Shozô Monjo.
37 In 1635, there was the voyage to Nagasaki with three galeotas and actually Silveira worked as the
Capitão Mor in place of António de Távora Pinto. - C. R. Boxer, The Great Ship from Amacon, pp.
141 – 142.
38 BAL, Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49 – IV – 66, ff. 41v. – 42.
Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência
47
Pereira. The debtors who appear in the bonds are important persons not only
in the Macao-Nagasaki trade, but also in the Macao government.
In the case of Japanese red-seal Ships and Chinese junks, in both cases
contracts were made between individuals. One should then ask why the
government was involved in the case of the Portuguese. First, it must be understood that the trade with Chinese junks was equivalent to smuggling. The
government was out of matters even if it knew actually about the transactions.
Second, due to the uncertainty of arriving Portuguese vessels and negotiations
in Canton and other ports, it was more suitable to invest in a larger community than to individuals in order to protect one’s own benefits. In the case of
Heizô II, there is another reason for his strong trust in the Macao government.
When Heizô II assumed his father’s heritage, an intense relationship between
the Portuguese and Suetsugu had already been established39. Furthermore,
Suetsugu had been the governor in Nagasaki, a position with the strongest
power and was the terminal organization in this city. There were many benefits for Macao to maintain good relations with Heizô II, and it is natural to
consider that Heizô II’s investments were actually a case of public trade with
the Macao government rather than private trade with Portuguese entrepreneurs.
The years when these letters were written marked the end of the MacaoNagasaki trade. There was not only the strict prohibition of Christianity and
the passage of missionaries from overseas, but by now the behaviour of the
Portuguese in Nagasaki was regulated. Though the trade business was still
working, rumours that this trade would soon come to an end were spreading
over the city and other commercial cities in Japan. As a result, the price of raw
silk had risen all over Japan, and this caused the price rise of other products,
too. In 1635, the price of qualified raw silk was fixed as 260 taels/pico in
Nagasaki, but is was traded as 480 taels in Kyoto40. There was the chaos on
the Japan market. In 1634 N. Couckebacker, the Chief of the Dutch Factory,
mentioned “Portuguese have received loans from Japanese merchants for the
past 12 years and the unreturned silver amounts to 150,000 taels. They must
pay one third in this year and the rest of the silver has to be paid 2 years from
now. The interests on the loans are incredibly high and I do not know how
they can pay such an amount of money41.” This description indicates that a
39 The relationship is apparent in the documents of footnote n. 34.
40 TDSH (comp. and trans.), OSN, Vol. 1 –2 (Tokyo UP, 1975, Japanese edition), p. 38, p. 69.
Nakamura Tadashi, Kinsei Nagasaki Bôekishi no Kenkyû (Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kôbunkan, 1988), pp.
120 – 121.
41 Ibid., pp. 50 – 51.
48
Oka Mihoko
large part of the silver which had been borrowed at respondência (high interest) had not been paid back. In this situation, the rumours about the end of
the trade caused some tragedies. In 1637 a group of Japanese merchants
attacked the envoy of a Portuguese debtor who was sent to negociate late payment42.
The role of Macao government played regarding their responsibility for
the debt due to respondência is important. Seeing the wretched situation of the
Portuguese in Nagasaki, the Macao authorities had to quickly find solution to
the large debt of the Portuguese.
4. Respondência and the Macao Government
As I mentioned above, it is clear that the Macao government involved
itself in the economics at respondência between Japanese and Portuguese. The
authorities were forced to consider the best way to make up for the ruin in this
trade which was caused by debtors. Although the best way to repair good relations would have been to pay off the total amount of debt, the Macao
government hesitated to carry out such a plan, because there were conflicts
around the respondência problem.
In 1610 the Vice Roy of India, Ruy Lourenço de Távora ordered
Portuguese officials not to accept any silver at respondência from Japan for
Macao. This order declared that those who received silver under these terms
from Japanese merchants would be punished with excommunication.
(6) “Trata da prata dos Japoes que elles costumão mandar a Macao
[...] o assento que tomou ao Reverendo Bispo da China D. Fr. João Pinto
sobre se tornara mandar a seos donos os cabedaes que vierão de Japão a
Macao que lhe forão denunciados por excomunhão e que as que sobre elles
... [sic] tomadas, desembargos que forão feitos se levantão e os ditos cabedaes
se enviem a seos donos a Japão sem se fazer emprego algum no proprio dinheiro em que vierão de Japão. Notifico assim todas as justiças de Sua
Magestade da cidade de Macao para que cumprão e guardem e a todos os
mais capitães das viagens, officiaes e pessoas a que pertencem e lhes mando
que assim cumprão, e guardem, e promptamente fação cumprir e guardar de
maneira que se neste contem, sem duvida, nem embargo algum [...]”.43
42 Ibid., Vol. 3 –1, pp. 90 – 92.
43 BAL, Jesuítas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–3, f. 28, Cód. 49–V–5, ff. 84 – 85.
Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência
49
Okamoto44 describes the reasons for these instructions as follows. The
first reason was to protect the benefits of fazenda real (the national treasury
of Portugal) by official trade and the second reason was to prevent Japanese
merchants from intervening in the negotiations directly. Though this strict
order had been passed to the Macao government from the Vice Roy in Goa the
receipt of silver from Japan still continued and we can confirm these transactions, for 1613, 1615 and 1617.45 The reason why this system was continued
is closely related to the position of the receivers in Macao. As we have seen
above, people involved in the respondência were situated at the top of the
Macao government and had important roles in the China – Japan trade.
Connection to private trade might be one of the most “useful” ways to make
a fortune. After all, this situation had not been changed since 1623 when Dom
F. Mascarenhas was sent from Goa to legitimate Macao’s administration.
It is clear that there was a conflict between the Macao governors concerning respondência as the following letter illustrates. Mascarenhas sent it to
the King of Portugal informing him of trouble in Macao after his arrival.
(7) “Sendo informado, como nestes navios tinha vindo muita prata de Japões
a responder, e do muito danno e perjuizo que era ao bem comum desta
terra, tirei com V. M. huma devassa do cazo, e por ella me consta que
Dominguos Carvalho feitor que foi da ditta viagem, avia trasido a dita
prata a responder, a quoal devassa tenho mandado ao senhor Visorrei da
India, e té sua resposta não poderá o dito Dominguos Carvalho entrar em
officio algum da cidade, por estar creminoso de que avizo a V. M.. E juntamente dos des adjuntos convem a saber, Ponceanno de Abreu, Pedro
Fernandes de Carvalho, Pedro Correa Craveiro, António Monteiro Pinto,
Pedro Rodrigues Teixeira, Lionel de Sousa de Limma, Manuel Pacheco de
Limma, Rafael Carneiro de Siqueira, Rodriguo Sanches de Paredes,
Heitor da Mota [Caldeira ?] , os quoais todos se asinarão em hum
protesto que me fizerão e intimarão por dous escrivães em que me tinhão
deposto do carguo de Capitão Geral. E tras elle tornarão as armas contra
sua Magestade com os mais exssessos de que tenho dado conta ao dito
senhor Visorrei, e a Relação. [...] Macau 28 de dezembro de 1624 annos,
a) Dom Francisco Mascarenhas.” 46
44 Okamoto Yoshitomo, “Nagegane ni Kansuru Tokushu no Siryô”, Shakai Keizai Shigaku, Vol. 5 –
6, (Tokyo, 1935), pp. 87 – 89.
45 For a discussion of these events, see, C. R. Boxer “Notes on the Portuguese Trade in Japan during
the Kwanei Period (1624 – 1643)”, Shigaku, Vol. 12 – 2, (Keiou Gijuku UP., 1933), Valdemar
Coutinho, O Fim da Presença Portuguesa no Japão, (Lisbon, Sociedade Histórica da Independência de
Portugal, 1999), Takase Kôichirô, “Nihon Iezusukai no Zaisei to Nagenane”, Shigaku, Vol. 43 – 1/2
(Keiou Gijuku UP., 1970).
46 BPADE, Cód. cxvi / 2-5, f. 238.
50
Oka Mihoko
It is notable here that the top governors in the Macao administration had
planned to expell Mascarenhas with reasons based on the respondência problem. This rebellion was amply concerned with the suppression of receiving
silver from Japanese merchants and we can see the governors had much interest in this silver trade. We must pay attention that the respondência problem
had become an official one rather than a private one at this point. As we can
see in the document (7), the Feitor, a position held by an accomplished
Portuguese politician/merchant, was the recipient of Japanese funds. If a ruler
would abolish this system, he would have to reform the whole political constitution of Macao, which had a cozy political economic relationship. In order
to separate politics from economics, the Portuguese authority sent a person to
Macao.
In the next year, 1625, Mascarenhas gave orders prohibiting the receipt
of silver at respondência again47 and it was stricter than ever, stating that the
punishment of disobedience was imprisonment in Goa.
Though these strict orders were put up repeatedly, carrying silver into
Macao did not cease. Even the people who took part in the rebellion against
Mascarenhas still continued to work in the trade in important positions, as
Rodrigo Sanchez de Paredes and Pedro Fernandez de Carvalho.48 These
wealthy merchants were necessary to run these trading activities because they
knew how to manage the commercial voyage and how to establish a good relationship with Japanese governors and merchants. Next, we should notice the
uncertainty of securing sufficient operating funds in Macao as a mediating
port. The Canton market had been unstable for the delay of payments by
Chinese and the difficulties of acquiring sufficient products like raw silk and
textiles to export. Futhermore, the route from Goa to Macao was constantly
under the peril of attack by the Dutch fleet and they had to secure their own
financial means without support from Portugal or India. The silver even at
respondência was the most useful and ready cash. Portuguese entrepreneurs
were not the only ones interested in preserving the respondência system. This
is clear in document (2)49. Several Hakata merchants required Macao to continue to accept silver from Japan, at least till the Portuguese debt would be
cleared off.
From the reasons above it seemed to be difficult to give up handling silver in official trade. However, at the declining epoch of the Macao - Nagasaki
trade, the problems around respondência had increased, and Portuguese had
47 See Ibid., f. 237.
48 He worked as a Feitor during the voyage from Macao to Nagasaki in 1638.
49 See footnote n. 27 above.
Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência
51
to grapple with the question how to pay back the loan or to ease the ill feeling of Japanese merchants.
While various embarrassing situations came up concerning Christianity
and South West European people in Japan, the Macao authorities decided to
send Dom Gonçalo da Silveira in the fanction of Capitão-Mor as envoy in
1635. He had already visited Japan in 1630 and had been detained in
Nagasaki with the Capitão-Mor, Oliveira de Aranha, till 1634. The aim of the
visit in 1635 was the same as in 1630: ease the Bakufu’s attitude towards
Portuguese trade. He took the role of Capitão-Mor from the already appointed António de Távora Pinto. The next quotation from a letter in 1636 from
Manuel Ramos to the Vice Roy in India may help to understand the reason for
his coming to Japam again.
(8) “[...] se ellegeo o anno passado a Dom Gonçalo da Silveira para hir por
Capitão Mor na viagem de Japão, assy por sua callidade, talento, e
partes, como pella muita experiencia, que tem daquele reino, foi sua
hida de grande importancia para os japõens, pello grande respeito que
lhe tem, por elle saber autorizar muito, como taobem pera os mesmos
portugueses, que como lhe conhecem a natureza, se não atreverão a
continuar em alguas dezordens, que intentaram [...] se conssiderou a
grande utilidade, que seria pera a fazenda Real tornar elle a Japão, em
dito de Sua Magestade, reputação do nome Portugues e maes segurança
deste Comercio [...].”50
Taking into consideration that Silveira was acquainted with Japanese
customs and the severe condition in Nagasaki for 4 years, it was natural that
he was elected as the head of the voyage. Additionally, his nobility and status
in India were elements that enabled him to gain the confidence of the
Japanese. It may be true, that he was trusted by the Japanese and the necessity for his coming was expressed best by Heizô II when he says “Dom Gonçalo
como esteve tantos annos em Jappão sabe muito bem os costumes desta terra,
seus costumes, e modos de proceder são dignos de muito louvor,”51 in his
1635 letter. Heizô II mentions his pains to get Silveira back to Macao in 1634.
(9) “[...] Essa cidade deve de folgar com a hida de Dom Gonçalo de Silveira e
António de Oliveira e para ida dos quaes trabalhei na Corte mais de trez
annos como elles dirão a V. M.. Havendo couzas que sejão do serviço dessa
cidade farei com muito gosto e ao diante o que se offerecer não deixarei de
o fazer com a mesma vontade [...].”52
50 IAN/TT, Livro das Monções, Livro 38, ff. 197v.
51 BAL, Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–11, f. 601.
52 BAL, Jesuitas na Ásia, Cód. 49–V–11, f. 616v.
52
Oka Mihoko
The quotation above indicates that Heizô II still had been greatly interested in the trade with Macao and been eager to improve and keep the relation. Nevertheless, when the envoy of Dom Francisco de Castelobranco, in
place of Silveira, went to Edo to greet the Court, the Shimabara Rebellion
broke out in 1637 and they were imprisoned. The situation surrounding the
Portuguese was only getting worse, and at this moment Heizô II settled on his
new strategy towards future associates.
5. The Strategy of Management by Heizô II
Heizô II decided to switch from trading with the Portuguese to trading
with the Dutch before the Shimabara Rebellion. Around 1634 he started to
rebuild relations with the Dutch Factory which had been harmed by Heizô I
in the affair of Peter Nuits,53 Heizô II told an interpreter for the Dutch “the
worst relation between our house and the Dutch has finished, and I will end
this problem.”54 In the same year, he revealed the different position from his
father to N. Couckbacker.55 Before these statements the Factory decided to sell
the Erasmus, which was the ship concerning the affair of Peter Nuits, declaring “to forget the bad memory about Suetsugu family.” Though both apparently started to come close, it is uncertain from his letter to Macao in 1635
whether Heizô II had already made up his mind to leave the Portuguese as his
trading partner. As the regulations of overseas matters by the Bakufu were getting worse for the Portuguese, the relationship between Heizô II and the Dutch
became stronger.
In 1635 three galeotas (small galleons) led by Gonçalo da Silveira arrived
at Nagasaki and the price of raw silk was decided at public rate (pancada).
While the price of the high quality silk was 305 taels/pico, and the second was
280 taels/pico, the ordinal was 240 taels/pico. The price of raw silk brought
by Dutch remained around 260 ~ 290 taels/pico.56 It was normal that raw silk
from Batavia was sold at a lower price than Portuguese silk and F. Caron, a
Dutch East Indiaman, asked Heizô II if it was “possible to rise the price of raw
silk on Dutch vessels by your power.” Heizô II replied “yes, it is possible, but
53 In 1626, the crew of the red–seal Ship dispatched by Heizô I, Masanao, and the Dutch quarrelled
about tariffs and some Japanese shipmen died in Taiwan. For revenge, Yahei Hamada, the captain of
that ship visited Taiwan again; they took hostages each other after the fight. The trade between two
stopped for four years because Masanao killed those Dutch hostages by his arbitrary decision. Though
Peter Nuits was dispatched from Batavia to repair the relation, he had been caught by 1636.
54 TDSH (comp. and trans.), OSN, Vol. 1 – 2, Japanese edition, p. 37.
55 Ibid., pp. 45 – 46.
56 Ibid., pp. 170 – 171, Nakamura Tadashi, Kinsei Nagasaki Bôekishi no Kenkyû (Tokyo, Yoshikawa
Kôbunkan, 1988), pp. 120 – 121.
Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência
53
you, the Factory have to supply more silk than ever to me secretly.” 57 As proof
of this fact, the amount of raw silk given to Heizô II from the VOC changed
suddenly from 30 pico to 50 pico in 1636.58 While the Portuguese silk could
be sold only for the selected merchants of five cities (gokasho shônin), Dutch
could conduct business with everyone they wanted, almost freely. It was obvious that Japanese merchants would necessarily concentrate on Dutch raw silk
after the corruption of the Macao trade. This transaction demonstrates the
foresight of Heizô II.
Furthermore, to slow how close the relation between Heizô II and the Dutch
Factory became in this period, it is useful to refer to Heizô II’s lists of goods
brought by Portuguese galeota to the Factory. Initially, the Factory required Heizô
II to provide the lists, but after the first year allowed him to submit them voluntarily. He passed these lists to the Dutch in the autumn always after the vessels had
arrived, in 1636, 1637 and 1638.59 In 1639, the list contained the goods and their
prices brought by Chinese junks.60 It is clear that the Dutch utilized these lists
when they purchased goods to import from Batavia for the next year. Heizô II’s
attempt could have been influenced by the intention of the Bakufu, because of the
Bakufu demand that Dutch ships would bring more products than before. Heizô
II must have thought the Dutch were better partners than the Chinese because of
the uncertainty of season they came, their number of ships, and the quantity of
products brought by them.
It was important that Heizô II played the role of intermediater in the connection between the Bakufu and the Factory. There are many articles which Heizô
II acted as an agent transmitting demands from the Dutch to representatives of the
Bakufu in Nagasaki (Nagasaki Bugyô). Although Heizô II’s position, the
Nagasaki Daikan, was under the Nagasaki Bugyô, two authorities dispatched
from the Bakufu depended on Heizô II to govern Nagasaki. He was accustomed
to dealing with local matters in Nagasaki while the Bugyô were replaced each a
few years. While the Factory needed Heizô II, the Nagasaki Bugyô also made use
of him when communicating with the Dutch.
As is well known, the Bakufu required the Dutch to cooperate in the
attack on peasants during the Shimabara Rebellion. Heizô II took an important part in informing Bakufu’s intention to the Dutch Factory. This rebellion
broke out in Shimabara, led by ex–retainers of Konishi Yukinaga who had
been ruined at the decisive battle between the Toyotomi and the Tokugawa in
57 Ibid., pp. 186 – 187, Nagazumi Yôko, “Hirado Oranda Shôkanchô Nikki o Tôshite Mita
Pancado”, Nihon Rekishi, Vol. 260 (Tokyo, 1970), pp. 84 – 85.
58 Nakamura, loc. cit.
59 TDSH (comp. and trans.), OSN, Vol. 2 – 1, Japanese edition, pp. 164 – 166, Vol. 2 – 2, p. 130, Vol.
3 –2, p. 197.
60 TDSH (comp. and trans.), OSN, Vol. 4 – 1, Japanese edition, pp. 183 – 188.
54
Oka Mihoko
Osaka in 1615, in November 1637 and the rebel army spread to another district of northern Kyûshû. At first the Bakufu sent a large force commanded by
General Shigemasa Itakura to suppress, but he died in the attack in January
1638 and the authorities were ordered to concentrate on suppressing the
rebellion as quickly as possible. On January 18th 1638, the Dutch informed
to Heizô II that they would cooperate if the governors required.61 Nine days
after Heizô II sent a messenger requesting six barrels full of gunpowder, the
Factory complied. On February 9th, Heizô II told the Dutch “supplying arms
and powders is the best way to show your loyalty at this time and you should
comply with everything the Bakufu wants”. Five cannons were taken apart
from the ship called De Lyp and sent to Arima the next day. On February
18th, Heizô II ordered this ship to stay at Hirado port, instead of returning to
Batavia. The next day, the Bakufu officialy commanded this ship to sail to the
battlefield.
As we have seen above, the Dutch Factory cooperated with the Bakufu
voluntarily, but it is obvious that their participation was planned by Heizô II.
Dutch and Heizô II perceived that the Portuguese would be compelled to leave
Japan and give up their trade.
After the suppression of the rebellion, the Factory received a monopol
right of possession in the Japan trade and Heizô II was rewarded by the
Bakufu in 1640.62 To be honoured by the top of the public hierarchy means
that Heizô II transcended his status as a private governor of Nagasaki and he
became an officially recognized politician in the end. We may say that he was
successful in business and in raising his status due to his intelligence, while his
father got the position of the Daikan by force. It should be concluded, from
what has been said above, that Heizô II constructed his status and made a fortune by his sense of business and ability for politics. Although his title was
that of a politician, it seems to me that he was a man of business rather than
of politics. It may not be too much to say that the political power was only a
means for increasing his wealth. He seemed to enjoy planning his strategy as
a merchant involved in the difficulties of overseas trade. Therefore, it was possible to take advantage of the speculation to foreign shipping for him. His
sharp business sense was based on a clear recognition of the world situation.
It is notable that he was also a trader who dispatched many red–seal ships
abroad to Taiwan, Siam, Cambodia, Vietnam and other parts os Asia. His
views towards other countries were sharper than that of contemporary
61 Most of the material treated in this section is derived from TDSH (comp. and trans.), OSN,
Vol. 3 1, Japanese edition.
62 Kuroita Katsumi (ed.), Tokugawa Jikki (Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kôbunkan, 1930, reprinted edition), p.182.
Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of Respondência
55
Japanese politicians. During the national isolation, the Bakufu developed the
market and controlled the domestic economy. The beginning of the 17th century may be the last brilliant time when the great merchants could freely utilize their powers and one could suddenly come into wealth in pre–modern
ages. Heizô II was one of the wise men who survived in such decades.
[Abbreviations]
BAL – Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisboa.
BPADE – Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora.
INCM - Imprensa Nacional – Casa da Moeda.
IAN/TT – Instituto do Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo.
JNT – Junshin Joshi Tanki Daigaku, Nagasaki Chihô Bunkashi Kenkyûsho
RAM – Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid
OSN – Oranda Shôkancho Nikki (Diaries kept by the heads of the Dutch
Factory in Japan)
TDSH – Tokyo Daigaku Shiryô Hensanjo. (The Historiographical Institute,
The University of Tokyo).
56
Oka Mihoko
Abstract
This article is an analysis of a structural aspect of the 17 th
century Macao-Japan trade. Focusing on the figure of a Nagasaki
merchant, who is known under the name of Suetsugu Heizô, the
structure of respondência and its importance in this trade will
become clear.
The system of investment had made some Japanese merchants wealthy, especially merchants originating from Hataka and
Nagasaki on the Kyûshû islands, because of the high rate of interest
which lay around 30%. But the character of Macao as na intermediate port brought more profits to the Portuguese in this trade
because of the value of silver in China and the countries under the
control of the Chinese empire. In this article becomes indicated the
nonpayment of Portuguese debt by certain bonds left in Japanese merchant’s houses. And actually this problem created confusion in the
Macao administration in the 1630’s because it could be one reason for
the decision taken by Japanese authorities to fade out the commerce.
I touch only the surface of this economic system and its
periphery, but this system can be one indicator to measure the economic structure of the Portuguese seaborne empire in Asia.
Resumo
Este artigo analisa um aspecto estrutural do comércio entre
Macau e Nagasaki no século XVII. Atentando na figura de um mercador de Nagasaki, que é conhecido pelo nome de Suetsugu Heizô,
o sistema da respondência e a sua importância neste comércio tornase claro.
Este sistema de investimento enriqueceu alguns comerciantes
japoneses, especialmente cidadãos de Hakata e de Nagasaki, na ilha
de Kyûshû, devido aos juros elevados que cobravam e que atingiam
30%. O papel de Macau com o um porto intermediário trouxe mais
proveitos aos Portugueses neste negócio, por causa do valor da
prata na China e nos países sob o controlo do Celeste Império. Este
artigo mostra as dívidas que os Portugueses não pagaram, através de
documentos que ficaram nas casas de mercadores nipónicos. Este
problema criou dificuldades à administração de Macau na década
de 1630-40 e pode ter sido uma das razões que levaram as autoridades japonesas a por fim ao comércio.
Analiso apenas aspectos superficiais e periféricos deste negócio, mas este pode ser um indicador para avaliar a estrutura
económica do império marítimo dos Portugueses na Ásia.