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DRAFT - Please do not cite or circulate this version
A DISPUTA INTER-ALIADA PELO CONTROLE DO ATLÂNTICO E AS
ORIGENS DA GUERRA FRIA
ROCHA, Alexandre L. Moreli
Doutorando em História das RI
PhD student at Sorbonne University (Paris 1)
The fall of France in 1940 transformed Germany’s strategic access to the
Atlantic and engendered major concerns pertaining to German ambitions in the
Ocean and its islands, such the Madeira, the Cabo Verde, the Canarias archipelagos
and, in particular, the Portuguese Azores. An eventual occupation of these insular
territories would be a threat to any other country’s presence in these strategic
locations; similarly, in the event of a catastrophic scenario, such as the loss of both
North Africa and Gibraltar, Germany’s presence would greatly limit the possibility of a
counter-attack on the part of the Allies.
Even if, ultimately, this worse case scenario never materialized, it nonetheless
revealed a growing sense that the world as a geo-political space was shrinking and
that the United States’ place in it was endangered. This was the very message
Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) sought to transmit to the American people even before
Pearl Harbor.
During his Fireside Chats (FDR’s radio speeches) in May (entitled National
Emergency) and September (entitled Freedom of the Seas) 1941, for example, the
American President stressed the strategical importance of the Atlantic and its islands
(calling them “the outposts of the New World”) and explained the threat posed to
Americans should they fall into Axis’ hands. “The war is approaching the brink of the
Western Hemisphere itself,” said FDR on one occasion. “It is coming very close to
home”1.
1
Radio Addresses of the President “Announcing Unlimited National Emergency” of May 27th 1941 and
“On Maintaining Freedom of the Seas” of September 11th 1941. Documents available on-line at
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library website [http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/firesi90.html]
visited on 25 June 2009.
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Aware of internal political difficulties in managing all the matters related to the
war and of the gap between the reality of the threat and delayed public
consciousness2, FDR needed to be as clear as possible:
“Control or occupation by Nazi forces of any of the islands of the Atlantic would
jeopardize the immediate safety of portions of North and South America and of the
island possessions of the United States, and, therefore, of the ultimate safety of the
continental United States itself”. (…) the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands, if
occupied or controlled by Germany, would directly endanger the freedom of the
Atlantic and our own American physical safety. Under German domination those
islands would became bases for submarines, warships, and airplanes raiding the
waters that lie immediately off our own coasts”.3
While revealing an acute perception of the risks that would come from a
generalized Atlantic Battle, FDR saw the Ocean as an “increasingly flimsy protective
barrier” to America4. The United States’ entry into the war and the action of the
military submarines operated by Germany (the U-Boats) would prove FDR right
jeopardizing progressively the Allied convoys over Atlantic, especially after the first
Allied military actions in North Africa at the end of 1942, which increased air and sea
traffic in the North Atlantic.
As a response to this threat, a single aircraft following a convoy of ships could
greatly hamper the operation of the U-Boats in the Atlantic. However, in order to
assure maximum air protection, the Ally convoys had to follow the north route, which
not only suffered the disadvantages of bad weather and ice, but which was very
familiar to the enemy. The southerly routes, still more vulnerable, demanded massive
logistic expenses for the same air protection.
2
CASEY, Steven. Cautious Crusade. Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the War
against Nazi Germany. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, Chapter 1, especially pp. 30, 35 and
36.
3
th
Radio Address of the President “Announcing Unlimited National Emergency” of May 27 1941.
Document available on-line at Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library website
[http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/052741.html] visited on 25 June 2009.
4
CASEY, Steven. “Franklin D. Roosevelt”. In: CASEY, Steven and WRIGHT, Jonathan (ed.). Mental
Maps in the Era of Two World Wars. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 222.
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Anyone examining the Atlantic Chart at that time could see that the decision to
reinforce the air protection entailed the use of the Portuguese Atlantic Islands, a
space that bore, as the British Chief of Staff (COS) himself said, “outstanding value in
shortening the war”5. In the beginning of 1943, the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs
of Staff (CCS) all agreed on the “tremendous benefits” that the United Nations would
gain from the earliest possible use of the Azores Islands6.
According to the British, who were particularly concerned in preserving the
vital convoys coming from America, the benefits of using the Portuguese Islands
could be summarized as follows7:
•
Much more extended air cover for all Allied convoys (travel to and from the
following locations: the US or the West Indies and the Mediterranean, the
West Indies and the UK, South America and the UK, the UK and the
Mediterranean and the UK and West Africa, and the Cape and territories
Eastwards);
•
The increased areas benefiting from air cover would give the Allies much
greater scope for alternative rerouting;
•
Without the Azores, allied forces would be restricted to the outside of the
circle while the enemy would keep operating from inside ;
•
The Allies would be able to increase their carrying capacity due to the
possibility of using more direct routes across the middle of the Atlantic;
5
The National Archives of the United Kingdom – Public Record Office, London (PRO). CAB 121/153 "Trident", conference at Washington between the UK and the USA, 1943 May. “Use of Portuguese
th
Atlantic Islands” Memorandum by the COS, CCS 226, May 15 1943.
6
PRO. CAB 121/153 - "Trident", conference at Washington between the UK and the USA, 1943 May.
“Use of Portuguese Atlantic Islands” Memorandum by the CCS for the President and the Prime
Minister, CCS 226/2, May 18th 1943.
7
PRO. CAB 121/153 - "Trident", conference at Washington between the UK and the USA, 1943 May.
th
“Use of Portuguese Atlantic Islands” Memorandum by the COS, CCS 226, May 15 1943. For an
historical perspective on Portuguese Islands and Maritime Power, see : GROVE, Eric. The Azores and
British Naval Strategy. In: Actas do V Coloquio Internacional de Historia das Ilhas do Atlântico, Angra
do Heroismo, 2000, pp. 161-170. WHEELER, Douglas L. The Azores and the United States (17871987): Two Hundred Years of Shared History, pp 55-71, FERREIRA, José Medeiros. Os Açores nas
Duas Guerras Mundiais, pp. 73-90 and ANDRADE, Luis Manuel Vieira de. A Importância
Geoestratégica dos Açores nas Duas Guerras Mundiais, pp. 1389-1397. In: Boletim do Instituto
Historico da Ilha Terceira, Vol. XLV, Tome I, Angra do Heroismo, 1988. TELO, Antonio J. Os Açores e
o Controlo do Atlântico (1898-1948). Lisbon: Asa Literatura, 1993.
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•
The Allies would be able to manage more successfully the direct fight
against the U-Boats (especially when they rest, refuel and recharge their
batteries in mid-ocean);
•
Blockade-running between Germany and Japan would be rendered so
hazardous as not to be worth the risk;
•
The Islands would prove very useful staging points across the air supply
routes from the United States to the theatre of operations.
For the Americans, the importance of this location in the Atlantic was evident.
Indeed, in the event of not gaining access to the Azores, the Joint Staff Planning of
the American Air Transport Command confirmed, in August 1943, the colossal effort
they would need to maintain to assure the flow of supplies to different strategic
locations8.
While the importance of the Atlantic Ocean during the 1940’s has always been
present in the analyses of historians, it remains that the vital importance of the
Portuguese archipelago of Azores as means of shortening the war, as well as a new
US strategical frontier for the development of the postwar American National Security
System, have yet to be explored. Furthermore, in light of the Anglo-American history
of mutual betrayal and rivalry, it is my contention that a closer examination of the
Azores as a geopolitical space would enable a better understanding not only of the
evolution of Anglo-American relations, but also of the origins of the Cold War.
Accordingly, this paper will draw on American, British, French and Portuguese
archival material and sources to address the difficult, and at times opposing, British
and American negotiations with the Portuguese leader Oliveira Salazar for access
and control of the Azores.
8
National Archives and Record Administration of the United States of America, College Park,
Maryland (NARA). Record Group 218, CCS 360 (4-30-43), box 269 – Appendix “B” Construction of
Facilities in West Africa for the Naval Air Transport Service, ATC 321 of August 1943. For a matter of
comparison, the save for a route US-Casablanca could reach 46% in the case Americans could use
the Azores as a staging point (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York (FDRL). PSF. Safe
File, Outline Plans for Specific Operation: Azores, box 4 – Appendix “A” to the JCS 319 “Seizure or
Peaceful occupation of the Azores” elaborated by the Joint War Plans Committee and submitted to the
President Roosevelt consideration in May 1943).
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Between betrayal and tactless diplomacy
In October 1943, Churchill delivered the following address to his Parliament:
« I have an announcement to make to the House arising out of the Treaty signed
between this country and Portugal in the year 1373 (…). Article I of the Treaty of
1373 runs as follows:
‘In the first place we settle and covenant that there shall be from this day forward …
true, faithful, constant, mutual and perpetual friendships, unions, alliances and needs
of sincere affection and that as true and faithful friends we shall henceforth,
reciprocally, be friends to friends and enemies to enemies, and shall assist, maintain
and uphold each other mutually, by sea and by land, against all men that may live or
die’.
This engagement has lasted now for over 600 years and is without parallel in world
history. (…) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, basing themselves
upon this ancient Alliance, have now requested the Portuguese Government to
accord them certain facilities in the Azores…”9
Shortly after the signing of the document on August 17th 1943, Churchill
announced the bilateral Treaty regarding the concession of facilities on the strategic
Portuguese Atlantic archipelago of Azores. In principle, this agreement was to also
benefit the Americans. However, both the highly strategic value of this territory and
the historical British influence over Portugal would prove to be of very particular
significance time in the history of Anglo-American relations.
In fact, a few months earlier, at the Trident Conference between the United
States and Great Britain in Washington in May of 1943, the importance of the
archipelago gained an unprecedented importance for the CCS. Indeed, as a means
of guaranteeing the use of the Azores, the US Navy Admiral Leahy actually
9
Dez anos de política externa (1936-1947) : a Nação portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial.
Lisboa : Imprensa Nacional, 1961-1992 (DAPE). Vol. 12, p. 380-382. Doc. No 212, Telegram No 397,
from Duc de Palmella, Portuguese Ambassador in London, to Oliveira Salazar, Portuguese Minister of
Foreign Affaires, London, October 12, 1943.
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suggested that, if necessary, the long-awaited European front could be opened from
Portugal10.
Even though this suggestion was not pursued, it was decided that the
Americans ("all United Nations forces"11) would benefit from the Portuguese facilities
to be conquered by the British, who had been placed in charge of the dossier,
notwithstanding certain disagreements12.
In one of the preparatory meetings, for instance, US Navy Admiral Ernest King
remarked that as a result of the historical Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, it would “for
diplomatic and psychological reasons, be better for United States troops to undertake
the operation” (which was perceived at the time as an invasion to conquer the
islands). At the same time, Harry Hopkins, one of FDR’s closest advisers, called for
caution since the chances the Portuguese would willingly grant use of bases in the
Azores were rather slim. Such was also the opinion of British Prime Minister himself,
who considered “that nothing would be gained by a diplomatic approach to the
Portuguese Government” and that “the Portuguese should be presented with the fact
of an imminent occupation with only sufficient time in which to send a message to
order that there would be no resistance”13.
Finally, British General Sir Alan Brooke insisted that “the Azores were in a
British sphere of responsibility”14, and that a military solution should be taken in the
10
PRO. CAB 121/153 - "Trident", conference at Washington between the UK and the USA, 1943 May.
th
th
Minutes of 86 CCS Meeting of May 17 1943.
11
PRO. CAB 121/153 - "Trident", conference at Washington between the UK and the USA, 1943 May.
Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, CCS 242/6, May 25th 1943.
12
PRO. CAB 121/153 - "Trident", conference at Washington between the UK and the USA, 1943 May.
th
rd
Meetings of CCS of May 17 and 23 1943 and Meetings of CCS with Roosevelt and Churchill, May
th
th
19 and 24 , 1943.
13
PRO. CAB 121/153 - "Trident", conference at Washington between the UK and the USA, 1943 May.
Meetings of CCS with Roosevelt and Churchill of May 19th and 21st 1943. To know more about
Churchill’s geostrategique views, see: BEST, Geoffrey. “The Maps on Churchill’s Mind”. In: CASEY,
Steven and WRIGHT, Jonathan (ed.). Mental Maps in the Era of Two World Wars. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 203-215.
14
PRO. CAB 121/153 - "Trident", conference at Washington between the UK and the USA, 1943 May.
th
th
Minutes of 87 CCS Meeting of May 18 1943. For an historical perspective on the Anglo-Portuguese
Alliance, see: STONE, Glyn. The Oldest Ally. Britain and the Portuguese Connection (1936-1941).
Great Britain: The Royal Historical Society, 1994. STONE, Glyn A. “The Official British Attitude to the
Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, 1910-1945”. In: Journal of Contemporary History, Londres, volume 10,
number 4, october 1975, pp. 729-746. MATTOSO, José. Historia de Portugal. Vol. I, Lisbon: Circulo
de Leitores, 1992.
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following weeks15. Led by FDR, the Americans adhered to the historical British
influence over Portugal and their competence on this matter.
However, a final decision regarding the use of force could not be taken at
Trident due to a very tense exchange of cables between Churchill and the Foreign
Office (FO) during the conference itself16. Following British War Cabinet’s insistence
that it would be better to first proceed by way of diplomacy (under British exclusive
responsibility, of course17), it was finally decided in early to engage in negotiations
with Portugal before undertaking any other action18.
Convinced that the facilities would be shared with all the Allies regardless of
outcome, the Americans respected Britain’s definitive decision as well as their total
control of the negotiations19. Nevertheless, this American optimism and confidence
was short-lived. On June 29th, Churchill sent a long message to FDR stating that
Salazar deemed the risk of adverse German reaction regarding the cession of the
Azores more important than the Allies did; consequently, the negotiations were
difficult and inevitably prolonged. Moreover, the British government wanted to know if
the United States could give the same guarantee of assuring Portuguese sovereignty
over all Portuguese colonies London had already given to Lisbon. Finally, in the final
lines of a four-page telegram, Churchill explained that Salazar, dreading a reaction
15
PRO. CAB 121/153 - "Trident", conference at Washington between the UK and the USA, 1943 May.
Meetings of CCS with Roosevelt and Churchill of May 19th and 21st 1943.
16
PRO. CAB 121/153 - "Trident", conference at Washington between the UK and the USA, 1943 May.
st
th
Meetings of CCS with Roosevelt and Churchill of May 21 and 24 1943. For the Churchill-London
argues, see: PRO. FO 371/34626 - Anglo-Portuguese collaboration in the Azores: Lifebelt. 1943.
Telegram No 159, from the Prime Minister in Washington to Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign
st
Secretary, May 21 1943 (On Churchill’s demands to the War Cabinet), telegram No 334, from Deputy
st
Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to the Prime Minister in Washington, May 21 1943 (On War
Cabinet’s refusals), telegram No 216, from the Prime Minister in Washington to Deputy Prime Minister
and Foreign Secretary, May 23rd 1943 (On Churchill’s protests about the War Cabinet decision).
17
PRO. FO 371/34626 - Anglo-Portuguese collaboration in the Azores: Lifebelt. 1943. FO Minute by
th
Frank Roberts of June 7 1943.
18
PRO. FO 371/34626 - Anglo-Portuguese collaboration in the Azores: Lifebelt. 1943. Telegram No
387, from Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to the Prime Minister in Washington, May 24th
1943.
19
The American Ambassador in Lisbon, Bert Fish, had absolutely no information or instructions
coming from the State Department or the White House. It was the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald
Campbell, who kept him informed (NARA. Record Group 84, Lisbon (Portugal) Embassy, “Azores”
th
CONFIDENTIAL FILE, box 1 – Letter of June 29 1943, from Bert Fish, American Minister in Portugal
to Cordell Hull, State Secretary).
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from the Axis, would not allow the presence of forces in the Azores other than
British20.
Washington reacted firmly and promptly.
Beginning with an austere message, the Americans first responded to the
issue of the Portuguese colonies, an obviously very delicate topic for the White
House. Choosing their words carefully, the Americans assured the British that they
would do everything possible to "respect” (but not guarantee) Portuguese
sovereignty. Next, they warned that any agreement restricting facilities in the Azores
to the British would be “unacceptable” and “would not be in harmony with the Trident
Agreement”21.
Following this initial misunderstanding, three other serious episodes occurred
that would lead American Foreign Policy to a turning point regarding AmericanPortuguese relations, the anticipation of American postwar National Security studies
and, lastly, the American ambitions concerning civil and military air and sea control
over the North Atlantic.
First, in July 21, Bert Fish, the American Minister in Lisbon, passed away.
Despite being the head of the American Legation, he had had, up until this point,
played no part in the negotiations conducted by London and the British Ambassador.
He rarely received updates from either his British colleagues or the State Department
(SD), whose diplomats knew more about the talks than his own colleagues in the
Portuguese Capital22. According to French agents serving in Lisbon at the time, Fish
never made any significant decisions, nor took any important initiatives23.
20
NARA. Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-1944, 741.53/118, box 3009 – telegram 4285 of June
29th 1943, from John Winant, American Ambassador to the UK to Cordell Hull, State Secretary (sent to
the President).
21
NARA. Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-1944, 741.53/121, box 3009 – telegram 4856 of
August 12th 1943, from Cordell Hull, State Secretary to John Winant, American Ambassador to the UK
to be transmitted to the British Government.
22
While John Winant kept informing the State Department the state of negotiations (NARA. Record
th
Group 59, Decimal File 1940-1944, 741.53/117, box 3009 – telegram 4228 of June 26 1943, from
John Winant, American Ambassador to the UK to the President and the State Secretary), in more than
a month, Mr. Fish had sent to the Washington only two brief telegrams with a superficial rapport of the
happenings concerning the Azores talks (NARA. Record Group 84, Lisbon (Portugal) Embassy,
th
th
“Azores” CONFIDENTIAL FILE, box 1 – Letters of June 29 and July 9 1943, from Bert Fish,
American Minister in Portugal to Cordell Hull, State Secretary).
23
French Ministry of Foreign Affaires Archives (FMFA). Série Guerre 1939-1945 – Londres-Alger, Vol.
1288. Letter No 24 of July 7th 1943, from Mr. Charles Clarac, Embassy Secretary in charge of the
France Mission in Portugal, to Mr. René Massigli, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in Alger.
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This situation would change with a young, but very active Chargé d’Affaires,
taking the lead of the Legation in Lisbon and, without delay, attempting to rethink the
policy vis-à-vis Portugal. A certain George Kennan who—still according to the
French—together with his friend from Princeton, William Butterworth (who was in
charge of economic affairs), had for some time now been the real initiator behind the
American mission24.
Similarly, a second important event occurred, which would impact the very
promising civil aviation market. In this domain, Americans had a solid presence in
Portugal going back to the pre-war period by means of Pan American World Airways
(PanAm), which, despite being the only American company to have a contract with
Lisbon (restricted to operation using sea plane models), worked closely with
Washington in secret military activities in the Portuguese territory25.
Since April 1943, crucial discussions had taken place between the State
Department and officers from the War and Navy Departments on the subject of
expanding trans-Atlantic air transportation and operating landplane routes to Europe
and North Africa via Azores not only during the war, but for the postwar period as
well26. These discussions also concerned the consequences of disclosing to the
British, or not, the United States’ intention to protect commercial interests27, a move
which they ultimately forfeited, opting instead for a continuation of a Anglo-American
global alliance28.
Adolf Berle, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of civil aviation matters,
was well aware that negotiations would be difficult29, even though, PanAm submitted
24
Ibidem.
25
NARA. Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-1944, 811.79653/10, box 4046 – State Department
memorandum by officer Perry Laukhuff of June 23rd 1943.
26
NARA. Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-1944, FW853.79681/89, box 5270 – Telegram 901 of
st
May 21 1943, from Cordell Hull, State Secretary, to Bert Fish, Head of American Legation in Lisbon.
27
The British Overseas Airways Company enjoyed the same rights to operate aircrafts via the Azores,
but they were not exercising it (NARA. Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-1944, box 5271 –
th
Telegram A-230 of May 5 1943, from Bert Fish, Head of American Legation in Lisbon to Cordell Hull,
State Secretary).
28
NARA. Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-1944, FW853.79681/94, box 5271 – State Department
memorandum of June 5th 1943.
29
st
NARA. Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-1944, 811.79653/17, box 4046 – Letter of January 1
1944 from Adolf A. Berle Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, to Frank Knox, Secretary of Navy.
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to the Portuguese authorities a request, in April 1943, for more rights, thereby
engaging, albeit “unofficially,” in negotiations30.
Some weeks later, on May 25th, the American Ambassador in Lisbon reported
to Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, that, even though the extension of new rights
would probably be insignificant, the talks were nonetheless advancing31. However, at
the same time, he also alerted Washington about the suspicions of his Chargé
d’Affaires, Kennan. Indeed, Kennan had the impression that the British might secretly
be cooperating with the Portuguese regarding the construction of airports at the
Azores.
In a memorandum of July 16th addressed to the SD and Berle, Kennan
insisted that the British were operating behind the back of America and undermining
its interests. He insisted that the SD should validate PanAm’s offer to the Portuguese
Government because, even if the demands would not affect Portuguese neutrality,
the British would certainly try to discourage the American plan. In this case,
continued Kennan, unless Washington pushed its project “energetically,” London
would probably succeed in “spiking” it not because they would be detrimental to the
ongoing war effort nor because they would infringe in any way on the rights of the
British Overseas Airways Company (BOAC)—these rights would be automatically
available to both companies due to an identical pre-war contract with the Portuguese
Government—but because of “an instinctive desire to remove us [the Americans] as
competitors, both political and economic” in commercial aviation.
This document could not end on a more resolute note: “In doing this, they will
be overstepping the bounds of legitimate commercial policy, and we should not, in
my opinion, let them get away with it” 32.
Surprisingly (or perhaps not), the day following Kennan’s memorandum, Lord
Halifax, the British Ambassador to the US, requested that the SD temporarily
30
NARA. Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-1944, FW853.79681/94, box 5271 – Telegram 4484 of
th
July 26 1943, from Cordell Hull, State Secretary, to John Winant, American Ambassador to the UK.
31
NARA. Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-1944, box 5271 – Telegram 1149 of May 25th 1943,
from the American Legation in Lisbon to Cordell Hull, State Secretary.
32
NARA. Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-1944, 853.79681/104, box 5271 – Memorandum of
th
July 16 1943, from George Kennan to the State Department and Adolf A. Berle Jr.
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suspend the PanAm talks with the Portuguese government, so as to avoid interfering
with the Luso-British negotiations on the Azores, which had begun at Trident33.
In the next few days, Cordell Hull would interrogate the FO regarding Lord
Halifax’s request since, for the Secretary of State, on the one hand, the PanAm
request was being described to the Portuguese as a technical matter, namely
updating flight equipment, and, on the other, the objectives sought was to increase
the Allied chances of wining the war. Hull emphasized the United States’ intention to
proceed accordingly unless the British Government “strongly” desired otherwise34.
The response came shortly. On August 5th John Winant, American
Ambassador to the UK, reported to Hull that the FO fully supported Halifax’s
requests, guaranteeing, as a means of appeasing the Americans, down the road they
would be prepared to give Americans whatever assistance they could provide35.
Evidently, this promise would not be fulfilled, and consists, rather, of one of many
examples of what the historian Alan Dobson called “aggressively competitive
between the British and the American aviation policy”36.
Besides confirming that the cessation of talks mentioned above could only
negatively impact American interests, a third major event that would culminate in a
turning point in American Foreign Policy occured few days later.
On August 17th, the signature of an exclusive Azores Treaty between Portugal
and Great Britain, which Churchill announced proudly to the British Parliament shortly
after, confirmed the worst case scenario imagined by Washington: the total exclusion
of an American presence not only in airbases, but in port facilities on the island as
well37.
33
NARA. Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-1944, 853.79681/105, box 5271 – Memorandum of
th
July 17 1943, from the State Department.
34
NARA. Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-1944, FW853.79681/94, box 5271 – Telegram 4484 of
July 26th 1943, from Cordell Hull, State Secretary, to John Winant, American Ambassador to the UK.
35
NARA. Record Group 59, Decimal File 1940-1944, 853.79681/101, box 5271 – telegram 5100 of
th
August 5 1943, from John Winant, American Ambassador to the UK, to Cordell Hull, Secretary of
State.
36
DOBSON, Alan P. Peaceful Air Warfare. The United States, Britain, and the Politics of International
Aviation. New York: Oxford UP, 1991, Chapter 5 and p. 175.
37
Documents constituing Agreements between His Magesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and
the Portuguese Governement concerning Facilities in the Azores – Lisbon, 17th August 1943. (PRO.
FO 93/77/125 - Notes, Agreements, Protocol and Annex. Azores. (1) Use of Facilities: General
agreement. (2) Economic and Shipping Facilities. (3) Status of foreign consuls, control of foreigners
etc. (4) Security: communication and travel. (5) Anglo-Portuguese Lend/Lease. 1943 Aug. 17, Oct. 4).
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Two days later, at the first meeting of the Quadrant Conference in Quebec,
Churchill, along with his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, and General Sir Alan
Brooke, attempted to justify this ban by claiming that the “negotiations had been very
protracted” and that “the British were not at fault in failing to obtain the immediate use
of these facilities for the United States”38.
Nevertheless, the British also failed to mention that on June 7th, only a few
days after the Trident Conference and even before the first encounter with Salazar
(on June 18th39), a meeting at the FO regarding the negotiations with Portugal already
hinted at the exclusion of the Americans.
The report of Frank Roberts, in charge of Portuguese affairs at the FO, could
not be any less clear: “Finally we must retain control of this [the Azores affair] and
discourage any hints from the American side that they should take our place
especially in utilizing the facilities we obtain. American aircraft could operate from the
islands but only under our general control” (emphasis in the original)40.
Confirming this decision on June 16th, Eden stated in an internal
communication with his ambassadors in Madrid and Lisbon that « the matter [of the
Azores] is being handled entirely on the basis of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and
neither United States nor Brazilian Governments are participating in any way in our
approach. The above is for your own background information only”41.
Although Churchill would keep in mind Britain’s (and his own) commitment to
obtain minimal rights over the Azores on behalf of the United States (he would
remind Eden from time to time that "we must remember the promises we have made
[to Americans]"42), the Foreign Secretary, however, strongly believed that the issue
38
PRO. CAB 121/154 - "Quadrant", conference at Quebec between the UK and the US, August 1943.
First meeting of the President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister with the CCS of August 19th 1943.
39
PRO. FO 371/34626 - Anglo-Portuguese collaboration in the Azores: Lifebelt. 1943. Telegram No
999, from Sir Ronald Campbell, British Ambassador to Portugal, to Foreign Office and the British
Chiefs of Staff.
40
PRO. FO 371/34626 - Anglo-Portuguese collaboration in the Azores: Lifebelt. 1943. FO Minute by
Frank Roberts of June 7th 1943.
41
PRO. FO 371/34626 - Anglo-Portuguese collaboration in the Azores: Lifebelt. 1943. Telegram No
th
1063, from Foreign Office to Madrid, repeated to Lisbon, June 16 , 1943.
42
PRO. FO 371/34674 - Anglo-Portuguese relations: Ingot. 1943. Prime Minister Personal Minute to
Foreign Secretary, Serial No M612/3, September 30th, 1943. The deal with the Portuguese preview the
th
entry of British troops from October 8 . The British had promised that from then on “everything would
be done” to permit the American access to the archipelago.
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was a British matter and that American interference vis-à-vis Portugal was
undesirable. He would even make the following (and unlikely) remark to the Prime
Minister a few days before the British entered the Azores: “It is important that the
Americans should realize that modern Portugal, which for all practical purpose
means Dr. Salazar, is not a second Guatemala43, from whom anything which the
Americans desire can be obtained simply by threats or bribes (…) We know Salazar
and the Americans do not. [The Azores] is in our own and not in the American sphere
of strategical responsibility. It should therefore be left to us to decide the best tactical
approach to Dr. Salazar”44.
The White House and the War Department would spend the following weeks
discussing the best possible strategy. The matter had gained in importance and
complexity: even if the anti U-Boat war had seen some progress due to the entry in
operation of aircraft carriers45, many doubts remained as to Britain’s diplomatic
attitude, as well as to the future use and importance of the Azores archipelago, both
in military and civil affairs. The plans for postwar American hegemony over the
Atlantic Ocean was a constant preoccupation of the Administration, and extended to
matters that ranged from civil aviation and National Security46.
A Turning Point in Foreign Policy
Originating in a nation not fully accustomed to its new internationalist position
and lacking administrative cohesiveness, the United States’ policy vis-à-vis Portugal
begun even before the administration had achieved coordination between the
43
At that time (and since 1931), the US-supported dictator Jorge Ubico ruled. This country also saw
the US United Fruit Company became its most important company, dominating the economy through
large investments in banana plantations, railroads, ports, and shipping. (WESTAD, Odd Arne. The
Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. New York: Cambridge UP,
2007, p. 146).
44
PRO. FO 371/34674 - Anglo-Portuguese relations: Ingot. 1943. Anthony Eden to Prime Minister,
rd
P.M./43/286, October 3 , 1943.
45
PRO. CAB 121/154 - "Quadrant", conference at Quebec between the UK and the US, August 1943.
Minutes of 111th CCS Meeting of August 18th 1943.
46
For discussions on the future use of the Azores since the beginning of 1943, see: NARA. Record
Group 218, CCS 360 (12-9-42) Sec. 2, box 270 – Statement Joint Strategic Survey Committee 9/4 of
April 8th 1943 on Air Bases Required for use of an International Military Force in the Post-War Era.
See also: LEFFLER, Melvyn P. “National security and US foreign policy”. In : LEFFLER, Melvn P. and
nd
PAINTER, David S. (ed.). Origins of the Cold War : an international history. 2 ed., New York:
Routledge, 2007, pp. 17-18.
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American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), FDR and his advisers, the State Department
and the Legation in Portugal. Furthermore, the colossal war effort against regimes
resembling Salazar’s Estado Novo worsened public opinion regarding an American
policy that attempted to ally the two ideologically-opposed countries47.
Having already gestured on many occasions toward the reformulation of
American Diplomacy before his arrival in the Portuguese Capital in 194248, Kennan
took advantage of his position in Lisbon in order to introduce the idea of an American
diplomatic effort service commensurate with its growing hegemony49. As Kennan
himself would reveal in his Memoirs, the situation in Lisbon was symptomatic of this
challenge : « So far as I could learn from the official files and from the memories of
persons on the legation staff, at no time since the entry of the United States into the
war had there taken place anything resembling a political discussion between the
American minister and the Portuguese Prime Minister. (…) at no time had we
discussed with the Portuguese at a responsible level such things as the compatibility
of our interests generally, in the face of the wartime situation, or the prospects for our
postwar relationship”50. He adds in a personal letter, “major decisions of the most farreaching importance for the future of our relations with this country have been taking
place without consultation, or even the advance knowledge, of this mission”51.
Kennan began communicating at once more firmly and clearly, even
demonstrating, according to John Harper, "extraordinary personal initiative”52 with
FDR and the SD regarding a new Portuguese-American relationship. He even
refused the execution of direct orders from Roosevelt pertaining to demands vis-à-vis
the Azores that he deemed excessive. For him, Washington’s ignorance of proper
procedures was clear, insofar as this ignorance extended to Salazar’s particular
47
STEPHANSON, Anders. Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy. Cambrigde: Harvard UP, 1989, pp.
25-26.
48
KENNAN, George F. Memoirs 1925 – 1950. Vol. I, Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company,
1967, p. 142.
49
George F. Kennan Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton (GFKP). Box 163, Folder
10 – Draft of a letter to Mr. Shaw, 1943.
50
KENNAN, George F. Op. cit., p. 144.
51
GFKP. Box 163, Folder 10 – Draft of a letter to Mr. Shaw, 1943.
52
HARPER, John Lamberton. American Visions of Europe. Flanklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan,
and Dean G. Acheson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994, p. 179.
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attachment to untouchable national sovereignty53. In this sense, the Americans had
two options: either to gain Salazar’s and his Administration’s confidence or to
overthrow the Portuguese leader54. The former would necessarily entail a
reformulation of all the policies that had been practiced up until that point.
After the deception with the Luso-British exclusive accord, Kennan begun the
groundwork for establishing direct discussions with Salazar’s Cabinet for a new and
closer relationship between the two countries55. For Kennan, it was evident that
Portugal could be used once more as it had always been: a stability factor vis-à-vis
Spain and the surrounding region56.
Even if Kennan’s presence engendered a shift in attitude, the definitive
American response to the British betrayal only came on November 2nd, following a
meeting at the War Department between the Secretary of War Henry Stimson, the
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, General George Marshal, General Henry Arnold,
General Laurence Kuter and the Under Secretary of State Edward Stettinius with the
blessing of the President.
On that occasion, it was determined that Kennan should present to Salazar
requests to obtain on behalf of the US the earliest possible use of air and naval
facilities in the Azores. The most significant change in the American approach,
however, was revealed at the end of the message addressed to FDR to announce
the decision: “the requests should be made at once to Salazar, without further prior
consultation with the British”57. Perceiving that each aspect of the post-war aviation
problem were “interwoven”, the JCS emphasized that military and civil aviation were
53
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1943, vol. II, p. 556. Telegram from George Kennan,
the Chargé d’affairs in Portugal, to Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, October 18, 1943.
54
FRUS, 1943, vol. II, pp. 558-561. Telegram from George Kennan, the Chargé d’affairs in Portugal,
to Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, October 20, 1943. See also: STEPHANSON, Anders. Op. cit.,
p. 26.
55
DAPE. Vol. 12, pp. 513-527. Doc. No 327, Report of the meeting between Oliveira Salazar,
Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and George Kennan, American Chargé d’affairs, Lisbon,
December 1, 1943.
56
GFKP. Box 163, Folder 17 – Letter to Mr. Ambassador of December 11th 1944.
57
FDRL. PSF. Diplomatic Correspondence Portugal, box 48 – Memorandum of Edward Stettinius,
nd
Under Secretary of State, for the President of November 2 1943.
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“too closely interrelated to permit wholly independent solution of either” (even if
priority should be given to military needs)58.
That very same November day would constitute a major turning point for
American Foreign Policy, which would be evoked numerous time by Melvyn Leffler in
his exchanges with John Gaddis from the 1980’s onward59. On that day, the JCS
drafted a long memorandum to be forwarded to FDR, and which established the
requirements for airbase facilities and operating rights in foreign territories. More
importantly, it requested that the State Department initiate without further delay
general negotiations with the concerned Governments to constitute a word-wide
chain of airbases, a matter deemed “of high priority”60.
In accordance with the distrust they felt vis-à-vis the British, the Americans
resolved to fight for own interests, as well as for the foundation of a new Transatlantic
partnership and a National Security Policy that included overseas bases all over the
world.
These guidelines, which were dictated by the JCS and approved by the White
House, engendered a new relationship in the following months between the State
Department, the American Mission in Lisbon and the Portuguese Government,
despite the fact that such a relationship would inevitably engender a conflict with the
British, which was to last until the creation of the Atlantic Alliance in 194961.
58
NARA. Record Group 218, CCS 360 (12-9-42) Sec. 2, box 270 – Draft of memorandum of the JCS
for the President of November 2nd 1943 and JCS 570 of November 6th 1943 on US Requirements for
Post-War Air Bases.
59
GADDIS, John L. “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War”. In:
Diplomatic History, 7, Summer 1983, pp. 171-190. LEFFLER, Melvyn P. “The American Conception of
National Security and the Beginnings of Cold War, 1945-48”. In: American Historical Review, Vol. 89,
No. 2, 1984, pp. 346-381. GADDIS, John L. and KUNIHOLM, Bruce. “Comments’ on Leffler”. In:
American Historical Review, Vol. 89, No 2, April 1984, pp. 382-390. See also: LEFFLER, Melvyn P. A
Preponderance of Power. National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War. Stanford:
Stanford UP, 1992, especially p. 56.
60
th
FDR received the complete report (JCS 570) on November 15 , approving it almost in its totality on
rd
November 23 . The President ordered some complementary studies and finally sent the order to
Cordell Hull to start the above mentioned negotiations on January 7th 1944. (NARA. Record Group
218, CCS 360 (12-9-42) Sec. 2, box 270 – Message of November 15th 1943, Memorandum of the
th
th
Secretariat of the JCS of December 30 1943, JCS 570/2 of January 10 1944 on US Requirements
th
for Post-War Air Bases and Letter from the President to Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, of January 7
1944).
61
ROCHA, Alexandre L. Moreli. « L’archipel portugais des Açores dans le contexte de la transition
vers le conflit Est-Ouest. 1946-1947, l’atlantisme et la fin du contrôle anglais sur l’océan ». In : Bulletin
de l’Institut Pierre Renouvin, No 27, 2008, pp. 77-89.
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The Salazar factor
Two days after the decision taken on November 2nd, FDR sent a telegram to
Salazar, informing him of Kennan’s intention to discuss the American use of the
Azores. More important than the actual message, however, the telegram attested to
a new attitude vis-à-vis Portugal on the part of the American President, which, until
that point, could be described, to quote Portuguese historian Antonio Telo, as a
“tolerated mistrust relation”62.
Seeking a rapprochement, Roosevelt took the opportunity to remind Salazar of
a personal experience the American leader had had at the time he was Under
Secretary of the Navy in 1918, when he stopped at the Azores on his way to Europe.
He stressed that during the Great War, the American-Portuguese relationship was
based on “mutual confidence and great friendship”. Still according to FDR, at that
time, the Portuguese did not doubt the good intentions of the US, who pledged that,
after the war, their presence in the archipelago would cease (this actually happened
in 1919).
Declaring he was “thinking in long range terms”, Roosevelt also proposed a
personal meeting to discuss a “closer association” between the two countries63.
Nevertheless, the establishment of such desired cordial relations would prove very
challenging.
In fact, during the early 1940’s, given the advances of the Axis and the
celebration of an alliance between the USSR and the Anglo-Americans, Salazar’s
vision of the future of Europe placed Portugal in a privileged position: given that the
world was oscillating between the Axis and the Allies, in the event of a treaty of
peace (imagined by the Portuguese government even after the signature of the
62
TELO, Antonio J. Portugal na Segunda Guerra. Lisboa : P&R, 1987, pp. 140-146. From the same
author, see also: TELO, Antonio. J. “Relações Portugal-EUA 1940-1941”. In: Analise Social, vol.
XXVIII (120), 1993 (1°), Lisbon, pp. 371-393.
63
FDRL. PSF. Diplomatic Correspondence Portugal, box 48 – Letter of November 4th 1943 from the
President to Oliveira Salazar, the Portuguese Prime Minister. Example that this travel really touched
FDR, still today it can be seen at the “President’s Study Room” at Hyde Park, US, (behind the
President’s desk) a painting of Charles Ruttan that depicts the Destroyer USS Dyer in the Harbor of
Ponta Delgada, Azores, in July 1918. This ship carried Roosevelt to the war in Europe. For a detailed
narrative of this FDR passage at the Azores, see: MESQUITA, Mario. “A Escala de Roosevelt nos
Açores durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial”. In : Boletim do Instituto Historico da Ilha Terceira, vol.
XLIV, Angra do Heroismo, 1986, pp. 37-64.
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Atlantic Charter in 1941) Lisbon would be one of the rare capitals capable of
collaborating with nations grounded in very different political systems. In this
scenario, the corporatist profile of the Portuguese regime (heavily influenced by
Mussolini’s Italy), on the one hand, and the historical links with Great Britain, on the
other, would constitute very important assets.
However, the Allied victories in North Africa, the Soviet counter-offensive
against German troops, as well as the cessation of communication between Portugal
and Germany (which in turn represented the interruption of very important business
connections with Berlin) engendered the impossibility of a scenario that placed
Lisbon as a potential European leader. With very few options in front of him and
fearing the weakening of his regime and his Empire, from mid-1943 Salazar looked to
renew the ties with Portugal’s oldest ally, Great Britain.
On the other hand, the Portuguese leader was sufficiently clever not to forget
other nations capable of countering what for him was becoming the great danger for
Portugal and for Europe: the rise of communism.
Even if both sides had common interests, the general rapprochement between
the Allies and Portugal encountered numerous difficulties and obstacles, in large part
because of the significant differences in how Portugal, the Unites States and Great
Britain considered and interpreted that key moment in twentieth century history. From
the anachronistic interpretation of the international situation by the Portuguese leader
(for whom both liberalism and communism had failed as social systems64), to
London’s intentions to keep Portugal in its sphere of influence despite meager means
of rewarding this diplomatic fidelity, to, lastly, the strong and growing American
strategic interests, it was clear that many factors impacted transatlantic relations
during the mid-1940’s.
The Portuguese historian, Antonio Telo, offers a very clear view of Salazar’s
thoughts regarding a post-war Europe:
64
To deteriorate the context, much German propaganda made reference to the American intention of
taking the Azores by assault and many Portuguese considered this hypothesis to be valid (FRUS,
1943, vol. II, pp. 558-561. Telegram from George Kennan, the Chargé d’affairs in Portugal, to Cordell
Hull, the Secretary of State, October 20, 1943). For a more general and introductory study about the
Propaganda Warfare in Portugal, see: TELO, Antonio José. Propaganda e Guerra Secreta em
Portugal (1939-1945). Lisboa : P&R, 1990.
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“The attitude of Lisbon is marked by one basic idea that says the Portuguese
regime is one of the last healthy sanctuary in a mad world that will, sooner or later,
go back to normal. In this sense, what it should do, nevertheless, is to maintain the
political and moral 'health' of the peninsular regimes and to expect that the future will
bring Europe back to the leadership route.”65.
Another factor to be considered in the evolution of the forces present in Lisbon
was the already mentioned progressive weakening of Germany due to the Allied
military advances. As a major Portuguese partner in the past (during the periods of
1936-1939 and 1942-1943, Germany was the second commercial partner of the
Portuguese Empire just behind the United Kingdom66), the decline of the Axis’
influence had not been globally compensated by the Allies. Indeed, Salazar
obstinately refused "hegemony or imperial superimposition", even if he feared that
the power and authority of certain nations, such as the United States and the Soviet
Union, could, in fact, become a reality67.
Since the initial discussions led by Kennan in 1943, Salazar continued to
believe that, in fact, Great Britain expected Portugal to refuse all American
demands68. The reasons behind such conviction was closely linked to the idea he
had of the world’s future: (i) the European loss of power before the advance of the
“American imperialism” put in danger the traditional positions of the European
empires, the Portuguese one principally, (ii) the last European defensive positions for
the Americans were in Portugal’s hands and this was the reason the Azores needed
to be kept outside any state of servitude and compromise, and (iii) consequently,
Portugal should defend its own as well as Britain’s interests as much as possible,
65
TELO, Antonio J. Os Açores e o Controlo do Atlântico (1898/1948). Lisbon, Asa Literatura, 1993, p.
459.
66
For an economic overview about the Portuguese situation during the War, see : ROSAS, Fernando.
Portugal entre a Paz e a Guerra (1939-1945). Lisboa : Editorial Estampa, 1995, especially p. 62.
67
FMFA. Série Guerre 1939-1945 – Londres-Alger, vol. 1285. Letter No 454 of May 27, 1944, from
Mr. Du Chayla, Comité Français de la Libération Nationale (CFLN) delegate in Lisbon, to Mr. René
Massigli, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in Alger.
68
FMFA. Série Guerre 1939-1945 – Londres-Alger, Vol. 1289. Letter 4082/RG of March 24, 1944,
from the CFLN Commander-in-chief in Alger to the Commission for Foreign Affairs.
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even if Great Britain could not understand such a demand, nor support Portugal at
that very moment69.
According to Antonio Telo, Salazar’s fear were based on two factors:
« …the future of the Portuguese empire and of the non democratic corporatist
system of the New State in a world dominated by the American values. Here is the
real problem: in the mind of a man who believed that liberalism "had been
condemned by History" and that it could never to be applied to Latin countries as
Portugal.
Salazar also knew that the Portuguese empire based itself on a strongly protected
market, on the British alliance and on the British control of seas, exactly what was
been questioned by the rising of American power. It is easy to understand the
dilemma in the mind of one of the few Portuguese strategists, used to thinking short
term, with a general perspective and with firm ideological convictions, formed during
his youth. It is absolutely not surprising that Salazar did not like the United States”70
Aware of these challenges, the State Department would continue the
negotiations initiated by Kennan, all the while opting for a confrontational approach
and coercive strategy: in order to exert pressure on the Portuguese decision makers,
the Americans circulated hopeless messages and rumors regarding the instability of
the country. Although not yielding immediate results, this strategy would nonetheless
prove successful in the long run.
Portugal’s Long Battle
Following the significant changes of 1943, Henry Norweb replaced Kennan at
the command of the American Legation in Lisbon in December and pursued the
negotiations. As the French Chargé d’Affaires in Portugal would observe some years
later, month after month the American intentions regarding Portugal revealed a
69
DAPE. Vol, 12, p. 528. Doc. No 327, Report of the meeting between Oliveira Salazar, Portuguese
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and George Kennan, American Chargé d’affairs, Lisbon, December 1,
1943.
70
TELO, Antonio José. Os Açores..., op. cit., p.430.
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decreasing narrow interest in Azores and a greater concern over the undoing of the
British global sphere of influence over Portugal, Europe and, more broadly, over the
Atlantic Ocean:
“This Mission has often indicated in its correspondence to the Section [of Europe of
the French Ministry of Foreign Affaires], the economic, the cultural and the political
rivalry that many times oppose, on the Portuguese ground, Great Britain and United
States. For centuries, England considered Portugal a part of its orbit and it is not
without some resentment that, reproducing the feelings of its Government, the
Embassy of Great Britain in Lisbon viewed, since the war, the effort made by the
Americans to hold a dominating position in Portugal in the spheres of economics and
political affairs”71
If at the end of 1943, all the while not fully aware of the FO’s real intentions,
FDR insisted on London’s assistance72, from 1944 the Americans slowly changed
their naïve approach vis-à-vis the British who, in their turn, would kept "magnifying
the difficulties"73 against the United States’ interest in Portugal.
Even if British aims were significant, London could not neglect the problems
resulting from the ongoing war. Reality and time worked against Great Britain. The
British were facing difficulties not only in wooing Portugal or presenting enough
resources to militarily patrol and control the Atlantic; more importantly, Britain’s
incapacity at maintaining allies by offering real guarantees and weapons (which the
vulnerable Portugal strongly needed), as well as the quasi-impossibility of keeping
their pre-war prestige and power, became worrisome.
Nevertheless, they knew they could count on the Salazar’s loyalty. The
Portuguese leader continued to envision Great Britain (sometimes even stronger
than the British themselves) side by side to the two new superpowers that were
71
FMFA. Série Europe 1944-1949 - Portugal, vol. 26. Letter 272/EU, of March 12, 1947, from Mr. De
Nerciat, French Chargé d’affaires in Portugal to Mr. Georges Bidault, French Minister of Foreign
Affaires.
72
FDRL. PSF. Diplomatic Correspondence Portugal, box 48 – Letter of November 8th 1943 from the
President to Churchill.
73
PRO. FO 371/39551 - Anglo-Portuguese collaboration in the Azores. 1944. British ambassador in
th
Lisbon, Ronald Campbell, to Frank Roberts, Foreign Office, December 30 , 1943.
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emerging. In Salazar’s mind, London’s geographical and economic position would
ensure the continuation of its power, just as Europe would continue to be a
“permanent source of civilizations and a general creator of other nations”74. The
Portuguese leader did not anticipate the somewhat expected British decline, and thus
continued to believe in a complete British recovery to become once again both an
European and world leader. Churchill and the FO very wisely profited from Salazar’s
vision, so as to sustain for as long as possible their privileged position vis-à-vis
Lisbon75.
Certainly, the United States appeared as a new superpower with Atlantic
ambitious, but Great Britain managed to keep a certain status before the Lisbon
government more because of the personal hopes of the Portuguese leader in a
British revival than because of its real capacity to face the new requirements imposed
by the new political world order.
Besides, Americans had to face an unfamiliar challenge: to establish the
foundation for a new and independent relation with a Nation with a particular
situation, since Portugal’s last liberal democratic experience had been in 1926,
thereby positioning the United States as dangerously as the Soviets76.
Given that this challenge was quite complex, it took the Americans more than
a year to finally sign a Treaty with Salazar concerning the Azores77. However, in
addition to obtaining only a provisional agreement (valid for the war period only),
Washington would not have access to the same facilities the British already had
since August 1943 and, what’s worse, they were obliged to share with London all the
new rights they had negotiated78.
74
FMFA. Série Guerre 1939-1945 – Vichy, sous série Europe, vol. 662. Letter No 179 of May 30,
1944, from Mr. Monnier, French Minister in Portugal, to the Ministry of Foreign Affaires.
75
FMFA. Série Europe 1944-1949 - Portugal, vol. 25. Letter 86/EU, of January 29, 1948, from Mr. Du
Sault, French Minister in Portugal, to Mr. Georges Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affaires.
76
PRO. FO 371/34630 - Anglo-Portuguese collaboration in the Azores. 1943. Prime Minister Personal
Minute to Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Cadogan, October 19th, 1943.
77
FMDA. Série 2 BB7 Li 4. 1939/1947. Secret and personal letter No 229/M of November 27, 1944,
from Mr. Charles Brun, Service Chief at Navy Commission, to the DTSS, Navy (R2B), French Navy,
E.M.G. 2nd Bureau.
78
DAPE. Vol. 13, pp. 143-147. Doc. No 496, Report of the meeting between Teixeira de Sampayo,
General Secretary of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreing Affairs and Henry Norweb, American
Ambassador in Portugal, and Sir Ronald Campbell, British Ambassador in Portugal, October 1944.
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Apart from this complexity, this November 1944 Treaty was also an
opportunity for Portugal to implicitly obtain American support for its acceptance in the
international order. Similarly, for the United States, this agreement, which went
beyond the military facilities, was one of the first steps towards a decline of British
influence in Portugal, an important asset in the reorganization of Europe for the
postwar period.
However, the Anglo-American rivalry would still last some years due to the
provisional character of the Treaties negotiated and to the growing importance of
Portugal to Americans.
Winning the war, but not the battle
At the end of the war, the shifting global scene obliged Portugal to reflect on its
Foreign Policy and, eventually, to readapt its principles regarding international
relations. The “victory of the democracies” caused some troubles for Portugal and the
transformations of that time found in Lisbon one of the most hesitating governments
in political evolution. This was due, on the one hand, to the lack of consciousness
and comprehension about the winning powers’ projects of a revised world order and,
on the other hand, to Salazar’s radical nationalist principles and power in
command79.
On the Anglo-American side, the continuity of Portuguese regime support
seemed effectively certain, even if meant a lack of material supply for the very reason
that, unlike Southeastern Europe, Portugal was a stable country. The tolerance of the
Anglo-Americans was essentially based on the uncertain future scenario of Europe80.
The danger of a new conflict in Europe (and not necessarily against Germany)
seemed plausible for Portugal. After peace was established in the continent, Salazar
gave a speech in which the language used regarding future relations with Great
Britain and the United States attested very clearly to the climate of the time. Indeed, it
79
TEIXEIRA, Nuno Severiano. Da neutralidade ao alinhamento : Portugal na fundação do Pacto do
th
Atlântico. In: Analise Social, Lisbon, 4 Series, volume XXVIII, number 120, 1993-1, pp. 55-80. For the
evolution on the Portuguese Foreign Policy in the 1940’s see also: PEREIRA, Pedro Cantinho.
Portugal e o Inicio da Construção Européia, 1947-1953. Lisbon: Instituto Diplomatico, 2006 and
ROLLO, Fernanda. Portugal e o Plano Marshall. Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1994, especially from p.
180.
80
ROSAS, Fernando. Op. cit., pp. 318-323.
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still recognized London as the main reference in Europe, but also by placing
Washington as a strategic future partner. To quote Salazar, “the regional agreements
imposed by the actual situation are a guarantee to Portugal, namely, first, the English
alliance, as an instrument of major relevance still capable of more development, and
second, the already close relation with the United States...”81. The Portuguese
leader, taking this moment as an opportunity to justify the transfer of the Azores (he
said that the neutrality was imperative for Portugal, but not a “selfish or sterile”
neutrality), nonetheless reaffirmed his nostalgic view of postwar Britain:
“We are (…) satisfied because England is in the summit among the victorious
nations. (…) No one among us had ever stopped considering our national interest as
united with the English reality (and even with the British Community) after the war.
Every one could notice that against the continental visions of Europe was opposed its
universal historical conception, and that the English and American victory (in which
Brazil had collaborated actively) would have as a result the displacement towards the
Atlantic ocean of the center of gravity of international politics that concerns the West.
We are interested in all of these subjects. Now, bleeding from uncountable wounds,
England rises among big ruins, not only victorious but invincible; with the links
between many parts of the empire consolidated, it can present itself to the World as
the leader, mother and guide of nations, of greatest and truest civilization”82
While the restitution of the allied bases in the Azores was planned and
scheduled to occur a few months following the end of the war, an other very
important turning point for the American Foreign Policy occurred in September 1945,
when the JCS elaborated the JCS 570/34 report. This strategic document reinforced
the decision to increase the number of overseas bases and classified the Azores
archipelago as importance number “1”, which meant a “strategic frontier of the United
States”. The JCS 570/34 underlined the importance of the Azores (“fundamental”)
and recommended immediate negotiations with Portugal with utmost priority (the
81
French Ministry of Defense Archives (FMDA). Série Europe 1944-1949 - Portugal, vol. 22. Letter
80/EU of May 9, 1945, from Mr. Du Sault, French Minister in Portugal to Mr. Georges Bidault, Minister
of Foreign Affaires.
82
Ibidem.
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Azores constituted the only base of priority “1” still not controlled directly by the
United States or by one client state at that time)83. In this context, this affair would still
know two transitory Treaties dealing with military bases and signed between the
Anglo-Americans and the Portuguese in 1946 and 1948, as well as the most
exclusive one for the Americans, signed between Washington and Lisbon but only in
1951, in the midst of the Cold War, the Atlantic Alliance and Korea War.
Conclusion
The concerns regarding national security in America reached a new level
during the last years of the Second World War. As numerous French historians such
as René Girault, Robert Frank and Jacques Thobie have pointed out: "The
Americans cannot lose interest in the world any longer and their isolationism is quite
dead (…) the Pearl Harbor's syndrome led them to a mental revolution: from now on,
they have to consider every point of the globe as important to their security"84.
Illustrating what the historian Melvyn Leffler observes, we can see through the
Portuguese affair of the Azores that the need to predominate throughout the North
Atlantic was not initially a result of deteriorating Soviet-American relations, but,
rather, a cause of the new technological imperatives accentuated by the presence of
the phantom of the Axis aggression. Back then, Americans were not motivated by
military aggression (even if they were strategically confrontational), but due to their
own National Security logic, which necessitated air power, strategic bombing and
adapting themselves to a postwar reality full of new technologies where the
establishment of an overseas military complex (in which the Portuguese Atlantic
archipelagos would play a key role) as well as the control of both the Atlantic and the
Pacific would prove crucial85.
Since FDR, as Steven Casey remembers well, Americans were strongly aware
that “the world was becoming increasingly interdependent” and small, and that new
83
th
NARA. Record Group 218, CCS 360 (12-9-42) Sec. 8, box 272 – JCS 570/34 of September 27
1945, Over-all examination of US requirements for military bases and rights.
84
GIRAULT, René, FRANK, Robert et THOBIE, Jacques. La loi des géants. Paris: Editions Payot &
Rivages, 2005, pp. 146-147.
85
LEFFLER, Melvyn P. “National security and US foreign policy”, op. cit. pp. 17-18, and GIRAULT,
René, FRANK, Robert et THOBIE, Jacques. Op. cit., p. 73.
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technologies (“especially the emergence of air power”)
would engender this
86
fundamental change . The Azores, in this sense, constituted a symbol, among
others, of transition from WWI to WWII, from naval power to air power as a means to
consolidate the force of a powerful Nation.
Besides, as this tense and complex chapter of the Anglo-American relation
suggests, the Portuguese issue should not be understated like a simple affair of
breaking historical links to save fuel. It remains just one chapter of a vast and long
history, all the while revealing the ways in which the Alliance was tempered when
faced with different perspectives on the shapes the postwar world would take.
86
CASEY, Steven. “Franklin D. Roosevelt”, op. cit., pp. 119-220.
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