Rio de Janeiro City Government
2012
HIGH PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT
RIO DE JANEIRO
CITY GOVERNMENT
SUMMARY – PART 1
HIGH PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
RIO´S BRAND
PREFACE
A CHANGING RIO, 09
PART 1
HIGH PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT RIO´S BRAND, 13
CHAPTER 1
THE RIO DE JANEIRO CONTEXT, 17
– HISTORICAL BACKDROP
– RIO´S SCENERY DURING THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 21st CENTURY
• Internal Context
• External Context
CHAPTER 2
THE CHANGE BEGINS IMMEDIATELY, 35
– THE FIRST 100 DAYS
– FORMING A TEAM OF LEADERS
– FINANCIAL HOUSEKEEPING
– CREATING A “SOLUTIONS OFFICE”
– COMING CLOSER TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR
– ACTIONS FOR TRANSPARENCY
– NEED OF A LONG TERM PLAN
CHAPTER 3
RIO´S BRAND IN HIGH PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT, 45
– FOCUS, DISCIPLINE, PRAGMATISM
– THE HIGH PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT MODEL
– THE PLANNING PROCESS
– EXECUTION AND CONTROL
CHAPTER 4
HIGH PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE: RESULTS, 55
– BREAKING THE DIVESTMENT CYCLE
• Rationalizing Fiscal Management
• Attracting Resources from Alternative Sources
– FOSTERING INTEGRATION
• 1746 Call Center
• COR - Rio de Janeiro Operations Center
• Creation of the Public Services and Conservation Department
• UPP Social
– ACTING BOLDLY
• Urban Mobility
• Breaking Paradigms in Education Management
• Social Organizations
• Rio in Order
• Family Card Program
• Waste Management
• Preparing Leaders
CHAPTER 5
LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE OF RIO, 91
– A MORE AMBITIOUS PROJECT
– THE CITY´S NEW SCENERY
– STRATEGIC PLAN 2013 – 2016
– ASPIRATIONS AND CHALLENGES
SUMMARY – PART 2
HIGH PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
STEP BY STEP
PART 2
– INTRODUCTION, 113
– THE HIGH PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT MODEL, 114
• Definition of Vision and Strategic Plan
1st Phase – Definition of Vision and Goals
2nd Phase – Strategic Plan Design
• Strategic Plan Implementation and Institutionalization
1. Creation of Delivery Support Teams
2. Action Plan and Results Agreement
3. Monitoring Routines
4. High Performance Culture
APPENDIX
– THE PPP CONSTRUCTION MODEL, 180
PREFACE
A CHANGING RIO
8
One of the major challenges for any government is to ensure the greatest
possible efficiency in its management. This means delivering services to
the population within a defined deadline, at the expected cost and with
quality. But it also means giving priority to projects that will bring useful
and enduring results, maintaining financial health and following a plan with
clearly defined goals for the short and long term.
Although this set of rules is not new to large corporations and important
institutions, it is not largely typical in Brazilian public management,
greatly based on the intuition of its officials or on political influence. The
administration of the city of Rio de Janeiro which took office in 2009
chose a different path: to follow the best management practices, absorbing
successful experiences from both the private and public segments.
The effort was translated into strategic measures such as improving the
City Government´s communication channels with the population, leading
to a better understanding of the city´s demands and enabling the efficient
selection of priorities. It also brought the payment of performance bonus to
city officials, as in many large corporations, raising employee satisfaction
and productivity levels. But the most important change was the development
of a Strategic Plan with clearly defined goals for the short and long terms,
supported by a structure to ensure their practical feasibility.
Today, Rio´s Government knows exactly where the city will be in 20 years,
and each action or project that is put to practice is given priority according
to its impacts on the fulfillment of future goals. Seeking results became the
City Hall´s guiding principle, and it is reflected in each and every one of its
officials as they constantly pursuit focus, discipline, and pragmatism.
The new culture has changed the reality of the city´s management. In four
years, we have become far more efficient and better prepared for the future.
And the results achieved in the city were relevant. The City Government has
been able to carry out projects that had been waiting for over a decade to
be executed by finding alternative paths to obtain funds and improving the
quality of service offered to its population.
This is an experience that deserves to be shared, especially in a country
where public administration has so many challenges to overcome. Thus
the motivation for this book, which describes how the change came about,
presenting the main innovations and detailing each step taken by the City
Government in the process. It may be used as a reference for other City
Governments to adjust some of the examples herein to their local realities.
We know there is no such thing as a unique solution, but the failures and
successes of the Rio experience will certainly be a great contribution for the
progress of public management in Brazil.
Eduardo Paes, Mayor of Rio de Janeiro
9
PART 1
HIGH PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
RIO´S BRAND
INTRODUCTION – A PLAN FOR RIO
The city of Rio de Janeiro has suffered a long period of political and
economic aggravation since it lost its position as the country´s capital city
in 1960. For decades, Rio lost its capacity to think big, was not organized
around a long term development project and watched its talents leaving the
city in search of new opportunities elsewhere in the country.
This scenery raised negative prospects until recently, when the present
administration took office in 2009 and decided to drastically change the
city´s situation. Guided by best management practices and focusing on
results, the government began to take firm steps towards a clearly defined
long-term project. The unequivocal march along this path, together with a
virtuous cycle of favourable events for the city, enabled an auspicious future
vision for Rio.
This book describes how the process took place, beginning with historical
events that led the city to decadence and a long period of uncertainty, and
the scenery in 2009, when the current administration made the decision to
change the city; the adoption of a High Performance Management model,
the establishment of long term goals, and the elaboration of a Strategic
Plan. It also discusses obstacles found along the way and the creative
solutions adopted to circumvent them. The Mayor designated the Executive
Office to lead the whole project.
In Part 2, readers will find a detailed methodological account of the High
Performance Management concept and a description of how the best
management practices were adapted to the reality of Rio. All this shows
that Rio de Janeiro never lost its capacity to reinvent itself: it was only
asleep. It learned how to be creative when necessary and was able to
absorb external experiences.
The book is meant for those who are interested in transforming public
management in Brazil and in getting acquainted with the emblematic
experience of Rio de Janeiro. The City Government is aware that any progress
can only take place when its employees are engaged and when society
participates and demands. Bringing these experiences and challenges to
the public is also a form of encouraging this approach.
This is a testimonial of the beginning of an evolution that still has a long way
to go from here. The solid foundations for a glorious future have been laid,
but it will be necessary to continue implementing structuring measures and
to focus on continuous improvement of the new public management model.
Only this will enable the City of Rio – awarded with the final match of the
next World Soccer Cup and the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games – to
be consolidated in the near future as the best city to work, live, and visit in
the Southern Hemisphere.
Pedro Paulo Carvalho Teixeira, Head of the Executive Office
13
CHAPTER 1
THE RIO DE JANEIRO CONTEXT
– HISTORICAL BACKDROP
– RIO DURING THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 21st CENTURY
• Internal Context
Opportunities for Improvement in Key Areas
for Social Development
Tolerating Disorder
Undermined Finances
Political Isolation
City Government Far Apart from Citizens
• External Context
Global Economic Crisis
2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games
Security Policy
New Prospects for the Oil Industry
17
THE RIO DE JANEIRO CONTEXT
– HISTORICAL BACKDROP
Rio staged the country´s major historical events. The largest port in Brazil
in the 19th century, it was the only city in the Americas that received a
European court, becoming the center of the Portuguese Empire in 1808 with
the arrival of the Royal Family. For 200 years, Rio was the country´s capital
city, during the monarchy and the republican period. In the beginning of
the 20th century, the city represented Brazil´s highest GDP and housed its
most diversified industry. It attained a level of specialization in trade never
reached by any other capital city in Brazil.
This glorious flight began to suffer in 1960, when the federal capital was
transferred to Brasília. The change took almost two decades to be completed
and did not include a strategy to reinsert the city in the national scenery.
Losing federal investments destined to the capital of the Republic, Rio
found itself adrift and was not capable of finding a vocation to recover its
national prestige.
It took some time for the decadence process to be noticed, although since
the 1970´s the economic pace of the city, and of the whole state, was
running at half the country average. The actual dimension of the crisis was
only perceived during the 1980´s, when the country plunged in financial
problems and Rio felt the worst impacts. In October 1988, the steep
decline in tax collections, the impact of the country´s galloping inflation
and the carelessness of the city´s public management forced the City Hall
to announce Rio´s insolvency. Employees were not getting paid and stopped
working for three months. Only waste collection continued to operate in the
city, avoiding a greater tragedy.
19
“Without alternative funding sources and
with a history of political isolation that
limited state and federal transfers.”
This trauma marked the bitterest moment for the former imperial capital
city. Since then, Rio experienced sporadic bouts of recovery. The 1988
Constitution assured larger transfers to states and cities and enabled the
City Government to reorganize its finances. In the beginning of the 1990´s,
the population witnessed a gradual economic and urbanistic recovery which
brought back some of the city´s long lost self-esteem. Paving and drainage
work was carried out, besides a relevant renovation of the landscaping along
Rio´s coastline.
Such promising moments, despite bringing some comfort to the population,
were never longlasting. Important improvements were generally followed
by longer periods of abandonment. Every breath of financial balance was
followed by further deprivation. Without alternative funding sources and
with a history of political isolation that limited state and federal transfers,
the City Hall lived the last decades on a tight budget and overlooking
important areas such as the city´s conservation.
This chain of events undermined the self esteem of Rio residents. In 2006,
a poll carried out jointly by the Institute of Labor and Social Studies and
Macroplan demonstrated that 63% of the population believed Rio would
be much worse in 20 years. Another survey held in 2008 by the Rio Como
Vamos NGO showed that 36% of the city´s residents claimed they were not
proud of living in Rio de Janeiro and that 61% judged that their quality of
life had worsened compared to the previous year.
Such a scenario imposed a series of challenges for the administration that
began in 2009. Although the situation was better than in the 1980´s, with
the whole country entering a promising phase, deeply rooted issues would
have to be faced such as the population´s lack of trust in public authorities,
the concerning rates in several areas of human development, lack of
dialogue with the state and Federal Governments, and budget constraints.
Adding to these most urgent challenges, the City Hall would have to develop
a government project that could envision a future for the city in the decades
to come. A plan with long term goals, including the necessary conditions to
become more than simply a letter of good intentions.
20
– RIO DURING THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 21st CENTURY
• Internal Context
Opportunities for Improvement in Key Areas for Social Development
In the first decade of 2000, Rio felt the need to bring about rapid progress
in important areas of social development such as health, education, housing
and transport. The challenge covered the whole city, but was even worse
in regions with lower human development index like the West Zone, which
was experiencing the fastest population growth. Solutions demanded heavy
investments in different fields and required reformulation of some of the
city´s public policies.
Health
Rio ranked as the worst primary care coverage among Brazil´s capital cities.
This means that the city was literally set apart from the country´s public
health policy. Primary care, which priorizes prevention and generates savings
in disease treatment, bringing better quality of life for the population, was
the globally accepted strategy adopted by the Federal Government in the
1990´s. In Rio, this coverage grew beyond 10% only in 2010.
PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION COVERED BY
THE FAMILY HEALTH PROGRAM, BY CAPITAL CITY
Rio de Janeiro
2002
1,35%
2003
1,34%
2004
2005
2006
3,29%
5,51%
6,68%
2007
7,36%
2008
7,20%
2009
2010
2011
2012
9,24%
14,90%
27,62%
33,57%
SOURCE: Ministry of Health
21
São Paulo
2002
16,66%
2003
19,53%
2004
20,0%
2005
2006
22,33%
24,97%
2007
26,49%
2008
26,62%
2009
29,26%
2010
29,38%
30,35%
2011
2012
34,03%
SOURCE: Ministry of Health
Curitiba
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
20,77%
22,50%
25,61%
28,85%
31,25%
32,60%
2009
31,89%
2010
32,08%
2011
2012
SOURCE: Ministry of Health
22
24,27%
34,07%
33,48%
Education
Since 2000, Rio de Janeiro´s public schools maintained a program for
automatic grade passing which approved students without a proper
evaluation. The model, advocated by many educators, did not prove to
be efficient in the city, its immediate consequence being to encourage
poor performance among students. The higher approval rates measured in
the system conveyed the false perception that education had fulfilled its
goals, when actually the rate of functional illiteracy remained alarmingly
high in schools.
PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS APPROVED IN MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS
94%
2000
2002
87%
2006
90%
2008
93%
2009
84%
*
86%
2010
90%
2011
* End of automatic grade passing
SOURCE: Municipal Education Department
PERCENTAGE OF FUNCTIONALLY ILLITERATE STUDENTS FROM
4th TO 6th GRADES IN BASIC EDUCATION
2009
2011
13,6%
6,5%
SOURCE: Municipal Education Department
23
SCHOOL DROP-OUT RATES IN CITY SCHOOLS
4,61%
2000
2001
4,05%
2002
4,29%
2,97%
2003
2004
2,87%
2005
3,16%
2,95%
2006
3,17%
2007
2,61%
2008
3,19%
2009
2010
2,36%
2011
2,31%
SOURCE: Municipal Education Department
Transport
Improved credit and a better economic situation led to a proliferation
of private cars. The inefficiency and low quality of public transport
disencouraged people to use the services. The result was a migration from
collective transport to private vehicles and a consequent worsening of the
city´s traffic.
PASSENGERS TRANSPORTED ANNUALLY BY BUS, TRAIN
AND SUBWAY IN THE CITY OF RIO
R$ Million
1.383
1995
2000
2006
2010
SOURCE: IBGE
24
1.211
1.061
1.159
AUTOMOBILE FLEET IN THE CITY OF RIO
R$ Thousand
1995
935
1.421
2000
1.612
2006
1.848
2010
SOURCE: IBGE
Housing
Rio suffered from a deficit of approximately 300 thousand units. The sprawl
of slums, as expected in any large metropolis, was further aggravated by
the lack of inspection of the public authorities and by the absence of an
efficient housing development program.
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS LOCATED IN SLUMS WITHIN THE CITY
1960
2000
69,6 thousand
306,6 thousand
SOURCE: IBGE
25
“Rio residents gradually
became accustomed to live
in a state of disorder.”
Tolerating Disorder
Former administrations in Rio developed important, although punctual,
programs to curb urban disorder in the city. Examples are the Rio Orla
program, implemented in the 1990´s, which reduced irregular parking and
illegal commerce in the beaches, and the Urban Control Center, created
in 1993, which helped organize street vendors. However, the city lacked a
continued policy establishing and enforcing clear rules.
Consequently, Rio residents gradually became accustomed to live in a
state of disorder. In the beginning of the 2000´s, this could be seen in the
customary occupation of sidewalks by vehicles, in the excessive number of
street vendors without any kind of control, in the excessive amount of ads
installed without any regulation. In regions with greater density and rising
real estate value such as the West Zone, buildings rose illegally, occupying
public land, environmental protection areas, and disaster-prone areas.
Rio de Janeiro´s population was not happy, notwithstanding their being
seemingly accustomed to the city´s chaotic situation. According to a survey
held in 2008 by the Rio Como Vamos NGO, 53% of Rio residents considered
bad or very bad the occupation of sidewalks by automobiles and 44% felt
the same about the invasion of public spaces by illegal trading.
Undermined Finances
After recovering from the bankruptcy in 1988, the City Government saw
an opportunity to balance its accounts, aided by mechanisms created by
the Federal Government. The 1988 Constitution established a new form of
sharing federal resources with states and municipalities, and the FUNDEF –
a fund to develop basic education and teacher training – enabled a greater
share of transfers from the states to cities to be invested in education.
Besides these instruments, the City Government also tapped additional
funds during specific moments, such as in 1990, when it issued securities
in the global market. Nevertheless, the situation was never fully controlled
or enduring.
If on the one hand successive administrations correctly chose not to place
the burden on the population, avoiding tax raises, on the other hand they
28
were not successful in obtaining alternative revenues. Constantly running on
a short budget, the city gradually lost its investment capability.
In the beginning of 2009, the administration found the city´s budget
almost entirely taken up. Approximately 9% were committed to pay
interest on a R$8.5 billion debt with the Federal Government and banks.
Additionally, almost half of the budget was spent with the city´s payroll,
dangerously close to the “prudential limit” of 51,3% established by the
Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF – Law No. 101 from May 4, 2004)*, above
which salary adjustments and new hirings are prohibited. With that, the
investment margin was only 2% of the Treasury.
* The law establishes rules for public finances aiming at increasing responsible
fiscal management.
CITY BUDGET
R$ Billion
2002
6,4
2003
7,2
2004
7,4
2005
2006
2007
7,8
8,3
9,6
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
11,1
10,7
14,2
18,7
21,8
SOURCE: Municipal Finance Department
29
Political Isolation
In the last 30 years, the lack of political articulation with the Federal and
State Governments isolated Rio. Although the causes were partisan and
ideological differences among the administrations in the three spheres, as a
result the city was financially smothered, and the federal and state transfers
were much lower than expected for the country´s second largest city.
The problem became obvious in 2007 with the organization of the PanAmerican Games, an international event almost entirely funded by the City
Government with very little aid from the Federal Government, leading the
city´s finances to a serious imbalance. Rio de Janeiro got the worst part of
this divergence.
TRANSFERS FROM THE FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS
TO THE CITY *
R$ Million
2005
147
2006
118
2007
115
2008
225
2009
217
2010
1.200
2011
1.200
2012
1.300
* Covenants and credit operations
SOURCE: Municipal Finance Department
City Government Far Apart from the Citizens
In a survey held in 2008 by the Rio Como Vamos NGO, 58% of respondents
said they did not trust the City Government. This reflects the enormous
distance between the city´s administration and its citizens. The City Hall
was seen as an absent institution that was never there to solve the city´s
problems and aroused distrust from the population.
The high level of dissatisfaction was related partly to the lack of investments
in the city´s conservation such as waste collection and street paving and
lighting, conveying the feeling that public authorities were inoperative. It
was also caused by an absence of dialogue. According to another survey
from 2006, carried out by IETS - Institute for Labor and Social Studies,
together with Macroplan, 96% of Rio residents were not happy with the way
its government communicated with the population.
30
For citizens, this impression was materialized when they had a specific
problem to deal with. The government offered over 70 contact numbers,
but very little information on which one should be used for each case. Not
knowing where to go, citizens were never able to communicate efficiently
with the administration.
• External Context
Global Economic Crisis
The credit crunch in the U.S.A. in 2008 spread uncertainty in all global
economies. In Brazil, the most visible impact was the decline in credit,
with banks cautiously holding back on loans and charging higher interest
rates. There was great fear as to how contagious the crisis would be for
Brazil´s economy. In the cities, this meant uncertainty about revenues in
2009 and subsequent years. Prospects were tight budgets and the need to
cut down on costs.
2016 Summer Olympics
In June 2008, Rio de Janeiro was officially appointed as one of the candidate
cities to host the 2016 Games, running against Tokyo, Madrid, and Chicago.
It would be the first time in history that Brazil would have actual chances
to stage the Olympic Games, and the possibility of being a host city was
unique. Not only because of the visibility the event would bring to Rio, but
also the expected investments that came with it, both public and private.
Security Policy
Also in 2008, Rio´s State Government started a program to implement
Pacifying Police Units, meaning community police, in areas ruled by drug
lords and militia groups. The project was successful in regaining state
control in over 20 communities that had been run by these parallel armed
forces. As a result, these areas were reintegrated in Rio de Janeiro´s urban
mesh, bringing an important decline in the city´s crime rates.
New Prospects for the Oil Industry
The development of oil exploration in Campos Basin during the last decade
had already leveraged economic growth and employment opportunities in
Rio de Janeiro State. With the discovery of large oil reserves below the
salt layers in 2007, the industry gained a whole new dimension. The new
reserves would double oil production in Brazil, with Rio as one of the main
beneficiaries, both of the royalties and of the expansion of the oil industry,
bringing new players and research centers to the state.
31
CHAPTER 2
THE CHANGE
BEGINS IMMEDIATELY
– THE FIRST 100 DAYS
– FORMING A TEAM OF LEADERS
– FINANCIAL HOUSEKEEPING
– CREATING A “SOLUTIONS OFFICE”
– COMING CLOSER TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR
– ACTIONS FOR TRANSPARENCY
– NEED OF A LONG TERM PLAN
35
THE CHANGE
BEGINS IMMEDIATELY
– THE FIRST 100 DAYS
The beginning of any government elected in a democracy is always a decisive
moment. Firstly because society expects it to immediately put to practice
its campaign promises in its first actions. Secondly, because the first
steps are crucial for the succession of achievements that will follow. The
traditional 100-day or six-month evaluations have the duplicate function
of demonstrating accountability to society and internally calibrating the
directions taken by the new administration.
When the government took office in 2009 amidst the challenging scenario
described in the previous chapter, there were immediate and vital measures
to undertake. As other administrations before them, the new government cut
off functions considered nonessential, audited accounts, and blocked part
of the budget. Fulfilling what was promised during the campaign, it also
attempted to implement most announced measures as soon as possible.
In the first 100 days of its administration, the City Hall submitted to
the population a report containing all campaign commitments and their
implementation status.
37
The most powerful differencial of the new city administration was not,
however, in these punctual measures, but in the management philosphy it
adopted immediately. The focus of the new approach was High Performance
Management. In other words, this meant that every administrative measure
undertaken should take into consideration its efficiency and its long term
impact. This was the trademark of the present administration since the
beginning, and the backdrop for all its initiatives.
The City Government´s High Performance Management focuses on three
basic values: results, pragmatism, and discipline. All three must be
identifiable in every decision made. That is, instead of relying only on need
or intuition, the City Hall follows methods to carry out its actions.
This trademark has been constantly present in actions such as the selection
of the secretaries to head the departments, the recovery of the city´s financial
health, and the decision to develop a long term plan. The following topics
bring examples of this mode of action. All 100-day measures were crucial to
trigger their results, among them the implementation of the Strategic Plan
at the end of the first year in government.
– FORMING A TEAM OF LEADERS
The selection of the secretaries of the City Government departments was
guided by a basic concept: to give priority to managers with expertise in
their area. Although this may sound like an elementary condition, it was
never customary in public management. The City Government specifically
chose to select a technical team, with professionals acknowledged for being
either experts in their fields or highly experienced in their previous functions
in the public or private arena.
The Health Department was handed to a Cardiologist with experience in
hospital management and research centers. For Education, a Business
Administrator with long experience in the public area. The Finance
Department was headed by an Economist who had commanded public and
private banks throughout the country. The City Planning Department, by
an Engineer who had previously worked in the City Government and was
responsible for major urban projects in the city. By giving priority to this
style, for the first time the City Government placed over 80% of its budget
on the hands of expert managers.
38
“Focuses on three basic values: results,
pragmatism, and discipline. All three must
be identifiable in every decision made.“
– FINANCIAL HOUSEKEEPING
The new administration´s first action was to announce a package of no less
than 40 decrees to reorganize the City Hall´s structure, which would bring
a relevant reduction in overhead while at the same time open space to
seek new and alternative revenues. The goal was to save R$1.5 billion per
year, or 15% of the city´s budget - the necessary amount to bring a first
balance to its finances. Audits were held in all the City Hall´s contracts
involving construction work, material supplies and services. Since then,
budget management has been controlled directly by the Mayor himself, who
defined routine of weekly meetings to direct resources for each department.
One of the decisions among the 40 decrees was the elaboration by the
Finance Department of a plan to implement an electronic invoicing system
in the city - the Nota Carioca - aimed at modernizing the service tax
collection, reducing bureaucracy and raising the government´s revenues.
The result of the project in its first year was an additional R$140 million in
the city´s budget.
– CREATING A “SOLUTIONS OFFICE”
A team of approximately 30 professionals was formed at the Executive Office
with the mission of finding creative solutions for new and old problems in
the city. The group was specialized in project development in different areas
and in conceiving mechanisms to put them to practice. Effectively, this
measure turned the Executive Office into a big “project incubator” for all
the other departments.
The team was responsible for listening to the city managers and helping
them to set up or to retrieve relevant initiatives that had not been given
due priority or to develop new ones based on the demands coming from
each area. Many of these projects had already existed for years, but needed
to be redesigned or required alternatives to become financially feasible.
The Office helped to evaluate approaches and alternatives, and the team
was empowered to carry out the projects which would be designated as
priorities for the City Government. Equipped with such expertise, the city
administration was able to put forth a series of projects that would never
have been executed otherwise.
39
– COMING CLOSER TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The City Hall established a partnership with the BRAVA Foundation and the
Brasil Competitivo Movement, two organizations that adapt private sector
management tools to improve efficiency in the public sphere. Through
this partnership, the City Government hired the INDG - Management
Development Institute - to identify potential revenue-raising leverages in
the Finance Department and the City District Attorney´s Office, aiming at
improving efficiency of investments made in Health and Education. The
agreement was based on the proper assumption of implementing best
management practices from the private sector in the public sphere.
– ACTIONS FOR TRANSPARENCY
A partnership with the Rio Como Vamos Movement, an organization that
monitors performance indicators and public policies in the city, brought
greater transparency to the City Hall. The partnership agreement determined
that the city administration would periodically provide data on its budget
expenses and the results obtained by the different departments in their
areas. The measure was an attempt by the City Hall to bring the government
closer to the population, who in turn would dispose of instruments to criticize
and to demand better results. Besides, a provision was amended to the Rio
de Janeiro City Codes determining that future Mayors of Rio must present
a targets plan for their administration up to 180 days after they take office.
– NEED OF A LONG TERM PLAN
The administrations of the 80´s and 90´s developed several plans to
solve problems in the city´s most critical areas. Some of them brought a
thorough set of initiatives for the city, with separate diagnosis for each
neighborhood. However, these plans did not include an institutionalized
tracking and control system, thereby hindering their effective execution and
the continuation of their benefits. Additionally, most of the plans were not
translated into tactical measures that could turn their ideas into actual
impacts for the population.
When the City Government began to elaborate its new management model
in 2009, it realized that a more ambitious change would not only demand
a long term plan, but also the definition of objetive targets. Adopting any
public policy projects without a very clear vision of the city´s ambitions could
lead to error and waste. With this in mind and aided by McKinsey & Company
consultants, the administration established a management model centered
around a long term vision for the city and a strategic plan aligned with best
management practices. The plan would be used as a government tool, that
is, it would not serve only the present city administration, but rather would
help in building up management to bring solid results in the future.
40
CHAPTER 3
RIO´S BRAND IN HIGH
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
– FOCUS, DISCIPLINE, PRAGMATISM
– THE HIGH PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT MODEL
– THE PLANNING PROCESS
– EXECUTION AND CONTROL
45
RIO´S BRAND IN HIGH
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
– FOCUS, DISCIPLINE, PRAGMATISM
The three core values pursued by the new administration since the beginning
- focus, discipline and pragmatism - played a crucial role in the decisive
moment of elaborating the Strategic Plan. The importance of this instrument
was soon identified within the first 100 days, as it guided the steps of
the administration from its implementation. With it, the High Performance
Management adopted in the city of Rio de Janeiro achieved its strongest and
most emblematic dimension.
The Strategic Plan included clear goals and all the objective conditions for
their implementation, avoiding errors present in previous plans. At a crucial
moment for the history of Rio, it enabled the city to once again turn its eyes
to the future, identifying a path to follow and a specific point to reach.
The plan´s identity was intimately linked with the city´s new moment. It was
at the same time a product of High Performance Management and its main
driver. The plan would never be maintained if the City Government did not
create a favourable environment for its implementation. A major challenge,
for example, was to find solutions to obtain funding for extremely urgent
projects. Without this, the plan would have been nothing but a letter of
good intentions.
This chapter describes the Strategic Plan, its main mechanisms, and
how they were implemented. Then it presents the highlights of the High
Performance Management, that is, practical initiatives that helped the City
Government to offer support to the plan and which were aligned with the
City Hall´s new philosophy.
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– THE HIGH PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT MODEL
The High Performance Management Model adopted by the Rio de Janeiro
City Government is based on six elements: Long Term Vision, Strategic Plan,
Teams to Support Delivery, Action Plan and Results Agreement, Monitoring
Routines, and High Performance Culture.
a – LONG TERM VISION
Defines long term aspirations for the city, organized on four pillars: social,
economic, environmental and political. In 2009, the Vision was defined for
the 2020 horizon.
b – STRATEGIC PLAN
Guides the City Government´s short and mid term actions in alignment with
specific aspirations and defines strategic guidelines, goals and initiatives
to be implemented in priority result areas. The basis for the Strategic Plan
is the city´s Master Plan. In 2009, a period of four years, until 2012, was
defined for achieving the goals and initiatives.
c – DELIVERY SUPPORT TEAMS
Are the teams needed for the correct implementation and monitoring of the
Strategic Plan. Among them is the Project Management Office, responsible
for following up on the strategic initiatives, and the Results Monitoring
Under-Secretariat, responsible for tracking the goals in the Strategic Plan
and in the Action Plan and Results Agreement. Both teams were structured
within the Executive Office of the City Government.
d – ACTION PLAN AND RESULTS AGREEMENT
Detailed working plans for each one of the strategic initiatives, for each
department involved, covering goals, metrics, and schedules and culminating
with a results agreement, which establishes a performance management
model based on meritocracy and on the monitoring of important indicators
to evaluate and reward public officials based on the results they achieve.
e – MONITORING ROUTINES
Interactions that take place with the purpose of debating the plan´s progress,
solving eventual bottlenecks and creating engagement for the delivery of
results. The regular meetings aim at facilitating interaction among the
48
many agencies involved in the initiatives, given the cross-cutting aspect
of the project. The Mayor, Secretaries and representatives of the Project
Management Office and Results Monitoring Under-Secretariat participate
in the meetings.
f – HIGH PERFORMANCE CULTURE
Behavioral aspects that influence the incorporation of High Performance
Management at all levels of the City Government, including the adoption
of transparent and persuasive communications, development of talents and
leading by example.
c
Delivery
Support Teams
f
High
Performance
Culture
a
Long-Term
Vision
b
d
Action Plan
and Results
Agreement
Strategic
Plan
e
Monitoring
Routines
SOURCE: Executive Office of the City Government
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– THE PLANNING PROCESS
The Strategic Plan was intended to be the City Government´s main instrument
to ensure focus and accountability to its administration. It established
priority actions for the City Hall´s several departments and agencies, with
specific targets to be met in the short, medium and long term.
The first step to materialize the plan was the definition of a vision for the
city´s future. That is, an ambition of what the city should be like in the next
decade. For that, the City Hall listened to opinion makers and anonymous
citizens in interviews and group discussions and held workshops with city
managers, to format a common objective. The aspiration defined in this
process was to make Rio de Janeiro, by 2020, the best city to live and work
in the Southern Hemisphere.
In order to fulfill this vision, specific targets and guidelines were designed to
be pursued in the short and medium term, that is, from 2009 to 2012. This
was one of the differences between the current plan and previous attempts
that were not so successful.
The city administration maintained its focus on choosing priority actions
for each department and establishing concrete targets to be achieved in
the short term, avoiding the generic objectives of previous plans and being
pragmatic by additionally developing strategic initiatives - or rather, practical
measures - to help fulfill each of the measures. They were highly disciplined
and created strict monitoring routines to track the plan´s progress.
Ten priority result areas were defined to make up the Strategic Plan - Health,
Education, Public Order, Employment and Income, Urban Infrastructure,
Environment, Transport, Culture, Sports and Leisure, Social Assistance, and
Public Management and Finance. For each of these areas, the government
elaborated 46 targets to be achieved by its departments and agencies and
37 priority areas for the City Hall that would ensure their fulfillment. The
targets would be rolled down every year to each department, which would
therefore have clear goals to pursue.
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“The Mayor led an agenda
of weekly, monthly and
quarterly meetings.“
– EXECUTION AND CONTROL
The basic motivation for the efficient functioning of this set of proposals
was a financial compensation mechanism. Employees and managers are
paid between a half and two additional salaries per year depending on the
results obtained in their area. Targets are agreed upon by means of yearly
Results Agreements.
To monitor the plan´s progress, two units were created within the Executive
Office: Results Monitoring and the Project Management Office. The first
unit was assigned the mission to detail targets for each department and
to monitor its achievement, periodically disclosing results to the public.
The second unit was designated to follow up on the strategic initiatives´
progress and solving problems that could eventually arise during their
implementation.
Strict tracking routines were put in place. The Mayor led an agenda of
weekly, monthly and quarterly meetings. Weekly meetings are held with
the representative of the Project Management Office to monitor the status
of the strategic initiatives and help clear eventual obstructions in the
projects, besides assessing progress in the achievement of targets for each
department. Monthly meetings are also held with the same purpose and
count with the participation of representatives of the Results Monitoring
Under-Secretariat. The quarterly meetings include all Secretaries and
include a general assessment of the results obtained during the period.
The Mayor´s determination to participate in rigorously all meetings and follow
up closely the results of the strategic initiatives was an important catalyst
for the successful implementation of the plan. The constant presence of the
head of government, always demanding results, helped disseminate in the
administration a culture of continuous focus on the goals and initiatives to
be achieved.
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CHAPTER 4
HIGH PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
IN PRACTICE: RESULTS
– BREAKING THE DIVESTMENT CYCLE
• Rationalizing Fiscal Management
Cutting Down on Spending
Raising Revenues
World Bank Loan
Fiscal Adjustment Results
Rating Agencies´ New Outlook for Rio
• Attracting Resources from Alternative Sources
Recovery of AP-5
Porto Maravilha
Olympic Park
Rio Negócios
– FOSTERING INTEGRATION
• 1746 Call Center
• COR - Rio de Janeiro Operations Center
• Creation of the Public Services and Conservation Department
• UPP Social
– ACTING BOLDLY
• Urban Mobility
• Breaking Paradigms in Education Management
• Social Organizations
• Rio in Order
• Family Card Program
• Waste Management
• Preparing Leaders
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HIGH PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE:
RESULTS
Rio´s election to host the 2016 Summer Olympics came during the first
year of the administration. This victory represented a great opportunity, but
also greater responsibility. To accomplish its intention of taking the city to a
new level, the government had to face the double challenge of achieving the
goals in the Strategic Plan and fulfilling the commitments set forth for the
Olympic legacy, including a package of over 20 projects agreed upon with
the International Olympic Committee.
To meet this expectation, three fronts were organized to support the first
wave of High Performance Management: (I) Interrupting the cycle of
divestments by rationalizing fiscal management and adopting alternative
forms of tapping resources and attracting investments; (II) Increasing
integration among the public entities and drawing the City Hall closer to
citizens; (III) Breaking paradigms in public management by adopting bold
measures with a long term focus.
The main result of the High Performance Management was the achievement
of over 80% of the goals proposed in the strategic plan by 2011. After
having traced its flight plan, the city administration was brave enough to
make decisions and choices, some of them very hard, to keep the promises
it made to the population. This capacity to meet goals derives not only
from a well drawn strategic plan, but also from the efficient operational
monitoring and tracking structure. The perfect match between a sound flight
plan and a constant supervision of the engine enabled the achievement of
the targets set for the period.
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– BREAKING THE DIVESTMENT CYCLE
The first challenge for the execution of the Strategic Plan was to reverse
the government´s low investment capacity. A large portion of the budget
was taken up by the city´s payroll and interest rates from a loan taken
from the Federal Government and banks. To circumvent this problem, the
city administration promoted a restructuring of its internal finances so
that it could invest its own resources in priority areas such as Education
and Health. Additionally, the Executive Office team was assigned to draw
up attractive investment projects for the private sector in order to enable
projects that otherwise would never be materialized.
• Rationalizing Fiscal Management
A survey held by the Finance Department in 2009 pointed out an alarming
fact: in six years, the city´s capacity to invest its own resources in new
projects - without depending on covenants or loans - had dropped 77.5%.
This represented a reduction from R$686 million in 2003 to R$154.1
million in 2009 - only 2% of the city´s entire budget. The need to rethink the
government structure became evident, for the administration was carrying
the burden of a very high debt and, facing increasing payroll expenditures
and decreasing revenues, its investment capacity was suffocated. The
following measures were taken to solve this situation.
Cutting Down on Spending
The package of 40 decrees announced in the beginning of the administration
was essential to help remediate the city´s budget. One of the measures
alone, which determined a 30% reduction in expenses with commissioned
positions, resulted in savings of R$600 million. A reduction of 20% was
also determined for all departments´ expenditures, except for Education and
Health, and all contracts for construction work, materials and services were
suspended to undergo audits. With the first measures in place, expenses
with personnel dropped down to 45% of the budget.
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“Rio residents were encouraged to
help the government in supervising
the collection of the tax by getting
discounts on their property tax (IPTU).“
Raising Revenues
The initial proposal of implementing an electronic invoicing system for
services in the city originated the Nota Carioca project in 2011. With the
new system, all invoices collecting the service tax (ISS) are issued and
stored online. The system was adopted by hotels, schools, movie theaters,
parking garages, fitness clubs, construction companies and other businesses.
Besides reducing costs with paper and physical storage of the invoices,
which according to the old model had to be archived for a period of five
years, the project enhanced the City Government´s supervision and control
of tax collections.
Rio residents were encouraged to help the government in supervising the
collection of the tax by getting discounts on their property tax (IPTU). In
the new system, consumers who inform their taxpayer number (CPF) upon
issuance of the invoice are entitled to a credit of 10% of the tax amount,
which is deducted from their IPTU. Besides this discount, prizes of up
to R$20 thousand are drawn among citizens who demand the invoice for
their purchases.
The purpose of the project was to increase service tax collections by 5%
without needing to raise the tax rate. In the first semester of 2011, the
amount collected was already 16% higher than in the same period of 2010.
After one year, the project added an extra R$140 million to the city´s budget.
With the Nota Carioca, the City Government was also able to track in
real time all service transactions classified by segment, further aiding
the management of tax revenues. In the beginning of 2012, 103,371
businesses were registered to issue the electronic invoice and over 160
million invoices had been issued, proving the program´s adoption by Rio´s
population and businesses.
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World Bank Loan
Rio de Janeiro was the world´s first city to perform a debt swap operation with
the World Bank. In this kind of transaction, an earlier debt is transferred from
one lender to another to enable its renegotiation and reduction of interest
rates. This loan was only possible because the City Government improved
its finances, expanded programs in the areas of Health and Education, and
implemented a plan with goals to be met as counterparts required by the
bank and accounted for in the High Performance Management program.
The healthy dialogue between the City Hall and the Federal Government
was essencial to materialize the operation. The Presidency of the Republic
guaranteed the loan, meeting the World Bank requirement for collateral.
Negotiations over the operation, amounting to US$1.045 billion (R$1.84
billion) began in 2009 and were completed by August 2010. The City Hall
committed to settle the amount by 2040, at a flat yearly rate of 3.62%.
The transaction was extremely favourable for the city, which was already
struggling with another debt of R$8.5 billion from the Federal Government
and banks which compromised 9% of its budget. The amount was used
to ammortize 20% of this debt, thus significantly reducing the interest
rate and enabling savings of R$250 million a year, besides contributing to
expand the city´s investment capacity.
CITY´S PRIMARY SURPLUS, YEARLY
R$ Million
2006
2007
2008
269
193
456
2009
2010
1.350
896
SOURCE: Municipal Finance Department
Financial Results of the Fiscal Adjustment
In 2009, the city´s primary surplus reached r$1.35 Billion. In 2010, the
amount was equivalent to 12% of total expenses, the highest result for the
country that year. The savings brought about by the city government during
the first two years of the new administration was essencial to increase its
investment capacity.
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After 2009, considered a year for adjustments, the City Hall gradually
managed to increase the share of its budget for construction works. In 2011,
this share reached 17.9%, equivalent to R$3.347 billion, far above the
states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais and the Federal Government itself. A
recent account demonstrates that in the first semester of 2012, this amount
rose to R$4.269 billion, corresponding to 19.5% of the total budget.
INVESTMENT IN CONSTRUCTION WORK EXECUTED BY THE CITY
GOVERNMENT, YEARLY (INCLUDING CONCESSIONS AND LOANS)
R$ Million
2005
557
2006
683
2007
873
2008
843
2009
2010
401
1.560
2011
2012
3.347
4.269
SOURCE: Municipal Finance Department
Rating Agencies´ New Outlook for Rio
The fiscal measures taken by Rio´s government and the World Bank loan
were assessed by rating agencies. Taking into account the city´s favourable
finances, Moody´s gave the city an investment grade in 2010. In December
2011, another rating agency, Fitch, also gave Rio an investment grade,
besides the same credit grade it gave to Brazil, BNDES, Banco do Brasil and
Petrobrás. One year later, Standard & Poor´s followed suit.
All three agencies´ reports highlighted three main aspects: impressive
financial performance improvement, prudential expenditures, and debt
sustainability, favoured by the World Bank loan. According to them, the
city´s financial operation demonstrated its strong capacity to recover, even
with the slowing down of global economy. The results, better than expected
in 2010, demonstrated a sustainable fiscal performance. All these remarks
indicated a city with healthy finances and a favourable business environment
for new investors.
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• Attracting Resources from Alternative Sources
Together with a renovated capacity for investing in new projects using its
own budget, the City Government saught alternative funding sources to
materialize the initiatives in its Strategic Plan and to execute constructions
for the 2016 Summer Olympics. The goal was to focus its budget in
priorities like Health and Education and identify which projects could
receive alternative investments. This option demanded an extra effort from
the government in creativity to find innovative solutions and to get closer to
the private sector.
The success stories are an example of the city´s effort to attract private
partners and to create specific laws to enable public-private partnerships PPP´s - for the city. This was crucial to materialize projects that would have
never come alive otherwise. Some of them are the recovery of AP-5, the
Porto Maravilha project, and the Olympic Park.
At the same time, Rio´s government also adopted a more proactive attitude
to attract investments to the city. The new Rio Negócios agency opened
a communication channel with private investors as part of its strategy to
attract resources for infrastructure projects.
Recovery of AP-5
The project to build a sewage and drainage network in Planning Area 5
(AP-5) is the largest public concession of its kind in the country. A private
consortium formed by two companies, Foz do Brasil and Saneamento
Ambiental Águas do Brasil, will invest R$1.6 billion to build 19 wastewater
treatment plants and 221 booster pump stations in a period of 25 years. The
City Government will not make any disbursement for this work, receiving,
instead, a share of its dividends.
AP-5 is located in Rio´s Western Zone and covers almost one half of the
municipal territory. It is home to 30% of Rio´s residents and includes
neighborhoods like Bangu, Campo Grande and Santa Cruz, which in recent
years housed the fastest-growing population in the city. If it were a city on
its own, AP-5 would be Brazil´s eighth city in population density, before
capital cities the size of Manaus, Recife and Porto Alegre. Being one of
the regions with the poorest sanitation infrastructure in Rio, currently
only 50% of its sewage is collected, with a mere 4% properly treated.
Untreated wastewater easily flow into the drainage works and run straight
into Sepetiba and Guanabara bays. Several communities in the area are
forced to live side by side with open-air sewage trenches and the stench
and diseases they bring.
An innovative operation was devised to attract private investments for
the project, which offers no apparent financial return. The city and State
Governments will share responsibility for implementing the water and
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wastewater works in the region together with the private consortium, thus
balancing their return on investment. Currently, the State Government is
entirely responsible for the water supply, through the state water and sewage
utility company Cedae. Since 2007 the city has assumed responsibility for
sewage collection.
The new sanitation bill passed in the City Council and in the State House of
Representatives. Under the new law, Cedae will continue to supply water, but
the sewage system will be built and maintained by the private consortium,
under the City Hall´s supervision. The gains in efficiency brought by the
private operator, registering users and collecting payment for the service,
will generate approximately R$3 billion in extra revenues. This will make
the project attractive for all parties and enable an investment that would
otherwise be a burden for the public treasury.
The goal is to have 65% of sewage collected and 40% treated in 4 years.
At the end of the concession period, the expectation is to achieve 90% of
wastewater treatment. The project will benefit two million citizens in the
region´s 21 neighborhoods.
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Porto Maravilha
Since the 1970´s, successive administrations had continuously failed at
attempting to revitalize Rio´s port region. Located in the city´s downtown
area, it used to be a main gateway for visitors, but suffered a long period
of decadence and degradation. The Porto Maravilha project, which will
finally make the dream come true, is the country´s largest public-private
partnership and follows an unprecedented financial model.
The project includes the revitalization and conversion of an area covering
5 million square meters with a series of urban infrastructure interventions
including drainage and sewage networks, water supply, electricity,
gas, street lighting, and a modern telecommunications grid. The City
Government expects to attract new businesses to the area and increase
the number of residents from the current 30 thousand to 100 thousand in
the next ten years.
The first phase of the project was funded by the city, a total investment
of over R$150 million, to revitalize three of the region´s neighborhoods,
covering 350 thousand square meters. The second phase, which will extend
to the entire region and include emblematic transformations such as the
removal of the Perimetral overpass and its replacement for two expressways,
will be executed by the Porto Novo consortium, formed by construction
companies Norberto Odebrecht, OAS, and Carioca Engenharia. The private
consortium will be responsible for implementing and providing urban
services in the region, like waste collection and street lighting, for 15 years.
Total costs add up to R$7.6 billion.
The innovation in this case was how the government covered the project´s
costs without spending any of its own resources. The money will come from
the region´s real estate prices themselves, which are expected to soar as a
natural consequence of the improvements. In 2009, the city passed a law
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“The removal of the Perimetral
overpass will revitalize region´s
urban environment.“
to extinguish the previous limit set on the height of new buildings in the
area in order to allow the construction of high rise towers. The companies
interested in building under the new code will have to purchase from the
City Government a bond called Cepac - Certificado Potencial Adicional de
Construção (Potential Additional Construction Certificate).
The Cepac bonds were the currency used by the city administration to enable
investments in the region. First they were sold as real estate securities to the
federal savings bank, Caixa Econômica Federal, transfering the operation´s
risk to the bank and providing the necessary collateral to start execution.
With that, Caixa became responsible for reselling the Cepacs at market
value to organizations interested in investing in the region, in auctions that
have been taking place since 2011. The money obtained from the sales will
be used to pay for the construction of the infrastructure and the remaining
amount - resulting from the likely valuation of the bonds - will be returned
to the bank as profit.
The Porto Maravilha project was inspired by other cities, assimilating and
adapting the successful experiences - and avoiding their flaws - of cities like
Baltimore, Barcelona, Buenos Aires, Hong Kong, Capetown and Rotterdam.
The neighborhoods included in the plan are the Downtown district, Santo
Cristo, Gamboa, Saúde, Caju, Cidade Nova and São Cristóvão.
The plan includes the building of the Museu do Amanhã and the Museu
de Artes do Rio, conversion of the Mauá Pier into a leisure area, and the
building of 530 housing units through the New Alternatives program,
besides 700 kilometers of water and wastewater networks, recovery of 650
thousand square meters of sidewalks, 17 kilometers of bicycle lanes and
planting of 15 thousand trees. The removal of the Perimetral overpass will
revitalize region´s urban environment. Even with the elimination of the
overpass, the region will accommodate a 50% increase in traffic in the two
new expressways and tunnels.
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“The Olympic Park will include
venues for physical activities, bicycle
lanes, playground, promenades,
decks, a marina and a terrace by the
shore of the Jacarepaguá lagoon.”
Olympic Park
The Olympic Park is the second largest Public-Private Partnership established
in Brazil and the first in the world to be built under this funding model. It
is part of the legacy of the 2016 Summer Games in the city. Built on the
area of the former Jacarepaguá Autodrome, a total of 1.18 million square
meters, the park was designed to hold 15 Olympic and Paralympic sports
competitions, besides a leisure area for athletes. After the Games, it will
become an area for leisure as well as commercial and residential projects.
The urbanistic project was commissioned by the City Hall through an
international competition held with the aid of the Brazilian Institute of
Architects and attracted 60 firms from 18 countries, which designed the
projects considering the use of the area during and after the games. The
winner was a London firm, Aecom Architecture, which also developed
London´s Olympic Park for the 2012 Games.
For the construction of the project in Brazil, the city launched a bid that was
won by a consortium formed by builders Odebrecht, Carvalho Hosken and
Andrade Gutierrez. Total investment will amount to R$ 1.4 billion, divided
into R$ 850 million executed by the consortium and R$ 525 million to be
executed directly by the City Government. After the games, the consortium
will have the right to develop and build commercial or residential projects
in the area.
The Olympic Park will include venues for physical activities, bicycle lanes,
playground, promenades, decks, a marina and a terrace by the shore of the
Jacarepaguá lagoon, besides parking areas, meeting and exhibit facilities,
and permanent toilets.
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Rio Negócios
Created to attract new investments in the city, the Rio Negócios agency
is a result of a Public-Private Partnership between the City Hall and Rio´s
Trade Association. Its purpose is to disseminate the city´s economic and
commercial potential and to act as a bridge between the government and
the private segment.
The model was inspired in similar agencies around the world, like British
“Think London” and Colombian “Invest Bogotá”, offering support to
entrepreneurs interested in investing in the cities. Based on projects
submitted by private initiatives, the agency helps potential investors to
undertand the city´s incentive laws and facilitates their contact with political
leaders and the media.
In 2010, the first year of its operation, Rio Negócios attracted R$745
million in investments to be be alocated until the end of 2014. The
performance was 24.2% higher than the goal, set at R$600 million. 183
organizations went to the agency in its first year, which helped produce 125
potential projects and negotiated operations with seven foreign companies:
General Electric (GE), Diageo, State Grid, Lekunbide, IBM, Columbia
University and Haobo.
Several priority segments were considered as the “city´s natural vocations”
in the efforts to attract investments. Among them are Energy (especially oil
and gas), Hotels and Tourism, Creative Industry (audiovisual productions
and events), New Economies (including information technologies and
scientific innovation), Real Estate and Civil Construction, Call Center and
Shared Services (rendering of services between companies).
The agency prepared a portfolio of opportunities for all these segments,
indicating their demand for logistics, infrastructure, research, and suppliers.
It has also surveyed commercial opportunities for the 2014 Soccer Cup,
including information as varied as event security all the way to supplying
of seats for the Maracanã stadium. The material is distributed among
companies, banks, and law firms. Additionally, the agency created a web
portal to provide information for foreign entrepreneurs (www.api-rio.com)
which offers to answer potential investors´ requests in up to 24 hours.
The agency also intends to go on international missions to intensify relations
with entrepreneurs from Asia, where most prospects for investments come
from, besides Europe and the U.S.
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– FOSTERING INTEGRATION
The promotion of greater internal and external integration was established
as one of the city´s guidelines since 2009. Internally, improved dialogue
among the several experts and departments in the city administration
raised its capillarity, expanding the government´s reach. Externally, bringing
the population closer to the administration was a manner of effectively
understanding the city´s demands in order to attack main problems.
This happened through generally rich and productive experiences. The
City Hall regrouped several of its areas that were working for similar
objectives, creating agencies such as the Public Services and Conservation
Department, responsible for everything concerning urban maintenance. It
increased communication between departments and agencies through the
Rio Operations Center, and with the population, with the new 1746 Hot
Line. It also helped to integrate the city with projects like the UPP Social,
which drew closer areas that had been excluded from the city.
All this approximation brought a very important strategic result. Different
areas are now able to share information, thereby increasing management
efficiency. In the past, the City Hall produced a large amount of information
that was not jointly assessed and therefore did not translate into knowledge
or effective actions. The exchange of data enabled a more comprehensive
view of the scenario and the embedding of intelligence in the figures,
becoming a more effective guide for the administration´s steps.
• Central de Atendimento 1746
A pioneer experience in Brazil, the 1746 Call Center (dialing “1-R-I-O”), called
Disk-Rio by the city´s residents, concentrates calls for 26 municipal agencies
and departments. By calling this number, citizens can inform of any problem,
complain about city services, place requests, get information about debts,
fines and permits, and even get tourist information in English and Spanish.
Inspired by New York City´s 311, the service can handle 234 simultaneous
calls and receive 600 calls per month. 350 operators work 24 hours a day,
seven days a week. Calls are billed as local calls. To set up the solution, the
city counted with support from a call center company - Contax - and from
Accenture, which provides support to manage relationship with citizens.
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The model attends to a request from the population which always complained
about the difficulty to contact the government, as was identified in interviews
held during the elaboration of the Strategic Plan. With the new system,
residents have a single point of contact with the City Hall to find solutions
for problems ranging from vehicles parking on sidewalks to holes on the
pavement, accumulated garbage, lack of street lighting, or the presence of
wild animals. Each demand has a specified deadline to be answered and
resolved which varies from 4 hours to 10 days, depending on the problem.
To ensure high performance for the service, the government entities involved
established a Plan of Action and Results Agreement. When targets are
accomplished, employees receive a bonus.
Besides the telephone, the service is also available on a web page,
www.1746.rio.gov.br, or in free apps for portable devices in a variety of
platforms. In this case, citizens simply upload a photo of the problem and
send it to the service for the necessary solution. With this tool, users aren´t
even required to inform the address - they simply click the “Locate” icon
and the system automatically georeferences the address automatically.
In one year, the service has received 2.5 million calls. Problems were
efficiently solved in 85% of cases. A poll held by Ibope after the first year
demonstrated that 81% of users were happy with the service. Most calls came
from the neighborhoods of Campo Grande, Tijuca, Copacabana, Taquara and
Barra da Tijuca. Main requests and complaints were: trimming of trees and
removal of debris, vehicles parked improperly and concentrations of dengue
mosquitoes, besides complaints about lack of street lighting and holes on
the pavement.
The service also became a very important management tool, one of its main
benefits. With more information about the city´s actual demands, the City
Hall can improve management of its public policies and attack problems
directly at their source.
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• COR – Rio de Janeiro Operations Center
In December 2010, Rio received a modern operations center, capable of
tracking events around the city by the second, and introducing a pioneer
risk management concept in the Brazilian government.
The Centro de Operações do Rio de Janeiro (COR) was inspired by Nasa´s
control center and developed through a partnership with IBM through the
Smart Cities project. It gathers 30 city departments, public agencies and
utility companies that work together based on the information collected by
the system. Data is monitored by 400 employees 24 hours a day, seven
days a week.
By the end of 2011, the center had installed 80 46-inch monitors,
transmitting images from 150 cameras located throughout the city - in one
year they will be over 600 cameras. The monitors display a detailed, realtime, digital map of Rio with icons, showing several aspects of the city´s
operational status such as traffic and streets blocked for service repairs.
In practice, the COR functions as a convergence center through which
public managers monitor the city and work together to solve issues in the
fastest and most efficient manner. Besides representatives from the local
administration departments, the center concentrates representatives from
the State Government such as the state police and public service utilities
such as the subway and the power company. The model eliminates lack of
communication between public entities for the execution of daily tasks and
enables prompt and efficient reaction to prevent or control emergencies.
For example, in the case of service repairs on the city´s streets, the center
enables a dialogue between the teams responsible for the repair job and
traffic control entities to minimize hassles for the population. If an accident
occurs, the COR can rapidly call the firemen or the state police, increasing
efficiency. On rainy days, the cameras enable the detection of flooded areas
and summon the Public Services and Conservation Department, firemen and
civil defense.
Weather monitoring is one of the most important functions of the center,
which regularly issues alerts to help the city prevent eventual disasters
caused by rainstorms and floods. The team is made up of four meteorologists
and seven technicians working in 24-hour shifts with a variety of different
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online information mechanisms. The system counts with 33 rain gauges
and lightning sensors located throughout the city. It is also linked to the
National Space Research Institute (INPE) computers. A recently installed
weather radar enables prompt viewing of any threat of rain in the city. The
radar images are associated to a series of data produced by the other tools,
producing extremely precise weather forecasts. When their are imminent
risks of floods or landslides, an alarm is issued to different state and city
agencies, like the civil defense, the urban cleaning company, the Public
Services and Conservation department, and the traffic control authorities.
Information is also given to the press and the population using Twitter.
To be more efficient in dealing with landslides, the government mapped
all the city´s slopes using tools like laser aereal digital modelling, digital
orthophotography, and oblique aereal photos with highly precise scale and
quality. This accurate mapping, added to the weather information provided
by the center, offers a precise idea about risks faced by different areas in
the city according to the rain forecast.
The COR facilities include a Control Room, which is its central nervous
system, a Crisis Room for emergency meetings with different departments,
and a Press Room, where media representatives are constantly helping
to disseminate alerts to the population. The center also has a direct
videoconferencing line with the official residence of the Mayor and a special
office for him, in case his presence is required. A decree defines that during
a crisis, if the Mayor is absent or unaccessible for any reason, the head of
the COR will be in command of the city, turning the entity into the city´s
main power center in emergencies.
• Creation of the Public Services and Conservation Department
Conservation services such as maintenance of public squares and gardens,
cleaning of drainage systems, repair of street lighting and signaling did
not receive the necessary investments in the last 20 years. In 1996, Rio
was spending yearly R$113 million (R$240 million in corrected values) in
maintenance. From 2001 to 2008, an average of R$50 million per year
were invested in city maintenance, depriving the urban infrastructure of
proper maintenance levels.
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The solution came in 2010, with the creation of the Public Services and
Conservation Department (SECONSERVA). The agency received a budget of
R$250 million, five times more than what was being invested in the area.
The greatest innovation in this initiative, however, was the concentration of
all entities responsible for the city´s daily operation in a single department,
in alignment with the City Hall´s integration philosophy.
The traditional structure of the City Government created a distance between
the different entities, lacking a single coordination point. Comlurb, for
example, the city cleaning utility, functioned under the Mayor´s Office.
All other maintenance departments, including the General Conservation
Coordination, were within the Public Works Department. In this case, since
the main mission of this department did not include conservation, this
essencial service was gradually set aside.
The centralization increased the importance of the activity, leading to gains
in focus and synergy. Formerly, basic actions such as maintenance of rain
water drainage systems, for example, were carried out slowly and took up
an excessive waste of efforts, rendering inefficient services. In this same
example, Comlurb was responsible for cleaning drains and manholes, and
the General Conservation Coordination was responsible for the underground
drainage galleries. With the integration of the two departments, it was
possible to triple the speed of maintenance services, without demanding
more labor or money.
The integration of this new department with the 1746 Hot Line also
brought about unprecedented gains for the city. In the past, conservation
actions were ruled by the administration or even by political orders. With
the establishment of a direct channel with citizens, the population´s
requests became the department´s main focus. Presently, 70% of the calls
to the 1746 number are for services provided by the Public Services and
Conservation Department.
• UPP Social
UPP Social is the City Hall´s plan for the complete reintegration of
communities occupied by the Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) - the State
Government´s public security project. The plan is based on the assumption
that law enforcement alone is not sufficient to solve all the problems faced
by these communities, which have expanded without any government
supervision or support. The goal is to extend public services to these areas
and bring them closer to the city´s daily operation.
The main challenge for the UPP Social Project is to remove the population
from the informal status they had been living in for decades, by means of
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a gradual transition, making amends with this historical debt and bringing
an end to a long period of abandonment, both in terms of security and
infrastructure, besides providing basic services equivalent to those offered
in the formal city. A complete diagnosis of the areas with UPPs was prepared
in order to help elaborate measures and to trigger actions from the private
sector and NGOs.
To coordinate the project, the administration created a management unit
based within the Pereira Passos City Planning Institute (IPP), and agency
responsible for managing information about the city and developing strategic
projects aimed at guiding local government investments and articulating
partnerships with other levels of government, the private segment, and civil
society. The unit is also responsible for establishing permanent channels for
dialogue with community leaders and residents.
The project was implemented in 20 communities, among them Morro
dos Macacos, Borel, Cidade de Deus, Morro da Providência, Rocinha,
Vidigal and Chácara do Céu. In these areas, the pacification program was
accompanied by urban conservation services, street lighting, cleaning and
waste collection, and real estate legalization. To bring health services, 17
Family Clinics and 24-hour Emergency Units (UPAs) were built until the
end of 2012.
The partnerships were key for the program´s success. The Rio de Janeiro
State Industrial Federation (Firjan), through its Industrial Social Service
(SESI), brought training and professional inclusion for the communities´
youth, for decades accustomed to be employed by drug lords. English and
Spanish courses were offered to residents of the communities located in
Rio´s South Zone to further encourage the region´s vocation for tourism and
to benefit from the hosting of the 2014 Soccer Cup and the 2016 Olympic
and Paralympic Games.
Another project, conceived in a partnership between the Brazilian Service
for Small and Micro Businesses (SEBRAE), the Pereira Passos Institute, and
the Labor and Employment Department helped to formalize businesses in
the communities. Since August 2010, the project, called Empresa Bacana
(Neat Business), has helped 1500 small businesses to obtain their tax
registrations and permits.
The collaboration of the power utility company, Light, was key for the
reintegration of the communities. Aiming at a gradual transition to formalize
residents´ electrical connections, the company developed a program that
promotes the qualification of power grids, gives incentives for efficient
energy usage, and stimulates the residents´ registration with the company,
which makes them elegible for inclusion in a program that entitles them
to pay lower power rates. Additionally, it created a waste recycling project,
linking recycling to discounts in the power bill.
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– ACTING BOLDLY
Bringing about structural and economic changes in the city involves taking
measures that may not be popular initially. This is the risk that is part of any
long term project aiming at accomplishing a broader purpose. Since it took
office, the city administration broke paradigms in public policies, always
envisioning a future scenario, even if it came at the expense of seemingly
unpopular measures.
This implied in challenging deeply rooted cultural habits. Some examples
are the implementation of the Order Shocks, reducing tolerance to urban
disorder, and the abolition of the automatic passing system in the city´s
public schools, which only encouraged lack of commitment from the part of
students. The City Hall also focused on long term actions, building a sanitary
landfill that employs new technologies never seen before in Latin America
and focusing on technical rather than political criteria to implement its
cash transfer program, following the Federal Government´s model. It was
also very firm in building partnerships with Social Organizations in order
to eliminate one of the administration´s worse problem areas: the lack of
flexibility to purchase materials and hire personnel.
• Urban Mobility
Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) Lanes)
The lack of urban mobility is one of the major challenges in any large city
around the world, and Rio was badly in need of facing this problem in
an efficient and sustainable manner. Mobility greatly impacts the city´s
economy, the population´s quality of life, and even housing policies.
The solution chosen by the City Government was both modern and accessible:
the implementation of the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) in the city. The system
was created in the city of Curitiba and successfully introduced in several
capital cities around the world. It employs high-capacity buses in exclusive
lanes that are independent from traffic conditions. Boarding and unboarding
in the buses is faster and practical, similar to subways.
For the implementation of the new system, four new expressways were
designed to cross the city, mostly benefitting fastly expanding areas such as
the West and North Zones. The expressways will have lanes for automobiles,
but with priority for the BRT vehicles. The entire system will transport more
than 60% of the city´s residents in high-capacity units that will include
trains, subways, and the BRT. Presently, public transit capacity doesn´t even
cover 20% of the population.
Another advantage of the BRT is its implementation, faster and easier than
other modes of transport, and with the same efficiency. The solution takes up
only 10% of the investments necessary to build subways covering the same
distances. The choice for the new system reinforces the City Government´s
practice of seeking original solutions to attain the best results. At a lower
cost and with a shorter implementation period, it will be possible to radically
change urban mobility in Rio.
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Travel times
Barra da Tijuca, Santa Cruz, Campo Grande,
Inhoaiba, Cosmos, Guaratiba and Recreio
dos Bandeirantes.
56 Km total distance
53 stations
220 thousand people served
Barra da Tijuca, Curicica, Cidade de Deus,
Taquara, Tanque, Praça Seca, Campinho,
Maduureira, Vaz Lobo, Vicente de Carvalho,
Vila da Penha, Penha, Olaria and Ramos
41 Km total distance
46 stations
400 thousand people served
40 min.
Deodoro, Vila Militar, Magalhães Bastos,
Jardim Sulacap, Taquara, Curicica,
Jacarepaguá, Camorim and Barra da Tijuca
26 Km total distance
18 stations
110 thousand people served
100 min.
50 min.
Deodoro, Guadalupe, Honório Gurgel, Irajá, Brás de 32 Km total distance
Pina, Penha Circular, Penha, Ramos, Bonsucesso, 28 stations
Olaria, Manguinhos and São Cristovão.
900 thousand people served
BEFORE
AFTER
TransOeste
100 min.
TransCarioca
TransOlímpica
TransBrasil
Interconnected neighborhoods
100 min.
100 min.
40 min.
60 min.
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Light Rail Vehicle (VLT)
This project joins urban mobility and the requalification of degraded areas.
It is the innovation brought by the Light Rail Vehicle, which will run on
six lines in the city´s Downtown region. Employing high technology and
low environmental impact with very low noise levels, the system is part of
the Porto Maravilha Project and will help revitalize the port area and its
surroundings.
The VLT will be the main public transit in the region and will gradually reduce
the number of buses on the streets. With a total 52 km of rails, the system
will employ 32 units with capacity for 450 people each and 42 stations
located 400 meters apart from each other. It will also be interconnected
with other transport modes such as the trains, subway, BRT and ferry boats,
consolidating the concept of an integrated transit network. The model has
been successfully implemented in touristic cities like Istambul, in Turkey,
and Houston, in the U.S.
The VLT will integrate important parts of the downtown area such as Praça
Mauá, Rio Branco and Presidente Vargas Avenues, Praça XV, Santos Dumont
Airport, Novo Rio bus station, and the central train station, Central do Brasil.
The system is expected to attract approximately 150 thousand passengers
a day by 2016, and will double its capacity in the following two decades.
The cost for implementation adds up to R$1.1 billion, and R$530 million
have already been guaranteed by the Federal Government. The remaining
cost will be funded by the city together with the private segment by means
of public concessions.
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• Breaking Paradigms in Education Management
In the beginning of its term in office, the City Government chose to eliminate
the automatic passing program in its public schools. This was a strongly
controversial theme. The program, in force since 2007, is advocated by
educators in several Brazilian states. It separates students´ school life in
cycles and ensures that each one lasts a maximum of three years. In Rio,
the model was adopted in a very deficient way, leading to the unrestricted
practice of students passing grades without requiring any counterpart.
For this reason, City Hall decided to bring back the conventional system:
student evaluation in exams, tests and research projects in the midterm and
at the end of each year. Those who cannot reach the average grade would be
assigned to reinforcement classes. They would also have to have a minimum
attendance. Students without sufficient attendance or who do not earn the
passing grade fail.
The government then developed a diagnosis of the city´s school network.
In early 2009, the Basic Education Development Index (IDEB) - a federal
monitoring system that measures student learning, was not very bad in
the city compared to the rest of the country. However, after implementing
achievement tests at the end of the first quarter, the city verified that there
was a significant discrepancy. The IDEB scores in Rio de Janeiro were
distorted because of the extremely low passing grades accepted by the
automatic passing program.
The diagnosis surfaced alarming news about the city´s Basic Education
System. Almost 30 thousand functional illiterates were identified, a third
of them in sixth grade. Over 40% of the students were badly in need of
reinforcement in Portuguese and Mathematics. There was also a deficit of
day care centers, which not only affected younger children´s learning, for
delaying their entrance in the school system, but also kept back some of the
older children, who needed to stay home from school to take care of younger
brothers and sisters. The number of teachers was insufficient and many
schools functioned in precarious facilities or in extremely violent areas.
With the complete diagnosis in hand, the government attacked several fronts.
The students found to be functional illiterates were gathered in special
classes for the whole year in 2009 using a special literacy program prepared
in partnerships with institutions like the Ayrton Senna Institute. A program
was implemented to offer reinforcement classes in schools beginning with
the West Zone, where half of the students were poor in Portuguese and
Mathematics, and later extended to the rest of the city. 5576 teachers were
hired in the first two years of the administration, and a new curriculum
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was designed, implementing bimonthly exams. In addition, the Education
Department was the first to sign a Plan of Action and Results Agreement
defining goals to be met and its officials were gratified with an extra bonus.
In another innovative project, the city began to offer full-day classes in
150 schools located in areas with higher violence rates. The schools, in
a total of 73 communities, adopted seven-hour periods which include two
and a half hours of extracurricular sports, arts, and cultural activities. Four
thousand teachers, coordinators and directors were trained in new teaching
methodologies that would help circumvent learning blockages in children
living with violence. The goal was to reduce school drop-out rates, which
were twice as high compared to the rest of the city, and to help students who
were failing in Portuguese and Mathematics and the functional illiterates.
The results of these measures were surprising. The reinforcement classes
benefitted over 20 thousand children from third to sixth grades, who got
higher grades in the exams. Drop-out rates in the schools adopting full-day
classes declined from 5.1% to 3.3%.
• Social Organizations
One of the the current administration´s innovations was to allow Social
Organizations, or not-for-profit entities, to be the City Government´s partners
in managing some public facilities. The model has been successfully adopted
for health program management in cities like São Paulo and London. The
main benefit is the great reduction in government bureaucracy, ensuring
greater efficiency and speed for city services.
Social Organizations enjoy greater flexibility to hire professionals and to
purchase materials. Besides, their employees have quality targets to meet
and can be replaced if their performance does not satisfy the population.
In Rio, these partnerships have brought major improvements, especially
in the Health Department, which received with them a raise in its budget
from R$1.8 billion to R$4 billion in three years by the City Government,
executed through partnerships with Social Organizations. Results attained
by the end the third year were a 700% increase in the number of doctors
and technicians in the city´s Primary Care System and the tripling of the
Family Health Program´s coverage.
The law authorizing this kind of partnership and its monitoring mechanisms
ensures minimum risk levels for public money. Only previously qualified
Social Organizations with at least two years of experience can be the
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Government´s partners. Contract renovation is linked to the fulfillment of
80% of the agreed targets, and inspection of the budget execution and
results is extremely strict. The Health and Civil Defense Department set up
an Internal Controls Office to monitor its activities throughout the contract
period, besides a committee that meets every quarter to assess results.
• Rio in Order
One of the first problems mentioned by the population in the interviews held
for the Strategic Plan was excessive tolerance to the lack of order in Rio. The
complaint was that city residents learned to live side by side with informality
and disrespect to rules, further stimulated by the public administration´s
culture of leniency and reflected in the generalized disrespect for traffic
rules, in the proliferation of unauthorized constructions, in the expansion of
irregular businesses and in illegal advertising spread through the city.
Under the point of view of public management, there was a historical lack of
integration between the City Government and the state´s law enforcement to
guard public areas. In the city, the City Guard, the Licensing and Inspection
Coordination and the the Urban Control Coordination, three of the most
important entities responsible for caring for urban order, worked in extremely
precarious conditions, without any motivation, and lacking focus.
A significant change in this situation was achieved with the creation of the
Public Order Department (SEOP) in early 2009, responsible for regulating and
inspecting economic activities, municipal order and the use of public spaces.
The City Guard and three Coordinations: Licensing and Inspection, Urban
Control, and Parking Inspection and Towing, were placed under its control.
The main purpose of the new department was to carry out an Order Shock
program. Officially implemented in eight neighborhoods in the beginning
of 2009, the operation employed 2 thousand city and state officials aided
by the Civil Police and state law enforcement agents to take minors into
custody, inspect retail and food trade, repress irregular street trading,
control illegal advertising and prohibit irregular parking practices, including
the “flanelinhas”, informal car guards.
In the first year of the new agency, another relevant initiative was the
formalization of street vendors. It was the largest registration operation
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carried out in the city. Thirty-five thousand people went to several Regional
Licensing and Inspection agencies that were set up throughout the city for
the operation. A total of 25 thousand vendors were granted permits.
In the summer of 2010, the operation concentrated on Rio´s beaches. In
addition to specifying requirements for vendors and their stands, the City
Government increased monitoring of sports activities with approximately
400 city guards and inspectors. Vendors were required to adjust to rules
and use standard equipment. Selling of certain foodstuffs that could
represent health threats to consumers was forbidden, like shrimp and
grated cheese, as well as cooking and preparing food on the beach.
Sports such as beach paddle and “altinha”, a kind of soccer game, were
restricted to defined areas, and pets were banned from the beaches as a
sanitary measure.
In 2011, the City Government launched the second phase of the Order
Shock, this time establishing Public Order Units (UOPs) in strategic points
of the city. Inspired by the pacification of slums, the project replaced
random and punctual operations for permanent ones. The initiative was
based on the lessons learned during the first two years of its efforts to
improve urban order.
The first UOP, the pilot for the project, was opened in the Tijuca neighborhood
with a team of 225 City Guard officers. Their actions were focused on
chronic problems such as irregular parking and informal guards, taking up of
sidewalks with tables and chairs, and illegal street trading. The operation´s
impacts were felt even in other areas like public security. During the first
month, the number of pedestrians robbed in the neighborhood dropped 35%.
The positive results of the pilot project quickly led to the implementation of
UOPs in the Downtown, Leblon, Ipanema and Copacabana neighborhoods.
The actions to bring order to the city were impressive. After facing initial
resistance, they were finally accepted and respected by the population.
A poll carried out by the Brazilian Social Research Institute (IBPS)
with 850 Rio residents showed that 70% of the people interviewed
acknowledged and approved the initiatives. The actions considered best
were the removal of homeless people from the streets (41%), demolition
of irregular buildings (24%) and repression of street trading on the
city´s sidewalks (14%). Only 13% of respondents disapproved entirely or
partially of the order shock.
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• Family Card Program
Several city and State Governments have established cash transfer programs
to help the low income population. The most recurring problem in these
initiatives is that the registration of beneficiaries is many times subject to
political influence, and the projects drift towards clientelism, slackening and
losing focus. Rio´s City Hall broke a paradigm in this area with the creation of
the Cartão Família Carioca program, in which the government has absolutely
no influence on the list of beneficiaries. Families are registered through the
Federal Government´s cash allowance program the Bolsa Família, which has
the official data base of the country´s lowest income families and includes
one million Rio residents.
The City Government created its program drawing on the efficiency of the
Federal Government´s program, which already counted with its own safe
registry. Realizing that beneficiaries of the federal program living in Rio
required a supplementary allowance because of the high cost of life in the
capital city, the program offers an additional amount to families with income
lower than R$108 per person, which corresponds to the extreme poverty
level defined in the United Nations Millenium Goals. One of the eight goals
is a 50% reduction of the number of people living in these conditions by
2015. Besides the value defined for the benefit, the program also takes into
account social and economic variables taken from the Federal Government´s
data base such as the kind of dwelling, access to public services like water,
power and sewage, education, and vulnerability such as breastfeeding
mothers and the number of children in the family. All this information is
taken into account in the estimates carried out by the Social Studies Center
of Getúlio Vargas Foundation, which selects the families for the benefit. The
additional allowance varies from R$20 to R$400 per family.
The City Government integrated the project with its efforts to improve
education. As a counterpart for receiving the benefit, families are required
to ensure at least 90% attendance of their children in school and the
participation of an adult from the family in school meetings held every
quarter. Another innovation was the granting of additional benefits linked to
student achievement - students who improve their grades by at least 20%
in quarterly exams get an additional bonus of R$50.
In December 2011, after one year of its implementation, the program
already displayed impressive results: the number of people living below the
poverty line dropped 46%, representing a total of 420 thousand people, or
8% of Rio residents. A study carried out by the Getúlio Vargas Foundation
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showed that the performance of students in the city´s schools who received
the benefit was 20% higher than those who were in the same situation but
out of the program.
The program expanded its coverage in 2012, doubling the allowance given
to children up to 18 years of age with disabilities and including youth from
pacified communities seeking professional qualification. Total investments
amount to R$155 million, and 540 thousand people are being benefitted.
• Waste Management
For over 30 years, Gramacho, in Duque de Caxias, was used as the main
destination for Rio de Janeiro´s waste. More than nine thousand tons of
garbage coming from Rio and other cities in the metropolitan region were
dumped in the landfill, which in spite of its importance collected a series of
irregularities, among them the degradation of the mangrove on which it sat,
being dangerously close to Guanabara bay, threatening to pollute its waters,
and the unstable, muddy terrain causing constant geological changes.
On the first day of its administration in 2009, the City Government
published a decree creating a working group to solve the issue. Some
time later a bid was announced for the construction of a new landfill in
the neighboring city of Seropédica. The winner of the bid was responsible
for building a modern Waste Treatment Center (CTR) to manage all waste,
since its arrival at the collection stations until its environmentally sound
disposal at the plant.
The new plant counts with state-of-the-art technologies never used
before in Latin America to ensure proper waste management. One of the
innovations is the triple layer of waterproofing over the soil, made of
high density polyethylene (PEAD), and sensors connected to a software
program that detects any abnormality on the soil. Leachate, the liquid
produced by waste decomposition, will be converted into reusable water,
and the biogas will produce energy and be traded as carbon credits. The
opening of the CTR in 2012 kicked off a process to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions that will increase Rio´s efforts to meet the reduction goal to
which it committed in 2009, when the government announced the city´s
sustainability plan, Plano Rio Sustentável. The purpose is to reduce 8%
of emissions by 2012, 16% by 2016, and 20% by 2020. The dumps
existing in Rio de Janeiro´s metropolitan region are accountable for one
of the highest greenhouse gas emissions in the state.
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• Preparing Leaders
Rio´s administration requires leaders who are qualified in different
management techniques and tools that help meet planned goals within
defined quality, deadlines and budgets to execute all its projects and
routines. It also intends to perpetuate the results management model based
on meritocracy, ensuring that career employees hold strategic positions for
the correct functioning of the government.
The first step taken in this direction was to reestablish the João Goulart
Foundation, an agency linked to the city´s Executive Office, designating it
to develop Rio´s leaders. Together with the Administration Department, the
foundation identifies, develops, allocates, evaluates and motivates leaders
among the city´s more than 120 thousand employees.
City Leaders
The Líderes Cariocas (Rio Leaders) project was launched in March 2012
with the purpose of identifying and developing leaders in the municipal
administration. Attracting over 1300 candidates among city officials, at
the end of an objective and innovative selection process, 149 of them were
chosen for the program´s first class. The evaluations used adaptive random
testing including logical, verbal and numerical reasoning, besides a series
of profile and competence assessments conducted by the candidates´
superiors following the competence model established after extensive
consultations with high performance officials from different agencies and
levels of the administration.
The program´s first class includes 10 PhDs and 46 Masters, among employees
from all different levels of the City Government. A relevant group of Leaders
are public officials who, in spite of their potential, had never held leadership
functions before. They were approved on their own merit in the strict selection
process and are now being prepared for new and greater challenges.
Management Course
To equip Rio´s leaders with the latest management tools, the João Goulart
Foundation hired COPPEAD, Rio Federal University´s MBA School. An
internationally renowned center of excellence, COPPEAD created an
extension program specifically designed for the City Government. During six
months, City Hall officials have classes on topics like Finance, Budget and
Controls, People Management, Leadership, Statistics, Strategic Planning,
and other subjects that are necessary to lead teams and projects in a complex
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and dynamic organization like the City Government. To ensure practical
learning of the concepts, the program´s final project is based on the goals
and initiatives of the city´s Strategic Plan, which will be implemented under
supervision of the Project Management Office and whose members are in
the examining board of the final projects. Additionally, at the end of each
topic, a presentation is made by the Secretaries and experts in each area to
link what was taught in class to the city´s reality, consolidating and applying
what they learned.
Strengthening Meritocracy
Aligned with modern management practices observed in the private segment
and in leading international government agencies, the Rio Government
developed even more aggressive measures to intensify meritocracy in its
People Management area. Leaders are given individual goals which may
result in a bonus of up to four additional salaries a year when met according
to the goals in the Results Agreements. This extra motivation aligns the goals
of both government and leaders, improving management of the routines and
projects they require to serve the citizens.
Identifying and Describing Strategic Positionss
As with the Leaders, it is necessary strategic positions need to be identified
for the efficient operation of public management. These functions, given
their responsibilities, have a significant impact on the government´s
results, and must therefore be held by officials specifically prepared for the
challenges they impose. With this in mind, the João Goulart Foundation
studied in detail all the job descriptions for the main positions in each
of the results areas and, after a criterious assessment of the information,
defined those that are strategic for the achievement of the government´s
yearly and long term goals.
People Management Committee
In order to assess the Leaders´ performance and define the best succession
alternatives for the strategic positions, a People Management Committee
was created to meet twice a year. Planning for succession in government
is one of the best tools to perpetuate the High Performance Management
Model adopted by the city since the current administration took office
in 2009, ensuring the absence of gaps in strategic functions of the City
Government due to a shortage of officials with the necessary profile, training
and experience to perform with the required efficiency.
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CHAPTER 5
LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE OF RIO
– A MORE AMBITIOUS PROJECT
– THE CITY’S NEW SCENERY
• Goals Achieved and Results Obtained
• Greater Optimism
• Future Prospects
• Disseminated High Performance Culture
– STRATEGIC PLAN 2013 – 2016
• Creation of the City Council
• Improving Strategic Initiatives
• A Better Defined Budget
• Governance of Initiatives
– ASPIRATIONS AND CHALLENGES
• Greater Collaboration between Government and Citizens
• Operations Integration and High Performance
• Investing In Structural Training – People and
Information Technology
• Applying Sustainability – A Broad Concept
• Improving and Perpetuating High Performance Management
91
LOOKING TOWARDS
THE FUTURE OF RIO
– A MORE AMBITIOUS PROJECT
The first Strategic Plan developed by the City Government defined as
a horizon a new vision for the city in 2020, establishing clear goals to
be achieved in the short term – between 2009 and 2012. The strategy
consisted in structuring a pragmatic plan with clearly defined directions.
Three years after its implementation and with the success obtained
in engaging City Government’s functional body, as well as, effective
improvements in the city, city management decided to develop a new plan
that would follow this strategy.
The intention was to monitor and recalibrate previously drawn objectives
but with goals to be achieved in the following period, that is, between 2013
and 2016. This deployment would take High Performance Management to
a new level, thus consolidating the focus of the machinery of government
on professionalism and results, and reducing changes due to the political
climate. The new plan refined the first project’s guidelines, making the
most of the learning obtained then. It was able to present more daring
goals since it was developed during a period in which the city presented
significant progress.
93
– THE CITY’S NEW SCENERY
• Goals Achieved and Results Obtained
A Prefeitura assinou em 2010 Acordos de Resultado com 19 órgãos e
secretarias e estabeleceu 123 metas para o funcionalismo. Em 2011,
foram 36 Acordos de Resultados assinados com 208 metas estabelecidas.
A Prefeitura fez um monitoramento contínuo destas metas, divulgando os
resultados preliminares no primeiro semestre de cada ano e os números
consolidados nos meses de dezembro.
Em ambos os períodos, os resultados alcançados foram bastante expressivos.
No ano de 2010, 83% das metas foram cumpridas integralmente ou
superadas (com nota maior ou igual a 8,0) e aThe City Government signed
Results Agreements with 19 agencies and departments in 2010 and
established 123 goals for civil service. In 2011, 36 Results Agreements
were signed with 208 goals established. The City Government continuously
monitored these goals, and disclosed the preliminary results in the first
semester of each year and the consolidated results in December.
In both periods, results achieved were extremely meaningful. In 2010, 83%
of goals were fully achieved or overcome (with a score greater or equal
94
to 8.0) and only 4% were not realized (score below or equal to 3.9). The
chart in the figure below demonstrates this good performance and shows the
distribution of fully, partially and not achieved goals.
The employees of the 19 agencies that signed the agreements in 2010
were awarded according to their performance and received a partial or full
14th salary and in some cases even a 15th salary. 82,912 civil servants
were benefitted (73.3% of the City Government’s active employees). R$132
million were invested in bonus payments.
In 2011, despite an increase in the number of goals and the inclusion of
new agencies and their civil workers in the Results Agreements, the balance
was a positive one. This time, 88% of the goals were achieved, a 5% average
increase from the first agreement. Approximately 90,000 civil servants from
36 public agencies received a bonus. The City invested R$250 million
this year in the payment of bonuses, equal to the monthly payroll of over
100,000 active civil servants.
The goals achieved also represented objective benefits for the population.
The Family Health Program coverage rate was 3.5% in 2008 and reached
27.4% by 2011, prioritizing lower income neighborhoods in the city. In the
field of Education, 15,000 new vacancies in day-care centers were opened,
5,000 teachers were hired and 20,000 children improved their school
performance thanks to reinforcement classes. Major transport projects were
under way such as the TransOeste, almost ready, and the TransCarioca. The
government’s accounts were sound and its investment capacity hit 17.9%,
a higher rate than the ones for São Paulo, Minas Gerais and the Federal
Government. ISS (service tax) collection also grew 16%. All these results
gave the feeling that High Performance Management and the Strategic Plan
were positive victories for the city.
• Greater Optimism
Rio’s government requested a survey from Ibope that demonstrated that
80% of Cariocas were satisfied or very satisfied with their lives and that over
60% were optimistic about Rio’s perspectives. The perception regarding
security was well assessed and thus data from the Public Security Institute
showed that violent death rate had dropped 13.7% in 2011 and motor
vehicle theft dropped around 10%.
Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s credit rating agencies granted the city
investment grade rating. Moreover, in 2010, Rio was the Latin American
city that most received foreign direct investments totaling approximately
US$ 7 billion. Economic activity growth driven by sectors such as Oil &
Gas, Civil Construction, Retail and Pharmaceuticals, increased the number
of temporary and permanent jobs making the city attractive to foreigners
as well. Around 43% of all work visas granted in Brazil in 2011 were for
jobs in Rio de Janeiro. In its first year of operations, the Rio Negócios
(Rio Business) agency was consulted by 183 national and international
companies that were interested in developing projects in the city.
95
• Future Prospects
Rio’s confirmation as host city for the 2016 Olympic Games was one of the
important factors to drive growth and enhance future perspectives. The event
was a key point in requalifying the city and attracting new businesses and
investments. Moreover, there’s the fact that Rio is also the stage for Fifa’s 2014
World Cup final, in addition to other important matches in this competition.
Given its new facilities and investments in the city’s infrastructure, Rio tends to
receive increasingly more sports competitions and major events. For instance,
in 2012 there was the UN Conference on Sustainable Development - Rio+20,
with an attendance of 150 heads of state and government and in 2013, the
city will host the World Youth Day, the largest Catholic event in the world with
a forecast participation of 2 million pilgrims from over 80 countries.
Brazil’s favorable scenario also presents good perspectives for Rio. Some
of the pillars that support the thesis that unheard of favorable winds favor
the country include: pre-salt oil exploration that presents the possibility of
making the country the fourth largest oil producer in the world by 2030,
privatization of major airports and expansion of the domestic market with a
new middle class.
• Disseminated High Performance Culture
In the government’s administrative sphere, managers and employees
got engaged in implementing the Strategic Plan. In 2011, 90,000 civil
servants and 36 municipal agencies participated in the Action Plan and
Results Agreement. This helped divulge internally a routine geared toward
High Performance Management. Secretaries and managers internalized the
practice of goals follow-up meetings with minds set on objective results.
This culture became part of the government’s day-to-day routine, although
it still faced other challenges, it at least, found a better greased in-house
scenario for good management practices. At the same time, the transparency
conferred to goal results allowed the Carioca population to closely follow
municipal administration and get used to demanding good performance.
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– STRATEGIC PLAN 2013 – 2016
The new Strategic Plan was developed within the same pattern as the
previous one. That is, it started off with a consolidated diagnosis so as to
define a vision of the future for the city, with medium term goals supported
by strategic initiatives to render them feasible. The difference is the new
plan is much more daring and there was greater popular participation in
its creation.
This audacity became the new look toward the future, envisioning Rio de
Janeiro in 2030. This vision plans on turning Rio “into the best city in the
Southern Hemisphere to live, work and know”. This means making the city
the capital with the best public education in the country, Brazilian reference
in reducing the housing gap and world reference in technology services for
the Energy sector, among other objectives.
This vision of the future is sustained by bolder medium-term goals supported
by the new positive scenario in Rio and the successful implementation of
the first Strategic Plan. The plan for 2013-2016 included 56 goals, as
opposed to 46 in the first plan and 58 strategic initiatives as opposed to 37
in the first one.
There are clear examples of this greater boldness. In the Health sector, the
previous goal to increase Family Health Program coverage in 35% went up
to 70% coverage by 2016. By doubling this very important Health indicator,
the City Government bet on continuous good results and a track record of
goals accomplished in this area.
In Housing and Urban Development, the new goal to build 100,000 housing
units by 2016 represented double the previous one. And the expectation
of reducing the area occupied by slums in 3.5% increased to 5%. One of
the major advances was the government’s integration with the population
through the 1746 Call Center. The new plan has determined to service
245,000 calls a month with a positive assessment by the resident, as
opposed to 100,000 a month in the first one.
97
“For two days, Council members
dedicated their time and energy voluntarily
to talk about five themes a day.”
• Creation of the City Council
The City Council is an advisory forum created in December 2011 with
the aim of reviewing the Strategic Plan drawn up in 2009 and supporting
the creation of the 2013-2016 Plan. It ensures that the plan is coherent
with the population’s yearnings as well as embracing diversity of ideas and
best city administration practices. The Council is made up of 150 opinion
makers from Carioca society selected either due to their knowledge about
municipal issues, or due to their personal or professional contribution to the
city’s evolution.
In the end of 2011, all Council members received the content of the 20092012 Strategic Plan, the Action Plan and the Results Agreement together
with an invitation to participate in the project. As part of the process, they
responded a survey on “Vision of the city” with general questions about Rio’s
status at the time and their future expectations, in addition to questions
about the 2009-2012 Strategic Plan and the Olympic Legacy.
The Council’s first meeting to plan workshops was in January 2012 and
lasted four hours. Each of the priority result areas was discussed.
For two days, Council members dedicated their time and energy voluntarily
to talk about five themes a day. On this occasion, they had the opportunity
to discuss the results of the 2009-2012 Plan with the secretaries present
and listen to the perspective of the managers responsible for the plan’s
implementation.
The 2013-2016 Plan was created based on this work, welcoming members’
comments and suggestions about restructuring some of the ten priority
result areas, guidelines, goals and initiatives. Contributions from the City
Council were analyzed by the Executive Office team, and included in the
Strategic Plan. From then on, the council gathers once every six months to
follow up on the goals.
98
List of city Council members
100
- Adilson Pires
- Felipe Góes
- Alba Zaluar
- Fernanda Montenegro
- Alfredo Lopes
- Fernando MacDowell
- Alfredo Sirkis
- Fernando Molica
- Andre Eppinghaus
- Ferreira Gullar
- Andrea Gouvea Vieira
- Flavia Oliveira
- Antenor de Barros Leal
- Gilberto Ururahy
- Antonio Dias Leite
- Guilherme Langger
- Antonio Roberto Cesario de Sa
- Guilherme Studart
- Armando Strozenberg
- Gustavo Rocha Lima
- Augusto Ivan
- Guti Fraga
- Bertha de Borja Reis do Valle
- Hélcio Tokeshi
- Beto Sicupira
- Hugo Barreto
- Brenda Valansi Osório
- Israel Klabin
- Bruno Filippo
- Jailson de Souza e Silva
- Bruno Thys
- Jairo Werner
- Carla Camurati
- João Dionisio Amoedo
- Carla Pinheiro
- João Guilherme Ripper
- Carlos Arthur Nuzman
- João Roberto Marinho
- Carlos Carvalho
- Joaquim Levy
- Carlos Tufvesson
- Jorge Guilherme de Mello Barreto
- Carmen Fontenelle
- José Antonio Fichtner
- Carol Sampaio
- Jose Formoso
- Carolina Wambier
- Jose Isaac Peres
- Celina Carpi
- Jose Luiz Alqueres
- Celso Barros
- José Marcio Camargo
- Cesar Cunha Campos
- José Padilha
- Daniela Fiszpan
- Julio Bueno
- David Zylbersztajn
- Leandro Piquet
- Dom Orani Tempesta
- Leda Castilho
- Eduardo Eugenio Gouvea Vieira
- Lenny Niemeyer
- Elena Landau
- Lucia Hipolito
- Eloi Fernandes
- Luis Carlos Barreto
- Luís Fernando Correia
- Philip Carruthers
- Luiz Augusto Maltoni JR
- Plinio Froes
- Luiz Erlanger
- Regina Casé
- Luiz Paulo Correa da Rocha
- Ricardo Amaral
- Marcelo Madureira
- Ricardo Cravo Albin
- Marcelo Neri
- Ricardo Teixeira
- Marcelo Szpilman
- Ricardo Vieiralves
- Marcelo Torres
- Roberta Medina
- Marcos Avila
- Marcos Vilaça
- Marcus Vinicius Freire
- Maria Celeste Emerick
- Roberta Ratzke
- Roberto A. Medronho
- Roberto Dinamite
- Maria Ercília Leite de Castro
- Rodrigo Baggio
- Maria Silvia Bastos
- Rodrigo Pimentel
- Mariano Beltrame
- Rogério Chor
- Mauricio Assumpção
- Rony Meisler
- Mauricio Dinep
- Rosa Celia
- Mauro Osorio Duarte
- Michel Sarkis
- Nelma Tavares
- Nelson Sendas
- Rosiska Darci
- Sergio Bermudes
- Sergio Besserman Vianna
- Nireu Cavalcanti
- Sergio Ferraz Magalhães
- Nizan Guanaes
- Sérgio Novis
- Olavo Monteiro de Carvalho
- Sérgio Ruy Barbosa
- Padre Josefá Carlos da Siqueira
- Silvia Ramos
- Patrícia Amorim
- Solon Lemos Pinto
- Paulo Ferraz
- Paulo Gadelha
- Paulo Melo
- Paulo Moll
- Susana Herculano-Houzel
- Suzana Kahn Ribeiro
- Tânia Zaguri
- Paulo Niemeyer
- Vera Cordeiro
- Pedro Abramo
- Vik Muniz
- Pedro Buarque de Hollanda
- Wadih Damous
- Pedro de Lamare
- Walter Mattos
- Pedro José Wahmann
- Wasmália Bivar
- Pedro Luís
- Peter Eduardo Siemsen
101
• Improving Strategic Initiatives
The new Strategic Plan has a larger number of strategic initiatives that
should help achieve the proposed goals for the period. There are 58
initiatives, some of which are a continuation of the 37 established in the
first plan, while others were created in accordance with the new scenario
and goals. Each initiative was created or updated according to the same
methodology established in the first plan, including a diagnosis of the
current situation, identification of expected results, alignment with goals,
creation of performance indicators, budget definition and indication of the
schedule’s main landmarks.
• A Better Defined Budget
The experience with the first Strategic Plan facilitated a more precise
detailing of each initiative’s budget. A major differential was promoting a
deeper articulation between the Projects Management Office, responsible
for initiative monitoring and enabling, the Finance Department and each
department leading the project. The result of this was a budget with more
precise figures.
Budget estimates improved in quality and level of detailing. Prior to this,
there was only one general budget for the project. The learning process from
the practical implementation helped detail the cost according to possible
revenue sources: internal or external, budgetary or non-budgetary. This was
an important step in order to measure the plan’s financial sustainability.
The new initiatives were also benefited with the experience acquired in the
search for alternative funding sources. Successful funding models such as
AP-5’s sanitation project concession or the Public-Private Partnership for
the Porto Maravilha (Urban Waterfron Revitalization) were an inspiration for
the new initiatives.
• Governance of Initiatives
When strategic initiatives were being delineated for the first Strategic Plan,
only one lead manager was appointed to be at the forefront of each project.
However, for all practical purposes, it became clear that each project also
depended on other managers from different departments or even external
entities. Thus, throughout the process, it was up to the Project Management
Office to seek these different interlocutors and articulate them in order to
solve bottlenecks that came up along the way.
In the new plan, the mapping of these interlocutors began earlier on, while
the initiative was being delineated. When designing each project, the City
Government would identify each manager in each department that could be
involved with the initiative and solve possible bottlenecks. Hence, in a school
102
construction initiative, for instance, a manager in the Educational area was
immediately appointed, another in Construction and one in Administration.
For each initiative a Leadership Committee from the Results Area was
formed with participation of managers from different departments involved
in the project, in addition to an EGP representative and one from the
Executive Office. An Initiative Management Committee was also formed
by directors of the second echelon so as to ensure greater synergy in the
project’s execution and schedule. These committees were created with the
purpose of coming together regularly so as to predict and solve bottlenecks
before they happened.
This new governance structure is shown in the figure below with all those
involved in managing the Bairro Maravilha (Marvellous Neighborhood) initiative.
This new model provides better flow of information from the beginning of
the project and creates a collaborative environment so that any outstanding
issues or bureaucratic hindrances are more easily resolved. With this
structure, the strategic initiative can be implemented quickly and depends
less on intervention by the mayor, who is only called upon when an issue is
not solved among the participating managers.
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− ASPIRATIONS AND CHALLENGES
In the past three years, Rio de Janeiro’s City Government has experienced
a transformation in its management model which is helping guide the
machinery of government more efficiently. This change is based on the
inclusion of best practices in management and use of public and private
sectors experience. It was implemented through a perseverant policy of
disseminating a high performance culture focused on results among city
managers and employees. One of the lessons learnt on how to put the
strategic plan into action was management’s pragmatism in breaking down
strategic plans into short and medium term goals for the departments.
The City Government has been able to execute the plans in a focused and
disciplined way.
The adoption of the new model did not happen overnight and still demands
continuous improvement. This is the City Government’s main focus at
present - correct eventual errors and make the most of previous experience
to ensure improvement in management and delivery of quality services to
the population. All progress obtained to date entitles the city administration
to seek greater aspirations for the purpose of becoming a national reference
in key themes around public administration. In order to follow this path,
some aspirations and challenges were identified.
• Greater collaboration between Government and Citizens
The creation of the 1746 Call Center in 2011 was an enormous progress in
the communication between citizens and the City Government. Following
the success achieved by this solution, the ambition now is expanding the
concept of service delivery channels. Reformulation of face-to-face service
channels with the adoption of one-stop shop and self-service stations
concepts is been considered so as to complement virtual communication
channels. Social networks and new media deserve special attention in
planned solutions.
The challenges this new channel model presents are to capture more
precisely and quickly the population’s needs, expand access to public
services, enable new forms of cooperation between government, citizens
and enterprises and increase general service efficiency.
• Integration and High Performance in Operations
Many city services are provided following intervention of more than one
government agency. These are the so-called horizontal processes that offer
104
higher management complexity in services delivery. The experience acquired
with the first strategic plan pointed out the need to restructure the most
critical processes, those that involve many agencies and present delivery times
deemed very long or variable. There is a need to review and propose a new
processes and operations structure that may support the delivery of municipal
services. The purpose of this is to increase the city’s competitiveness in
attracting business and provide greater satisfaction and comfort to the citizen
who uses municipal services.
• Investing in Structural Training –
People and Information Technology
The city administration acknowledged the enormous importance of the
theme PEOPLE by implementing the Carioca Leaders program and reestablishing the João Goulart Foundation. The challenge here is to
consolidate the structures, processes and indicators that will develop the
city’s new leadership.
In parallel, there is a need for information technology infrastructure and tools
that may provide robust support to public services innovations. The Rio Intelligent City initiative channels considerable investments in connectivity,
information processing capacity, integrated corporate systems, channels
technology and expert tools in the government’s most critical areas.
The ambition is to enable responsible leading edge initiatives such as
implementation of patients’ Electronic Chart, Telemedicine, and Beds
Regulation Center (Health), Self-regulatory Traffic Signs (Transport), Social
Programs Integration (Social Development), Citizen Base (Management)
and improving COR (Rio Operations Center) and Flood Control systems.
• Applying Sustainability – A Broad Concept
The concern with sustainability is embedded throughout the context of High
Performance Management. From the inception of strategic initiatives to the
follow-up meetings, sustainability criteria are taken into account. During
the development of the 2013-2016 Strategic Plan, sustainability held a
prominent position as a strategic matter making up a result area together
with the Environment. However, it was not limited to this area alone, and
influenced the definition of several initiatives, particularly those in Transport,
Public Order and Conservation and Housing. The concept of sustainability
embodied issues such as the environment, efficient use of resources and
also initiative’s financial support. The ambition is to include and consolidate
sustainability criteria as an integral part of any city decision and action.
105
“The challenge now is to perfect
this Model taking it to a new
level of efficiency.”
• Improving and Perpetuating High
Performance Management
One of the greatest successes of city management as of 2009 was the
implementation of the High Performance Management Model, for which,
the Strategic Plan and Results Agreement were one of the structuring
solutions. The challenge now is to perfect this Model taking it to a new level
of efficiency, upgrading Rio to a leadership position and a reference in public
administration. The solution proposed to this end contemplates the expansion
of the Results Agreements and the consolidation of the “Projects and Goals
Monitoring System” through the deployment of goals and monitoring routines
in all City Government agencies and departments. Likewise, the model must
be reinforced with the inclusion of fundamental parameters such as costs
and quality of projects delivery and the strengthening of technical structures
that are responsible for the monitoring.
Lastly, the continuation of this High Performance Model is one of the main
goals of city administration so as to avoid retrocession of benefits achieved.
The dissemination of good management culture among the city’s civil
servants and the creation of a legal framework to support the Model are
some of the core elements necessary to reach this objective. Our goal will
be achieved when each unit, each direct or indirect administration agency
becomes a microcosm of High Performance Management.
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PART 2
HIGH PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
STEP BY STEP
– INTRODUCTION
– THE HIGH PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT MODEL
• Definition of Vision and Strategic Plan
1st Phase – Definition of Vision and Goals
1. Diagnosis
2. Definition of Vision
3. Definition of Goals
2nd Phase – Strategic Plan Design
4. Detailing of Goals and Initiatives
5. Physical-financial feasibility analysis
6. Strategic Plan Refining
• Strategic Plan Implementation and Institutionalization
1. Creation of Delivery Support Teams
2. Action Plan and Results Agreement
3. Monitoring Routines
4. High Performance Culture
APPENDIX
– THE PPP CONSTRUCTION MODEL
111
INTRODUCTION
The implementation of High Performance Management by Rio’s government
which began in 2009 is an experience that deserves to be shared with
other Brazilian city administrations. The methodology was developed in
partnership with McKinsey & Company, and although it is specific for Rio’s
context, it can be adapted by governments that seek management efficiency.
We believe that there are no ready-made recipes for efficient management,
but some successful models can inspire significant and long lasting changes.
In the following chapters, we will present our management model, detailing
the implementation tools in each stage, from the creation of a detailed and
ambitious Strategic Plan to the creation of institutional mechanisms for
delivery results monitoring.
In the appendix at the end of the book, we also describe the innovative
methodologies used to prepare Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) that were
used in the city and that allowed the government approach private entities
and create a specific and efficient legal framework. Such tools allowed us to
carry out such emblematic works as the Porto Maravilha project – the largest
PPP ever signed in Brazil.
Results of the City Government’s innovations, dedication and commitment
can be observed in several accomplishments in the past few years. We
believe that experiences such as this one, that can add knowledge to public
administration in Brazil, deserve to be shared.
113
THE HIGH PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT MODEL
The High Performance Management model adopted by Rio’s government is
based on six elements: Long-Term Vision, Strategic Plan, Delivery Support
Teams, Action Plan and Results Agreement, Monitoring Routines and High
Performance Culture, as is shown in Chart 1.
a – LONG-TERM VISION
This outlines the city’s long-term aspirations organized in four pillars: social,
economic, environmental and political. In 2009, the Vision’s horizon was
set at 2020.
b – STRATEGIC PLAN
Guides the City Government’s short- and medium-term actions according to
established aspirations and defines guidelines, goals and strategic initiatives
to be implemented in priority results areas. The basis for the Strategic Plan
is Rio de Janeiro’s Master Plan. In 2009, a four-year period was established,
by 2012, to achieve goals and initiatives.
c – DELIVERY SUPPORT TEAMS
These are the teams that implement and monitor the Strategic Plan. They
include the Projects Management Office, responsible for overseeing strategic
initiatives and the Results Monitoring Under-Secretariat, responsible for
overseeing Strategic Plan and Action Plan and Results Agreement goals. Both
teams were set up at the Municipal Executive Office.
d – ACTION PLAN AND RESULTS AGREEMENT
These include the work plans details for each strategic initiative, for each city
department involved, considering goals, metrics and schedules and leading
to a results agreement which establishes a performance management model
based on meritocracy and on monitoring important indicators that assess
and award civil servants based on their achievements.
e – MONITORING ROUTINES
These are the interactions carried out with the purpose of debating the plan’s
progress, solving eventual bottlenecks and engaging people towards delivery
of results. Routine meetings aim at facilitating integration of the different
agencies involved in the initiatives, given the high transversality of projects.
Participants include the Mayor, secretaries and representatives from the
Projects Management Office and the Results Monitoring Under-Secretariat.
114
f – HIGH PERFORMANCE CULTURE
These are behavioral aspects that influence the inclusion of High Performance
Management at all levels of City Government, such as adoption of transparent
and persuasive communication, talent development and leading by example.
CHART 1
HIGH PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT MODEL ADOPTED BY RIO DE
JANEIRO’S CITY GOVERNMENT
c
Delivery
Support Teams
f
High
Performance
Culture
a
Long-Term
Vision
b
d
Action Plan
and Results
Agreement
Strategic
Plan
e
Monitoring
Routines
SOURCE: Executive Office of the City Government
In this book, the approach adopted has a methodological description of
the process bias, with a focus on each element’s main stages, activities
and landmarks. Special attention was given to two central elements: Vision
and Strategic Plan, which together make up a plan for the city’s future.
The last four elements (Delivery Support Teams, Action Plan and Results
Agreement, Monitoring Routines and High Performance Culture) are
institutionalization tools for the Strategic Plan. That is, they are elements
that enable the Plan to be much more than a book of good intentions,
but rather an integrated and coherent management system geared toward
improving efficiency and execution.
115
DEFINITION OF VISION AND STRATEGIC PLAN
c
Delivery
Support Teams
f
High
Performance
Culture
a
Long-Term
Vision
b
d
Action Plan
and Results
Agreement
Strategic
Plan
e
Monitoring
Routines
DEFINITION OF VISION
AND STRATEGIC PLAN
The definition of Vision and Strategic Plan is the most relevant element
in the creation of a Plan for the city and, in general, is carried out in two
different phases: Definition of Vision and Goals and Strategic Plan Design.
Chart 2 illustrates a general view of the two phases, including the main
stages and the blocks of activities, major landmarks and main workshops
held to prepare a Plan for Rio de Janeiro. Following this, we present a
detailed description of each one of the phases.
117
CHART 2
1ST PHASE /// DEFINITION OF VISION AND GOALS
1. DIAGNOSIS
1.1 Interview with Experts
ACTIVITIES
1.2 Interview with Managers
1.3 Assessment of Previous Strategic Plan
1.4 Data Collection
OBJECTIVE
• Understand the city’s starting point
FINAL
PRODUCT
• Detailed diagnosis by result area
2ND PHASE /// STRATEGIC PLAN DESIGN
4. DETAILING OF GOALS AND INITIATIVES
4.1 Launching of the City Council
ACTIVITIES
4.2 Detailing of Goals
4.3 Detailing of Initiatives
4.4 Workshop with the Secretary
OBJECTIVE
• Present a clear, measurable objective, with a
defined period for each goal
• Prioritize strategic initiatives
FINAL
PRODUCT
118
• Definition of indicators, term and objective for each goal
• “Template” for discussion
2. DEFINITION OF VISION
ACTIVITIES
2.1 Workshop with Managers
• Define a direction for the city
OBJECTIVE
FINAL
PRODUCT
• Define main vocational areas
• Confirm Vision and Result Areas
5. PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
5.1 Review Costing and Investments
ACTIVITIES
5.2 Adjust Goals and Indicators
5.3 Discussion with City Council
• Discuss and refine goals and initiatives with City Council
OBJECTIVE
FINAL
PRODUCT
• Define funding needs and sources for the project
• Detailed budget for each project including costs and
funding sources
119
Workshop
3. DEFINITION OF GOALS
3.1 Survey of Best Practices in Public Management
ACTIVITIES
3.2 Public Opinion Polls
3.3 Workshop with the Mayor
OBJECTIVE
• Compare the city with local and international
best practices
• Define goals for each result area
FINAL
PRODUCT
• Goals and aspirations for each result area
6. REFINEMENT OF STRATEGIC PLAN
6.1 Review for Strategic Plan Final Adjustments
ACTIVITIES
6.2 Approval of Plan
6.3 Launching of Plan
OBJECTIVE
• Validate Strategic Plan feasibility and ambition
FINAL
PRODUCT
• Strategic Plan
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DEFINITION OF VISION AND STRATEGIC PLAN
1ST PHASE
DEFINITION OF VISION AND GOALS
CONCEPT – The first step for High Performance Management is to define
a vision for the city through an organized process in three activity groups:
diagnosis, definition of vision and goals.
APPLICATION IN RIO – This happened in two different moments: in 2009,
when the 2020 vision was established and in 2012, when economic,
political and social changes in the city motivated a review of the 2012-2016
vision and the Strategic Plan and its vision for 2030.
EXAMPLE – Methodological detailing of each activity group.
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1. Diagnosis
CONCEPT – The initial diagnosis aims to establish a defined starting point
regarding the city’s development stage in its main social, economic,
environmental, political and managerial issues.
APPLICATION IN RIO – The process to establish this starting point included
an analysis of existing strategic plans and master plans, in addition to
interviews with public administrators, experts and outstanding city leaders.
This survey was completed with the collection of data and performance
indicators for Rio de Janeiro. These activities are detailed below.
1.1. Interview with Experts
CONCEPT – Interview with experts from different areas enable the formulation
of a quick and solid perspective on the main opportunities and challenges
related to the city’s long-term vision. These interviews also enable the
creation of themes for specific result areas, always in accordance with each
interviewee’s field of expertise. The interviews usually last in average 45 to
60 minutes and it is recommended that they be done by third parties who
are not directly involved in city administration. It is also suggested that
representatives from the Executive Office or the City Projects Office (when
applicable) participate.
APPLICATION IN RIO – The beginning of the works was marked by interviews
with 26 opinion makers and external experts, including academics, artists,
businessmen, social entrepreneurs and athletes. The purpose of the
interviews was to provide subsidies in order to review the city’s long-term
vision, assess the implementation of goals and strategic initiatives and
identify opportunities and challenges in result areas. The interviews lasted
in average 45 minutes and were carried out by consultants and members of
the Executive Office, with the use of a standard interview guide, according
to Chart 3.
CHART 3
INTERVIEW SCRIPT.
PART I – Vision for Health
1. Aspirations/Vision.
What aspirations should we have in order to develop the city’s health sector?
And what is your vision for this mandate?
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2. Mission.
Given this, what is your mission in the health sector?
DEFINITION OF VISION AND STRATEGIC PLAN
PART II – Strategic Plan for the Health Sector
3. Goals, Status.
What is your perception about current goals of the Health Department and
Civil Defense? Are these goals appropriate? Do they need to be refined? Are
they being achieved? (discuss goal by goal)
4. Goals, Impact.
Do you think these are the most appropriate goals to ensure that this
mandate’s health sector objectives/aspirations be reached? If not, what
would have to be redefined? Should we include other more appropriate goals
(new indicators)? Should this be defined by geography?
5. Goals, Development.
Are each of the goals associated to strategic initiatives that clearly help
achieve the desired result?
6. Initiatives, Impact on Goals.
We would like to discuss the strategic initiatives that are priority in the
current strategic plan. What do you think of each one of them? Have they
achieved the expected result? Is each one linked to a specific goal? Have
they produced an impact on the agreed goals?
7. Initiatives, Budget.
Has the budget for each one of these initiatives been well defined? Is the
budget included in the City Government’s planning? Does the Mayor have a
good idea about the volume of resources necessary for the years to come?
8. Initiatives, Sustainability.
Is there some kind of private sector partnership for these initiatives, or some
of them, or a transfer of funds from state and federal governments that
might make them self-sustainable? Or even decrease the need for an outlay
from the City Government? (investment or operating expenses).
9. New Initiatives.
What other ideas/initiatives could be created so as to achieve significant
results toward our aspirations? And to achieve our goals more quickly in the
coming years? In your opinion, what are the existing barriers against better
performance in health in the city? How could we overcome them?
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10. Means Areas.
Which are the City Government’s “means areas” (example: IT, Infrastructure,
Maintenance, Human Resources, etc.) that present the greatest impact
in your day-to-day (project execution and delivery)? What are the positive
aspects in interacting with these departments? What are the greatest
difficulties? How can this be improved?
11. Private Initiative Partnership.
What could be the City Government’s role in attracting investments/business
in the health area to Rio de Janeiro?
12. Other.
How can the City Government take the opportunity of hosting events such
as the World Cup and the Olympic Games to encourage/develop the health
sector in the city?
1.2. Interview with Managers
CONCEPT /// The second stage of the first phase is to conduct interviews with
technicians and city administrators from the main city departments. For
the interviews, a standard guide is used to collect perspectives about the
city’s starting point, its main opportunities, challenges and aspirations. This
process will be added to the first perspective regarding the diagnosis that is
extracted from the interviews with the experts.
APPLICATION IN RIO /// Interviews were conducted with Secretaries from
the following Departments and Under-Secretariats: Finance, Housing,
Urban Planning, Environment, Culture, Education, Public Services and
Conservation, Public Order, Works, Transport, Health and Civil Defense,
Executive Office, Social Assistance, Tourism, in addition to RioFilme,
CDURP, Instituto de Urbanismo Pereira Passos, IPLANRio, Rio Águas and
Rio Negócios. Interviews lasted about 90 minutes and were conducted by
members of the Executive Office.
1.3. Assessment of Previous Strategic Plan
CONCEPT – Master plans and previous versions of strategic plans are
important references that provide a quick understanding of prior efforts and
their errors and successes. In addition, these plans and versions lead to the
creation of a relevant basis to structure the new plan’s result areas.
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DEFINITION OF VISION AND STRATEGIC PLAN
APPLICATION IN RIO – The 2009 Strategic Plan and the 2010 Master Plan
were used as a basis to understand the city’s starting point as well as the
existing opportunities and challenges in each result area. During this stage,
the main advances of each area were examined since the launching of the
2009-2012 Strategic Plan, by identifying mistakes and successes in the
implementation of goals and initiatives. The main existing challenges in
each result area were also pointed out and whose solution was approached
by the 2013-2016 Strategic Plan, as well as opportunities presented.
EXAMPLE – Chart 4 demonstrates the goals achievement assessment.
CHART 4
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1.4. Data Collection
CONCEPT – Another important stage in conducting the diagnosis is collecting
concrete indicators of city performance in the most important areas under
the responsibility of city administration, such as Health, Education,
Economic Development and Transport.
APPLICATION IN RIO – Data were collected from official sources such as
IBGE, RAIS, IPEA and other, according to the example illustrated in Chart
5. They were essential to the understanding of Rio de Janeiro’s reality.
EXAMPLE – Panel with city data collection.
CHART 5
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DEFINITION OF VISION AND STRATEGIC PLAN
2. Definition of Vision
CONCEPT – Once the city’s starting point is clear, the long-term vision must
be defined. Based on previous interviews and diagnosis, it is possible to
identify the city’s strengths on which it should be based.
APPLICATION IN RIO – An objective to be achieved by 2030 was established
and it was called “Vision Rio 2030”. The future scenario that the City
Government envisions for the city can be translated into an ambitious goal:
“to be the best city in the Southern Hemisphere to live, work and visit”. In
addition to the vision and ambition for the city, four aspiration pillars were
defined: social, economic, sustainability and politics, as shown in Chart 6.
EXAMPLE – Vision of Rio in 2030.
CHART 6
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Rio’s ambition for the social area is to be the capital that simultaneously
unites best quality of life, an efficient primary health system and promotion
of healthier habits and customs for a population that is integrated to
education and culture. To this end, the following aspirations were defined:
• To be the capital city with the best public education in the country.
• To be the capital city whose primary health system presents the best
quality in the country, in both efficiency and care.
• To be a national reference in reducing the housing gap in big urban centers.
• To be a capital city with no extreme poverty, no extreme inequalities and
the most culturally and socially integrated one.
For the economic area, Rio was defined as a city that will be a city of
global prominence given its high attractiveness to business, reduced rate of
indolence, and continuous growth of its workers average income. To achieve
this, Rio shall be:
• World reference in services and technology for the Energy sector and the
largest tourist center in the Southern Hemisphere.
• Leading capital city in the country’s Creative Industry Development with
special focus on design, fashion, scenic and audiovisual arts.
• National reference in business environment excellence, leading in
attracting and maintaining productive investments.
In the field of sustainability, Rio aspires to be acknowledged as world
reference in sustainable development, with the conservation of its
environmental heritage. To achieve this, it shall be:
• A world reference in the maintenance of a sustainable transport matrix,
in eco-efficient economic activities and in educating a society for low
GHG emissions.
• The city whose metropolitan area has the largest forest coverage integrated
to the urban area on the planet, with clean and preserved water resources
(rivers, lagoons, bays and ocean coast).
• One of the largest capital cities served by a waste and wastewater collection
and treatment system that is both efficient and universal.
In the political arena, the city wishes to be recognized as one of the main
political and cultural centers in the global scenario. To achieve this, it shall be:
• Recognized for holding major events and as a decision-making venue
for discussing global sustainability and economic development of emerging
countries.
• A national reference on High Performance Public Management.
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• A global reference in high value cultural productions.
• Prominent in respect for human diversity.
DEFINITION OF VISION AND STRATEGIC PLAN
2.1. Workshop with Managers
CONCEPT – The approach used to define the vision consists of one or more
workshops with public administrators and selected experts. The purpose of
this workshop is discuss the lessons learnt during the diagnosis and vision
establishment stage, considering the city’s main challenges and competitive
advantages as well as the citizen’s most remarkable beliefs and values.
APPLICATION IN RIO – Workshops were held with administrators to review
this vision based on interview results and City Government’s performance
analysis regarding the long-term vision established in 2009 and in 2012.
Workshop participants included members of the Executive Office, experts
and Secretaries. The sessions were facilitated by outside consultants and
lasted approximately 4 hours.
EXAMPLE – Chart 7 illustrates the aspirations raised in the workshop with
transport and public order administrators.
CHART 7
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3. Definition of Goals
CONCEPT – While the Vision, supported by the four essential pillars,
presents a more general idea of the city’s long-term objectives, the
Strategic Plan directs short- and medium-term actions. The rationale is to
extract from this aspiration the tactical actions that the City Government
shall adopt at present so as to achieve this vision. The Plan shall be
deployed into great aspirations (strategies guidelines) and then into
strategic goals and initiatives.
APPLICATION IN RIO –The Strategic Plan firstly defined actions for the 2009
- 2012 period and, in its most recent version, for the 2013 - 2016 period.
Chart 8 illustrates the hierarchy adopted by the city to deploy the Plan into
goals and projects.
EXAMPLE – Structuring of Rio de Janeiro’s Strategic Plan.
CHART 8
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3.1. Survey of Best Practices
in Public Management
DEFINITION OF VISION AND STRATEGIC PLAN
CONCEPT – This survey intends to identify practices implemented by other
cities and even in other spheres with challenges that are similar to those of
Rio de Janeiro. The solutions and results obtained will serve as reference
cases in strategic planning discussions.
APPLICATION IN RIO – In order to understand how the city could improve, it
was essential to understand how other cities that were in a similar situation
had acted. This national and international benchmarking was important not
only to generate new ideas on best practices in management, but also set
limits around the goals for the city’s result areas.
EXAMPLE – Charts 9 and 10 present examples of practices raised and
comparative analyses made at this stage of the process.
CHART 9
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CHART 10
3.2. Public Opinion Polls
CONCEPT – Public opinion polls are used to guide strategic planning. By
means of this instrument, the City Government can better understand how
the citizen sees his city and which the priority themes are.
APPLICATION IN RIO – In order to raise additional information for the
diagnosis of result areas, a quantitative research with about one thousand
Cariocas was requested to IBOPE. Sample selection was done in two stages:
the first one, a probabilistic selection of censitary sectors and the second,
with a fixed number of participants. The error margin for the poll was
3%. This survey demonstrated not only the main challenges for the city
according to its citizens, but also how they evaluate specific areas, such as
urban transport, education and health.
EXAMPLE – Some selected research results can be seen in Charts 11 and 12.
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CHART 12
DEFINITION OF VISION AND STRATEGIC PLAN
CHART 11
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3.3. Workshop with the Mayor
CONCEPT – As the main executive of the city’s administration, the Mayor is
also the Strategic Plan’s main sponsor. Thus, the definition of goals shall
be made with his attendance. The workshop approach is more efficient
for discussions and submission of propositions, for it gathers managers
and experts.
APPLICATION IN RIO – After the result area diagnosis was concluded, a
workshop was held at the City Hall with the participation of the Mayor, City
Secretaries and guests (experts in the different result areas). During the
workshop, result areas diagnosis was analyzed and this served as a basis for
participants to propose new guidelines, goals and strategic initiatives for the
2013-2016 Strategic Plan. Thus, following the discussion about the main
advances in each area during 2009-2012, the definition of the main existing
challenges and opportunities and benchmarking against international and
national references; the Secretaries and experts presented the elements to
be used in reviewing the plan from the point of view of guidelines, goals
and strategic initiatives. The proposals by the workshop attendees were
refined throughout the process and could count on contributions from other
members of the City Government as well as from civil society.
In this work session, participants helped define 10 priority result areas
for Rio de Janeiro’s development. These areas were identified through the
city’s socioeconomic diagnosis and for being a structuring axis for City
Government’s long-term vision. These areas include:
RESULT AREAS IN THE 2013-2016 PLAN
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Health
Education
Public Order and Conservation
Economic Development
Housing and Urban Planning
Environment and Sustainability
Transport
Culture
Social Development
Public Management and Finance
EXAMPLE – Chart 13 presents a goal discussed for the Education area.
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DEFINITION OF VISION AND STRATEGIC PLAN
CHART 13
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DEFINITION OF VISION AND STRATEGIC PLAN
2ND PHASE
STRATEGIC PLAN DESIGN
CONCEPT – Once the city’s vision and goals have been defined, it is necessary
to develop the actions that when implemented will enable the achievement
of these goals and objectives, and the plan’s focus is on establishing shortand medium-term projects with detailed scope, investments and work plan
feasibility.
APPLICATION IN RIO – The main innovations in the Strategic Plan detailing
process were the inclusion of Civil Society, by means of the City Council,
and a thorough analysis of the initiatives’ physical and financial feasibility.
The City Council assembles 150 citizens, under the City Government’s
leadership, to discuss the Strategic Plan and create a communication
channel between public management and civil society.
In addition to this, the physical and financial feasibility analysis of the
strategic plan is a crucial stage of thoroughly understanding the financial
and execution capacity of each proposed initiative. At this point, each
city department detailed its budget and funding sources for all projects,
adjusting goals to be achieved according com the City Government’s
investment capacity.
EXAMPLE – Synthesis of main activities, objectives and final products of
each moment of the Strategic Plan design process.
139
4. Detailing of Goals and Initiatives
CONCEPT – Defining a long-term vision and strategic goals and initiatives is
an important step toward giving the city a direction to follow. However, it is
essential to quantitatively and measurably detail which goals, so as to direct
the efforts of civil servants and better monitor the strategy’s execution.
The detailing process of annual goals and initiatives is composed of four
distinct phases: (i) discussion with the City Council so as to engage Civil
Society in the decision making process; (ii) detailing of goals whose
objective is to describe goals with analytical indicators; (iii) detailing of
initiatives, turning goals into concrete actions with schedules, indicators
and budgets; (iv) aligning departments´ leadership with the Executive Office
and the Mayor.
4.1. Launching of the City Council
CONCEPT – When implementing a Strategic Plan in a public administration
it is vital to count on citizens’ contributions. This can happen through the
creation of councils, assemblies or advisory agencies.
Civil Society’s participation not only enhances public management but
also increases citizen’s political involvement. The decision to bring
in representatives from the population to help in the strategic planning
effort is based on successful national and international experiences. This
exercise, when well mediated, can generate creative solutions to problems
and deadlocks.
The option of creating an advisory council means restricting the number of
participants, but also demands defining a work methodology, including roles
and accountabilities of council members, rules of participation, as well as
definition of guest participants.
The first meeting with council members should include an explanatory part
about the council’s dynamics, thus clarifying council members’ participation
and engagement expectations. During this stage, the council is involved in
the debate around goals, presenting the diagnosis prepared in the previous
stages and fostering a debate around the goals for each work area. In order
to level out participants’ knowledge about possible themes and ambitions,
international and national cases of governments that faced similar situations
with positive results should be presented.
APPLICATION IN RIO – The City Council was created as an advisory forum
made up of 150 outstanding citizens, either due to their knowledge about
issues related to our city or due to their personal or professional contribution
toward the city’s progress. The Council gives assistance so that the plan is
coherent to the populations’ desires while providing a diversity of ideas and
best practices in city administration.
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DEFINITION OF VISION AND STRATEGIC PLAN
The people who were invited to participate in the Council received a book
containing the 2009-2012 Strategic Plan, the city’s Action Plan and
Results Agreement and an invitation to participate in the forum. As part
of the process, they replied a survey about their “Vision of the City”, with
general questions about Rio’s current status and their future expectations,
in addition to questions about the 2009-2012 Strategic Plan and the
Olympic Legacy.
This first event included a presentation about the concept, the role of the
Council in the Strategic Plan, in addition to a diagnosis of the city. The
approach used to present the material was a poster gallery that showed
the city’s evolution in key-indicators and presented some national and
international examples of cities that face similar challenges to the ones
faced by Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, posters were also used so that council
members could suggest changes to guidelines and strategic initiatives
outlined in the previous plan.
EXAMPLE – Charts 14 and 15 show the rules of participation for council
members and the posters displayed in one of the meetings.
CHART 14
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CHART 15
At the end of the meeting, an opinion poll was held among participants to
evaluate the level of satisfaction with the event. The poll included aspects
such as general perception, content, materials, format and dynamics, in
addition to questions about specific aspects of the meeting that met their
expectations and improvements for future meetings. Poll results were
compiled, analyzed and shared with the Executive Office.
4.2. Detailing of Goals
CONCEPT – Detailing goals consists in quantifying those to be achieved
every year by the municipal departments, agencies and public enterprises
involved. This entails the description of the measurement unit used as
an indicator, the calculation formula, and the reference unit as well (last
available information about the indicator).
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DEFINITION OF VISION AND STRATEGIC PLAN
APPLICATION IN RIO – Working meetings were held with 21 departments,
agencies and public enterprises of the city with over 100 participants to
translate the goals proposed by Secretaries during their workshop into
annual quantitative goals. These meetings lasted in average two hours and
were facilitated by external mediators, and whenever possible, counted with
the participation of at least one member from the Executive Office. A first
meeting with all members from the city´s departments, agencies and public
enterprises involved is recommended in order to present forms to be filled
out, as well as to explain the structure of the Strategic Plan. After filling out
these goals, the Executive Office team assesses the boldness of the goals
based on the past performance of the indicator’s area.
EXAMPLE – Chart 16 illustrates the model used to detail goals with an
example from Health goals.
CHART 16
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4.3. Detailing of Initiatives
CONCEPT – This is the formulation of one or more technical solutions,
together with managers and experts, with the purpose of achieving quantified
goals. The best technical solution is picked as a strategic initiative.
APPLICATION IN RIO – Three meetings, on average, are held between
members of the Executive Office and managers involved in each strategic
initiative to be detailed. The purpose of these meetings is to fill out the forms
with details of each initiative’s current status; description; expected results;
alignment with goals; budget; and major milestones on the schedule.
EXAMPLE – Chart 17 details an initiative from the Health sector.
CHART 17
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4.4. Workshop with Secretaries
DEFINITION OF VISION AND STRATEGIC PLAN
CONCEPT – An additional workshop with Secretaries is indicated in view
of the number of participants including managers, experts, consultants
and also the need for aligning the “Final Review and Approval” with the
Strategic Plan’s coordination. Moreover, all participants involved are
encouraged to get engaged especially in initiatives that involve more than
one department.
APPLICATION IN RIO – The goals and initiatives were justified and defended
by the responsible area in workshops with the participation of the Head of
the Executive Office and his team. These workshops were held in sessions
of about 4 hours. The meetings were divided in different result areas, so
that all agencies involved in that specific area participated. For instance,
in the Culture area workshop, participants included Secretaries and experts
from the Culture Department, RioFilme president and employees and
representatives from the Under-Secretariat of Heritage and the Department
of Public Works.
5. Physical and Financial Feasibility Analysis
CONCEPT – Resources availability is one of the most important preconditions
in the implementation of a Strategic Plan. Furthermore, an analytical and
conservative budget approach is essential to plan resource allocation,
check costs feasibility and identify strategic priority projects that have no
defined budgets.
An in-depth physical and financial feasibility analysis includes: (i) a
comprehensive costs and investments review; (ii) adjustment of goals
and indicators to the expected resources level; (iii) validation with the
Advisory Council.
APPLICATION IN RIO – Each department together with the Department of the
Treasury and the Project Management Office was responsible for the costs
and investment review (revenue source should be detailed in the budget).
Previously agreed upon goals were fine-tuned to meet the defined investment
capacity of the strategic initiative. The process ended in a workshop with
the City Council, so that Council Members could suggest revisions in goals,
guidelines and strategic initiatives.
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5.1. Review Costing and Investments
CONCEPT – The methodology used in this stage for each project’s budget
formulation calls for active participation of the Department of the Treasury.
In order to fully understand the actual budget and consequently the
financial feasibility of the project, it includes a detailed description of the
project’s financial resources, if they are internal or external, budgetary or
non-budgetary. This approach shows the allocation of resources and costs
paid by the City Government agreed upon in the Strategic Plan as internal
budget sources and the part that corresponds to external sources such as
loans and transfers (external budget sources) or concessions and PPPs
(non-budget external sources) to assess the plan’s financial sustainability.
APPLICATION IN RIO – The promotion of a joint effort among the Project
Management Office, responsible for the oversight and implementation of
initiatives, the Department of the Treasury, responsible for the treasury, and
all the departments responsible for the project was a major step forward in
Rio’s City Government. This alignment resulted in a well-coordinated budget,
with precise figures and greater clarity. All stakeholders will participate in
budget alignment meetings for projects at the different departments.
A series of work sessions took place with the team of the Budget
Superintendence of the Department of the Treasury (FSOR) in order to
proceed with the ongoing process to analyze the financial sustainability
of the Strategic Plan and study the city´s current and forecasted
investment capacity. FSOR met with the departments to detail budget
costs as well as internal and external financial sources. The Department
of the Executive Office added the results as part of the Strategic Plan
sustainability analysis.
Information on the costs and investment analysis process must be standardized
among all departments to help entry of financial information received.
EXAMPLE – Chart 18 A and B shows the examples of the models used by the
Transport Department to detail annual budgets and identify funding sources
for each initiative.
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CHART 18 B
DEFINITION OF VISION AND STRATEGIC PLAN
CHART 18 A
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5.2. Adjust Goals and Indicators
CONCEPT – Information on costs and investment of initiatives and aggregated
analysis of all available resources calls for goals and indicators adjustment
in order to align them to financial availabilities.
APPLICATION IN RIO – A series of meetings with FSOR and the departments
to align goals and indicators.
5.3. Discussion with City Council
CONCEPT – The City Council is an advisory body formed by experts from
different areas that express their views on the guidelines, goal and initiatives
set forth.
APPLICATION IN RIO – City Council members participated in 4-hour workshops
about each priority result area: Economic Development, Education, Health,
Environment and Sustainability, Transport, Public Order and Conservation,
Housing and Urbanization, Culture, Social Development, and Management
and Public Finance.
Council members met for two days and on a volunteer basis contributed
with their time and energy to debate five topics each day. On this occasion
they had the chance to go over the 2009-2012 Plan with the Secretaries
and listen to the points of view of those responsible for the implementation
of the 2009-2012 Plan. This activity gave Council members a clearer view
on strengths and obstacles for the implementation of the plan.
Once this activity was over, the City Council members made their
contributions by suggesting guidelines, goals and strategic initiatives to be
included in the 2013-2016 Plan.
EXAMPLE – Conclusions of workshop activities, suggestions on guidelines,
goals and strategic initiatives by area to be included in the Strategic Plan
were summarized and analyzed by the team to check the compliance
level and overlapping of proposals already made in previous stages to the
creation of the plan (workshops with secretaries, work meetings with City
Hall technical personnel) as shown in Chart 19. Charts 20 and 21 show the
Council’s meeting schedule and Chart 22 shows the summary of proposals
accepted by the Plan.
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CHART 19
CHART 20
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CHART 22
DEFINITION OF VISION AND STRATEGIC PLAN
CHART 21
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6. Refinement of Strategic Plan
CONCEPT – The refinement stage of the Strategic Plan is divided into three
main activities: (i) Strategic Plan final adjustment review; (ii) validation
by the Mayor (or head of state, in the case of states or countries); (iii)
launching of the Plan.
It is important to analyze all information and align the Strategic Plan with
all stakeholders in order to launch the project in due time.
APPLICATION IN RIO – Validation by the Mayor took place within the framework
of a workshop, and the launching took place in two events, one for Council
members and the other one as an open event with more than 500 citizens.
EXAMPLE – A list of the activities that took place is detailed below with a
description of the activity and the end product of each one.
6.1. Strategic Plan Final Adjustments Review
CONCEPT – The review focuses on the assessment of consistency among
vision, goals and initiatives, as well as on final priority feasibility of
initiatives introduced. The activity ends with the selection and grouping of
certain goals and initiatives.
APPLICATION IN RIO – The Executive Office compiled and analyzed
lessons learned in the City Council workshops which led to suggestions of
guidelines, goals and strategic initiatives to be included in the plan to check
consistency levels and overlaps with previous proposals. The Executive
Office also analyzed the summary with the contributions made by the City
Council to refine the Strategic Plan and ensure its financial sustainability.
Once the group defined the strategic initiatives in the 2013-2016 Plan,
the following criteria were followed to establish priorities: i) positive result
for citizens; ii) time to delivery of positive results; iii) regional impact. The
Executive Office team established priorities for each new strategic initiative
according to the above mentioned criteria, grading them from 1 to 3.
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DEFINITION OF VISION AND STRATEGIC PLAN
6.2. Approval of Plan
CONCEPT – The head of the Strategic Plan and the highest-ranking authority
in the city, state or country is responsible for the final plan´s approval.
At this point, authorities validate proposals and grant the necessary final
priorities, especially in areas subject to budget limitations and deadline or
feasibility challenges to implement projects proposed.
APPLICATION IN RIO – The implementation process is divided in two stages.
First, the Executive Office and Treasury teams participated in a one-day
workshop to go over all goals and initiatives in each area for a last consistency
check before the final meeting and interaction with the Mayor. After this first
moment, another one-day workshop for final validation takes place.
6.3. Launching of Plan
CONCEPT – The launching of the Strategic Plan is a key moment, as it
gives the plan an institutional framework for empowerment by society. A
well-organized launching event is one of the main aspects in the creation
of a Plan for a city, state or country that will go beyond terms of office.
The ideal situation would be to introduce the Strategic Plan report in an
official presentation event that focuses on the plan’s structure, key pillars
and ambitions. Public disclosure of the Strategic Plan is an important
transparency initiative and a way to communicate the city´s plans and future
vision to the population.
APPLICATION IN RIO – A new edition of the 2013-2016 Plan was presented
to Council members in March, 2012. This edition included their comments
as well as the conclusions of the workshop with City Hall Secretaries and
technical staff and comments by the population of Rio de Janeiro State.
Council members could see firsthand which are the Plan’s guiding pillars, key
initiatives, estimated budget, and especially how their own suggestions and
recommendations were included in the Plan.
The Strategic Plan public launching event took place at the Port, in an
important ceremony with the Mayor and all Secretaries.
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STRATEGIC PLAN
IMPLEMENTATION AND
INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Once the definition of the Strategic Plan is over, the new challenge is to
implement and monitor it efficiently. In order to achieve this, mechanisms
to oversee implementation must be created as is the case with organization
structures that focus entirely on project monitoring and management. The
Results Monitoring Office (EMR, acronym in Portuguese) and the Project
Management Office (EGP, acronym in Portuguese) were set up in Rio de
Janeiro for this purpose.
The first step in the Strategic Plan implementation and monitoring
stage is to create an action plan with detailed annual goals. This is an
essential step in the definition of structure, schedule, budget and key
implementation milestones for each strategic initiative. Each agency (city
department, foundation, company, public agencies) is responsible for the
detailed description of goals prior to the signing of the Action Plan and
Results Agreement, a document entered into by the Department as proof of
commitment to the goals described.
Another challenge is to involve all city officials and motivate them to
accomplish the established goals. One of the most widely used methodologies
in the private sector are the performance based bonus programs, which can
be adapted to the public segment. The Action Plan and Results Agreement
is a contract entered into by each agency and the Mayor, establishing a
payment of bonuses for civil servants who reach annual goals.
With the Results Agreement finalized, it is important to decide upon monitoring
routines, definition of a meetings schedule, presentations of indicators reports,
and definition of who will take part in the meetings. In the case of Rio, weekly,
monthly and quarterly meetings with the Mayor were scheduled.
Finally, it is important to highlight the High Performance Management culture.
As is the case with the Results Agreement, which is a formal mechanism to
guarantee High Performance, informal considerations as setting the example
in leadership behavior, the desire to collaborate among sectors and goals
cascading are important to strengthen the commitment to deliver results.
A detailed description of main activities in this stage is listed below.
c
Delivery
Support Teams
f
High
Performance
Culture
a
Long-Term
Vision
b
d
Action Plan
and Results
Agreement
CREATION OF DELIVERY SUPPORT TEAMS
Strategic
Plan
e
Monitoring
Routines
1. CREATION OF DELIVERY
SUPPORT TEAMS
1.1. Creation of the Results
Monitoring Under-Secretariat
Management is the main productivity leverage in an organization. This
concept is applied both to the public and private sector. The creation of a
strategic center for performance management is one of the key aspects in
public management transformation since it creates a role model and the
urge to change.
The Results Monitoring Under-Secretariat in Rio is responsible for the
Strategic Plan’s goals follow up. The Under-Secretariat Is also essential for
the Action Plan and Results Agreement since it interfaces the narrowing
down of the plan’s goals into more specific goals each department or public
agency has to achieve throughout the year.
The entity´s team has to collaborate in the establishment of specific goals
for each department, follow up on their achievement and disclose results
both for the internal public at the City Government and the external public.
157
IplanRio, the city´s IT agency, will develop a system to simplify monitoring
of goals and provide greater flow and transparency to information exchange
between managers and the Results Monitoring Under-Secretariat. Figures
below show the functions of the tool that will allow the Under-Secretariat
to monitor and disclose performance results in each area. This program
shows goals achieved by result area in the Strategic Plan and Action Plan
and Results Agreement goals by department, as demonstrated in Chart
23. These applications are important since some result areas have goals
from different city departments, as is the case with the Transport results
area, which includes goals from the Transport Department and the Public
Works Department.
CHART 23
158
CREATION OF DELIVERY SUPPORT TEAMS
CHART 24
1.2. Creation of the Project Management
Office - EGP
The Project Management Office was created within the framework of the
Executive Office, following the example set by the Results Monitoring UnderSecretariat. It is responsible for monitoring and facilitating the successful
implementation of strategic initiatives and for supporting the UnderSecretariat in formulating and monitoring goals. The focus of activities in
the Office are twofold: (i) prepare management reports for senior managers
and especially for the Executive Office and the Mayor; (ii) Identify deadlocks
and support managers in ways to overcome barriers to the timely fulfillment
of the scope and schedule of the strategic initiatives and related goals.
In order to achieve these objectives, strategic project implementation is
monitored by an online monitoring panel to check on delivery, together
with regular meetings with project managers, and when possible, by sector
management meetings monitoring and on-site information checking.
159
The Project Management Office promotes meetings with sponsors on a
regular basis to overcome the difficulties presented by the cross cutting
nature of projects. A project management methodology was adopted to
mitigate the impact deadlocks might have on timely implementation of
initiatives and goals.
The Project Management Office and IplanRio (The City Government´s IT
agency) developed an IT tool in a partnership project to support strategic
project implementation and management. EGPWeb is a web based tool, as
shown on Chart 25.
The tool´s functionalities provide monitoring of all project activities. The
manager can contact all stakeholders in the project, at all levels up to the
Mayor, in case of urgent situations that threaten the timely schedule of
initiatives and related goals. In practical terms, these types of functions
clear bottlenecks and help information flow, contributing to a successful
implementation of initiatives.
CHART 25
160
c
Delivery
Support Teams
f
High
Performance
Culture
a
Long-Term
Vision
b
d
Action Plan
and Results
Agreement
Strategic
Plan
e
Monitoring
Routines
ACTION PLAN AND RESULTS AGREEMENT
2. ACTION PLAN
AND RESULTS AGREEMENT
This is the first step in the Strategic Plan implementation and monitoring.
The objective of the Action Plan is to provide detailed information on
each strategic initiative and explain the analytical structure, governance,
schedules, budgets and clear goals to each agency involved, in order to
ensure achievement of scope and strategic goals.
These goals were agreed upon in the Results Agreements, a key milestone
in the modernization of public administration. The tool rationale focuses on
results, satisfaction and effectiveness, more than rewarding those who stand
out in their duty for meritocracy. The model provides greater commitment
of the city administration with the City Government´s results and helps
improve public service through clear objectives, showing administrators how
to achieve goals.
This phase is divided in four stages: (i) detailed work plan description
for each initiative; (ii) description of goal proposals by agencies; (iii)
assessment, negotiation and inclusion of proposals in Results Agreements
by the Executive Office and the agency; and (iv) detailed description of
annual goals by the Agency’s internal structure. Once this final phase is over,
161
the resulting Action Plan will include goals, metrics, governance, schedules,
budget and an Action Plan and Results Agreement for each agency in order
to implement the Strategic Plan.
A description of main activities in this phase is listed below.
2.1. Detailed Description of the Action Plan
Strategic initiatives and goals defined in Phases 1 and 2 are implemented
through an annual work plan developed for each initiative that must include
the following items:
• PAS – Project Analytical Structure (Initiative) – Chart 26
• Governance – Chart 27
• Schedule – Chart 28
• Budget refinement and Budget fine tuning – Charts 29, 30 and 31
Work Plans for each strategic initiative in Rio de Janeiro are exemplified
below, using Health as an example.
CHART 26
162
ACTION PLAN AND RESULTS AGREEMENT
CHART 27
CHART 28
163
CHART 29
CHART 30
164
ACTION PLAN AND RESULTS AGREEMENT
CHART 31
2.2. Goals Proposed by Departments
Each department is responsible for drafting a detailed goals proposal that
describes the Strategic Plan goal in terms of a more specific sub goal. The
purpose of this activity is to create goals that combine final results like
IDEB grade, indicators of tangible end products like number of schools
built/remodeled, vacancies in day care centers, and project indicators such
as the percentage of children served.
The departments received model spreadsheets, shown in Chart 32 A and
B, to enter details on how the proposed goal would be achieved by dividing
it into more specific sub goals that are compatible with each department´s
activity in an approach covering all areas in Rio de Janeiro.
165
CHART 32 A
CHART 32 B
166
2.3. Assessment, Negotiation and Inclusion in
Results Agreements
ACTION PLAN AND RESULTS AGREEMENT
In this stage, the Mayor and the Executive Office team (Head, EGP and
EGM) proposed goals to strike a balance between what is desired and what
is plausible for the agency.
Goals are agreed upon by the Executive Office and each agency in the Action
Plan and Results Agreement entered into by the City Hall that connects the
achievement of previously detailed goals to the bonus reward.
In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the Action Plan and Results Agreement is an
important accountability instrument, not only for the departments, but also
for civil servants’ achievement of goals defined.
93 thousand civil servants collected R$ 140 million in performance bonuses
for goals achieved in the Action Plan and Results Agreement in 2012. In
2011, 39 departments joined in the process and 83% of goals agreed upon
in the Action Plan and Results Agreement were achieved.
The creation of the Action Plan and Results Agreement is described in
detail below.
The tangible result of the Agreement is translated into financial bonuses paid
to each city employee. The amount varies from one half to two additional
salaries per year per employee, depending on results achieved. This model
is similar to the performance bonuses paid in privately owned companies.
Goals are agreed upon between the Executive Office and each department
or public agency. These goals are not the major goals in the Strategic Plan,
but the more specific sub goals that are compatible with the activities of
each department in a crosscutting approach to all areas. These sub goals are
created by combining final result indicators like the IDEB grade in the case
of education, as well as indicators of tangible end products like the number
of vacancies in day care centers, and project indicators like the percentage
of children served. The idea is to use parameters that can be measured on
a regular basis.
• Grades Definition
All City Departments entering into the Results Agreements are subject
to performance assessment through a grading system. If they exceed the
expected threshold, they receive a performance bonus. Grades are rated
from two to ten, and results are disclosed at the end of the year:
• Grade 2 – The indicator stays at the same level or below.
• Grade 4 – The indicator improves significantly.
• Grade 6 – The indicator improves significantly but the goal was not achieved.
167
• Grade 8 – The goal set by the department was achieved.
• Grade 10 – Considered a “super goal”, difficult to achieve, exceeds the
expected goal by at least 20% or accomplishes the goal established for the
following year.
All grades are rated in color codes: green for grades between 8 and 10,
yellow for grade 6, orange for grade 4 and red for grade 2. Departments
that fulfill the agreement (grades between 8 and 10) are rewarded with
variable bonuses at the end of the year. Chart 33 shows Education as an
example of goals set by a city department for the end of 2010. Assessment
to determine which agency will receive a bonus is based on these goals.
CHART 33
168
ACTION PLAN AND RESULTS AGREEMENT
Implementation of the Action Plan and Results Agreement in Rio´s City
Government was gradual. Agreements were entered into by municipal
schools and Riofilme in 2009, involving 43% of the city´s employees. A
two-way movement came into play when the first bonuses were paid to
teams that achieved goals. On the one hand, the government learned how
the performance bonus works, and on the other, city departments and
agencies not part of the Action Plan and Results Agreement felt a healthy
internal pressure to join the program. By 2010, 19 agencies had entered
into agreements with a total 77 goals and 73% involvement of city officials.
In 2011, over 80% of employees from 39 government agencies and 208
agreed goals were part of the program.
SUMMARY
RESULTS AGREEMENTS BY NUMBER OF DEPARTMENTS
PER YEAR AND % OF PARTICIPATING CITY EMPLOYEES.
2009 2 city departments/agencies 43,1% of city employees
2010
2011
73,2%
19
39
82,4%
Chart 34 A and B shows a copy of the Results Agreement entered into by the
Mayor and the Health and Civil Defense Department. Chart 35 shows the
publication of the goals in the 2012 Results Agreement in the city´s Official
Gazette - DORio.
169
CHART 34 A
CHART 34 B
170
ACTION PLAN AND RESULTS AGREEMENT
CHART 35
171
2.4. Detailed Description of Annual Goals by
Agency´s Internal Structure
In this stage, the agency´s team analyses annual goals in detail to assess
involvement of all city employees and creates a productivity measurement
instrument for each sector with transparent rules for in-house distribution of
the variable value of the performance bonus if goals are achieved.
The performance bonus is paid in two installments, a pre-established
amount and a variable payment. Each agency that enters into an Action
Plan and Results Agreement with the City Government must analyze
indicators in detail and clearly define goals included in the agreements
to be published in the city´s Official Gazette 30 days after the publication
of the agreement, as seen in Chart 36, in order to distribute the variable
bonus among city officials.
CHART 36
172
c
f
High
Performance
Culture
a
Long-Term
Vision
b
MONITORING ROUTINES
Delivery
Support Teams
d
Action Plan
and Results
Agreement
Strategic
Plan
e
Monitoring
Routines
3. MONITORING ROUTINES
In order to implement the Strategic Plan as best as possible, the City Hall
created follow up routines, that is, regular interactions with the purpose of
debating progress in the Plan, overcome possible bottlenecks and promote
the commitment to deliver results. During these meetings the Results
Monitoring Under-Secretariat and the Project Management Office share
information gathered by city officials with the Mayor. These interactions are
essential for the implementation of the Strategic Plan and perfect to deal
with unscheduled situations and barriers.
Three different meetings are held with the Mayor on a regular basis:
a quarterly meeting with the department´s full staff, a monthly meeting
with the team at the Results Monitoring Under-Secretariat and the Project
Management Office, and a weekly meeting with the Project Management
Office team. Even though each meeting has different objectives, the
common part in all of them is that the Head of the Executive Office takes
part and is briefed on progress in the Strategic Plan implementation and
can make demands and suggest changes.
173
3.1. Meeting with Secretaries
Quarterly meetings with the Mayor, the Executive Office team, the
Department of the Treasury, the Secretaries of city departments and heads
of municipal agencies are eight hours long. Main stakeholders responsible
for the implementation of the Strategic Plan are present. The purpose of
these meetings is to debate the plan’s progress as a whole and check the
performance of each department and result areas in the period under study.
Meetings are organized with the simultaneous display of the goal monitoring
systems and related strategic initiatives in two screens. This is an excellent
opportunity to overcome bottlenecks, standardize information on progress in
the city hall among the different departments and to press for deliverables.
Meetings are held before two panel meetings – the Initiatives and the Goals
Panel Meetings, sponsored by the Project Management Office and the
Results Monitoring Under-Secretariat. Consequently, when getting ready
for the meeting, the Project Management Office and the Results Monitoring
Under-Secretariat teams follow the routine of meeting beforehand with the
Secretaries to go over their views on goals and initiative progress and agree
on main items to debate with the Mayor and try, as far as possible to
foresee solutions for outstanding issues.
MONITORING ROUTINES
3.2. Goals Monitoring Meeting
Monthly meetings with the Mayor, the Results Monitoring Under-Secretariat
and the Project Management Office coordinators are one and a half hours
long. These meetings discuss the progress made in the fulfillment of
Strategic Plan goals and initiatives and identify difficult to achieve results.
The report presented to the Mayor includes the assessment of each result
area and an indication of the probability of meeting the month’s goals by
rating the chance from “good” to “highly problematic”, as shown in Chart
37: Progress report example for goals achieved. At this moment the Mayor
can contact the responsible secretary of a department with a problem goal
and invite him/her to come up with options before the quarterly meeting.
CHART 37
175
3.3. Check Points Monitoring Meeting
Weekly meetings with the Mayor provide him with the chance to doublecheck after his regular meetings with department managers. These meetings
focus on the progress of ongoing projects from the perspective of the Projects
Management Office. Since the Projects Management Office is not directly
involved in project implementation, staff can provide insight to all schedule
stages, anticipate problems, pinpoint check points and recommend solutions.
During these meetings the representative of the Projects Management Office
presents an updated report on all strategic initiatives to the Mayor and the
Head of the Executive Office. The brief report is only one page long as shown
in Chart 38 and includes information on two issues: a) problems that demand
immediate action by the Mayor; b) identification of delivery issues faced by
each strategic initiative during that week. The report includes checkpoints,
that is, bottlenecks or situations identified by the staff at the office or
brought up by the heads of the implementation process that will eventually
hinder the implementation of a given initiative. During the meetings the
Mayor phones secretaries involved to clarify problems, demand answers or
suggest solutions.
CHART 38
176
c
Delivery
Support Teams
b
d
Action Plan
and Results
Agreement
HIGH PERFORMANCE CULTURE
f
High
Performance
Culture
a
Long-Term
Vision
Strategic
Plan
e
Monitoring
Routines
4. HIGH PERFORMANCE CULTURE
The inclusion of the notion of a high performance culture within the
government environment was a subtle but equally essential aspect in
the formalization of the City Government High Performance Management
Model. This culture refers to behaviors and routines that contribute to the
dissemination of good practices among civil servants.
177
4.1. Leadership Role Models
The City Government encourages managers to share the importance of
the Strategic Plan and its monitoring routines among team members. The
example is set by the Mayor himself, a good governance advocate who
participates in all routine meetings to talk about the Strategic Plan and the
Action Plan and Results Agreement dynamics with full dedication. Meetings
are cancelled on very rare occasions. The Mayor’s priority consideration sets
the tone for public managers as far as responsibility regarding the High
Performance Management model is concerned.
4.2. Motivating Cooperation and Partnership
Monitored departments could see the Results Monitoring Under-Secretariat
and the Project Management Office responsible for oversight activities with
certain mistrust, creating an environment of hostility. In order to overcome
this situation, the Head of the Executive Office has chosen managers in both
agencies with special care and considered professionals with a technical
profile and good people skills and established a routine for regular meetings
among managers and city departments to debate ministerial issues before
bringing them up with the Mayor. If the performance of a secretary fell
short of expectations, he/she can volunteer improvement suggestions and
be aware of topics in the agenda for the meeting with the Mayor. If there
are no surprises, the secretary would not be threatened by whistleblowing or
negative exposure at the monitoring meeting.
4.3. Cascading
The City Hall also encourages the replication of Results Agreements
monitoring routines within each department. Secretaries meet on a regular
basis with staff to check on goals achievement and deliverables.
More than that, some secretaries even post on the office wall a copy of
the performance bonus check received for goals achieved on the previous
year. This exemplifies the importance attributed to the Action Plan and
Results Agreement by Secretaries and encourages civil servants to focus on
achieving goals again.
178
4.4. Transparency and Dissemination Actions
Apart from the monitoring routines with the Mayor, interaction with the
external public and with City Hall civil servants were scheduled to provide
greater transparency to Strategic Plan results and fulfillment of Results
Agreement’s goals.
Reports with the statement of results obtained in the period are published
twice a year. These reports are published in the press and by civil society
organizations like Rio como Vamos movement that analyses the City Hall’s
performance from a critical perspective on a regular basis.
Performance bonuses are awarded to municipal civil servants that achieved
their goals in an annual event. On this occasion the City Hall communicates
results for each department. The manager in charge receives a symbolic
check for the value of the performance bonus on behalf of staff members
that achieved their goals. Results are also published in the City’s Official
Gazette and on the City Government´s web page.
179
APPENDIX - THE PPP
CONSTRUCTION MODEL
181
THE IMPORTANCE
OF ALTERNATE FINANCING
Rio City Government has traditionally resorted to two financing models for
public works: own investments through bids or concessions. An example of
the latter are the kiosks along the city´s beaches, the Riocentro Convention
Center and the Multipurpose Arena built for the 2007 Pan American Games.
In the transport area, contracts with Bus Lines and the Yellow Highway are
examples too. These projects are based on the February 13, 1995, 8.987
Federal Act on concession regimes and the permission to render public
services in compliance to article 175 in the Federal Constitution among
other provisions.
The major difference between these two models (bids for works and
concessions) lies in the fact that concessions granted for public works
change the focus of the undertaking. In the traditional model, the focus
is on the works, that is, the contracted party’s revenue comes from the
payment collected for the assignment done. The company’s economic flow
of expenses and revenue ends when the work is delivered and ready (except
for outstanding issues). Under this format, the contracting public agency is
responsible for the operation and necessary maintenance works.
In a concession, the focus is placed on the exploitation of a public service
as a business although is serves the needs and demands of the population.
In this case, the concession holder is a private company that pays the
costs during the construction phase and keeps revenue of the operation
understood as the exploitation of the public service. The objective of the
concession holder is the return on the investment through the exploitation
of the public service to pay for investment previously made and expenses
from operation and maintenance.
From this perspective, the approach of the private entrepreneur in a
concession is opposite to the traditional one. In the traditional model the
entrepreneur carries out what is included in the bid by the public agency.
The public agency in turn is the one that assesses the economic and/
or social demand of a given undertaking, drafts (or hires the drafting) of
projects, estimates costs involved and is responsible for the bidding process
for the construction work. In a concession, the private party estimates the
costs involved in the construction phase and future revenue to consider if
the project will produce the desired shareholder profitability.
Apart from these two formats, December 30, 2004 11.079 Act, together with
opinion 614/2006 by the Department of the National Treasury introduces a
182
APPENDIX
new format for projects in the country. The Act introduces general regulations
for bids and Public Private Partnerships in public administration. PPPs are
a key option to face historical problems in Brazil, like the still deficient
infrastructure, although it does not entirely replace the above mentioned
traditional formats. A Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 2006 study describes five
advantages in PPPs:
• The value of the investment can be distributed throughout the whole life
period of the asset and not only in one period;
• Proven delivery track record both for the schedule and budget;
• Some risks are transferred to the private sector and provide incentives for
appropriate asset maintenance;
• The long term view can cut infrastructure costs, as well as construction
and general life cycle costs; and
• Can include follow up service level indicators in contracts to foster a
strong customer service orientation.
Apart from these factors, another one is worth mentioning in Brazil,
considering the historic uncertainty with reference to payment capacity by
the public sector: the compulsory adoption of fungible and extra budgetary
collateral. Collateral must be unconditional and enforceable in case of
noncompliance by the contracting party, in this case, the public agency.
This provision guarantees service continuity. The act establishes that
collateral options can be linked to revenues, to special funds, guarantee
insurance; guarantee backed by international organizations or financial
institutions not controlled by the government, guarantee funds or a state
owned company set up with this purpose, apart from other mechanisms
granted by law.
Although this tool is hardly used in the country, it is gradually gaining
momentum with time and its dissemination.
As shown in Chart 39, low revenue generating capacity projects that
attract no interest from the private sector are traditionally implemented
under the figure of an Administrative PPP, since the public sector will
contribute with investment. As revenue generation capacity increases,
some alternatives become viable. Projects that are partially financed
without public resources, that is, are profitable but revenue is insufficient
for project self-sustainability, can be implemented by Sponsored PPPs or
by a Subsidized Concession. If a public service project can finance itself
totally, it is implemented under the Ordinary Concession modality. Finally,
private projects at the top of the revenue generation capacity pyramid are
implemented by an induction or stimulus policy if it is in the interest of
183
government but are financed by the private sector interested in the specific
project. That is, the lower the revenue generating capacity, the greater is
the need of direct government participation through the contribution of
public resources.
CHART 39
REVENUE GENERATING CAPACITY COMPARED TO PROJECT
IMPLEMENTATION ALTERNATIVES
1. Induction
Motivation
2. Ordinary Concession
3. Sponsored PPP
Subsidized Concessions
PPP with reimbursement
PPP with contributions
2
Projects that are financially
self-sustainable
RE
VE
NU
EG
EN
ER
AT
IN
G
CA
PA
C
ITY
4. Administrative PPP
Public Works Contracting
1
Private
projects that
are interesting
for the
Government
3
Projects with no public
resources
4
Traditional public projects
SOURCE: Consolidation by PPP Unit
From a different perspective, public sector revenue sources change as
positions rise in the pyramid. Chart 40 shows that the implementation
of a PPP project involves a greater level of complexity among project
184
stakeholders. Nevertheless, a well-designed contract guarantees good
government management to render the best possible service for citizens,
and even produce additional revenue for investments in governmentrelated areas.
CHART 40
REVENUE SOURCES IN A PUBLIC WORK AND IN A PPP
PUBLIC WORK
PPP
Subsidies
Collateral
Investment
Maintenance
Taxes
Charges
Fees
CITIZENS
PRIVATE
SECTOR
GOVERNMENT
Grants
Taxes
Charges
Fees
APPENDIX
GOVERNMENT
Investment
Maintenance
CITIZENS
SOURCE: Adapted from Mandri-Perrott, C. and Cuttaree, V. (2011)
Nevertheless, if the economic and financial viability of a project does not
attract new investors, business does not evolve. Attracting investors is a
key prerequisite for project success. The purpose of economic analysis is
to identify economic costs and benefits for all stakeholders and the most
viable option from the economic standpoint to fulfill the goals of defined
185
policies. Economic analysis further helps estimate financial implications of
different options for the government.
Chart 41 shows the economic and financial viability in a project that not
only depends on the interaction of these two variables but also on their
interaction with the market in its broadest terms. A number of technical
financial studies and assumptions are necessary to get a first impression
on the analysis. As a consequence, the first versions of the Cost Benefit
Analysis for each studied option as well as the necessary preliminary
financial structure can be ready. But these two studies are not enough to
guarantee project success. With information at hand, it is important to
contact a specialized consulting firm to check information in the market as
to macroeconomic assumptions used compared to project scope, as well as
information used to assess the economic and financial viability. This process
will show if assumptions accurately reflect macroeconomic risks exposure
and correct risk pricing for better allocation in terms of financial modeling.
CHART 41
INPUT:
Base studies
OUTPUT:
Cost
analysis X
Each option’s
pros
Economic
Feasibility
Macroeconomic
factors (with
financial
project)
INPUT:
Project duration,
inflation rate,
borrowings
OUTPUT:
Macroeconomic risks
exposure
186
Economic
Feasibility
Information
in the market
(with financial
project)
INPUT:
Technical
and financial
assumptions
OUTPUT:
Preliminary
financial
structure
INPUT:
Financial feasibility
assumptions
and results
OUTPUT:
Risk pricing and
allocation in
financial terms
GLOBAL BACKDROP
Europe has more experience than Brazil in Public Private Partnerships and
concessions in infrastructure project financing, since these instruments
have been used there for some time now.
According to the European Investment Bank’s Economic and Financial
Reports, 2010, one of the best contributions on PPP’s in the EU in terms
of use and macroeconomic environment in the region is the study by BlancBrude et al. (2007). This study is an important PPP evolution analysis in
Europe and 2008 and 2009 figures were added by the EIB to the report
mentioned earlier and updated to 2011 with data from the European PPP
Expertise Center.
The European Public Private Partnerships system is very diversified and
each country has its own model according to its legal framework. Chart 42 A
and B shows that the United Kingdom is the country that uses the tool the
most, both in terms of contracts and values. Spain, France, Germany and
Portugal have 156, 111, 96 and 45 projects respectively.
CHART 42 A
NUMBER OF PPPs BETWEEN 1990-2011
Total value per country (€ Billons)
UK
159
ES
38
FR
28
DE
PT
23
11
IT
BE
6
NL
6
IE
5
OUTROS
APPENDIX
13
36
SOURCE: EPEC, EIB, HM Treasure
187
CHART 42 B
NUMBER OF PPPs BETWEEN 1990-2011
Number of contracts per country
UK
970
ES
156
FR
111
DE
96
PT
45
IT
37
BE
23
NL
20
IE
19
OUTROS
59
SOURCE: EPEC, EIB, HM Treasure
PPPs in these countries have traditionally been used in the transport sector
in the buildings and public equipment area (schools, hospitals, prisons) and
in environmental projects (water, wastewater treatment, waste management)
as shown in Chart 43 A and B that relates investments per sector for 2011.
CHART 43 A
CONTRACTS PER SECTOR IN 2011
Number of contracts per sector
Public Services in General
23
Education
23
Public Order and Safety
12
Transport
12
Environment
7
Health
Energy
SOURCE: EPEC, EIB
188
5
2
CHART 43 B
CONTRACTS PER SECTOR IN 2011
Total value per sector (€ Billons)
Public Services in General
2,2
Education
1,0
2,3
Public Order and Safety
Transport
10,5
Environment
Health
Energy
1,4
0,6
0,0
SOURCE: EPEC, EIB
This modality has been used in Europe since the 90’s and the United
Kingdom is the main example. More than 900 PPPs were implemented till
2009 for more than € 90 billion in the health and transport sector as shown
in Chart 44.
CHART 44
20
15
Traffic
Offices
IT
Military
Environment
Equipment
Education
Other
5
0
Transport
10
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
APPENDIX
Contracts
Contracts
Value
35
30
25
Health
Billions of Euros
ACCUMULATED PPPs DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
PER SECTOR UNTIL 2009
SOURCE: Partnerships UK
189
BRAZIL’S SCENARIO
Brazilian legal framework as far as PPP’s are concerned is maturing, but
information available is still scarce. By the end of 2011, there was only one
signed contract at national level, 17 partnerships at state level as shown in
Chart 45 A and B and 30 at city level. The total sum of all of these projects
is less than 50 contracts, an average of almost six contracts per year since
legislation was passed in 2004.
CHART 45 A
NUMBER OF PPPs PER STATE AND SECTOR
Number of Contracts per State
MG
4
SP
3
PE
3
BA
3
DF
2
CE
1
RN
1
SOURCE: Consolidation by PPP Unit
190
CHART 45 B
CONTRACT VALUE PER SECTOR
(Millions of Reais)
MG
772
550
2.111
311
SP
1.990
997
PE
379 143
1.953
BA
592
619
104
DF
2.487
904
CE
519
RN
400
500
1.000
1.500 2.000 2.500 3.000
3.500 4.000
Stadiums
Highways
City Administration
Hospital
Sanitation
Prisons
Subway
Housing
APPENDIX
-
There are three reasons why this figure is not greater. Two are accounted for
by the legislation: the 3% net current revenue contribution limit imposed to
public agencies and the obligation that projects must exceed R$ 20 million
under this model. The third is an institutional one: companies, governments
and jurists are currently studying the legislation, considering and fostering
less ordinary ways to make projects viable in an environment with little
standardization and flexibility in use of federal government resources.
191
RIO’S SCENARIO
The establishment of the Strategic Projects, Concessions and Public
Private Partnerships Under-Secretariat within the Executive Office to study
options to make projects feasible proved to be insufficient. December
22, 2009 Complementary Municipal Act 105 was passed to deal with
the subject in Rio de Janeiro City, together with April 13, 2010 Decree
number 32.120 on Regulations of the Guarantee Fund and June 21, 2010
Decree number 32.422 on Public Private Partnerships Municipal Program
Steering Committee Bylaws/ PROPAR-RIO, as shown on Chart 46.
CHART 46
PPP STEERING
COMMITTEE
Public
Order
1. Prepares
PPP Plans
Public Works
2. Approves Projects
Solidary
Economic
Development
3. Approves Contracts
4. Authorizes use of
Guarantee Fund
City Planning
5. Hiring Process
Attorney’s
Office
Treasury
Executive Office
PPP Unit:
New Projects
Assessment
192
Key directions in the Federal Act were followed by the Municipal one as follows:
• 5 to 35 years concession terms
• Contract values greater or equal to R$20 million
• PPPs Annual financial contributions cannot exceed 3% of net current
revenue. Rio de Janeiro City Government must send the Senate and the
Department of the National Treasury all necessary information to check
compliance with this provision before each PPP contract. (Act 11.079, 1st
paragraph, art. 28)
• Sponsored PPPs financial contributions equal or above 70% of the private
partner’s remuneration under specific legislation
• Creation of Municipal PPP Steering Committee
• Establishes type of collateral
• Creates Guarantee Fund
Apart from the above mentioned provisions, the Under-Secretariat took over
more responsibilities. May 3, 2011 Decree number 33.733 changed the
name of the Strategic Project Under-Secretariat to Strategic Project, Public
Service Concessions and Public Private Partnerships Under-Secretariat. It
was not simply a name change but also a clear sign that the subject of
Concessions and PPPs are really part of the City Government´s agenda as a
relevant topic.
PROJECTS
APPENDIX
The projects under study at the Under-Secretariat in the beginning of
the administration were TransCarioca, TransOeste and the West Zone
Sanitation (AP5). An urban project was also studied for the city port area,
but would call for an alternative financial structure that gave way to Porto
Maravilha Project. The structure of the project demanded a format that
went beyond traditional ones used in Rio and in almost all Brazilian cities
at the time: Public Private Partnerships. Great social impact projects like
the sanitation of AP5 and environmental ones like the Seropédica Landfill
were also assessed.
193
NEXT STEPS
Strategic Planning
The new Strategic Plan is much bolder than the previous one and included
people’s participation in a more significant manner. Consequently scope and
follow up indicators of a series of projects were defined. Around 20 of these
projects can be implemented through concessions instruments and PPPs.
The following step is to gather detailed information on each one of them
and together with each corresponding department, give priority to projects
according to criteria eventually established and agreed upon to develop a
specific Action Plan with the detailed approach strategy for social, financial,
legal and environmental impacts of projects under study.
Manuals
Although the City Hall had already implemented PPPs, there was no guide
on the selection, assessment and bidding process. The implementation of
these types of routines boost local capacity to deliver PPP format projects
since they leverage resources (human, financial, etc.) to structure and
assess projects.
Furthermore, the idea is to make the city’s regulatory framework more
comprehensive. Procedure manuals, as is the case in other countries, will
make rules more transparent and in turn will make the new partnerships
structuring process faster and sound. This will be the case with public
control authorities as the Prosecutor’s Office, the Audit Court and the
Office of the Controller as well as with the private sector in order to reduce
frequency of questionings and uncertainties.
A contract for the drafting of procedure manuals was entered into with the
World Bank to start with the analysis in an orderly manner. The objective
is to begin with the local reality, include tested good practices from other
countries and across the country.
This project is divided into three main phases: gather existent information;
draft and deliver guidance modules; and distribute produced material within
the City Government to draft seven manuals on the topics below:
• Selection, assessment and bidding
• Stakeholders’ functions and responsibilities
194
• Terms of reference for official projects, project preparation team/execution
• Risk management framework and project feasibility analysis guidance
using the Value for Money (VfM) technique
• Risk allocation
• Key contract provisions
• PPP transactions communication
The first step in this direction took place in June, 2011 when several city
departments participated in a training course with World Bank specialists
from abroad on related topics.
The manuals are currently under production and they will be ready by the
end of August, 2012.
Regulation
APPENDIX
Partnership with the World Bank also includes the framework to create
a regulatory system for the city. The purpose of the partnership is to get
recommendations from the World Bank on the implementation of the
system based on best practices and the Bank’s 20 years’ experience on PPP
regulation. Specialists will present each topic with a set of options, describe
pros and cons, and suggest recommendations when appropriate concerning
the context of Rio.
This activity is a direct consequence of the growing number of concession
contracts and PPPs implemented in Rio. Public and private objectives do
not necessarily coincide. Consequently services provided by concession
contracts need regulations to protect end users. This is only achieved through
impartial conflict management, through the monitoring and compliance of
contracts and by the concession holder’s performance.
The regulatory authority has the duty to establish technical and commercial
service standards, set accounting standards used by concession holders,
monitor the operational performance of concession holders, regulate tariffs
and assess contract readjustments, resort to conflict resolution in trial
courts and subsidize the PPP Unit in the creation of new contracts.
The implementation of these options is another step in the direction of
transparency, speed and risk mitigation.
195
PARTICIPANTS
MAYOR’S CABINET
Mayor
Eduardo da Costa Paes
Vice-Mayor
Carlos Alberto Vieira Muniz
Chief of Cabinet
Luiz Antonio Guaraná
Sustainable Development and
Metropolitan Governance Technical Office
Sergio Besserman Vianna
Cultural Heritage, Urban
Intervention, Architecture
and Design Under-Secretariat
Washington Menezes Fajardo
CDURP
Jorge Luiz Souza Arraes
Rio Negócios
Marcelo Haddad
CITY DEPARTMENTS, PUBLIC
COMPANIES, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
AGENCIES AND FOUNDATIONS
Administration
Paulo Jobim Filho
Welfare
Rodrigo Bethlem Fernandes
CET-Rio
Claudia Antunes Secin
Comlurb
Angela Nóbrega Fonti
Public Services and Conservation
Carlos Roberto Osório
Culture
Emilio Richa Bechara Khalil
Education
Claudia Maria Costin
Olympic Company - EOM
Maria Silvia Bastos Marques
Treasury
Eduarda Cunha de La Rocque
Geo-Rio
Márcio José Mendonça Machado
City Guard
Cel. Henrique Lima de Castro
Housing
Jorge Ricardo Bittar
IplanRio
Ricardo de Oliveira
Environment
Carlos Alberto Vieira Muniz
Public Works
Alexandre Pinto da Silva
Public Order
Alexander Vieira da Costa
Rio-Águas
Mauro Alonso Duarte
RioUrbe
Armando José Guedes Queiroga
RioFilme
Sérgio de Sá Leitão
Health and Civil Defense
Hans Fernando Rocha Dohman
Pereira Passos
Ricardo Henriques
People with Disabilities
Georgette Vidor Mello
Transport
Alexandre Sansão Fontes
Tourism/RioTur
Antonio Pedro Viegas
City Planning
Sergio Rabaça Moreira Dias
COLLABORATORS
Project Management Office
André Luiz Faria Miranda
Carlos Pereira Dias
Angela Lopes
Claudia Rocha Conde Aljan
Antonio Fernandes de F. e Sá e Equipe
Durval Alves Mello Neto
Arícia Fernandes Correia
Elaine Alves da Silva
Camille Barcellos
Teodoro Marconi Franco
Fernando de Menezes Duba
Strategic Plan Coordinator
Giuliana Miranda Santos
Antonio Carlos Menezes Ramos
Guilherme Nogueira Schleder
1746 Call Centre
Gustavo da Rocha Schmidt
Gustavo Miranda Rodrigues
Juliana de Fátima Correa Pestana
Ana Guerrini
Marcella Muller e Equipe
Gustavo da Silveira Pereira da Silva
Romeu Rodrigues de Brito
Simone Paradelo Maluly
Rosemary de Azevedo Carvalho e Equipe
Under-Secretariat for Strategic
Projects, Public Service Concessions
and Public Private Partnerships
Samora Gonzaga de Miranda Teodoro
Tadeu Santana
André Luiz Marques
Gustavo Di Sabato Guerrante
BOOK COORDINATION
Executive Office
Pedro Paulo Carvalho Teixeira
Management Planning and
Modernization Under-Secretariat
Jean Leonardus Caris
Andréa Ferreira de Araújo
Results Monitoring
Under-Secretariat
Ricardo Costa Vieira da Silva
Simone Thury Mosqueira Rodrigues
Fundação João Goulart Institute
Rodolfo Magno de Carvalho Coelho
Elen Barreto de Souza
Patricia Guimarães
Arthur Wilson Neves Pereira
Mckinsey & Company
Roberta de Oliveira Guimarães
Gisela Gasparian
Felipe de Souza Camargo
Marcos Cruz
Mariana Peixoto de Toledo
Patricia Ellen
Monica Fernandes Costa
Renata Maia