Small Arms Holdings in Brazil:
Toward a comprehensive mapping of guns
and their owners
Pablo Dreyfus e
Marcelo de Sousa Nascimento 1
1. Introduction: Goals, obstacles, methodology and sources
If armed violence in Brazil is seen as an epidemic, with small arms as the vector of transmission,
it becomes very important to understand the distribution of this vector (i.e. arms ownership)
across Brazilian territory. Understanding where the small arms are, who holds them and what
kind of weapons they are is key to grasping the strength of the relationship of between violence
and small arms availability.
Simply counting weapons is not enough: weapons differ in terms of their firing range, power
and rate. Although all small arms are lethal, the extent of damage they can cause is related to
the kinds of weapons involved and the geographical and socio-economic environment where
these weapons are distributed. For example, a sparsely populated rural area with a high
concentration of single-shot guns and revolvers will likely have different small arms-related
problems than a densely populated megalopolis with a high concentration of semi-automatic
pistols and military-type small arms in criminal and/or informal circuits. This is why we have
put an emphasis on collecting and analyzing data about the type of predominant weapon in
each state of the Brazil as well as the rural/metropolitan distribution of these guns. This was
done through a combination of interviews and the collection of quantitative data on registered,
seized, sold, and collected or destroyed small arms.
As with SALW production and trade, research on holdings is complicated by obstacles related
to low-quality, incomplete, or confidential data sources. The decentralization of data
from federal to state governments has contributed to sub-notification of data
from state to federal authorities, making research on holdings even more difficult.
In a developing federal country of the size of Brazil gathering data was like patiently and
slowly assembling a puzzle.
The authors would like to especially thank the collaboration of Luiz Carlos Carvalho Silveira
a retired Detective from the Civilian Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro currently working for
Viva Rio and who spent six month visiting the capitals of 25 Brazilian states, collecting
quantitative and qualitative information about legal and illicit small arms holdings. We would
also like to thank the research assistance of Julio César Purcena, Assistant Researcher at the
Small Arms Control Project of Viva Rio/ISER.
We would also like to express our gratitude to the following state and federal officials who
collaborated with statistical data and with interviews during our field research:
Delegado Ilzomar Pontes, Chief of the Civilian Police of the State of Acre; Mr. Nonato Sousa,
press advisor of the Public Security Secretariat of the State of Acre; Delegado Egivaldo de
Farias, Chief of the Statistics Sector of the Civilian Police of the State of Alagoas; Mr. Adailson
Calheiros, press advisor of the Public Security Secretariat of the State of Alagoas; Delegada
Sandra Dantas, Chief of the Civilian Police of the State of Amapá; Mr. Sérgio Bringel, Press
1
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Pablo Dreyfus is the Research Manager of the Small Arms Control Project of Viva Rio/ISER and Marcelo de Sousa Nascimento is Chief Statistician at ISER.
Advisor of the Public Security Secretariat of the State of Amapá; Mr. A.P.C. Marques, Chief of the
Firearms Sector of the Civilian Police of the State of Amapá; Delegado Luiz Fernando do Nasicmento,
Chief of the the Office of Public and Social Order (DEOPS) of the Civilian Police of the State of
Amazonas; Dr. Edilamar Calazans, Cabinet Chief of the Civilian Police of the State of Bahia; Dr.
Iracema Silva de Jesus, Chief of the Statistics Sector of the Public Security Secretariat of the State of
Bahia; Delegado João Carlos Passos, Chief of the Division of Firearms Ammunition and Explosives
(DAME) of the Civilian Police of the Federal District; Major (Military Police) Carlos Alberto Teixieira
Pinto, Public Security Secretariat of the Federal District; Delegado Luiz Carlos Dantas, Chief of the
Intelligence Superintendence of the Civilian Police of the State of Ceará; Inspector Nodege F. De
Carvalho Nogueira, Chief of the Firearms Sector of the Civilian Police of the State of Ceará; Delegada
Celma Couto, Chief of the Civilian Police of the State of Espirito Santo; Firearms Sector of the Civilian
Police of the State of Espirito Santo; Delegado Humberto Jesus Teixeira, Office of the Police Chief of the
State of Goiás; Mr. Medrado, Civilian Police of the State of Goiás; Dr. Raimundo Cutrin, Secretary of
Public Security of the State of Maranhão; Delegado Nordman, Civilian Police of the State of Maranhão;
Delegado Robson, Civilian Police of the State of Maranhão; Delegado Victor Sebastião Gonçalves,
General Director of the Civilian Police of the State of Mato Grosso; Mrs. Nizlete, Assistant to the
Director of the Civilian Police of the State of Mato Grosso; Delegado Marcelo Vargas, Civilian Police of
the State of Mato Grosso do Sul; Delegado Marcos Silva, Chief of the Division of Firearms, Ammuntions
and Explosives (DAME) of the Civilian Police of the State of Minas Gerais; Mrs.Márcia Cristina Alves,
Superintendent of Crime Prevention of the Social Defense Secretariat of the State of Minas Gerais;
Delegado Luiz Paschoal de Alcántara Neto, Civilian Police of the State of Pará; Ms. Graça Mendes,
Chief of Statistics of the Public Security Secretariat of the State of Pará; Delegado Geraldo Veloso,
Chief of the Division of Firearms and Explosives (DAME) of the Civilian Police of the State of Paraíba;
Public Security Secretariat of the State of Paraná; Sr. João Braga, Secretary of Social Defense of the
State of Pernambuco; Federal Representative (Pernambuco) Raul Jungman; State Representative
(Pernambuco) Herbert Gomes; Delegado Djalma Raposo, Manager of the Criminal Statistics
Department of the Social Defense Secretariat of the State of Pernambuco; Delegado Emir Maia, Chief
of the DAME of the State of Piauí; Delegada Suerda, Civilian Police of the State of Rio Grande do
Norte; Delegado Joldeci, Chief of the DAME of the State or Rio Grande do Norte; Delegado Artistóteles
Bridi, Chief of the DAME of the Civilian Police of the State of Rio Grande do Sul; Delegado Deraldo
Escatolon, Civilian Police of the State of Rondônia; Delegado Arilton Zanelatto, Chief of the DAME of
the Civilian Police of the State of Santa Catarina; Delegado Roberto de Mello Aníbal, Chief of the
DAME of the Civilian Police of the State of São Paulo; Major (Military Police), Álvaro Batista Camilo,Public
Security Secretariat of the State of São Paulo; Dr. Túlio Kahn, Public Security Secretariat of the State of
São Paulo; Civilian Police of the State of Tocantins; Staff of the Division of Control of Firearms and
Explosives (DFAE) of the Civilian Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro; Colonel (Miltary Police of Rio de
Janeiro), Angelo Ubiratan; Delegado Walter Barros, Delegacia Legal, Civilian Police of the State or Rio
de Janeiro; Delegado (Federal Police) Fernando Oliveira Segovia, Head SINARM, Federal Police
Department; Delegada (Federal Police) Silvana Helena Vieira Borges, General Coordinator of the
Office for General Coordination of Private Security Control of the Federal Police Department; Brigade
General José Rosalvo Leitão de Almeida, Head of the Directorate of Controlled Products (DFPC) of the
Brazilian Army; Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Toledo Freitas, DFPC, Brazilian Army; Lieuterat Colonel
Paulo Mendes, Cabinet of the Commander of the Brazilian Army; Special Agent Marques, Rio de
Janeiro SINARM office, Federal Police.
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We also thank all those interviewed and consulted that for methodological or confidentiality
reasons are not mentioned above..
1.2 Obstacles
Among the main obstacles encountered were:
• Sub-notification of firearm statistics from state police departments to the Federal Police
central data bank,
• At the state level, a frequent lack of accurate, up to date, and computerized statistics on
registered and seized small arms,
• In many Brazilian states, a lack of accurate record keeping on registered and seized small
arms,
• Lack of communication between federal and local authorities for data collection and
analysis,
• Confidentiality and difficult access to military statistics
Historically there has no been efficient small arms control in Brazil. As we saw in the legislation
chapter, the very first national regulation concerning small arms was enacted in 1934 (regulated
in 1936). Although it organized and regulated small arms production and foreign trade, the
decree did not deal directly with domestic sales or registration of small arms. The decree
gave vague guidelines for the Ministry of the Army to establish arrangements with state
authorities concerning registration. The purchase and use of firearms by civilians remained
unregulated until 1980, when the Ministry of the Army enacted a regulation that established
the number and type of weapons that civilians above 20 years old would be able to purchase
and also established the mandatory registration of those weapons (as a precondition for
completing the purchase). However, small arms were registered with the Civilian Police of
each state, with no national institution in charge of centralizing the data on firearms and their
owners. Nonetheless, this was an improvement: prior to this, arms registration was optional.
This situation, added to a historical lack of horizontal (state to state) and vertical (state to
federal government) police cooperation would make it impossible to track down the movement
of imported and produced small arms.
It was only in 1997, with the SINARM act, that the National Arms Control System was created
and a legal requirement for comprehensive registration of privately owned guns was introduced.
According to that law, in order to purchase a small arm, an individual has to first obtain a
registry authorization that was granted by SINARM, which is administered by the Federal Police
(Brazil is a Federal Republic divided in 26 states plus the Federal District). Local authorities
(normally the civilian –investigative- police) received the request, filed it to the SINARM in
Brasilia, after criminal records were checked and OK from SINARM was granted, local
authorities granted the registry authorization and then register the arm. This registry only
authorized the person to hold the arm at home; it was not an arm carrying authorization,
which following separate procedures could be granted by State authorities (for carrying within
State borders) and by the Federal Police for carrying within all the national territory.
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According to the law, SINARM should centralize and update a national database of all
registered and seized firearms in the country. Each one of the states should periodically update
this information. However, the process of digitizing local registries and linking them to SINARM
via computerized interface has been more than slow. Sub-notification of data concerning
both registered and seized weapons was the order of the day, and from 1997 to 2003 (when
the new law federalizing and centralizing control was passed) SINARM was still incomplete
and subject to random and inconsistent notification. This was due to technical deficiencies,
such as the lack of trained personnel and equipment for the efficient digitalization of data
(which was common in poor states with scarce resources) but also to political rivalries between
local and federal authorities and inter-bureaucratic competition between state and federal
police agencies. To overcome this serious obstacle, we decided to carry out field research
(complemented by phone interviews) in 25 states of the Federation..
We found that states with very efficient arms control mechanisms and sophisticated databases,
such as Rio Grande do Sul, would often underreport their data, perhaps because of issues of
institutional rivalry. In São Paulo, the richest, most developed and populated state of the
Federation, the Federal Police sub-contracted a private firm for the digitalization of all data
on small arms registration. This is the only state where local records match SINARM data.
However, a delay in payments from the Federal Government led the private firm to halt the
digitalization work. Interviewed local authorities estimate that about 200,000 guns may have
been left out of the system. Between 1997 and 2000, SINARM personnel opened local offices
in every Brazilian state and also installed software and computers for the local arms control
police units. States tended to have more severe data problems according to their level of
underdevelopment and lack of infrastructure, or simply because of a lack of coordination
between the main office in the state capital and local police stations in rural areas and midsized cities. In many states, firearms would be registered via paper forms at local police
stations; this data was then reported, erratically and with delays, to the metropolitan offices.
This same dynamic of delays and erratic notifications was often replicated when state offices
reported to the national office in Brasília.2
Another obstacle was differences in the periods covered by state data collections. With a few
exceptions (Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, Bahia, Santa Catarina, the Federal
District (Brasília), Amazonas, Pará and Paraná) the information provided by states failed to
cover the whole period from the year registration began up to 2004. Most of the states gave
information from the early 1980s on (when mandatory registration was regulated by the army)
or from 1997 on, when the Federal Police started providing infrastructure for the digitalization
of data and when it became mandatory to forward registered and seized small arms records
to SINARM. As a result, there is a data vacuum over periods that range from 20 to 50 years.
2
Interview with Luiz Carlos Carvalho Silveira, field researcher that collected data in 25 Brazilian States.
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The main reason for this underreporting is that data for previous years is still held in disorganized
paper files, in some cases suffering damage with the passing of time.2 Weapons, however, do
last. Small arms purchased in the 1950s, 60s and 70s can be in perfect working conditions
today. 85 percent of Taurus revolvers (the most common make of small arm both among
registered and seized arms) collected between August and December 2004 at Viva Rio’s
collection posts during the voluntary arms buyback campaign were manufactured before
1981.3 About 90% of these weapons were functioning, and over 60% of the people that
delivered them were above 50 years old, suggesting that most of the weapons may have
been purchased before 1980, and certainly before 1997.4 To this we must add the fact that
the registration campaign established by the SINARM act was extremely inefficient due to bad
coordination between the federal and state authorities and the lack of a consistent media
campaign.
Moreover, going again to the case of Rio de Janeiro, over 25% of the small arms seized by the
police between 1951 and 2003 had been previously registered.. This suggests a diversion of
legal guns to illicit markets (via irregular sales or theft). This is why it is important to maintain
updated computerized databases that would allow tracing of registered weapons in case
they are used in crimes or diverted to illicit markets.
The table below illustrates the extent of underreporting by the states to SINARM. It compares
the number of small arms registered by private legal entities and individuals at SINARM with
information provided by state arms control police offices during our field research. It also
gives the period covered by the information collected during field research as well as the year
in which registration begins in each state according to the interviewed source. Marked in red
are sub-notifications; that is, cases in which the number of weapons registered at SINARM is
lower than the number of weapons reported by states during our field research. Mismatches in
other states are the result of different time periods covered by the available data (generally
1995-2003). Marked in blue is São Paulo, the only case of a state providing information that
matched SINARM data.
3
Ibid.
These weapons had purely numeric serial numbers, with no letters. After 1981, Taurus began using alphanumeric combinations for its revolvers. On this issue see:
Toccchetto, Domingos (2003), Balística Forense: Aspectos Técnicos e Jurídicos (3rd edition), Campinas, Millenium Editora, pp.99-113
5
5870 weapons (60% of which were revolvers) were collected at Viva Rio’s collection posts, 1327 of which were Taurus revolvers. For more information about this see:
Gustavo Goulart/Dimmi Amora (2004). “Pesquisa do Viva Rio mostra que 62% dos que aderiram a campanha têm mais de 50”, O Globo, October 19, 2004, p.16
4
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Table 1.
Underreporting of
registered small
arms data:
Source: Federal Police Department, SINARM,
2003 and Small Arms Control offices of State
Civilian Police corps.
To the chronic lack of
efficient communication
and cooperation between
states and the federal
government we must add a
historical
lack
of
cooperation between the federal institutions that monitor arms and ammunition supply
(manufacture, sales, imports and exports) and demand (buying, carrying, use and registration).
On the one hand, the Army (which has neither police powers nor duties) controls production;
sales by manufacturers to dealers and exporters; imports; exports and direct factory sales to
armed forces, police forces, police officers and soldiers when private users, and arms collectors.
The Army also systematizes and centralizes information about these activities. On the other
hand, the Federal Police (under the Ministry of Justice), as we saw through SINARM, centralizes
the information on arms registered by private citizens as well as information about seized
weapons.
Up through 1997 there was no communication between these agencies. The 1997 SINARM
act decreed that the Ministry of Justice and Defense would establish an inter-agency protocol
for information exchange concerning small arms. That protocol was never established and in
practice there was no exchange of information. According to SINARM act, manufactures and
importers would send the Federal Police a list of the sold or purchased small arms with the
identification of the purchaser. Information was not however provided on a real-time basis (it
was erratically sent on diskettes) and SINARM was not notified on a consistent basis.6
SINARM’s software and structure was designed in 1997 to function as described in Diagram 1
below. The system can track the “life-cycle of guns” from the moment they leave the factory or
are imported until they are discharged or destroyed. The system should be able to track property
transfers and cross information on manufactured, traded, registered and seized guns. However,
the lack of complete and consistent notification prevented the system from working efficiently.
6
Interviews with SINARM officials.
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Diagram 1. “Ideal
SINARM (1997)”
The practical result of this
lack of cooperation is that
information on the trade
routes that newly produced
and imported firearms take
is never compared with
available data on arms
registration
and
confiscation. Given this
situation, it is practically
impossible to track patterns
in the routes used for
diverting arms and illicit
trafficking, as well as to
detect the irregularities in arms sales that enable ‘grey markets’ to be established. Police forces, particularly
the Federal Police, are crippled in their efforts to fight the illicit trade in small arms. They are also
hindered in determining the volume, type and serial numbers of arms and ammunition that are exported
to countries representing a potential risk for triangulation, such as Paraguay or Suriname.
These obstacles deny researchers a single centralized source for reliable data, which led us to look for
information in many different federal and state agencies. Due to the changes introduced by the Statute
of Disarmament, such as the federalization of registration and the mandatory integration of the Army
and Federal Police databases, the flow and centralization of information is expected to improve in the
years to come. However, results were not visible at the closing of this study, since the law has been fully
in force only since July 2004, when it was regulated.
Another foreseeable obstacle was confidentiality and lack of access to certain statistics. It was not
possible, for example, to get access to the statistics of seized weapons from the Federal Police (who
were, nonetheless, extremely forthcoming with data on registered small arms and private security
companies). Based on interviews with local and federal policemen, we have concluded that the level of
sub-notification from the States is very high.
Another key research challenge was obtaining data from the Directorate of Controlled Products
of the Brazilian Army (DFPC). This agency is the gatekeeper for data on arms production,
sales (including information about gun shops) , exports, imports, registers of private holdings
of restricted use small arms (usually held by military and law enforcement officers and noncommissioned officers) as well as information on armed forces and law enforcement inventories
and stockpiles. After a long process of confidence-building, and under a confidentiality protocol,
the Army granted Viva Rio access to the Army’s Statistical Yearbook (Anuário Estatístico do
Exército, ANEEX) which contains statistics on permitted-use small arms production and sales
as well as about collectors, hunters and professional shooters (colecionadores, atiradores and
caçadores, or CAC). Information about sales and production of permitted-use small arms
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and ammunition goes back to 1967 and up to 2003. On the other hand, information about
restricted-use small arms sales (to law enforcement agencies) is only available from 2000 on.
Data concerning CAC and gun shops is available from 1997 on. It was not possible to obtain data on
armed forces and law enforcement stockpiles and holdings as well as private holdings of military and
police officers and NCOs (which are registered at the DFPC´s Military Arms Managing System, SIGMA)
As in most Latin American countries this data is considered highly confidential. In this case, we relied on
multipliers based on secondary sources and interviews.
One minor obstacle encountered with ANEEX is that the data is presented and organized not by states
but by Military Regions (MR), which are the major units of the Brazilian Army’s battle order (equivalent
to Army Divisions). Each MR covers several states. Fortunately, many MRs correspond to a single state or
two states, particularly in the case of states that are important in terms of income, population and/or
small arms related problems: São Paulo (2nd MR), Minas Gerais (4th MR), Rio Grande do Sul ( 3rd
MR),Rio de Janeiro / Espírito Santo (1st MR), Santa Catarina / Paraná (5th MR) and Mato Grosso / Mato
Grosso do Sul (9th MR).
In order to match the data with the political structure of the Brazilian Federation (i.e., its states), the
ANEEX data related to CAC holdings was distributed according to the proportion of small arms legally
registered by civilian individuals in each state. Members of CAC, however, were distributed according
to the proportion of population by state. Maps of Brazil and of the Brazilian Army’s Military Regions are
displayed below. SALW factories are represented with white circled crosses.
In the next section, we explain the methodology adopted in order to overcome the obstacles discussed
above.
Map 1. Brazilian Army´s
Military Regions
Source: ANEEX various issues.
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Map 2. Brazil (political division)
Source: GuiaNet. O Guia do Brasil - Mapa Político do Brasil
www.guianet.com.br/brasil/mapapolitico.htm
1.3. Methodology
1.3.1. Counting guns: how are they distributed in Brazil and who holds them?
Before explaining how we counted guns, it is worth explaining what we were measuring. So
far, we know that Brazil is affected by an epidemic of violence whose primary risk group are
young men between 15 to 29 years old with incomplete primary school education. We also
know that violence is concentrated in big urban centers and that the vectors of violence are
small arms. We also know that Brazil is the second largest producer of small arms in the
Western Hemisphere and that small arms production booms in the very same decade that
violence starts rising. Finally, we also know that because of a set of factors described above,
small arms control is chronically inefficient.
In the chapter on the impact of violence, both violence and its victims have been mapped. We
need now to map the vector of this epidemic. Knowing where small arms are and who holds
them will allow us to evaluate their weight among factors of risk for urban violence. This issue
will be tackled in another chapter of this study, to be published in the near future.
Where to start? On one side there are the arms held by government organs (including the
armed forces and police), which, in principle, should not be part of the problem. On the other
side we have private holdings. These arms are held by law-abiding citizens and by criminals.
Reality, however, is not so simple. In a country where small arms registration was only
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systematically regulated at a national level in 1997, we have to assume that there is a
huge informal market, i.e. small arms that, although not necessarily in the hands of
criminals, are undeclared and unregistered, and thus illicit and more susceptible to
being diverted into criminal markets. The scenario gets even more complicated if we
consider that there are certain “gun castes” such as collectors (who can own military
style weapons at home), shooters, hunters and police and military officers and NCOs,
all of whom possess privileges to buy small arms, and who are not directly monitored
by the police. To this we must finally add a booming private security industry that, as
will be shown, employs twice as many guards as there are police agents in the country.
Our universe of study is summarized in Diagram 2. The state, represented by armed
forces and law enforcement agencies holdings and stockpiles, and private holdings,
which are divided into two main groups: legal holdings and illicit holdings. This latter
group is subdivided into informal (undeclared) and criminal holdings.
Diagram 2.Universe of
study: Holding groups
We begin with private holdings, and more specifically with registered civilian holdings
(individual and legal entities). This is exactly the type of firearm ownership that is
supposed to be registered in SINARM. In order to calculate these holdings, we crossed
the following information:
• SINARM Data (totals 1997-2003) of registered small arms (by civilian individuals
and private legal entities)
• Data (quantity and year) on registered small arms (by civilian individuals and private
legal entities) collected in the public security secretariats of each Brazilian state.
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Because of Viva Rio’s cooperative relationship with the state government of Rio de Janeiro, we
were permitted full access to the data base of the Division of Control of Firearms and Explosives
of the Civilian Police of Rio de Janeiro (DFAE), which contains information on serial number,
make, caliber, and type of weapon. For the other states, using a combination of quantitative
and qualitative research, (interviews), we were able, in some cases, to obtain information on
the type and caliber of registered weapons, as well as the rural/metropolitan distribution of
small arms registration. A copy of the protocols used for the interview is included as an ANEEX
to this work.
In a few cases, states provided data on number of registration per year; more frequently, they
provided totals for a given period of time.
Holdings were estimated for each of several types or groups of holders, and then distributed
among the municipalities of the 27 units of the federation.
Private (non-governmental) Holdings
a) Civilians (individuals and legal entities such as private security companies and firms with
security departments):
Under the 1997 SINARM act, data on this group was first registered by local police and then
forwarded to SINARM. We saw, however, that there were serious problems of sub-notification.
To overcome this obstacle, data was divided into three groups according to the quality provided
by each state government during our field research: First Best Case Scenario; Second Best
Case Scenario and Data Vacuum.
• Best Case Scenario: This is the data that was taken as a parameter for estimates. Ten states
provided integral information (number of registered weapons, year of creation of arms register,
and period covered by the information): Amazonas, Federal District, Goiás, Pará, Paraná,
Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, São Paulo and Tocantins.
The information provided by these states was kept intact.
• Second-Best Case Scenario: This information refers to states that provided information
that covered either very short periods of time or recent periods of time. These states were:
Acre, Alagoas, Amapá, Bahia, Ceará, Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso do Sul,
Mato Grosso, Rio Grande do Norte, Rondônia and Sergipe.
For these states we took 1980 (the year in which the first national regulation concerning
mandatory registration was enacted) as a base year. With the time period information, we
calculated the yearly average for number of small arms registration in each state. With that
figure we back-estimated the total number of registered small arms since the year the state’s
arms register was created, or since 1980 for cases in which that information was not provided:
Registered weapons = m annual registry for state * number of years since the beginning of
registration
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• Data vacuum: This information refers to those states that provided no information during
the research. Namely: Maranhão, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Piauí and Roraima. In this case we
applied a multiplier reflecting the average sub-notification found in the “Best Case Scenario”
states, found to be 2.52. This multiplier was then applied to SINARM data: Registered weapons
= SINARM * 2.52
Aapplying these criteria, we estimated a total of 5,568,621 small arms registered to
civilians in Brazil
b) Registers of Small Arms held by active and retired military officers and non-commissioned
officers (NCOs) for private use:
Active duty
We considered here the personal-use weapons of all officers and NCOs7, who make up 41,3%
of the total force8. Each officer and NCO has the right to buy 3 small arms (one handgun, one
rifled long barrel gun, and one smooth-bore long barrel gun) every two years. Brazilian Armed
Forces do not provide a service handgun to officers and NCOs for them to hold up to the end
of their career. When in service, military officers and NCOs may either share handguns
belonging to the force stockpiles or they can use a small arm (of compatible caliber) purchased
by them9. Based on interviews, we decided to use a conservative estimate of 2 handguns
purchased per officer and NCO. One handgun is used as a service weapon and the other
stays at home. So, if we are considering private use, we have a conservative multiplier of one
gun per active duty officer and NCO.
Following these criteria, we estimated a total of 129,800 active duty military officers
and NCOs who hold 129,800 private small arms.
Retired
According to a secondary source, there are as many as 500,000 active duty military, retired
military and pensioners (includes widows and single daughters of soldiers) in Brazil.10 There
are 314,300 active soldiers in the Brazilian military, leaving us with 185,700 retired military
and pensioners. We need then to estimate the number of retired military.
The average age of retirement for military officers is 50. The average life expectancy for men
in Brazil is 65, so the average retiree benefits 15 years from his retirement pension.
7
In Brazil, NCOs are generally called sargentos (sergeants); this category does not include corporals, who are counted together with soldiers and sailors
Over a total force of 314,300 with 33,800 officers and 96,000 NCOs according to Nueva Mayoría (2004), Balance Militar de América del Sur, Colección Estudios 44,
Buenos Aires, Nueva Mayoría editorial pp. 112-151
9
Interviews with active and retired military personnel.
10
Mariz, Cristiano (2004), “Congresso garante reajuste de 10% no soldo de militares”, Jornal de Brasília, 15 September 2004, http://clipping.planejamento.gov.br/
Noticias.asp?NOTCod=150256
8
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On average, Brazilian wives are 5 years younger than their husbands are, and life expectancy
for women is 70 years. So, the average military wife is 60 years old when her husband dies,
and would benefit another 10 years from his pension. Daughters, also with a 70 years life
expectancy, would benefit another 20 years (given a generational gap of 20 years).
15/45 is then the multiplier applied to find the proportion of retired military and NCOs. That
corresponds to, approximately, 35% of 185,700; which in turn equals about 20% of the active
duty personnel, a proportion confirmed by interviews. In order to find the number of weapons
held by this group, we multiply the resulting amount by our multiplier of 2. That is, 2 handguns
per retired officer and NCO (since he is no longer in service, both weapons remain at home).
Following these criteria, we estimated a total of 64,995 retired military officers and
NCOs holding 129,990 small arms.
c) Registers of small arms of police personnel (for private use):
Active duty
As with active duty military personnel, our interviews revealed that police officers commonly
own two guns, one as a “back up” to their official weapon, the other kept at home. Thus we
again adopted a conservative multiplier of one small arm (from the two purchased) being
considered as ‘private use’.
Following these criteria, we estimated a total of 480,721 active duty policemen who
hold 476,169 private small arms.
Retired
Based on interviews with retired policemen, we estimated that the total number of retired
policemen in Brazil is 25 percent of the total active duty personnel. We then applied a
conservative estimate of two small arms per retired policemen in order to calculate holdings
in this group. In this case we did not differentiate between officers, NCOs and soldiers (or
agents) because they all enjoy the same ease in purchasing firearms (compared to civilians) .
Following these criteria, we estimated a total of 120,180 retired policemen who hold
240,360 small arms.
d) Collectors, Shooters and Hunters (CAC, Caçadores, Atiradores e Colecionadores)
Although a civilian category, CAC holders register their small arms with the army. Shooters
and collectors have the right to own more weapons than the average civilian, and collectors
can hold military style small arms at home. Data about these groups was taken from the
ANEEX, where figures are distributed by military region.
Collectors can hold large numbers of restricted-use firearms, including military style semiautomatic assault rifles (upon authorization from the Army). For this reason, we analyzed
data related to this sub-group separately from hunters and shooters. The quantity of weapons
106
held by collectors was estimated taking as a base an ANEEX table which crosses number of
weapons held (divided into 4 ranges: from 1 to 10 small arms;11 to 49; 50 to100 and 101
and more) by the number of collectors which fall under each range. Data is given by military
region. We calculated the average quantity for each range and multiplied it by the number of
collectors per range. This resulted in an estimate of 155,096 small arms held by collectors.
Table 2. Collectors by military region as presented in ANEEX:
Source ANEEX 2002 and 2003
Although hunters and shooters can buy small arms and renovate permits quite easily, based
on an interviews and secondary sources we used a conservative multiplier of 4 small arms per
hunter and shooter.11
Following these criteria, we estimated firearms holdings of 155,096 for collectors,
4,692 for hunters and 55,672 for shooters, yielding a total of 215,460 firearms held
by CAC.
e) Private security companies:
Up through 2003, private security small arms were registered together with civilian small
arms, hence their inclusion in the group “Civilian”. Because of the importance of the private
security sector in Brazil, as well as the very real possibility (considering Brazil’s high crime
rates) that private security small arms will be either diverted or stolen we decided to estimate
of the number and distribution of small arms belonging to private security companies.12
11
Interview with a small arms collector at Rio de Janeiro. Also see: Arruda, Leonardo (1999), “Entrevista à Revista Época (Não Publicada)”, O Correio do Cidadão,
Nº 76, http://www.armaria.com.br/corr_cid/correio076.htm
12
According to the Federal Police there are 1,120,842 legal private guards in Brazil (Ministry of Justice, Federal Police Department, Office of General Coordination
of Private Security Control, Ofício N° 3559/04), October 2004. Although not all them carry small arms when in service, all people credited (after examinations) as
private guards by the Federal Police can use small arms while in service. Carrying or not a gun will depend on the activity assigned by the Private Security company
(which holds small arms for its personnel). This is why we decided to consider the whole number of private guards and in order to calculate the number of small arms
held by the private security sector we applied a multiplier based on labor shifts.
According to a report of the chamber of representatives of Rio de Janeiro, only in that state more than 13,000 small arms were either stolen or diverted from private
security companies. See: Ministry of Justice, National Public Security Secretariat, Arquitetura Institucional do SUSP, Capitulo 1, Controle de Armas de Fogo, http://
www.segurancahumana.org.br/susp/nacional/s_arq_cap1.htm
107
According to the Federal Police there are 1,120,842 legal private guards in Brazil (Ministry of
Justice, Federal Police Department, Office of General Coordination of Private Security Control,
Ofício N° 3559/04), October 2004. Although not all them carry small arms when in service,
all people credited (after examinations) as private guards by the Federal Police can use small
arms while in service. Carrying or not a gun will depend on the activity assigned by the Private
Security company (which holds small
arms for its personnel). This is why we decided to consider the whole number of private guards
and in order to calculate the number of small arms held by the private security sector we
applied a multiplier based on labor shifts.
This purpose of this estimated is to create a geo-referenced representation of private guards
and private security small arms. Again, the amount of small arms held by private security
companies is diluted within the bulk amount estimated for civilian individuals and legal entities..
It is important to note that, according to Brazilian regulations, private guards cannot serve
with their own guns. They serve with small arms belonging to the private security company
they work for.
Three sources of data were used:
• Official information sent under request by the Federal Police (who has the responsibility of
monitoring private security at the national level).13
14
• Report from the National Federation of Private Security Companies (FENAVIST).
• Specific legislation about private security.
FENAVIST and Federal Police documents sources presented similar data on the number of
private guards by state and according to their level of specialization and training. The level of
specialization and training are important because this category will determine the number
and type of small arms private security guards can use when in service.
There are three basic categories:
• Guards with basic training –BT: can only carry a revolver that belongs to the company
• Guards with training on escorting valuable cargo and armored value trucks –VT/AE: can
carry a handgun and a long barrel gun (a shotgun or a .38 carbine) while on duty.
• Bodyguards with personal security training –PST: can carry two hand guns.
This information was crossed with the number of private guards belonging to each category
and holdings were thus estimated. We then used conservative multipliers for each category
based on the fact that guns are shared by several guards serving on 3 shifts (8/24, 12/36, 24/
72).
13
Ministry of Justice, Federal Police Department, Office of General Coordination of Private Security Control, Ofício N° 3559/04), October 2004
Federação Nacional das Empresas de Segurança e Transporte de Valores (FENAVIST).(2002), Relatório Anual da Segurança Privada no Brasil 2002, 37pp.,
FENAVIST, Brasília, 2004.
14
108
BT work with a single small arm per shift while VT/AE and PST work with two small arms per
turn (a hand gun and a long barrel gun). We then calculated one small arm for every 3
guards in the case of BT guards, and 2 small arms for every 3 guards for TV/AE and PTS
guards. That gives us a multiplier of 0.33 for BT guards and 0.66 for VT/AE and PTS guards.
Holdings for this group
are represented in
Table 3:
Source: Ministry of Justice, Federal Police Department, Office of General Coordination of Private Security Control, Ofício N°
3559/04), October 2004
Following these criteria, we estimated a total of 413,994 arms held by private security
companies.
f) Informal and Criminal Holdings:
This was the most difficult group to estimate. There are no official records about illicit small
arms holdings. We divided illicit holdings in two groups, namely:
Informal holdings: These are unregistered small arms held by private individuals and
entities (such as undeclared or unauthorized private security companies). They are not
necessarily in the hands of criminals or being used in crimes. However, because they are
unregistered, the state does not know about them and they can more easily (and in an
unnoticed way) migrate to criminal hands via theft or illicit sales.
• Criminal holdings: This refers to small arms in the hands of criminals and being used to
commit crimes.
•
In the absence of official records we used the following sources to calculate these holdings:
109
• Our main reference was the Rio de Janeiro Police’s Data Base on Registered Arms (550,669
small arms), and Seized Arms (232,997 small arms). This database has been thoroughly
cleaned and corrected by cooperative effort with ISER. We crossed this data to determine the
proportion of registered to unregistered weapons among seized arms, and this ration became
our main reference.
States’
Public Security Secretariats (information on registered and seized small arms). Obtained
•
through direct field research.
• Voluntary survey of 2207 individuals participating in a small arms buyback campaign at
Viva Rio’s collection posts in Rio de Janeiro and 350 participants who handed over guns at
Sou da Paz-related collection posts in São Paulo.
• study by Renato Sergio Lima, Jaqueline Sinhoreto e Luci Gati Pietrocolla, of the University of
São Paulo (USP), on firearms in São Paulo, which contains an estimate of firearms holdings in
São Paulo and Brazil.15
Using the sources above, we followed these steps to arrive at an estimate of illicit holdings:
1.Start from the question: How to estimate the number of civilian arms in circulation in Rio State.
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
We know the number of registered arms, from 1951 to 2003 (Reg)
We know the number of seized arms, from 1951 to 2003 (Seiz)
We know the percentage of registered arms found among (Seiz): 25,7%
We assume that (Seiz) is a reasonable sample of all arms in circulation (Circ), registered
and unregistered.
1.5 However, this assumption (1.4) has at least two biases:
1.5.1 The bulk of (Seiz), 78 percent, was apprehended from 1981 to 2003, which
corresponds to the growth of the fire arm epidemic in Rio.
1.5.2 We know that besides the Registered and the Criminal arms universe, there is an
important third segment: unregistered arms in possession of law abiding citizens.
There is an informal (Inf) arms market in Brazil that should not be confused with the
criminal (Crim) market.
1.6 We estimated (Inf) by the results of the voluntary sample in the voluntary small arms surrender
campaign. A very conservative result establishes the informal market as 46 percent of all
the arms in hands of non-criminal civilian individuals (Reg)+(Inf).
1.7 To make the assumption that (Seiz) is a sample of all arms in circulation (Circ) more
reasonable, we considered, at this stage, the numbers of (Seiz) and (Reg) from 1981/2003
only. We found that the same proportion of (Reg) in (Seiz) held true here. In the whole lot
(point 1.3 above) we had 25.7%. Here, from 1981 to 2003, we found 25.6%.
15
De Lima, Renato Sergio;Sinhoreto, Jaqueline and Gati Pietrocolla, Luci, “Armas de Fogo, Medo e Insegurança em São Paulo: Risco de Uma Pessoa que Possui
Arma de fogo Ser Vítima Fatal de Um Roubo”, Revista do ILANUD, 16, 2001, pp.33-40
110
1.8 We had the number of (Reg) from 1981 to 2003: 179.166, which we estimated
represented 54.6% of (Reg)+(Inf) in the period. By the same token, we estimated (Inf),
45.4% of (Reg)+(Inf) , to be: 149,129. Thus we had (Reg)+(Inf) , the arms in the hands
of law abiding citizens who entered the market between 1981 and 2003. (Reg)+(Inf)
was 328,295.
1.9 How then to estimate the number of arms in criminal hands (Crim)? Assuming the point
1.4, that (Seiz) is a sample of all arms in circulation (Circ), and knowing that (Reg)
represented 25,6% of (Seiz), we dared to solve the equation:
(Reg) 1981-2003 = (Circ) 81-03 * 25,6% or (Circ) 81-03 = (Reg) 1981-2003 / 25,6%
(Circ) 81-03 = 179.166 / 25,6% = 700.711
(Crim) 81-03 can be estimated then as (Crim) 81-03 = (Circ) 81-03 – (Leg) 81-03 = (Circ) 81-03 (Reg) 81-03 – (Inf) 81-03 or 700.711 – 328,295 = 372,416
1.10 To expand the estimation of 1981 to 2003 to the full period of our base, 1951 to 2003,
we did one more calculation: having found that this period represented 78% of (Seiz),
point 1.5.1 above, we estimated the full (Crim) universe to be 372,416/ 78% = 477,925
1.11 We had the number of (Reg) from 1951 to 2003: 550,669, which we estimated to
represent 54,6% of (Inf)+(Reg). By the same token, we estimated (Inf), 45,4% of
(Inf)+(Reg), to be: 457,882. Thus we had (Inf)+(Reg), the arms in the hands of law
abiding citizens in Rio de Janeiro:1,008,551. Adding the estimated number of arms in
criminal hands, 477,925, we find (Circ), the total of arms circulating in Rio, to be
1,486,476.
1.12 In short, (Circ) = 2,7 X (Reg).
2. We tested this multiplier, based on Rio’s statistics in São Paulo:
(Circ)SP = 2,7* (Reg) SP = 2,7 * 1.593.902 = 4,302,801
For all states however we have subtracted all seized weapons reported as destroyed by the
Army (ANEEX) and/or submitted during the buy back program in 2004 (and thus out of
circulation and liable to destruction).
In the case of São Paulo, 444,180 firearms were either destroyed or bought back, so civilian
small arms in circulation in that state was estimated at 3,858,621
A 2001 study on firearms in São Paulo, using a different methodology, estimated a total of
3.608.789 arms in civilian hands.16 Their number is 1.7 percent lower than ours is.
The 2.7 multiplier was applied to the estimate of civilian registered small arms per state. To
the resulting amount we applied Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo estimated percentage of informal
small arms: 45.4 percent. Criminal holdings would then result from:
(Circ) - ( Inf +.Reg)
16
De Lima,Sinhoreto, and Gati Pietrocolla, op cit.,
111
It is worth mentioning that by applying this 2.7 multiplier, we obtain the total Civilian holdings
(excluding CAC and military and police private holdings). These holdings are then represented
in table 4 below.
Table 4. Civilian Licit
and Illicit holdings (does
not include CAC and
private use military and
police small arms)
Sources : SINARM, States’ Public Security Secretariats, ANEEX various years (for destroyed small arms), Federal Police (for buy
back program), Analysis, ISER/Viva Rio.
Thus, following these criteria, we estimated 4,635,058 informally held small arms
and 3,857,799 small arms in criminal hands.
State holdings:
State holdings are by definition licit. In principle, institutional small arms should not be taken
as part of the violence problem in Brazil. However, the diversion of police and military small
arms and ammunition towards organized crime and the abuse of lethal power by the police
is a realty that can not be ignored.17 Thus, beyond the pure exercise of counting guns, locating
and identifying military and police small arms arsenals is a way of approaching the problems
posed by these holdings when they fail to meet adequate stockpiles security measures and in
cases police does not have adequate training.18
17
In Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo alone the number of civilians killed by the police reached 1195 and 868 persons respectively in a country where extrajudicial
executions are the order of the day. See on this issue: Centro de Justiça Global. 2003. , Human Rights in Brazil 2003, Global Justice Annual Report, Rio de Janeiro,
Centro de Justiça Global, p. 13 also see: Cano, Ignacio.1997. The Use of Lethal Force by Police in Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, ISER, 1997,81pp.
18
To get a sense of the extent of diversion of military and police small arms (whether by theft or corruption), an ISER study of the DFAE database of crime-related
seized arms found 244 IMBEL assault rifles (calibers 7.62 and 5.56 NATO), 579 submachine guns produced in Brazil (INA, URU and Taurus-Beretta 9mm and .45)
and 109 Colt M16 assault rifles with serial numbers beginning with the letters AO, an indication that they belonged to the Rio de Janeiro Military Police. All the
weapons included in this list are restricted-use, and can only be owned, purchased, and imported by law enforcement and police forces.
112
a) Armed Forces: 19
Since data on Armed Forces stockpiles are not open to the public (as is usually the case in
Latin America), our estimate was based on secondary sources and interviews with active duty
and retired military from the three branches of the armed forces. Rather than developing a
general multiplier for the three armed services, we considered the specificities of stockpile
administration and the extent of small arms use by each service. Our main sources were:
• The Military Balance of South America (MBSA), a publication produced by an Argentine
institute on policy and defense analysis The MBSA gives detailed data (based on field work
and secondary sources) on the number of personnel and (heavy) equipment of Armed
Forces in each South American Country.20 The MBSA was used to get data on personnel
levels in each Armed Force as well as proportions of officers, NCOs and privates in each
armed service. This source was also used to estimate the size of significant special corps
inside each service that can own a higher number of small arms than the rest of the force,
such as the Marines in the Navy for example.
• The Military Balance 2003-2004 published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
London (IISS/MB). This source was used to check the personnel of the immediate recall
reserves and also to compare its figures with the MBSA, interviews and other sources.
• Information contained in the National Census 2000 (Brazilian Institute of Geography and
Statistics, IBGE) which gives information about population by labor category (including the
military) for each Brazilian state. This information was used as a parameter to distribute
military personnel within each state according to the proportion of military personnel in
each unit of the federation.
21
• Interviews with active duty and retired personnel from the three armed services.
• Current legislation. In Brazil the maximum number of personnel per branch of the armed
forces during peace time is periodically fixed by Presidential Decree.22 This information
was used as a parameter to check the validity and reliability of other sources (i.e. that
figures would not surpass the maximum amount established by law). It was also used to
estimate the proportion of officers in the infantry corps of the navy and air force.
• Specialized publications such as Jane’s Infantry Weapons and Forecast International were
consulted in order to triangulate information concerning the kind of small arms used by
each service. These publications as well as import (CACEX and SECEX) and production
data (ANEEX) were useful in the sense that they provide indirect data through the analysis
of the amount of imported/produced small arms for the Brazilian Armed Forces.
19
Since Brazil has not had an internal armed conflict and since light weapons (heavy machineguns, mortars, rocket launchers, MANPDS) are not commonly used by
criminal urban groups, by Armed Forces holdings we mean here small portable arms (assault rifles, sub machineguns, and pistols). Light weapons are not considered
here.
20
Nueva Mayoría, op.cit.
21
A retired high ranking officer from the Brazilian Navy, a retired middle ranking officer from the Air Force, and an active Marine who also served in an army infantry brigade.
22
We consulted decree N° 5710/2004, which fixes the maximum amount of personnel for the Army (including recruits); decree N° 7150/2004, which fixes the
maximum amount of officers for the Air Force (by branch and specialization) and decree N°5019/2004 which establishes the maximum amount of officers for the
Navy (by branch and specialization). All decrees are available at www.planalto.gov.br
113
How did we proceed to estimate holdings?
Estimating military stockpiles is not as simple as counting one gun per soldier or applying
multipliers as if the use of SALW were the same in the three armed services. Moreover, the use of
SALW may vary inside each service. For example, both the navy and the air force have infantry
units that naturally have more SALW equipment than the rest of the force. The navy has the
Marines (fuzileiros navais), a 14,600-strong force whose role is protecting certain naval bases
and carrying out amphibious operations.23 The air force has a small infantry corps whose role
is protecting air bases.
We considered the differences and specificities of each force. This differentiation came from
common background knowledge and from interviews with active and retired military men. The
army as a land force with a big infantry component has a more broad use of small arms. We
assumed then that each officer and sergeant use a handgun when on service. The army, a less
technical force that depends on human combat power also has a larger component of conscripts
and corporals. We therefore figured that the army would hold a bigger proportion of assault
rifles (the standard infantry weapon).
Based on interviews, in the case of the Army we determined a multiplier of 2 arms per soldier
(independent of the rank). Corporals and privates are not assigned a specific assault rifle. They
pick a different gun each time they go on maneuvers, patrol, guard etc. However, the army
keeps two rifles for every corporal and private. One for basic training and the other for non drill
situations or more sophisticated training maneuvers.24
In the case of officers and NCOs, we followed the following line of reasoning: each officer
carries a handgun at all times when in service (or leaves it available at the base/barracks). This
handgun has been purchased by the officer, since the Brazilian Armed Forces do not provide
officers with a personal arm to keep throughout their career.25 In addition to the handgun, we
estimate one assault rifle every two officers and sergeants, for use in training exercises and some
non-drill situations (such as peacekeeping operations abroad), anda a pistol from the inventory
evey two officers and sergeants.
The same multiplier, 2 guns per soldier (independent of rank), was used for the Marines (fuzileiros
navais) and for the Air Force infantry, two specific corps that, because of their tasks, use infantry
small arms for their basic activities. In the case of the marines, the 2 per soldier multiplier is
further justified by the fact that between 1997 and 1998 the marines replaced their FAL assault
rifles with M16A2 assault rifles purchased from the US. The FAL were not discarded as surplus,
but rather kept for heavy training situations (in Brazil’s military jargon “para ralar”).26
23
Data from MBSA and IISS/MB
Interview with a low-ranking military man that served as private in an army infantry unit and currently serves in the Marines.
25
This contrasts with standard practice in Latin America, wherein each officer is provided with a handgun he keeps until retirement.
26
Inteviews with active duty and retired military personnel.
24
114
For the rest of the navy and air force, we used a multiplier of 0.5 for corporals and privates or
sailors (i.e., 1 assault rifle every two men) and 1.5 handguns per officer or sergeant. This was
based on the fact that in both the Air Force and the Navy, a reduced number of small arms is
shared among personnel while on guard duty, or else locked up to be used in order to defend
the bases and/or ship from eventual armed assaults. 27 In the case of officers, one of the
handguns would be privately held, used while on duty and another handgun which stays at
the base and/or ship and is shared by two officers/sergeants for guard shifts.28
Our estimate for the total amount of guns held by the three branches of the armed
forces for active duty personnel is 549,505.
Those were then proportionally distributed among Brazilian states according to their population
of military personnel as stated in the 2000 census.
Table 5. Estimates
of Small Arms
holdings (active
duty)
Sources: El Balance Militar de América
del Sur, The Military Balance and
interviews.
Finally, we estimated the small arms available for reserves. The data was taken from the IISS/
MB, according to which Brazil has 400,000 reserves subject to immediate call-up in case of
war. According to interviewees, military surplus weapons are rarely destroyed in Brazil. Surpluses
are stockpiled for years, and some of these weapons are left for reserves. The same sources
27
28
Ibid.
Ibid.
115
affirmed that only the first line of ready reserves matter, and that current planning is for at least
one small arm for each reservist. The proportion of active duty officers and NCOs was used
in order to calculate the number of reserve officers and NCOs (estimated at 163,762). We
then used a very conservative multiplier of 0.5 handguns (side arms) for that group. That
resulted in a total of 81,881 additional small arms for reserve officers and NCOs.
Following these criteria, we estimated a total of 481,881 small arms held by the
armed forces reserve.
Reserve small arms have been also proportionately distributed using data from the
census.
It must be noted that the army interrupted its purchases from IMBEL (pistols and FAL rifles) in
the mid 1980s. FAL rifles from the Army are periodically sent to IMBEL for repairs and
maintenance but no new large-scale purchases have been made.29 According to secondary
sources, IMBEL did not produce more than 200,000 FALs between the early 1960s up to 1983
(not including, of course, Belgian-made FALs imported in the early 1960s).30 At the same time,
according to information provided by the Army, between 1977 and 2004 IMBEL reported a
total production of 334,534 (this includes assault rifles and pistols).31 On the other hand, the
Brazilian branch of Beretta (bought in the early 80s by Taurus), produced a total of 40,000
Model 92 9mm pistols (in use in the Navy and Air Force) for the Armed Forces.32
In Brazil, each branch of the Armed Forces decides autonomously on its arms purchases, and
the Air Force uses a different type of small arms: it purchased Heckler und Koch G-3 and HK33 rifles in the early 1970s as well as some MP5 machine guns for its special forces. With the
exception of a limited purchase of SIG 551 rifles in the mid 1990s, no further acquisitions
were made by the Air Force. The Navy chose the US-made M16A2 in the late 1997 for the
Marines and kept the old FAL rifles for training.33
As we saw in the chapter on legal SALW production and trade, IMBEL is planning to equip the
whole Army with 5.56mm, domestically designed MD97L assault rifles by the end of this
decade. If tradition is maintained, the old 7.62mm FAL rifles will be kept for recruits and
reserves.
29
Interview with Colonel Alte S. E. Zylberberg, Superintendent of the Itajubá Plant of IMBEL, Itajubá, May 4, 2004 and interview with active duty military personnel
(marines and army).
Klare, David and Andersen Arthur (1996) A Scourge of Guns: The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Latin America, Federation of American Scientists,
Washington D.C., p 19
31
DFPC, Relatorio da Situação do SICOFA, Brasilia 2004.
32
Wilson, R.L.(2001), Il Mondo Beretta: una leggenda internationale, Sperling & Kupper, p.222
33
Interview at Rio de Janeiro with the owner of a firm that imports small arms for law enforcement agencies and interview with active duty military personnel (marines and army). Also see: Jane’s Infantry Weapons, National Inventories section.
30
116
b) Law enforcement and Criminal Justice:
The complexity of the police and criminal justice system in Brazil matches the size and diversity
of the country. Each of the country’s twenty six states plus the Federal Disctrict has its own
Military Police, organized along military lines (with military ranks, uniforms and in some cases,
small arms) and an investigative/judiciary Civilian Police (plain clothes detectives). That means
54 separate state police forces, with about 461,069 men and woman total. Each state decides
autonomously the kind of weapons its police will use and how to manage its stockpiles.
Several factors, however, countervail the tendency toward plurality in policing practices and
equipment:
• Considered as “auxiliary” to the Armed Forces, military police corps operate under similar
doctrines and organization in all states.
• The protectionist nature of the Brazilian small arms market prevents widespread
diversification into different calibers, models and makes among Brazil’s police forces, which
with a few exceptions purchase their firearms from Brazilian firms.
• Both the Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula administrations developed and implemented
National Public Security Plans, which included economic support to states for the purchase of
new small arms with standardized calibers and models. According to our field research, most
civilian and military police corps are currently adopting .40 caliber Taurus pistols as their
standard side arm, as well as .40 Taurus Carbines and sub-machineguns.
To the state police corps we must add the 7,800-strong Federal Police, an investigative force
which is active throughout the country, and the 7,300-strong Federal Highway Police, responsible
for enforcing the law along federal highways. Finally, we have to count the state fire departments
(which in Brazil are lightly armed paramilitary units), state prison guards (up until last year
Brazil did not have a federal prison system), municipal guards,34 and judges and magistrates,
who in Brazil have the right to request from the state a small arm for personal defense purposes.
We consulted several sources in elaborating our estimates:
• Field research in Brazilian states (questionnaires and interviews): number of policemen in
service, the weapons they use, and typical work shifts;
• Secondary sources (press releases), checked by the appropriate institution (Federal Police
and Federal Highway police);
• Primary sources (e.g. the Rio de Janeiro state government publishes data on number of
policemen on its official police homepage);
• Police gazettes and other publications;
• 2000 Census 2000 (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, IBGE)
34
Some cities in Brazil have municipal police charged with taking care of public buildings and monitoring transit; in some cases these guards are armed with revolvers. The Statute of Disarmament (regulated in June 2004) declares that cities with over 250,000 inhabitants may have armed municipal guards, provided they meet
a set of very strict requirements (most of them related to adequate training).. This issue may contribute to increased holdings in the law enforcement sector in the
near future.
117
Federal Police:
Data about the Federal Police was collected from secondary sources and interviews with active
duty agents. This police corps is unique in that it is made up of highly mobile teams that are
convoked on a case by case basis. Federal Police agents do not necessarily have fixed working
shifts. For example, a federal policemen working in Rio de Janeiro in support of the buyback
campaign may be suddenly called on to travel (together with other agents gathered from
other states) to Manaus and arrest a counterfeiter.
Federal police agents generally receive a handgun from the official inventory that remains
with them throughout their career; and they may also carry a private handgun. When there
are on special missions they may choose to carry a long barrel gun (generally a semi-automatic
M16A1 or a H&K MP-5 submachine gun). According to our interviews each Federal Police
local headquarter has about 1 long barrel gun for 4 policemen. Our multiplier for the Federal
Police (counting handguns and long barrel guns) is 2.25.
Federal Police-held small arms were distributed among Brazilian states using the 2000 Census
(IBGE) proportion of policemen by state.
Following these criteria, we estimated a total of 17,550 small arms held by the
Federal Police.
State Military Police (MP), State Civilian Police (CP) and Federal Highway Police (FHP):
For military and civilian state police corps, we developed a multiplier based on common
denominators found in questionnaires distributed during our field research. Both in civilian
and military police corps, policemen carry a single institutional handgun when in service. To
that institutional handgun we must add a second private (registered) backup handgun, which
policemen are authorized to carry while on service. There is a third small arm, a long barrel
gun that is shared between three policemen and usually stays in the car or at the police station35.
This would imply a multiplier of 1.33 (1 handgun + 1/3 one long barrel gun per 3 policemen
) institutional firearms per agent. However, to this we should add police agents’ private “backup”
handguns (conservatively estimated at 1 per agent), counted here as service weapon:
Institutional handguns do not stay with policemen at all times; they are returned to the police
station or barracks after agents have completed their shift. Another common denominator
found in police and civilian military corps is that they serve in 8/24, 24/72 and 12/36 hour
shifts, so at any given time about 1/3 of the police force is on duty. We applied the same work
shift multiplier to the Federal Highway Police (FHP), yielding a multiplier for all three corps of:
1 (personal handgun) + 1.33 (institutional firearm) * 1/3 (agents on duty) = 1,433
35
118
The one exception to this rule was the state of Ceará, were policemen carry two institutional handguns
Following these criteria we estimanted 538,422 small arms for State Military Police
corps (378,332 police agents); 135,082 small arms for State Civilian Police corps
(87,288 police agents); and 10,463 small arms for the Federal Highway Police (7,300
agents). 36
Judges and Magistrates:
Our field research indicated that each state judiciary maintains a certain number of handguns
for judges and magistrates that may require a state weapon for their personal defense. These
weapons are generally entrusted to drivers / bodyguards and remain within official cars.37
We used a very conservative estimate of 1 official small arm for every 10 judges and
magistrates. This was based on two considerations: first, since judges have the right to carry
small arms, and may purchase them very easily, the state probably does not need to provide
arms to the majority of them. Second, according to our field researcher, most states have a
very limited number of guns to be assigned on request for the protection of judges.38
Following these criteria, we estimated a total of 1,207 small arms held by the states’ judiciary
for 12,067 judges and magistrates.
Others:
For groups such as prison guards (who, according to specialist Julita Lemgruber, only carry
small arms while on prison premises and while transporting inmates), armed municipal guards
and fire departments we also used a very conservative multiplier of 0.1, applied to the census
category “other policemen and transit guards”.
Following these criteria, we estimated a total of 19,023 small arms held by these
institutions.
1.3.2 A Closer Look at Holdings
Finally, beyond a simple estimate of the number of firearms in Brazil, this study has sought to
understand how small arms are distributed within each state along rural/urban parameters
as well as identify the types of small arms used by the different groups of holders discussed
above.
36
During the field research six consulted state sources informed the number of either civilian or military police holdings. In these six cases the number informed by
these authorities was accepted as valid and use in lieu of our estimate.
37
Interview with field researcher Luiz Carlos Carvalho Silveira.
38
ibid
119
Data collection and analysis was based on questionnaires distributed among state small
arms control agencies during field research across Brazil. Data on seized and registered
small arms by type, make, model, caliber and manufacturer was requested. Although data
was not available in every single state, we got a quite representative sample of the kind of
weapons held and used by civilians, police and the military in Brazil as well as the types of
small arms commonly used in criminal activities.
The methodology adopted involved comparing data from our field research and ANEEX
statistics on permitted use small arms, triangulated with interview material, to analyze and
map the distribution of sales of small arms and ammunition in the civilian market by decade.
A detailed analysis (including geographical representation) of holdings by group, small arms
types and geographical distribution is made in section 2 of this chapter.
2. Counting guns: how small arms are distributed in Brazil and who holds them
This section analyzes state and private holdings by holder and according to geographical
distribution within Brazil. The reader should keep in mind the maps displayed in Dr. Phebo`s
chapter on the impact of armed violence while looking at the maps on holdings distribution.
Where the former show the expansion of the violence epidemics and the localization of the risk
group affected by it, the latter show how the vector of that epidemic is distributed in the territory.
2.1. How many guns and who holds them:
Using the methodology explained in the section 1, total small arms holdings in Brazil was
estimated at 17,010,941. These holdings are distributed in the following way by holding group:
Diagram 3:
Distribution of
Small Arms
Holdings per
group.
120
Graphically, holdings are distributed as displayed below:
Graph 1. Small Arms Holdings in Brazil.
Graph 2. A zoom into licit holdings.
Graph 3. A zoom into the ilicit side
of guns.
121
Graph 4. A zoom into private
civilina legal holdings.
Graph 5. A zoom into legal small
arms privately held by military and
police personnel and by the CAC.
Graph 6. A zoom into CAC (2003).
122
Graph 7. A zoom into state holdings.
What do these statistics tell us about the distribution of small arms among holding groups? In
the first place, legal and illicit holdings are distributed in an almost 50 / 50
proportion. This is a very tense and delicate balance in a country where communication and
cooperation between state and federal control agencies is lacking, and where until the
enactment of the Disarmament Statute there was little cooperation between the institution that
controls production and trade (the Army) and the institution that controls possession, use and
law enforcement (Federal Police). Basically, authorities do not know where about half
of the small arms in the country are, nor who is holding them. Half the circulating
stocks are in the hands of either criminals or private citizens in the informal
market.
Controlling the criminal market is a matter of police efficiency, honesty and intelligence.
Controlling the informal market is an even more delicate issue: the state must convince citizens
to voluntarily hand over their guns (via cash incentives and amnesties for unregistered guns)
or to register them, which is exactly what is being done now under the Disarmament Statute:
350,000 small arms were collected during eleven month of a national buy back program,
wich represents 3% of the estimated private legal and informal holdings.
As we see in Graph 3, the proportion between criminal and informal small arms
almost mirrors the distribution between legal and illicit: half and half.
Small Arms migrate from legal to illegal circuits. In Rio de Janeiro, we know that 25.6 percent
of small arms seized between 1981 and 2003 belonged to legal users that had previously
registered them. In São Paulo this proportion was 52 percent among small arms seized
between 2000 and 2003, while in Brasilia, the proportion was 29% between 2001 and 2003. 39
39
Sources: DFAE for Rio de Janeiro; Office of Coordination of Planning and Analysis of the Public Security Secretariat for São Paulo and Division of Control of
Arms and Explosives (DAME) of the Civilian Police of Brasilia.
123
If registered weapons, theoretically monitored by the state, can migrate in such numbers to
criminal circuits, then we can expect an even greater flow of unregistered weapons to end up in
the hands of criminals, whether through illicit sales, theft or use in criminal offences?
When we zoom into licit holdings we see in Graph 2 that the majority of small
arms, 52 percent, are in the hands of civilian individuals. It is expected that with the
stricter and more expensive registration regime implanted by the Disarmament Statute, the
number of registered small arms will decrease over time. This would be in keeping with the
experience of Rio de Janeiro state, which implemented similar measures at the state level in
2001. Of course, such an effect will depend in part on the efficacy of information sharing
between the states and SINARM, as well as the ability of the the Federal Police to identify and
sanction those owners who fail to renew their permits.
By zooming into the “gun privileged castes”, i.e. those groups that enjoy easier access to the
purchase of small arms (military, police, judges, CAC), and whose holdings are controlled directly
by the Army and not by the Federal Police; we see that the predominant group in terms of
number of firearms is policemen. This has to do with a police ethos of being a policemen “24
hours a day” (even if they serve in shifts) and with the fact that policemen out of service are
specifically (and sometimes viciously) targeted for murder in cases of armed robbery.40 Within
the CAC, we find the disquieting fact that the predominant group are the collectors, who can
hold large numbers of restricted-use small arms at home, some times semi-automatic military
style rifles. The great risk here is the chance of burglary and the theft of military style guns in
perfect working order.
2.2. Where are the guns? Geographical distribution of small arms in Brazil, by holding
group:
Once we know how many small arms and who holds them (by group), we can look
at how these holdings are distributed in a country of 177 million inhabitants.41 Let’s
look at the maps:
Small arms are concentrated (over 10 weapons per 100 households) in states that underwent
processes of recent colonization, notably Rondônia, Amazonas, Roraima, Tocantins and Pará,
Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul. These are states that from the 1970s on received large
influxes of young male migrants from Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná and Santa Catarina and
also from the northeastern states (Bahia, Paraíba, Pernambuco and Ceará). Whereas Mato
Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul experienced an expansion of the agricultural frontier, the rest
of the mentioned states received male migrants who went working in the (legal and illegal)
extraction of timber, gold and precious stones. Migrants often carried with them either the
“cowboy’ (gaucho) gun culture that characterizes the south (mainly Rio Grande do Sul where
cattle raising is predominant) or the macho culture that characterizes the rough life of peasants
in the northeast .42
40
Interviews with active duty and retired federal and state policemen.
With the advent of the Disarmament Statute, the legal age for possession rose from 21 to 25. Police officers can buy small arms from the age of 18.
42
Information collected from interviews carried out by our field researcher.
41
124
An exception to this is São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro, three highly populated states with high
per capita income, where the urban and rural middle class (as the chapter on demand for firearms shows)
purchased small arms in periods of loose or inexistent control and regulations. The case of Brasilia is very
particular: a high concentration of income (it is basically a capital of well-paid public servers) and public
security and military officials who also hold small arms for private use.
Data is presented per 100 households. Given the epidemic of violence sweeping the country, households
were considered a useful unit for measuring private holdings: a small arm owned by a person in a family
group can be misused by any member of the family, and can kill our wound any member of that family.
Map 3. Private holdings per 100
households (2003)-by state
Map 4. Legal Private holdings per
100 households-by state (2003)
125
Map 5. Illicit (Informal and
criminal holdings ) per 100
households (2003)- by state
Besides individual civilian holdings, it
is also necessary to understand where
the military, the police, and private
security (with their small arms) are
located. Another important group is
the CAC, especially collectors.
The relevance of these holding groups
is that they stockpile large amounts
of small arms and ammunition,
sometimes very close to areas with a strong organized crime presence, giving way to cases of
corruption and theft. Interviewed military sources, for example, manifested their concern about
the fact that conscript soldiers that serve in military bases in the metropolitan area of Rio de
Janeiro (where there is a high concentration of military units) come in most cases from favelas
with a strong organized crime presence. These young men may either be involved in the theft
of arms and ammunition or be recruited after the end of their military service as soldados do
tráfico, i.e. armed members of drug trafficking factions.
Finally, understanding where police small arms in terms of the common and broad spread
poor training and abuse of lethal force by police in Brazil.
Table 6. Estimated
Holdings by CAC (2003)
Source: ANEEX 2002 and 2003
126
Map 6 Private security guards per 100
people (by state)
Source: Federal Police. Office of General Coordination for Private Security Control
Map 7. State Military and Civilian police
corps personnel per 100 people (2003)
Sources: Data gathered from states’ public security secretariats
Map 8. Distribution of Armed Forces
(active duty and reserves) small arms
per 100 people (by state)
Sources: MBSA and IBGE
127
Note that in map 8, the symbols mark municipalities that host Army Brigades (yellow crosses),
Air Force squadrons (planes) or Navy bases (boats). The distribution of brigades, squadron
and bases by township is displayed in table 7 below.
Table 7
Source: MBSA
Regarding the issue
of diversion and
theft of military
materiel to criminal
organizations, it is
worth noting the
h
i
g
h
concentration of
military bases in
the municipality
of Rio de Janeiro.
Most of the Air
Force
logistical
and
materiel
bases are in Rio,
as well as most of the small arms belonging to the Air Force infantry that guards
these bases. In 2004 there were two episodes involving the diversion of HK-33 rifles and
hand grenades belonging to the Air Force. The Marines (an elite force) also have their main
bases and facilities in Rio de Janeiro as well as the Army’s Parachutist Brigade which is basically
formed by conscripts recruited in that municipality. Seizures and arrests involving theft from
the Marines and the Army are also common.43 Many of these bases are very close to favelas
controlled by criminal organizations.
43
See: Grupo de Estudos de Defesa e Segurança Internacional (GEDES).2004. Observatório Cone Sul de Defesa e Forças Armadas, Informe Brasil, Numbers 120,
141 and 122 ,Universidade Estadual Paulista, Campus Franca, São Paulo.
128
2.3 Zooming into states and holding groups:
We have now seen how small arms are distributed among Brazil’s states, who the owners are,
and how many guns they own. We can further ask how small arms are distributed within each
state: Are they predominantly in densely populated metropolitan areas, or are they mostly
hold by landowners, rural workers and peasants in rural areas? More importantly, which kinds
of small arms are held by each group? All small arms are lethal, but handguns are
concealable, and thus easier to use for crimes and to transport. Fire rate and power marks
also a difference: the problems of a big city with high concentration of automatic weapons in
criminal hands are different from those of a mid-sized rural city where robbers use revolvers
and pistols. The same applies to institutional arms: are the police adequately equipped in
Brazil? These are the type of questions that will be answered in this section. Information
presented here combines answers to questionnaires and statistical data provided by the states’
public security secretariats during our field research as well as answers to interviews conducted
by our field researcher.
Since not all states answered questions related to the type of small arms commonly registered
and seized, we decided to present a case by case analysis, highlighting commonalities and
differences between different regions of the
country.
2.3.1. Urban rural distribution:
Below we present qualitative or quantitative data
about the rural/metropolitan distribution of
registered and/or seized small arms and/or
carrying permits from those states that provided
it (Table 8).
Table 8. Rural/Urban distribution of private
holdings
Source: Public Security secretariats of various states.
129
In states with large cattle farming, such as Rio Grande do Sul, Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso
do Sul, a single land owner may register several small arms for his employees. These are
areas with extensive cross-border cattle theft, and it is common for rural workers (cowboys) to
work armed. This situation also leads to cases in which small arms are purchased by landowners
in neighboring countries (Uruguay and Bolivia) and then transported across poorly policed
land borders. These weapons are not registered. We have a situation then of informal rural
arms holdings. On the other hand, a completely different kind of demand is seen in the urban
informal markets in states like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.44
2.3.2 Who has what? Types of weapon by holding group
What kinds of small arms are held by each holding group? This question is relevant to the
evaluation of the firepower of these holdings as well as an assessment of the adequacy of law
enforcement policies.
Individual Civilian Legal Holdings
Although most of the consulted states provided totals of registered and seized small arms, as
shown in Table 9 below, only seven public security secretariats answered the questions
concerning type and calibers of registered small arms.
Table 9. Proportion of
registered small arms
by type and state (when
information available)
Source: Public Security Secretariats.
44
130
Interview with field research Luiz Carlos Siveira. Also see Benjamin Lessing´s chapter on demand for firearms in Rio de Janeiro.
These data show a variation from region to region. Whereas handguns (revolvers in this case)
are the predominant type of small arm held by civilian individuals in Rio de Janeiro, this
seems not to be the case in more rural states such as Rio Grande do Sul or Mato Grosso. The
latter show a more even distribution between revolvers and shotguns. In Acre, long barrel
guns (shotguns and carbines) are predominant.
Information about calibers and makes is scarce. The only states to offer reliable information
were Rio de Janeiro, Sergipe, Ceará and Pernambuco. However, given the protectionist nature
of the Brazilian domestic small arms market, it is possible to infer the makes for different kind
of permitted-use small arms (i.e. those allowed for civilians):
* Taurus and Rossi .38 and .32 revolvers (.38 is the most popular caliber)
* Taurus .380 and 7.65mm imported pistols (7.65mm is a common pre-1980 caliber when
most of the pistols were imported because Taurus did not produce pistols before that year).
* CBC, Boito and Urko shotguns in various calibers.
* .38 Rossi carbines.
Private Security:
The type of small arms that private guards are authorized to use depends on their level of
training. Basic training guards are authorized to use either a .32 or 38 revolver or a .38
carbine. Guards with training for escorting the transport of values can carry a .32 or .38
revolver or a 7.65mm or .380 pistol and a long weapon which can be a 12 caliber shotgun or
a .38 carbine. Bodyguards (personal security training) can carry .32 and .38 revolvers or
7.65mm or .380 pistols.45
Military and Policemen for Private Use:
This group of holders can choose to have restricted-use or permitted-use handguns at home.
Automatic weapons are not permitted.
Law Enforcement community:46
Up through the late 1990s, the most common side arm for both civil and military state police
corps was a .38 revolver, though military police often corps often purchased 9mm Taurus
pistols (generally PT92 Beretta inspired). Surplus material was rarely if ever destroyed. Old
small arms would often be stored for use of spare parts in repairs of functioning weapons still
45
46
Federal Police, Office for General Coordination of Private Security Control, op.cit.
Information gathered during field research and questionnaires.
131
in service. Since the late 90s, however, with federal support, there has been a nationwide
effort to standardize police stockpiles. All state police corps, keeping with the tradition of a
protected internal market, are replacing their old .38 revolvers and 9mm pistols with .40
caliber Taurus pistols. Most of the consulted police corps declared that since part from older
side arms are not compatible with the new standard armament, surplus weapons are being
systematically sent to the Army for destruction.
The Disarmament Statute establishes that captured and seized weapons can no longer be
incorporated into police holdings, a situation that was common before. From December
2003 on, seized weapons must be destroyed 48 hours after they have cleared forensic analysis.
Most long arms used by state police corps are 12 gauge pump-action shotguns and the newly
incorporated .40 Taurus carbines and, in the case of special operation teams, submachineguns. Assault rifles and sub-machine guns are generally used for border patrolling
in states that have international borders, in highway check points (to be used in case of truck
theft), and in case-by-case special operations (e.g. liberation of hostages etc.). There are
exceptions, however: in Rio de Janeiro and Espirito Santo, the police use assault
rifles (M-4 carbines and FAL in Rio and FAL in Espirito Santo) for routine urban
police activities. The police of Minas Gerais are also increasingly using the new
MD97 assault rifle in their metropolitan patrol units.
Law enforcement officials claim such firepower is needed, because criminal organizations in
these cities also have automatic weapons. Given the generally poor quality of police training,
carrying full automatic weapons into densely populated areas may represent more of a threat
than a factor of protection. In the chapter on firearms demand, evidence is presented that
suggests that automatic weapon use by police may have contributed to an escalating arms
race between drug factions and state forces.
Federal Police agents generally use a 9mm or .40 pistol as service weapon and a semiautomatic M16A2 version or an MP-5 submachine gun when in special operations.
Armed Forces:47
The standard assault rifle of the Army is the FAL 7.62mm, manufactured by IMBEL (some
Belgium FALs are still in service). Some 5.56mm versions of the FAL have been manufactured
by IMBEL for light infantry units (caçadores). As mentioned in the production chapter, IMBEL is
expecting to re-equip the Army during this decade with newly produced MD97 5.56mm rifles.
Side weapons include: 9mm and .45 IMBEL pistols.
Special operations units may use M-4 carbines and MP-5 submachine guns.
47
Interview with Colonel Alte S. E. Zylberberg, Superintendent of the Itajubá Plant of IMBEL, Itajubá, May 4, 2004 and interview with active duty military personnel
(marines and army).
Interview at Rio de Janeiro with the owner of a firm that imports small arms for law enforcement agencies). Also see: Jane’s Infantry Weapons, National Inventories
section.
132
The Marines use US-made M16A2 assault rifles as their standard rifle. Old IMBEL FAL rifles
are still in service in the marines for training and in the rest of the Navy for the protection of
ships and bases. Side weapons include PT92 and Beretta 9mm pistols. Marines special
operation teams use Uzi submachine guns, MP-5 submachine guns and M-4 carbines.
The Air Force uses G-3 and HK-33 assault rifles bought from Germany in the 1970s. Special
operation teams use MP-5 submachine gnus. The PT92 Taurus is used as a side arm.
Illicit holdings:
A large number of states provided information on types of seized weapons, allowing for a
more comprehensive analysis of illicit holdings:
Table 10. Seized
small arms by
type and state:
Source: State Public Security
Secretariats
With the exception of Acre (where long guns are also predominant in licit
holdings), handguns (revolvers followed by pistols) are invariably the predominant
type of weapon seized by police. Only in Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco do we see a
significant proportion of military style small arms (assault rifles and submachine guns). In
Rio de Janeiro that proportion goes up to 3% in the 1990s.48 In the rest of the states the
seizure of assault weapons is not significant.
48
See Patricia Rivero’s chapter on the criminal market in Rio de Janeiro.
133
Information about makes and manufacturers was only provided by São Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro: in both cases seized small arms replicate the legal market when it comes to permitteduse small arms (.38 Taurus and Rossi revolvers and .380 Taurus pistols). On the other hand,
in Rio de Janeiro the number of foreign restricted-use small arms seized by the police was
twice the amount of seized Brazilian-made restricted-use small arms.49 Permitted-use small
arms can be purchased freely in gun shops, while restricted-use can be purchased directly
from the factory only by law enforcement agencies or, if authorized by the army, CAC members.
As such, the presence of restricted-use weapons indicates either the diversion of
arms from state actors, international arms trafficking or both. The predominant
caliber of restricted-use weapons is 9mm.
Because of the lax controls for purchasing permitted-use small arms and the predominance of
the domestic arms industry in arms sales, we will assume here that most of the revolvers and
pistols seized in the rest of the states were also made in Brazil.
2.3.3 Contrasting with sales:
Sales from factories to gun shops and deposits can be also taken as an indirect measure of
small arms consumption and availability in different regions of Brazil. We analyzed and
mapped ANEEX information concerning permitted-use small arms and ammunition. This
information is grouped into general categories: handguns and long barrel guns for arms,
bullet cartridges and shotgun cartridges for ammunition. Besides measuring overall sales to
gun retailers as an indirect indicator of demand, the information by type of small arm and
ammunition also gives an indirect indicator of the type of product consumed by region.
However, ANEEX data has several limitations:
• ANEEX reports only sales to the private civilian market. Sales to state law enforcement
institutions are only available for 2000, 2001 and 2002.
• As was the case in ANEEX’s information on production, we found data vacuums (no sales
for certain years) that were not clearly explained in the source. They may be related to
underreporting or simply to mistakes in the ANEEX data entry process.
• Information is given by military region and not by state (mitigated in the case of single state
military regions)
• Data values may vary in proportion to the efficiency of control and notification procedures
in each military region.
• Firms and individuals may buy weapons in states where taxes and purchasing requisites
are lower. This bias is unlikely to be important, considering that the only state with high requisites
and taxes on the purchase of small arms was Rio de Janeiro, and that only from 2001 on.50
49
Analysis of Rio de Janeiro’s DFAE data base.. Restricted use small arms represented about 8.5 % of total seizures in the last decade.
Interviewed DFAE sources declared that after 2001, private security companies started to make their arms and ammunition purchases in the state of Paraná,
which has a big concentration of shops and no local taxes over the sale of small arms.
50
134
ANEEX information is taken here as an indirect indicator used to check and confirm trends
identified in the analysis of police information on small arms registration and seizures, rather
than as a direct indicator of small arms availability. In the maps below main small arms and
ammunition factories indicated with circled white crosses.
Map 9. Sales of permitted use
small arms (from the factory to gun
shops) per 1000 households 19681976 (by military region)
Source: ANEEX
Map 10. Sales of permitted use
small arms (from the factory to gun
shops) per 1000 households 19771985 (by military region)
Source: ANEEX
135
Map 11. Sales of permitted use small
arms (from the factory to gun shops)
per 1000 households 1986-1994 (by
military region)
Source: ANEEX
Map 12. Sales of permitted use small
arms (from the factory to gun shops)
per 1000 households 1995-2003 (by
military region)
Source: ANEEX
Map 13. Sales of ammunition (from the
factory to gun shops) per household
1968-1976 (by military region)
Source: ANEEX
136
Map 14. Sales of ammunition (from the
factory to gun shops) per household
1977-1985 (by military region)
Source: ANEEX
Map 15. Sales of ammunition (from the
factory to gun shops) per household
1986-1994 (by military region)
Source: ANEEX
Map 16. Sales of ammunition (from the
factory to gun shops) per household
1995-2003.51 (by military region)
Source: ANEEX
51
ANEEX does not report ammunition sales in 2003. For that year we use a
very conservative estimate of proyecting the ammount sold the previous
year.
137
What we see in the maps above is the distribution by military region of small arms and
ammunition sales (from the factory to gun shops) in four different periods covered by this
study: 1968-1976; 1977-1985; 1986-1994 and 1995-2003. This last period also illustrates
(marked in black points) the distribution of gun shops and deposits in 2002. In all maps,
relevant small arms and ammunition factories are marked with white circled crosses. Firearms
data was distributed (using IBGE stats) per 1000 household, while ammunition was distributed
per 100 household.
What we see in these maps confirms the trend shown in the holding maps: to the north and the
west of the country, the sale of small arms and ammunition appears to follow the occupation
of the Amazonian basin as well as the expansion of the agricultural frontier in Mato Gross and
Mato Grosso do Sul. On the other hand, sales are also concentrated in traditional small arms
consuming states such as Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Paraná. Sales also show
proportionally high in São Paulo, the richest and most populated state.
In general terms we see a drop in sales of small arms in 1995-2003 , most likely
due to the increased requirements imposed by the 1997 SINARM law. We do not
see that drop in Rio Grande do Sul, a state that continues to lead in sales. In that state sales
rose from 186,3 per 1000 households in 1986-1994 to 276,5 small arms per 1000 households
in 1995-2003. However, when the evolution of sales per year in Rio Grande do Sul is
analyzed, it is possible to see (as shown in graph) that in 1996 (a year before the SINARM
law) sales were twenty times higher the average sales for the 1995-2003 period. Then following
the national trend, they dropped abruptly.
Graph 8
Permitted use
small arms sales
to gun shops in
Rio Grande do
Sul 1995-2003
Source: ANEEX
138
This trend is confirmed by the registration and carrying licensing data from the civilian police
of Rio Grande do Sul shown below:52
Graph 9
Graph 10
DAME= firearms division (office
located in Porto Alegre), DPI=Police
stations in rural areas (interior), DPM=
Police stations in the metropolitan area
of Porto Alegre
It seems plausible that the
Disarmament Statute would
cause an even larger drop in
small arms registration and
purchases.
We do not see a similar drop in
the proportion of ammunition sales. This highlights the equal emphasis that should be given
to ammunition when analyzing and planning small arms control policies.
In some regions such as the 12th and the 9th (Amazonian states and Mato Grosso and Mato
Grosso do Sul) the proportion of sales of small arms and ammunition per 1000 households
and households is high. However, when we look at the type of small arms and ammunition we
find a majority of long barrel guns (only hunting rifles and shotguns are allowed for civilians)
and shotgun ammunition. These are the states where small arms are concentrated in rural,
inhospitable areas. In the southeast and northeast part of the country, we find a clear
predominance in the sale of handguns and bullet cartridges. See Table11 below.
52
Unlike the totals used for calculating Rio Grande do Sul holdings, this data includes renovations and transfers.
139
Table 11. Sale of small arms and ammunition (from the factory to gun shops) by type
and Military Region:
Source: ANEEX
3. Conclusion
Like so many other socioeconomic factors, small arms possession is extremely heterogeneous across Brazil’s
many states and geographical regions. Poor registration and inadequate control may be ubiquitous, but
they manifest themselves in different ways, from the unregistered .38 revolver that ends up in the hands of
criminals in a favela of São Paulo or Rio de Janeiro, to the unregistered rifle or shotgun on state land in Mato
Grosso or Rio Grande do Sul, to the shotgun used to guard illegal gold mines in Rondônia.
As such, the problem of small arms cannot be analyzed through a single lens. Regional and local reality
must be considered in order to propose adequate control policies. Still, these realities are ultimately
interlinked in the country as a whole, and are subject to influence through national legislation
and institutions. Knowing where the small arms go, what their legal status is, and which
groups hold them, is a first step toward the efficient implementation of small arms control
policies and laws. This is of utmost importance in a country where, as we saw, 50% of
holdings were estimated to be illicit (either criminal or informal).
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Annex
Questionnaires used during field research
Questionnaire 1 : holdings, inventories and stockpiles
Registered firearms and carrying licenses:
1) How many firearms were registered (per year) by civilian individuals since the year registration
begun in your State? Are these newly registered firearms or this data includes renovations and property
transfers? Could you please give information about type and caliber?
2) How many firearms were registered by civilian legal entities since the year registration begun in
your State? Are these newly registered firearms or does this data include renovations and property
transfers? Could you please give information about type and caliber?
3) Same question as questions 1 and 2 but referring to licenses to carry. Please differentiate between
licenses to carry carrying licenses issued to civilian legal entities, civilian individuals, police agents and
military officers and NCOs.
4) Before the enactment of the Statute of Disarmament, which were the State agencies responsible for
registering firearms and issuing licenses to carry?
5) Regarding Article Nº 22 of the Statute of Disarmament did your state government come to any
cooperation agreement with the Federal Police for the registration of firearms? If yes, could you
please name the state agency that currently registers firearms and issues carrying licenses?
6) What are the changes brought by the Statute of Disarmament in terms of the procedures for registering
firearms and issuing carrying licenses? If there was no change yet, what changes do you expect will
come?
7) Is there a centralized database for registered firearms and issued licenses to carry in your state?
Would you make that information available for this research?
8) Which is the locality in your state with the higher number of registration/carrying requests? Is it rural
or urban?
Seized firearms:
1) What is the total number of small arms seized in your state? Could you please give us a historical
series of that data (per year)?
2) Could you please distribute that data by caliber and type?
3) How many firearms belonging to the state’s inventories are reported as stolen or lost per year?
4) What is approximately the quantity of ammunition yearly seized in your state?
5) Which is the agency responsible for storing seized firearms and ammunition in your state?
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6) What is the circuit followed by seized arms and ammunition since the moment of seizure?
7) Does your state government have a centralized seized firearms database? Would you make that
information available for this research?
8) Which is the locality (urban and rural) with the higher arms and ammunition seizures?
9) Is there a central state deposit for seized firearms and ammunition? If the answer is yes, which is
the agency currently administering the deposit and how many firearms are currently stored there?
10) In case answer for question 9 is negative, where are seized firearms and ammunition stored?
11) Was there a change in seizing and storage procedures since the enactment of the Statute of
Disarmament? If there were no changes, do you expect changes in the near future?
State holdings stockpiles management and security:
A) Civilian Police:
1)
(a) What is the total personnel of the Civilian Police? (b) How many small arms are carried by
each agent when in service?(c) Please describe the work shifts used in your police force (frequency
and duration).
2) Does your police agency use standardized small arms calibers, makes and models? What is the
adopted standard for
a) Handguns
b) Long barrel guns
3) Does your agency have standardized procedures for the marking, identification and safety of
institutional holdings and stockpiles?
4) What is the procedure followed for the forensic analysis of civilian police small arms involved in
shootings? Is there an official deposit for the storage of these weapons?
B) Military Police?
1)
(a) What is the total personnel of the Military Police? (b) How many small arms are carried by
each agent when in service? (c) Please describe work shifts in your police force (frequency and
duration).
2) Does your police agency use standardized small arms calibers, makes and models? What is the
adopted standard for
a. Handguns
b. Long barrel guns
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3) Does your agency have standardized procedures for the marking, identification and safety of institutional
holdings and stockpiles?
4) What is the procedure followed for the forensic analysis of military police small arms involved in
shootings? Is there an official deposit for the storage of these weapons?
C) Other state agencies:
5) Approximately how many small arms belonging to state inventories have been distributed among
officials of the State Judiciary and Legislative powers?
6) Is there any standard adopted for these small arms (caliber, model, make)?
7) Are there standardized procedures or rules for the identification, marking and security of the State’s
holdings and inventories?
Questionnaire 2
State’s firearms purchasing and surplus management policies and State small arms control laws
1) In which year arms did registration begin in your state?
2) What is the current number of gun shops in your state? Is there any difference when compared with
a decade ago?
3) Does your state have a law regulating the sale of small arms as is the case in Rio de Janeiro?
4) If the question to the previous question is yes, could you please give us/send us a copy of the law or
give us a reference number to locate it in the Official Bulletin?
5) If the answer to question 3 is yes did the local firearms law provoke a change in the availability of
firearms in your state?
6) Is your government currently buying new small arms for the police?
7) Are your public security authorities the purchase one small arm for each police agent?
8) How do you dispose of your surplus small arms?
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Pablo Dreyfus e Marcelo de Sousa Nascimento
Pablo Dreyfus is the Research Manager of the Small Arms Control Project of Viva Rio/ISER and
Marcelo de Sousa Nascimento is Chief Statistician at ISER.
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