Empresas de Brasil e China na África:
Parceria, Concorrência e Desenvolvimento
New Multinationals from Brazil and China:
The Case of Oil
Andrea Goldstein
OECD (in his personal capacity)
[email protected]
CEBRI – São Paulo
12 agosto 2010
Big questions indeed!!
• Quais setores e países se destacam na atração e atuação de empresas de Brasil e China na África? Como são financiados os projetos?
• Quais seriam os determinantes do investimento direto? Há uma distinção na forma de atuação entre empresas estrangeiras? É possível extrair um padrão da atuação destas empresas? • Qual é a relação entre empresas privadas e os governos ao se lançarem para investir na África? Há alguma forma de coordenação ou apoio? • Em que difere as operações africanas de empresas brasileiras e chinesas? Cooperam ou apenas concorrem? • Como empresas brasileiras e chinesas compatibilizam normas existentes e regras locais (por exemplo, direitos trabalhistas e ambientais)? Seguem os padrões e critérios de boas práticas? • Como os países africanos percebem a atuação das empresas de Brasil e China na África? Quais são as maiores dificuldades? Qual a percepção da sociedade local?
The relationship between the Asian Drivers and Angola has attracted an attention only paralleled by
the one surrounding interactions with Sudan. Three closely related perspectives are important. First,
the rapid expansion of the Chinese and Indian economies has sustained the world price for oil, of
which Angola is the second-largest producer in sub-Saharan Africa. In the process, China has also
become Angola's third-largest trading partner, with a sizeable trade surplus favoring Angola. Second,
from an international financing perspective, China's keen interest to diversify the portfolio of assets in
which to invest its huge international reserves is only matched by Angola's need to find alternatives to
normal and concessional sources of international financing, from which it is excluded due to the lack
of progress in negotiating with the BWis. Third, all these issues must be understood in the broader
and possibly more complex scenario of the political economy of the relationship between Angola and
the world. Because of the country's size and control over huge oil resources, the growing presence of
China in Angola has reverberations across the rest of Africa. Angola also joined OPEC in late 2006.
Why Study Oil Multinationals from Emerging Economies?
• understanding oil is essential for understanding contemporary political economy
• analyzing the growth and development of oil multinationals is crucial for analyzing changes in the geography of international business
• Emerging Asia and Brazil now host to some of the most dynamic NOCs. • Petronas is the world’s second‐largest TNC from developing countries (UNCTAD 2008) • China and India have increased significantly their energy consumption as a share of total world energy use (IEA 2009) Chinese OFDI in 2006: Industry Composition
Sectoral distribution of Brazilian OFDI stock as of 2007 (including tax havens)
Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
Outline
1
Global Trends
2
Brazil & PRC NOCs: History and Governance
3
Brazil & PRC NOCs: Internationalization
4
Brazil & PRC NOCs: Going to Africa
Conclusions: Issues & Challenges
The political economy of oil
• Paolo Scaroni’s three “North Stars”
– Oil is not ours, it is theirs
• It is mostly consumed in the zones other than the producer zones. • Approximately 60 percent of the yet to discover reserves are estimated to lie in countries where NOCs have privileged access to reserves (Energy Intelligence Agency, 2006)
– You don’t find oil in Switzerland
– When prices go up, everyone wants to share the bonanza
• Oil producers are restricting investment opportunities (e.g., Russia, Venezuela) or delaying openings (Kuwait, Iran)
• The action is in new areas (Central Asia, West Africa, pré‐sal), non‐traditional oil (Canadian sands) and alternative energy sources
Production and Consumption by Region (million barrels per day in 2005)
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
-40
AFR
ASIA
Production
ECA
LAC
Consumption
MENA
HI-nonOECD
HI OECD
Deficit/Surplus
Exploration and Development Costs by Region
Source: IEA (2003)
Global Ownership of Proved Oil Reserves Exxon/Mobil ,
1.00%
Chevron, 0.90%
BP, 0.90%
Middle Eas t
NOCs , 69.60%
ConocoPhillips ,
0.60%
Shell, 0.50%
Latin Am erica
NOCs , 9.80%
Rus s ia NOCs ,
6.80%
Europe NOCs ,
1.00%
As ia NOCs ,
2.10%
Africa NOCs ,
6.60%
Drilling oil is a risky business …
Political risk index
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Political risk index
… and so is trading
China’s Oil Demand and Domestic Supply
million barrels per day
1990‐2009
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Demand
Net Imports
Domestic Supply
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy
Projections of China’s Net Oil Imports
million barrels per day
20
15
10
5
0
2006
2015
Actual
Reference Scenario
Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2007
2030
Petrobras trade balance
Outline
1
Global Trends
2
Brazil & PRC NOCs: History and Governance
3
Brazil & PRC NOCs: Internationalization
4
Brazil & PRC NOCs: Going to Africa
Conclusions: Issues & Challenges
Key corporate data – financial
Total assets
PetroChina
1999 a
2007
49642 117822
Total revenues
1999 a
2007
21257 112814
Total net income
1999 b
6672
2007
20413
Capital and
exploratory
expenses
1999
2007
1049 23878
ONGC
Petronas
Petrobras
2544 20304
31996 85201
33733 128715
4686
15957
23467
13764
50984
87735
1319
3318
727
3801
14446
13138
825
n.a.
4351
n.a.
5992
20978
ENI
45874 148162
29959 120753
2678
13724
5140
14522
Shell
113883 269470
149706 355782
8584
31331
8471
25220
Key corporate data – operational
Oil production
1999 a
2007
Natural gas
production
1999 a
2007
Oil reserves
1999 b
2007
Natural gas
reserves
1999 b
2007
PetroChina
775
839
437
1627
11000
11706
33000
57111
ONGC
193
n.a.
665
n.a.
4838
n.a.
22884
n.a.
Petronas
255
241
1440
1943
3430
5360
84400
82992
Petrobras
422
700
263
656
8279
9613
7498
12547
ENI
246
372
810
1502
3137
3925
13644
11204
Shell
828
664
2941
2250
9775
3776
58541
40895
Privatization
•
•
Privatization policies differ depending on underlying motivation and political limitation
– Selling majority shares: Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Romania and Russia
– Partial privatization: Brazil and Thailand
– Sold non‐core state‐owned companies and assets while keeping their NOCs under control: Kazakhstan
Most of the high‐income countries also privatized their national oil companies but their strategies differed:
– Such as BP (UK), Elf Aquitaine (France), ENI (Italy), and Repsol (Spain) in oil sector were initially founded as state‐owned companies, and gradually fully privatized. – Norway only partially privatized its national oil company (StatOil) in mid‐2001, while keeping its share of at least 33.4% to prevent a take‐over. Petrobras shareholder base
More than 100,000 investors in Brazil and abroad
60% of the economic value of Petrobras in private hands
Government maintains control with 55% of voting shares
Key data on technological efforts
R&D
expenditures
($m, 2007/08)
R&D
expenditures
(2005/08 average
growth)
R&D
expenditures
(% of sales,
2007/08)
USPTO patents
(since 1976)
USUKEU- CNPC/ ONGC Petrob Petron
based a based b based c Petroc
ras
as
hina
512.0
883.5
428.4
727.7
n.a.
881.0
n.a.
41.7
59.0
-24.0
66.0
n.a.
124.0
n.a.
0.20
0.25
0.23
0.6
n.a.
1.0
n.a.
3512
3200
181
9
0
172
5
Petrobras competitive advantage
Petrobras operates 22%of global deepwater production
Petrobras competitive advantage
Petrobras operates 18% of all operating vessels
Outline
1
Global Trends
2
Brazil & PRC NOCs: History and Governance
3
Brazil & PRC NOCs: Internationalization
4
Brazil & PRC NOCs: Going to Africa
Conclusions: Issues & Challenges
FDI Trends
• There have been significant changes in pricing mechanism of oil that caused significant price highs throughout years, which led to structural changes in the world oil industry. • FDI increasing following high oil prices of the recent years and expectations for oil demand in the future.
– cross‐border North‐North M&A (“drilling in the canyons of Wall Street”)
– North‐South investments
• NOCs as MNCs
– in other oil‐producing developing countries (South‐South) – and in the North to acquire existing assets (including refineries, retail networks and reserves) and reach customers.
FDI and M&A Flows (Upstream), 1990 to 2005 120
$ billion
100
Global
M&A
80
60
40
Developing
countries
20
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
Cross‐border M&A activities
US billion
120
100
Petroleum
Petroleum Refining
80
60
40
20
20
05
20
03
20
01
19
99
19
97
19
95
19
93
19
91
19
89
19
87
0
International Oil Companies
• IOCs are concerned about increasing their upstream capacity and exploit exploration and development opportunities in countries with proven reserves as well as with oil reserve prospects. • different business strategies.
– After the oil crisis of the 1970s, incentives from governments +
high prices Æ 1975‐1985 total investment reached $1.1 trillion (in 2003 dollars) (UNCTAD 2003).
– mid‐1980 prices crashed and demand contracted Æ IOCs were left with over‐capacity, non‐profitable investments Æ
diversification into non‐energy activities
– Late‐190s into 1990s Æ large mergers both domestic and cross‐border.
– Since second half 1990s Æ new opportunities in Central Asia and Africa emerged.
Independent oil companies
• Smaller companies’ opportunities were at first limited to small, mature fields in marginal countries
• in 2000 the majors started shedding assets in established areas such as the North Sea and offshore West Africa • skyrocketing oil and gas prices Æ increasing importance of unconventional assets Æ independent operators are paid for the right to use their infrastructure
• focus on applying specialized technology and squeezing out greater efficiency Æ cast‐off fields provide a steady revenue stream
• Higher chance of making unexpected announcements that can dramatically move shares Æ Cairn Energy in Rajasthan in 2004
Some Companies will Disappear:
46 of 79 Independents No Longer Exist
1995
2007
Source: PFC Energy
Key corporate data – internationalization
Trans Internationalizatio
n index
nation
alizati
on
index
19 20
2006
99 06
CNPC
Foreign listing
1999
Foreign
ownership in
2008
2008
Directo Manag
rs
ers
n.a.
0
0/13
0/7
Petronas
n. 3
a.
n. 16
a.
20 26
5
0
0/7
0/15
Petrobras
7 16
10
√
37.4a
0/9
0/7
ENI
41 53
56
√
42.6
0/9
0/11
Shell
56 70
79
5/14
b
ONGC
8
Non-nationals
in 2008
√
√
√
0
Geographical distribution of oil production activities Home country
Europe
North America
South America
Middle East and
North Africa
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Former
Rest of and
Rest of the World
USUKEU- CNPC ONGC Petrob Petron
based based based 2007
2007
ras
as
2005a 2005b 2005c
2008
28.8
11.8
2.5 78.22 87.54
93.8
18.6
8.6
15.2
0.0
6.6
21.5
1.0
0.1
1.7
5.0
34.2
5.8
2.2
14.0
21.6
0.0
21.78 12.46
15.1
11.8
21.8
0.4
9.0
20.1
1.7
0.0
10.9
6.4
1.9
0.0
7.2
0.8
0.0
0.0
Outward FDI by selected NOCs
Corporation
(home country)
Total assets in
2004
($ billion)
110.6
Canada, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Mauritania,
Myanmar, Sudan, Rep. Bol. de Venezuela
CNPC (China)
State
Indian Oil Corp.
Lukoil (Russia)
State
Private
10.9
29.8
PDVSA (Venezuela)
State
13.4
PEMEX (Mexico)
State
84.1
Iran, Libya
Iraq, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Canada,
Uzbekistan
Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Germany,
Paraguay, United States (Citgo)
Argentina
Petrobras (Brazil)
State
19.4
Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Tanzania
Petronas (Malaysia)
State
53.5
Saudi Aramco
State
Cambodia, Chad, Iran, Myanmar, Sudan,
Turkmenistan
Canada, China, United States
Petro China (China)
State
58.8
Nigeria, Sudan, Rep. Bol. de Venezuela
Top twenty oil and gas deals since 2006
Value (US$m)
32,412
32,192
20,145
19,623
17,364
13,239
9,585
7,450
7,373
7,088
6,643
6,279
5,848
5,838
5,830
5,385
5,260
5,255
5,073
5,000
Date
28-Aug-06
18-Dec-06
17-Jul-07
23-Jun-06
23-Jul-07
03-May-07
12-Jul-07
21-Dec-06
03-May-07
23-Oct-06
17-Dec-07
31-Jul-07
08-Sep-08
14-Jul-08
31-Oct-07
23-Jun-06
12-Dec-07
17-Oct-06
24-Sep-07
20-Dec-06
Buyers
private investors
Statoil
Basell Holdings
Anadarko Petroleum
Transocean
Rosneft
Apollo Management LP
Gazprom
Ssab Svenskt Stal
Royal Dutch Shell
National Oilwell Varco
Marathon Oil
ConocoPhillips
Royal Dutch Shell
Penn West Energy Trust
Anadarko Petroleum
Institutional Investors
Sacyr Vallehermoso
TAQA
CNOOC
Sellers
Kinder Morgan
Norsk Hydro
Lyondell Chemical
Kerr-McGee
GlobalSantaFe
Yukos
Huntsman
Mitsui and others
IPSCO Inc
Shell Canada
Grant Prideco
Western Oil Sands
Origin Energy
Duvernay Oil
Canetic Resources Trust
Western Gas Resources
Knight Inc
Institutional Investors
PrimeWest Energy
Government of Iran
North America
Europe
International
North America
International
Russia & CIS
International
Russia & the CIS
North America
North America
International
North America
Australia
North America
North America
North America
North America
International
North America
Asia Pacific
Outline
1
Global Trends
2
Brazil & PRC NOCs: History and Governance
3
Brazil & PRC NOCs: Internationalization
4
Brazil & PRC NOCs: Going to Africa
Conclusions: Issues & Challenges
Why Africa? Because it is open for business
access to reserves
Full IOC access
Reserves held by Russian cos.
NOC oil reserves
(equity access)
African
countries
NOC oil reserves
(no equity access)
Source: PFC Energy, 2005
Why Africa? Because politicians extend a warm welcome to foreign visitors
Africa provides one‐third of China’s crude oil imports …
Total
Total ==3.3
3.3million
millionb/d
b/d
Source: General Administration of Customs of China
… and Angola is where the real action takes place
Source: General Administration of Customs of China
… and Angola is where the real action takes place
China’s NOCs are investing throughout Africa …
African countries where China’s NOCs
have contracts for equity participation
Algeria
Gabon
Angola
Kenya
Chad
Cote
d’Ivoire
Eq. Guinea
Nigeria
Nigeria/São
Tomé & P
Libya
Joint DZ
Mauritania Sudan
Niger
Tunisia
…but the value of Chinese oil assets in Africa lags behind that of other firms Figure 2: Commercial Value of Oil Investments in Africa
300000
278913.9
US$ Million
250000
200000
168252.1
150000
100000
48534.6
50000
13488.1
0
African NOCs
IOCs
Other
Chinese NOCs
Source: Wood Mackenzie, March 2007
China’s NOCs: small producers in Africa
Sources: Company reports, Wood Mackenzie
Most of the African oil production of China’s NOCs is currently in Sudan
Source: Wood Mackenzie and industry press
Chinese NOCs have a limited presence in Angola Block
Production in 2008 (bbl/d)
Operator
Concessionaire
Zero
340,000
Chevron (since 1955, 39%)
Sonangol, Total and Eni
1
ENI (50%)
Total, Petrogal, INA-Nafta
2
Chevron (20%)
Petrobras, Total, Sonangol
3 (Canuku)
4 (Kiabo)
Sonangol (100%)
Sonangol (100%)
5
6
14
300,000
Sonangol (30%)
Petrobras (40%)
Chevron (31%)
15
800,000
ExxonMobil
BP, Norsk Hydro, NaphtaIsrael
Eni, Sonangol, Total
and Petrogal
BP, Eni and StatoilHydro
15/06
Eni (35%)
16
Canada Natural Resources
(50%)
Total
Sonangol
17 (Perpétua, Hortensia, 250,000
Zinia and Acacia)
18
200,000
18/06
26
31 (Plutão, Saturno, Vênus 450,000
and Marte)
32
120,000
34
BP (50%)
Petrobras (30)
Petrobras (80%)
BP
Total
Sonangol (20%)
Other partners
Sonangol
Sonangol, Total Falcon,
Statoil
Odebrecht, Sonangol
ExxonMobil,
StatoilHydro
BP,
and
Sonangol Sinopec
Sonangol
Petrobras, Norsk Hydro,
ConocoPhillips, Shell
Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola (Sonangol) –Sole concessionaire and partner in concession agreements and in some PSAs with iIOCs
Petrobras in Africa
Angola since 1979
• E&P agreements, with shares in 6 offshore blocks (1 production)
– non‐operating partner in only two block through November 2006
– since December 2006, operator of Blocks 6/06, 18/06 and 26
•
•
•
•
Nigeria since 1998
operator in block OPL 315 since February 2006 + non‐operating partner in 2 blocks
Tanzania since 2004
100% stakes in two offshore exploratory blocks (Blocks 5 and 6)
Libya since 2005
exploratory oil and gas rights and shared production rights for area 18, operator of the consortium that explores the block
Namibia since 2009
50% of the exploration stakes for block 2714A
Direct PRC state financial support: less than meets the eye
• Minimal reliance by China’s NOCs on Chinese bank loans
• balance sheet enough to finance most investments
– High profits from high oil prices
US$ billion
Pre-tax Profits of Chinese Oil Companies
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2002
2003
2004
CNPC
2005
2006
CNOOC LTD.
2007
2008
SINOPEC CORP.
– Most deals are small Æ no big loans needed
2009
Indirect PRC State Support
• China Eximbank’s lending priorities shaped by Chinese foreign policy priorities, including access to energy
– loans for large infrastructure projects in oil‐rich states
• But there are other motivations
– Gaining support of recipients in multilateral organisations – Creating opportunities for other Chinese firms
– Preventing diplomatic recognition of Taiwan
• “Oil‐for‐infrastructure” deals have yielded mixed results for China
– Chinese loans to Luanda helped Sinopec gain some upstream assets in Angola … but not everything it wants
– Efforts to link Chinese oil and non‐oil investments have not won China’s NOCs attractive blocks in Nigeria Santa Cruz‐Porto Alegre Project – Financing Structure
equity
El Paso, US
Enron, US
Shell, Netherlands
BHP, Australia
BG, UK
Transredes, Bolivia
Petrobras, Brazil
US$2.06 billion
debt
Petrobras, Brazil
US$280 million
US$143 million
GTB(Bolivia)
El Paso, US
Enron, US
Shell, Netherlands
BHP, Australia
BG, UK
Transredes, Bolivia
Petrobras, Brazil
US847 million
US$612million
TBG(Brazil)
Petrobras, Brazil
Multilaterals:
CAF
IBRD
IDB
EIB
Why are China’s NOCs small players in Africa? (views from China)
• Stiff competition for assets
• Latecomers to the region
– IOCs have a historical advantage
• Technology hurdles
– No deepwater capacity
• Insufficient use of diplomatic tools to help secure assets
Source: Erica Downs, China energy fellow, Brookings Institution
Chinese NOCs and African Development
• The contribution of China’s NOCs to develop host countries
– CNPC/Sudan: roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, training and education
– Sinopec/Angola: social welfare projects
• China’s NOCs likely to continue good deeds to: – Remain welcomed guests
– Reduce investment risk – Improve global image
Company CSR Rankings
CNPC
ONGC
Petronas
Petrobras
ENI
Shell
EITI
2008 Report
2009 Global
Covalence
Reputation
Principles and on Revenue
Ethical
Criteria
Transparency
Pulse
Ranking Q1
(ranking
of Oil and Gas
2009
among oil and
Companies a
(ranking
gas
among oil and
gas
companies)
companies)
n.a.
n.a. Nor endorsed
Low
n.a.
n.a. Nor endorsed
Low
n.a.
n.a. Nor endorsed
Low
3
1
Endorsed
High
20
6
Endorsed
Middle
25
n.a.
Endorsed
High
Organização Odebrecht in Angola
• Hidrelétrica de Capanda, Projeto Luzamba (mineração), Águas de Luanda, Vias de Luanda, Belas Business Park, etc. • A Odebrecht tem 44 contratos e 35.727 integrantes em Angola, dos
quais apenas 11% são estrangeiros. • Odebrecht + Damer + Sonangol JV Æ Companhia de Bioenergia de Angola (BIOCOM) para produzir açúcar, etanol e bioeletricidade.
• O projeto, orçado inicialmente em US$ 258 milhões, prevê a construção de uma usina sucroenergética no município de Cacuso, na província de Malanje, até o início de 2012, com uma área equivalente a 30 mil hectares (ha) destinada ao plantio de cana. • Segundo a BIOCOM, quando estiver em funcionamento, a usina terá
capacidade de produção de 30 milhões de litros de etanol, 250 mil toneladas de açúcar e 160 mil megawatts‐hora (MWh) por ano de bioeletricidade CSR at Organização Odebrecht in Angola
• Campanha de combate ao HIV/AIDS.
• Programa Sangue Seguro, em parceria com a Cruz Vermelha e com o Centro Nacional de Sangue do Ministério da Saúde.
• Programa Parto Seguro, para formação de parteiras tradicionais.
• Programa de esclarecimento para a prevenção da malária.
• Centro de Informação Móvel
• Programa Cadeia Produtiva da Mandioca na província de Malange.
• Programa de distribuição de merenda escolar e plantio de legumes e verduras.
• Construção de postos médicos em várias regiões do país. Odebrecht Logística e Exportação (OLEx) in Angola
• Trading company of Odebrecht Organization
• Cerca de 40 obras para suprir em Angola – rodovias, vias urbanas, condomínios, projetos agroindustriais, hidrelétrica, saneamento, rede de supermercados e outras. • Projeto Nosso Super – construção da única rede angolana de supermercados
– abastecimento de 31 lojas e dois centros de distribuição nas 18 províncias do país
• Para suprir a demanda por pescados, a OLEx havia selecionado um fornecedor na China, tradicional exportador de tilápia, mas ainda buscava melhorias para o cliente, tanto no produto quanto no atendimento. • Negociações com a Coopemar – Cooperativa Mista de Marisqueiros, Pescadores e Aqüicultores do Baixo Sul da Bahia Æ primeira exportação em abril 2008 (quase 20 t de tilápia estuarina = dois meses de produção)
Presence in Worst‐Performing “Voice and Accountability” Oil‐Producing Countries
Country
Myanmar
Turkmenistan
Libya
Cuba
Uzbekistan
Equatorial Guinea
Syria
Sudan
Vietnam
Saudi Arabia
Iran
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Chad
Iraq
Tajikistan
Cote d’Ivoire
Egypt
Tunisia
Ethiopia
Azerbaijan
Congo
Angola
Brunei
Yemen
Kazakhstan
Pakistan
Oman
Algeria
Russia
Total
Rank
1
2
3
3=
5
6
7
7=
9
9=
11
12
12=
14
15
15=
17
18
18=
20
20=
21
22
22=
24
25
25=
27
27=
CNPC
√
√
√
Petrobras
ENI
Shell
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
10
√
√
√
14
2
√
√
√
√
√
14
Total
3
4
3
4
1
1
2
3
3
2
5
0
3
2
0
1
4
2
1
1
1
2
1
0
3
2
2
3
4
Two views on governance and FDI
Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig (2009)
Peter Drysdale (2009)
• Chinese outward FDI is attracted to large markets, and to countries with a combination of large natural resources and poor institutions. • Disaggregation shows that the former effect is related to OECD countries, whereas the latter interaction effect holds for non‐OECD countries
• Applying special conditions for these investments would reinforce the perception of the primacy of regulatory solutions over market solutions, and help sustain the dominance of the bureaucracy over the market in PRC and drive Chinese investment to other destinations in Africa or Latin America where there are less robust institutions to host it.
An adviser for various Governments in their petroleum organisations • Governments award licenses and concessions to IOCs with inadequate care and investment on their part – Petroleum offices are barely given enough money to pay their staff, let alone their utility bills or commercial costs of doing business with IOCs.
– Staff are treated like simple public servants rather than custodians of the national petroleum treasures. • FDI in oil in a weak‐governance environments requires – Government recognition of the large business risk they have entered
– sustainable institutional strength in all manner of disciplines in the Government petroleum organisation
– enormous and consistent donor support – Improved capitalisation of petroleum organisations, good definition of business processes, generous operating costs and competitive staff remuneration – discipline to avoid corruption and avert political intrusion
The HDP
• Launched in Heiligendamm 2007
• Objectives
– Work together to meet the challenges of globalization
– Work towards a common view on outstanding global issues
– Develop common initiatives for resolving them
• Principles
– Topic‐driven policy dialogue, and not a negotiating process
– Openness, transparency and equal partnership
– Complement work in other multilateral or regional G8 & G5 LEADERS
OECD
G8 & G5 SHERPAS
(personal representatives of Heads of State and Government)
HDP Support Unit
DEVELOPMENT, PARTICULARLY IN AFRICA
ENERGY, WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION, INCLUDING IPRs
CROSS‐BORDER INVESTMENT, INCLUDING CSR/RBC
DEVELOPMENT
ENERGY
INNOVATION
• Quality of aid and its effectiveness in meeting the MDGs,
• Retrofit of coal‐fired power plants
• Fragile states
• Energy‐efficient and sustainable buildings
• The role of education and skills and the promotion of market and fiscal incentives to promote and facilitate the innovation process
• Role of aid and trade in development
• Capacity development particularly focusing on good governance and institution building;
• Role of triangular cooperation with equal partnership
• Renewable energy
• Energy security
• The international IP system and its socio‐
economic impact on developed and developing countries
INVESTMENT
• Promoting, protecting and facilitating international investment
• Improving investment conditions
• Responsible business conduct and corporate social responsibility
“We … commit to work together on global challenges and to improve international governance”
Outline
1
Global Trends
2
Brazil & PRC NOCs: History and Governance
3
Brazil & PRC NOCs: Internationalization
4
Brazil & PRC NOCs: Going to Africa
Conclusions: Issues & Challenges
Main findings
Size
Growth
Autonomy
Technology
Internationaliza Transpare
tion
ncy
CNPC
Large
Medium
Medium
Low
Very low
Low
ONGC
Small Very high
Medium
Low
Low
Low
Petronas
Petrobras
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Low
Large
High
High
High
Low
High
Impact on Industry Dynamics
• Minimal on IOCs because competing for different projects
– China’s NOCs have no deepwater capacity
– Many blocks offered in “package deals” of little interest to IOCs
• Larger impact on Asian NOCs
– Seoul and New Delhi competing to offer better “package deals”
– Competition encouraged by some host countries (Nigeria, Angola)
• Brazil and Petrobras lie somewhere in the middle
–
–
–
–
Deepwater capacity
South‐South solidarity
Active diplomacy, including in support of business
Towards Brazil Inc.?
Future Work
• Are (A)NOCs bidding more aggressively than IOCs and independent companies?
• (A)NOC investments and Investment Climate/Governance indicators
• Development impact of FDI in oil sector – backward linkages
– Revenue generation
• Internationalization and inner dynamics of corporate organization