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ANALYSIS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENT MANAGEMENT OF
THE BRAZILIAN ELECTRIC SECTOR
Ricardo Moreira da Silva (UFPE/PROPAD)
[email protected]
Maria de Lourdes Barreto Gomes (UFPB/PPGEP)
[email protected]
Josilene Aires Moreira (UFPE/GPRT)
[email protected]
The Brazilian government, between 1994 and 2001, adopted the neoliberal management model; promoting important changes in the
Brazilian electric sector, which had had an institutional arrangement
with the public administration since 1960, aand incorporating a market
vision to manage the sector, now regulated. The new government, in
place since 2002, has argued the need for keeping the terms of the
signed contracts, striving for perfect balance in this specific area, but
has modified some elements of the institutional arrangement, while
preserving the same neo-liberal managerial essence. It is possible to
show that Brazil copied and has kept an institutional arrangement
focused on market vision, similar to the one introduced in England, and
that administrative gaps have to be filled. The main objective of this
article is to understand these changes, and to explain the facts based
on the neo-liberal and Keynes theories. This being so, it is a fact that in
Brazil’s case: (1) the past institutional arrangement has not been able
to finance itself; (2) the private institutional arrangement is not
competitive; (3) it would be more adequate to work under a hybrid
management model, like in Sweden.
Keywords: Brazilian Electric Sector; public administration; private
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1. Introduction
Brazil is a country of continental size and, for this reason, its electrical management has
presented further difficulties for the government since its beginning. Furthermore, Brazil has
some very populated regions, but it also has some sparsely populated regions with or without
energetic autonomy, where consummation centers do not correspond with productions
centers.
Being that hydraulic production has always been the main source of electricity in Brazil, local
politicians chose state management. The control of energy and water by private companies
was never allowed. In the 90’s, however, the government began giving the department back to
the private sector. According to Cisneros(1995), by this time, the department was “without
investments and had no capacity to react”. Since the beginning of the century, the department
has passed through three phases, as shown in figure one:
Until 1960
Private Management
1960 a 1990
State Management
1990 a 2006
“Regulated” Private
Management
Figure 1: SEB’s Chronology of Management - Source: Moreira (2006)
Historically, the institutional arrangement of SEB – Brazilian Electric Sector – has aligned
itself to Brazilian economical moments and, according to Souza (2002), has passed through
four periods:
•
1st period - Institutional transition and state intervention (1960 – 1965): With the end
of the war, there was a clear tendency for state intervention at the formulation and
execution levels of electrical energy politics, with noted differences of opinion
between the liberals and the interventionists.
•
2nd period - Institutionalization and apogee (1965 – 1980): The military government
consolidated the interventionist politics, with an institutional rearrangement,
nationalized the department and invested hugely in public work.
•
3rd Period - Preparation for a change in the institutional arrangement (1980 – 1995):
This period was marked by the worldwide implantation of neo-liberalism and deficient
SEB management. This period was further marked by the worst crises in its history,
and the near bankruptcy of the department.
•
4th period - Institutional reorganization (1995 – 2005): The institutional erosion of
SEB accelerated with the de-capitalization of the department, commercial
liberalization and the external pressure for the adoption of the Washington Consensus,
at which time the privatization of the department began being dictated according to the
English model, which, according to Rosa (1995, p. 44), “hardly considered the
essentially hydraulic characteristic of Brazil”. The declared goal of these reforms was
to make a more competitive market viable, which in fact, never happened.
This article analyzes SEB under two points of view: the state interventionist management, and
the current public management with state regulation, adapted from the English model. It is
part of a doctorial thesis, with a qualitative conception that uses a historical comparison
methodology to describe the changes at SEB, and eventually analyzes the state and the private
2
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arrangement.
2. State Institutional Arrangement
Although the Ministry of Mines and Energy and Eletrobrás were created as government
bodies to centralize the actions between 1960 and 1961, as far back as the 30’s, according to
Pontes (1999, p.44), “the country had chosen a monopolist and centralized administrative
institutional arrangement at the most important areas of economy and (…) a clear option for
the state intervention in the economy.” Among the lieutenants of the 30’s, and later, the
militaries of the 60’s, there had been an interest in the nation security, and an idea of
nationalist consciousness that was taken to an extreme. In this context, SEB administrative
politics, that was in place through the beginning of the 90’s, is based on the keynesian
principles, whose scheme is presented below:
Transmission
‘’”“–•˜—š™›•˜œž

Power
Companies
Load
Distribution
Figure 2: SEB state scheme from 1960 to 1990 - Source: Moreira (2006)
During this scheme, many state companies were in charge of the power, transmission,
distribution and commercialization, but they all had a single coordinator, centered in the
company Eletrobrás. In this environment, there was no competition and the client was unable
to choose from whom he wanted to get his service. The brazilian state determined everything
through laws, decrees and edicts, using either the legislative power or the Ministry of Mines
and Energy and furnished the electrical energy to the consumers through companies that
belonged to Eletrobrás holdings.
The big advantage of this management model is that it left the electrical energy department,
strategic as it was, under the single coordination of the state. Any possible imperfections
could thereby be more easily corrected. In addition to this, one can observe the following
characteristics of the state arrangement:
2.1 Regulatory body: Since its creation in 1968, the Departamento Nacional de Águas e
Energia Elétrica –DNAEE- the regulatory body for water and electrical energy usage, has
been subordinate to Eletrobrás. The total accomplishment of its functions could never be
actualized since the company itself regulated and supervised the holding companies.
2.2 Transmission, verticalization and system connection: The generation and transmission
were connected and usually belonged to the same state company. Even though there were
losses in the energy transportation, there were no reasons for serious worries since the system
gained idleness capacity in the 80’s. Its central coordination, for example, made it possible to
supply the northern part of the country through the CHESF system in case of a drought or the
maintenance of the gates in Tucuruí.
2.3 Quality and productivity: The goal was to attend to demands without accidents. The
training offered to the employees was always directed at the accomplishment of tasks and
specialization. The indices were only measured according to errors in the system and work
accidents. It had always been a characteristic of state companies to develop austere O&M
programs, with a high degree of bureaucracy.
3
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2.4 Water management: The possibility of efficient water management was a direct
consequence of the system connection.
2.5 Workers: Apparently the companies were not worried about the diminishing the costs of
workers. The study of Barbosa (2003, p.55) shows that “employment at the electric
department during the period before the privatization does not present a linear dynamic”. This
can be verified in the following graphic, where the average employment reached 180.600
employees/year.
Number of work posts
W o rk e rs 8 6 -9 5
2 0 0 0 0 0
1 9 0 0 0 0
1 8 0 0 0 0
1 7 0 0 0 0
1 6 0 0 0 0
1 5 0 0 0 0
1 4 0 0 0 0
19 86
1 98 7
19 88
19 89
1 99 0
19 91
1 99 2
19 93
19 94
1 99 5
y e a r
Figure 3: Number of work posts at SEB from 1986 to 1995 - Source: Moreira (2006)
2.6 Politics of costs, prices and investments: The re-selling of energy was based on service
by the cost. According to Gonçalves (2002, p.116), “The amount collected should only be
capable of covering all costs of operation and maintenance, besides the amortization and
depreciation of the equipment, plus the corresponding amount for the remuneration of the
invested capital”. The goal was not obtaining profit, but getting only a sufficient sum to keep
functioning. In this scheme, the costs “were simply shared among all the concessionaires
involved, according to each one’s volume of assets” (ARAÚJO, 1999, p.201).
2.7 Social aspects and physical security of the population: SEB adopted a vision of the
welfare state, concerned with social issues. The tariffs were smaller in comparison to current
ones. Additionally, the energy supplied in some given locations were compromised with
respect to physical security. As an example, the illumination of shantytowns like Rocinha
could not only take financial interests into account (MOREIRA, 2004).
2.8 Restrictions to the state institutional arrangement: The Brazilian state arrangement
model was administratively worn away, and the investment capacity of the state eventually
came to an end. It doesn’t matter if this was a natural consequence of the model, external
interference with this goal, or both things combined. Abreu (1999), Cisneiros (1995),
Gonçalves(2002), among others, have proved that SEB lost its financial auto-management
capacity and as a result, the operation units started to fall apart. Since there was no kind of
substantial investment in the department, between 1994 e 2001, it suffered severe losses,
including blackouts and electricity rationing. It was the end of the state institutional
arrangement as a model for the Brazilian Electric Department management.
3. Brazil Institutional Arrangement same English Arrangement
Brazil adopted the same English institutional arrangement from Thatcher’s time. (ABREU,
1999; MOREIRA, 2004; ROSA, 1995; ARAÚJO, 1999). Parts of the company were
transferred back to the private sector, but the government was not careful enough to make the
adaptations on the micro-actions level.
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In England, the Central Electricity Generating Board - CEGB was created in 1957, as well as
twelve regional companies (RECs) responsible for the distribution and furnishing of the
electrical energy produced by companies that eventually became private in 1983, according to
Rosa (1995). In Brazil’s case, all distribution companies became private
(KLINGELHOEFER, 1995), with the exception of those that were not largely profitable, as
well as Itaipu Binacional (for politic reasons) and the nuclear ones (for national security
reasons) (ROSA, 1995). The “English” institutional arrangement of Brazil presents some of
the following characteristics:
3.1 Regulatory body: Like England, where the Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER)
was created to supervise prices and stimulate competition, according to Klingelhoefer (1995),
Brazil created the Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica –ANEEL- in order to support
governmental regulation actions with real political power.
3.2 Transmission and deverticalization: The Sistema Nacional de Transmissão de Energia
Elétrica - SINTREL was created and a calculation of transmission and furnishing costs
methodology was developed. Additionally, a transportation tariff was included in Brazilian
consumers’ monthly bill.
3.3 Quality and productivity: According to Klingelhoefer (1995) there was a high elevation
of productivity indices in England, but also a generalized complaint regarding the service
quality, including blackouts. The same could be seen in Brazil.
3.4 Water management. Since 70,44% of the energy produced in Brazil has hydroelectrical
sources, water is the primary resource, and according to the constitution, belongs to the state.
Even if the government could de-verticalize all of the electrical energy production chain, the
private generation would still be directly connected to the state. Regardless of this “detail”,
water, although believed differently 20 years ago, is limited, has hidden costs and should no
longer only be used for energy production.
3.5 Workers: “In England, 50% of the workers were dismissed”. (Klingelhoefer, 1995) In
Brazil, SEB reduced a large portion of the labor force. Demand and the energy supplying
rose, but employee levels went down. One might wonder if this reduction is related to the
implantation of technologies that replaced man work. Unfortunately, it is more closely related
to an intensification of work at the companies and limitless outsourcing politics, as seen in the
following figure 4:
2 0 0
1 8 0
Number of work posts
1 6 0
1 4 0
1 2 0
1 0 0
8 0
6 0
4 0
2 0
0
1 9 9 5
1 9 9 6
1 9 9 7
1 9 9 8
1 9 9 9
2 0 0 0
y e a rs
Figure 4: Reduction of employment at privatized SEB - Source: Moreira (2006)
In the current government there are still the Programas de Demissão Incentivados (PDI), but
there is not yet a high level of automation, which probably means that this falling tendency
5
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should stabilize.
3.6 Tariffs and investments: In England, there was no increase in investments and the
domestic consumers never incurred increases as they had after the privatization. In Brazil,
with rare exceptions, there were no investments in the generation and transmission areas.
There is still hydraulic potential to be explored, however, with the exception of the
assemblage of the machines 9A and 18A at Itaipu, not a single plan has left the drawing
board.
3.7 Social aspects and physical security of the population: Since the vision of a welfare
state concerned with social issues is no longer accepted, governmental actions are minimal
and the SEB, as a state agent, does not exist. ANEEL is present in Brazil not to regulate
energy use with social or physical security goals, but to prevent abuses in supplying and
contracts, as well as to maintain a certain control over tariff increases.
3.8 Restrictions to the “English” institutional arrangement in Brazil: The institutional
arrangement planned by SEB included the separation of generation, transmission, distribution
and commercialization. The system was open for companies to sell energy in any segment,
and also for company exploration, using ANEEL as a regulatory body for the whole sector, as
shown in the following representation:
Power
T1
G1
G2
Load
Companies2
Load
Companies3
Load
T2
T3
T4
G3
Companies1
Transmission
A
N
E
E
L
Distribution
Figure 5: Institutional arrangement planned by SEB - Source: Moreira (2004)
In Brazil, this type of management system did not work well since there was no competition,
and thus the goal of private investors was to maximize profits. In this case, regulation via
decrees or edicts interfered with the strategic planning, but could not efficiently attain the
whole productivity chain. Each state, town or village had only one concessionaire distributing
energy which, in turn, bought energy from single generation companies as well. This means
that there was no competition and the market remained captive.
Even with all the effort and expectations from the government, there were some contrary
reactions and the implantation of the English arrangement did not proceed exactly as
forecasted. There was no privatization of the department and no verticalization either:
• Distribution was not all privatized due to the fact that some companies were not
profitable. In addition, there were reactions from the people, jurists, politicians and others
against the privatization of some companies, such as COPEL, in Paraná State and CEMIG in
Minas Gerais State;
•
In regard to transmission, SINTREL was created but there was an internal reluctance
6
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about the transmission sector selling, and privatization was left aside for further studies;
•
Power, with the exception of ELETROSUL, was not sold.
From this, we can affirm that the institutional arrangement of the Brazilian Electric
Department had a market essence with state protection mechanisms.
4. Final Considerations
Since the implementation of the “half” English arrangement for SEB in 2005, the government
has studied an adaptation of the current system through the Ministry of Mines and Energy.
The result, called “New Re-organization of Brazilian Electric Department”, follows the
ideology, with some slight modifications:
(a) It confirms officially the privatizations that have already occurred.
(b) It removes the chance of further privatizations, when plans to invest again on the
improvement of companies that have not yet been sold are actualized.
(c) It gives the planning back to Eletrobrás.
It is possible to affirm that SEB’s current institutional arrangement is a badly implemented
copy of the one used in England. Brazil has lived through two visions of management: one
institutional arrangement that was present from 1960 to 1990, which believed in state
intervention, and the current one, which has market vision. But which is the best model for
Brazil?
Hope (2003) affirms that there is no best model or institutional arrangement in a absolute
way, but only models and arrangements that can be well implemented or not, and work
properly or not. Further studies are necessary in Brazil, searching for a more flexible
institutional arrangement than the state offers: an institutional arrangement that allows for the
entrance of private resources, and contemplates social aspects, forgotten by the private
arrangement.
Some countries (Spain, Chile, Argentina, etc.) have also changed the institutional arrangement
of their electric departments. Others (France and Germany) have maintained their state
institutional arrangement and are models of competency. Others still, have adopted a hybrid
arrangement (USA and Sweden), where there is a state management and a private system at
the same time.
In the Swedish case, according to Silveira (2002), there are two companies that own 80% of
the generation: Vattenfall with 50%, and Sydkraft with 30%. Distribution (municipal
majority) is under the charge of 250 different companies. Consumers can change their
distributors, and the transmission network includes the whole national network operated by
the state company Kraftnatt. As far as competition, Sweden exports energy to all
Scandinavian countries and considers Sweden itself as only a region. It is important to stress
that, even surrounded by a big number of companies making up the energy market, the
Swedish National Energy Administration (STEM) is the regulatory body responsible for
investigating the formation of little distribution cartels.
It is important to remember that a state institutional arrangement offers interesting
particularities for a state-nation. The single management, even with the operational part decentralized, favors a global vision, connecting the different existing systems.
7
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In Brazil there are no major problems regarding water management, but there is the necessity
to use this natural resource perfectly. The water and electrical energy management must be
under the same coordination. Private companies controlling water supplying are not
acceptable. Besides, SEB’s state management works better for the necessary social aspects of
energy.
USA and France opened their energy market to the private initiative, but not the management
control. The American and French problems are more related to shortage of goods than to
management.
The idea that a state institutional arrangement is not efficient is a weak point of view, based
on concepts of the World Bank and taking as a reference the particularization of SEB itself,
that suffered premeditated political and financial erosion. It is also impossible not to admit
that at the end of the 80’s, SEB’s state arrangement was bankrupt. The company was at a
critical moment, with blackouts in 2000 and the start of the 90’s offering no possibilities of
increases. Even though Rosa (1995) proposed another strategy and not privatization, the SEB
was forced to submit to the pressure of external agents and chose the institutional
arrangement.
The taking back of SEB’s increase via internal and external caption of private resources and
efficient private management, could recover the technological edge, adjust the production
flux, leaving them more balanced and would raise the performance level of the workers.
There was, however, the decrease of work posts and the state interference to regulate the
energy regionalization. In practical terms however, it eliminated the competition possibilities,
which is the pillar of the private arrangement. Therefore, we can affirm that the institutional
arrangement applied at SEB from 1990 to 2004 was not competitive.
5. References
ABREU, Yolanda Vieira de. A reestruturação do setor elétrico brasileiro: questões e perspectivas. Originally
presented as a master memoire, Universidade de São Paulo. São Paulo: USP. 1999.
ANEEL. Site www.aneel.gov.br. Visitado em maio 2006.
ARAÚJO, João Lizardo R. Hermes de. Questões da transmissão em um setor elétrico reestruturado. In
Regulação e gestão competitiva no setor elétrico brasileiro São Paulo: Sagra Luzzato. 1999.
CISNEIROS, Saulo J.N. Proposta de Arranjo Institucional empresarial para gestão de empresas estatais de
energia elétrica. Informe técnico do XIII seminário nacional de produção e transmissão de energia elétrica SNPTEE. Camboriu: 1995.
GONÇALVES, Dorival Junior. Reestruturação do setor elétrico brasileiro: estratégia de retomada da taxa de
acumulação de capital. Dissertação de mestrado. Programa Pós Graduação em Energia da Universidade de São
Paulo. São Paulo: USP, 2002.
HOPE, Einar. Efficiency gains from deregulation: lessons from the Norwegian electricity regulatory reform.
Tenth World Productivity Congress. Santiago, Chile: 1997.
KLINGELHOEFER, Eduardo de Sá. A privatização do setor elétrico na Inglaterra e reflexões para o caso
brasileiro. Rio de Janeiro: BNDES, 1995.
MME. Ministério das Minas e Energia. Reestruturação do Setor Elétrico Brasileiro, PROJETO, Sumário
executivo, <http://www.mme.gov.br/sen/reseb/resebnovo.html> last visited at 15/10/2003.
MOREIRA, Ricardo da Silva. Arranjo institucional do setor elétrico brasileiro: da gestão pública à privada.
Originally presented as a PhD Thesis. João Pessoa Pb: UFPB, 2006.
ROSA Luis Pinguelli. Participação privada na expansão do setor elétrico ou vendas de empresas públicas?
Rio de Janeiro: COPPE/UFRJ, 1995.
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PONTES, João Randolfo. A indústria de energia elétrica no Brasil: In Regulação e gestão competitiva no setor
elétrico brasileiro São Paulo: Sagra Luzzato.1999.
SILVEIRA, Semida. et.al. Building sustainable energy system: Swedish experiences. Svenskbyggtjãnst and
Swedish national energy administration. Stockholm. Swedish.2002.
SOUZA, Paulo Roberto Cavalcanti de. Evolução da indústria de energia elétrica brasileira sob mudanças no
ambiente de negócios: Um enfoque institucionalista. Originally presented as a PhD Thesis. UFSC/PPGEP.
Florianópolis, SC. 2002.
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