CENTRE FOR
BRAZILIAN STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
The Brazilian Armed Forces in the Post-Cold War Era:
What Has Changed in Military Thinking?
João Roberto Martins Filho
Translated by Daniel Zirker
Working Paper Number
CBS-85-07
Centre for Brazilian Studies
University of Oxford
92 Woodstock Rd
Oxford OX2 7ND
Centre for Brazilian Studies, University of Oxford, Working Paper 85
The Brazilian Armed Forces in the Post-Cold War Era:
What Has Changed in Military Thinking?
Dr João Roberto Martins Filho,
Federal University of São Carlos1
Working Paper
CBS-85-07
Abstract
This article examines changes in military thinking in the post-Cold War era,
contrasting the processes that have occurred in the Army and the Navy. It analyses the
changes in military conceptualisation regarding relations with the hegemonic power in the
Hemisphere, the insertion of Brazil into world and Latin American plans, as well as its role,
missions, and hypotheses regarding the use of the Armed Forces. In this regard, it seeks to
understand the specifics of how each of those branches has influenced the evolution of
military thinking, underscoring the fundamental role of the component of technology, in
particular, in understanding the evolution of the Navy. The central thesis is that the ground
forces today present the strongest elements of continuity with Cold War era doctrines.
Nevertheless, both branches have been influenced by some processes of change in their
views.
Resumo
Este artigo examina as mudanças no pensamento militar brasileiro no período pósGuerra Fria, comparando os processos internos do Exército e da Marinha. O trabalho
analisa as mudanças na conceitualização das relações com o poder hegemônico no
Hemisfério, a insercão do Brasil na América Latina e no mundo, e visões sobre a missão
das Forças Armadas. Nesse sentido, o artigo procura entender como tais aspectos têm
influído na evolução do pensamento militar, enfatizando o papel fundamental do
componente tecnológico, especialmente, para entender a evolução da Marinha. Nossa tese
central é que é o Exército que apresenta mais continuidades com doutrinas do período da
Guerra Fria. Mas tanto o Exército como a Marinha têm mostrado mudanças nas suas
respectivas visões.
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This article aims to analyse the evolution of Brazilian military thinking over the past
three decades. In this sense, it is consistent with the analytical tradition that recognises in
military doctrine an important key to understanding military policy. In the following pages, it
seeks to decipher the origins of the changes in military thinking in the post-Cold War era,
contrasting the processes that have occurred in the Army and the Navy, the two forces with
significant material for analysis. It analyses the changes in military conceptualisation
regarding relations with the hegemonic power in the Hemisphere, the insertion of Brazil into
world and Latin American plans, as well as its role, missions, and hypotheses regarding the
use of the Armed Forces. In this regard, it seeks to understand the specifics of how each of
those branches has influenced the evolution of military thinking, underscoring the
fundamental role of the component of technology, in particular, in understanding the
evolution of the Navy. The central thesis is that the ground forces today present the
strongest elements of continuity with Cold War era doctrines. Nevertheless, both branches
have been influenced by some processes of change in their views.
THE PATH OF THE NAVY
By the end of the 1960s, in the last days of the Costa e Silva government, a US
Department of State document characterised dominant military opinion in Brazil as
favourable to a relative independence from the United States.2 In this analysis, the rise of a
generation of high-ranking officers less touched by the experience of the participation of the
country in World War II tended to have a future impact on military perceptions of the alliance
with the United States. At the same time, and along with this view, the three branches of the
Brazilian Armed Forces developed a perception that the military assistance programme
established by the 1952 bilateral military accord no longer addressed the demands of
military modernisation of the country: “there is a feeling in the Armed Forces that the United
States usually considers only its own requirements and not those of Brazil.”3
In this more general sense, because of its characteristics, the Navy was the first
branch where these diffuse perceptions expressed themselves in concrete concerns. The
cited document underscored that the Brazilian Navy intended to transform itself into a “small,
but modern force” and mentioned the opinion of “at least one top ranking naval officer” that
“Brazil’s Navy officers could not sit on the beach and watch US Navy units patrolling its
waters” (US Department of State 1969, 61).
Here were the roots of current naval thought that some authors have called
“heterodoxy,” in contradistinction to an “orthodox” posture that remained more closely tied to
the geopolitical thought of the Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra, or ESG).
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Hegemonic after the 1970s, the most general characteristic of this current of thought was its
identification with the stance of Brazilian foreign policy during the Geisel period (1974-1979).
In my view, this tendency to affirm a relative autonomy in the face of US policies was
emphasised. As an analyst noted, “the preoccupation with defining objectives that are
appropriately Brazilian in the South Atlantic question, distinct from Hemispheric or Western
interests, these latter having been traditionally perceived in the Navy as identical with
national interests, is clear” (Decuadra 1991, 139).
In effect, the spokespeople of this current of thought pressed themselves to reevaluate the pros and cons of the alliance initiated with the arrival of the US Naval Mission in
1922. The pillars of this revision were summarised by one of the exponents of this group,
Admiral Vidigal:
The alliance with the United States—from which comes all of the logistical flow to
maintain Brazilian ships in operation—had resolved the difficulties and confusion
that had before then afflicted the Navy, but at the cost of its initiative in the
process which, briefly, would have fatal consequences. Under the American
command, we learned to wage sea war in a modern form, we encountered
recent and sophisticated equipment, such as sonar and radar, we came to think
more in world than in regional terms, we awakened once again to our Atlantic
vocation. Nevertheless, the total material dependency would add up to a
sterilizing intellectual subordination in subsequent years (Vidigal 1985, 89).
In the Navy, proponents of heterodoxy and orthodoxy agreed with the need to
overcome this external material dependency in the production of armaments; the bone of
contention was thus the question of strategic subordination to the United States. In truth,
agreement as to the necessity of seeking, from outside the US, military resources desired by
the Brazilian Navy caused an interesting effect: the search for greater autonomy in strategic
planning was preceded by the search for new sources of technological modernisation.
Hence, the Ten Year Programme for the Renewal of Waterborne Resources (Programa de
Renovação dos Meios Flutuantes) of 1967 opened the door to the purchase in Europe of
submarines, frigates and mine sweepers, without this implicating reformulation of the
existing strategic view. The motive for this switch was the resistance of the US to providing
any kind of armament to the navies of the Hemisphere because it included planned missions
for these naval forces only within the context of the Cold War (Vidigal 1985, 96ff).
In this regard, the current of thought that became dominant beginning with the
Geisel government took a further step in expressing the dissatisfaction of sectors of the
Navy with the conceptual straight jacket imposed by the US on its hemispheric allies. In the
case of naval forces, these were implicated in the exclusive commitment of hemispheric
navies to the collective defence of the Hemisphere against the Soviet Union, and hence an
eventual confrontation between the two Cold War camps in a South Atlantic scenario, with
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hemispheric navies tasked with anti-submarine defence of maritime traffic. In effect, the
thinking that developed in the ESG, with its emphasis on national security and total war, left
little space for reflection on national defence and localised conflicts (Oliveira 1988, 241-242).
Nevertheless, in the final years of the 1960s, the evolution of the Brazilian Navy took with it
important sectors of naval thought in aspiring to broader horizons in its focus, which was
extrapolated from the defensive and collective security character imposed by the United
States within the limitations of the Military Assistance Accord of 1952 and the Inter-American
Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance of 1947.
The advent of the Geisel government, with its foreign policy geared to affirming
Brazil as an emerging power, provided conditions that had been lacking so that the new
strategic naval thinking could become the basis of change in the policies of the Navy. In
1977, the country denounced the military accord of 1952, in the context of the tensions
provoked by the human rights policies of the Carter Administration, as well as its opposition
to the signing of a military accord with Germany (June, 1975). This same year, the new
assemblage of Basic Policies and Directives of the Navy (Políticas Básicas e Diretrizes da
Marinha) was published. This document, developed and articulated earlier in the Strategic
Plan of the Navy (Plano Estratégico da Marinha), generated the Basic Policy of the Navy
(Política Básica da Marinha). Its central idea was that Brazil should remove itself from
generic concepts of the collective hemispheric defence, and define its own defence interests.
Thus it started with the perception that a conflict of huge proportions between the US and
the USSR was improbable, committing the Brazilian Navy to prepare itself for localised
conflicts within the reach of the region, and this widened the task range of the naval forces,
which came to include, for example, aerial and surface threats (Vidigal 1985, 103-107;
Câmara 1983, 173-174).
Concern with strategic autonomy was reflected as well in an emphasis which
came to consider as a necessity the nationalisation of military resources. These directives
first became evident in a lecture by Admiral Henning, Minister of the Navy under President
Geisel, at a seminar at the ESG at the beginning of 1978: “special emphasis is merited for
consideration of the establishment of a doctrine of deployment that is appropriate to Brazilian
conditions, as well as to the growing nationalisation of its armaments and equipment, with
support in research and development in concert with a flowering national arms industry”
(Henning 1978, 36).
These changes consolidated the support of the Navy for the more general
directives of the Geisel government, including the process of opening the military regime. In
the words of one of the principal formulators of the new naval orientation: “Beginning in
1977, the Navy for the first time in a fully conscious way formalised through adequate
documentation its strategic conceptualisation, in consonance with governmental policy”
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(Vidigal 1985, 105). It should not be surprising, then, that asked about his impression of
naval forces at the end of the military regime, Admiral Mauro César, Minister of the Navy in
the first government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, responded: “I would say that,
since the Navy had for a long time already seen the necessity of following this path, it was
very natural. There was a certain sense of relief” (Castro e D’Araujo 2001, 262)
In the end, the changes that occurred in the naval forces made it possible, by the
end of 1989, to affirm that the Navy was more clearly focused on strictly defensive policies:
“the Navy understands that its principal role is that of defence, in the sense of safeguarding
and protecting Brazilian interests on the sea. This concern should subordinate everything
else.” (Proença Junior and Franco 1993, 152). Based on a series of interviews with mostly
superior officers, carried out during the last months of the Cold War, a researcher observed
that the Navy no longer identified with the concepts of the ESG, and that, in the view of the
interviewees, “there did not exist an internal conflict, which would, in any event, not be the
responsibility of the Armed Forces” (Franco 1993, 125). In contrast, high ranking officers in
the Brazilian Army still held on to the ESG concepts and regarded as probable the eruption
of conflicts over internal order in Brazilian society. This difference introduces the next topic.
THE ARMY’S PATH
If we can say that the need for technological modernisation sent the Navy in
search of freeing itself from the “straitjacket” of automatic alignment with the US, in the case
of the Army it was an affection for the geopolitical elements of the Cold War that seems to
have taken it to the realisation that Brazil needed at least some freedom of action in order to
develop its own interests, which ultimately included technological modernisation. This would
lead to a military-industrial project that would create new terms for relations with the US.
In a text dated 1987, an independent military analyst registered that “the current
Brazilian geopolitical doctrine was elaborated in the 1950s and 1960s. In the following
decade, it incorporated new concepts without abandoning its ideological premises and
without altering its political-strategic premises” (Cavagnari 1987, 84). The mentioned
incorporation of new concepts refers to the rise, in the mid-1970s, of the military view that
Brazil would be ready to begin its effective trajectory in the direction of its construction as a
world power, an old postulate of the Brazilian geopolitical doctrine that gained new currency
with the economic growth of the country after 1968. Nevertheless, it is interesting to
underscore here that the ambition to become a world power before the end of the Twentieth
Century did not begin, in the dominant thought of the Army, with the questioning of alignment
with the US. Contrary to what happened with the Navy, the thinking of the ground forces
included the belief in the possibility of reaching major strategic autonomy with the permission
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of the US: “Coherent with its theoretical matrix, military conceptualisation elects as its goal
for power the exercise of regional hegemony with American consent” (Cavagnari 1987, 80).
The pronounced conservatism of the Army was also reflected in its affection for
the ideological dogmas of national security. Up until the end of the Cold war the Army still
considered maintenance of internal order as its fundamental mission, and resisted more than
did the Navy the idea of civilian control over the Armed Forces. This factor should not
impede us, however, in identifying some important changes that occurred after 1977 in the
views of the Army vis-à-vis its North American ally. Hence, while the abrogation of the
military accord of 1952 had not signified a more radical revision of the idea of strategic
subordination to the US, some processes hinted at change in the evaluation of the terms of
the alliance. In our hypothesis, the question of military technology returns at this point as an
explanatory factor.
In effect, the intention of building itself up as a world power inevitably put on the
table the need of developing Brazilian strategic capacity and of diminishing its vulnerabilities.
It is worth remembering in this regard that the geopolitical doctrine already affirmed the need
of endowing the country with a more sophisticated industrial base, augmenting its
technological capacities, refining its infrastructure, and modernising the Armed Forces,
objectives which, in the ideology of national security, were included in the binomial motto,
“security and development.” Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, the military aspect of
these needs gained disproportionate weight in the dominant thinking of the ground forces:
“the modernisation of the military forces, technological-military development and the
domination of nuclear technology for military ends” (Cavagnari 1987, 82). Or, in other words,
The militarization of the principal programmes of advanced technology…would
come to reveal the determination of the Armed Forces to obtain the technology
of [certain] vectors: nuclear submarine, mid-range ballistic missile and fighterbomber…the possession of these vectors would be one of the principal motives
for the tension in relations with the United States (Cavagnari 1994, 28-29).
For purposes of this study, it is worth recalling the difference between the processes
that occurred in the Navy and in the Army. In the case of the former, the necessity of
technological modernisation preceded the change in strategic thinking. In the case of the
latter, without changing its strategic orientation, the Army came to the need for technological
autonomy. In both cases, the result was an increase in tensions in relations with the US.
This line expressed itself with more clarity in the negotiations that were
established between the Reagan administration and the Figueiredo government in the first
half of the 1980s, and which resulted in the signing of a “Memorandum of Understanding of
Industrial-Military Cooperation,” on February 6, 1984. This document was the result of the
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efforts of one of five working groups created for President Reagan’s visit to Brazil at the end
of 1982, and expressed the intentions of the US to reactivate military relations with Brazil
thirty years after the signing of the accord that had defined military relations between the two
countries during the first part of the Cold War, and five years after its abrogation by the
Geisel government.
The 1984 memorandum represented the failure of the US to convince the military
government to accept a broad enough agenda for the Reagan Administration, which
included: 1) agreement of Brazil with the creation of the South Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(SATO); 2) the assignment of Trindade Island for the establishment of an American base; 3)
the formation of a new combined military mission of the two countries; 4) reversing of
Brazilian policy in Central America, where the US was compromised by the undermining
effects of Sandinismo; 5) the resurrection of an inter-American peace force, with the
objective of acting in Central America (Bustamante 1987, 64).4 It is easy to understand why
this agenda, which flowed from a denial of the most elementary principles of Brazilian foreign
policy, was not accepted. From the perspective of my argument, it is more significant to
explore the reasons that led the Figueiredo government to refuse the more limited agenda of
military technology transfer, the touchstone of American efforts to reactivate preferential
inter-military relations.
Contrary to the conjuncture at the beginning of the 1950s, - when an important
sector of the Brazilian Armed Forces was frankly favourable to the establishment of military
accords with the US - at the beginning of the 1980s the North American intent came face-toface with a significant group of obstacles. These expressed the new terms in which the
Brazilian Armed Forces collectively conceived of their interests vis-à-vis the American ally.
We have already seen that, in the Army, the bone of contention was not about diverging
strategic concepts. Instead, the disagreement was around the limits that US military
technology transfers imposed on the freedom of action of modernisation projects sponsored
by this military branch.
Profoundly compromised by the project to consolidate a national arms industry,
through exports to Third World countries, the Army was not interested in accepting this,
whether it was based on limits that American legislation imposed on re-exporting arms with
American technology, or whether it was based on whatever other North American project for
reconverting military technology employed in Brazil. This position was hardened in February
of 1984 when, six days after signing the Brazilian-US memorandum of understanding by
foreign ministers Saraiva and Shultz, in Brasília, the six Brazilian military ministers released
a note in which they affirmed that the country should not accept American military
technology if it was tied to restrictions on exports to third countries (Bustamante 1987, 7475). Thus it was possible to affirm that the “lend-lease” era, which had been marked by
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military cooperation according to the terms of the 1952 accord, was over. It is not surprising,
then, that the understandings initiated in 1982 have resulted in almost nothing in subsequent
years. As an analyst noted, “the Memorandum of Understanding on Industrial-Military
cooperation was in effect until the 6th of February of 1989, without concrete results”
(Cavagnari 1994, 45).
FROM ARGENTINA TO THE CALHA NORTE
The year 1982 appears as an important date in another regard as well. The War
of the Malvinas, which presented the Argentinean military dictatorship with an enemy from
outside the hemisphere, put on trial the efficacy of one of the central pillars of the
Hemisphere security arrangement of the Cold War: the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (1947). Moreover, the defeat of Argentina concerned the military because it
clarified the “incapacity of the Brazilian Armed Forces in a conventional war of medium
intensity” (Cavagnari 1994, 52). Nonetheless, on a regional level, the South Atlantic war
contributed in the end to a process that had been unfolding since 1977, when areas of
disagreement regarding approval of the hydro-electric potential of the rivers of the Plata
basin had been resolved: the relaxation of military tensions between Brazil and Argentina.
Hence, although the deployment of military force had never figured as a real
possibility in the relations between the two countries, one of the four hypotheses of war of
the Joint Chiefs of the Brazilian Armed Forces—Hypothesis Delta—had predicted a conflict
with a Northerly neighbour (Cavagnari 1994, 48). As he recalled from a lecture that he gave
in 1992, General Manuel Teixeira, who was Deputy Chief of the Joint Chiefs of the Army in
the mid-1980s, noted that
For 80 years, since the [military] schools were well organised, they have
regarded as doctrine the hypothesis of a war of Brazil with Argentina and viceversa. The officers who designed the courses at the Escuela de Estado
Mayor…in Buenos Aires, until 4 years ago, participated in war games where the
enemy was Brazil, and this was not hidden from our officers. In Brazil, we did this
differently, calling it the Southern enemy or identifying it with a colour (Teixeira
1992, 14).
If these dates are correct, only inertia can explain the retention of these
exercises until almost the end of the 1980s. Already in 1977, military analysts perceived
“indications that in Brasília the military Joint Chiefs tended to react positively to the idea of a
major coming together of the Southern Cone countries” (Góes 1978, 160). The posture
assumed by Brazil in 1982 contributed to a deepening of these tendencies: “Brazilian
diplomatic behaviour, [expressing] solidarity with Argentina and directed at seeking a
peaceful solution to conflict, helped to dissipate old fears and to end an historic rivalry”
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(Cavagnari 1994, 39). In the Army, this project was continued under the administration of
General Manuel, responsible for strategic planning in the Army in the mid-1980s.
An understanding of the evolution of military thought requires a return to 1977,
however. At that time, regarding changes in external policies sponsored by the Geisel
government, which included a major concern with South America, it was a relaxation of
tensions in the South that allowed for the concentration of military efforts, principally those of
the Army, in an area that began to become the major focus of its concerns: Amazônia, the
target of the Treaty of Cooperation (TCA) between the countries of the region, signed in
March 1977. The connection between the two processes appeared in statements by the
Minister of the Army, General Fernando Belfort Bethlem at the end of that year: “the
Southern borders are consolidated, whereas those of the North can be called live borders”
(Folha de S. Paulo 1977). In effect, concluding the task of occupying the North was of
principal interest to the Army; this had been predicted in the classic reflections on Brazilian
geopolitics. In the end, for General Golbery do Couto e Silva (1981, 47), this would “inundate
with civilisation the Amazon rainforest, covering over our border points, beginning with a
forward base in the Centre-West, in a coordinated action with the progression E-O,
according to the axis of the great river.”
In May 1985, at the beginning of the Sarney government, this work was furthered
with the proposal of the Secretary-General of the National Security Council of an action plan
in the region north of the banks of the Solimões and Amazon rivers. The plan seemed to
express primarily the dominant views of the Army. Its entire justification was couched in the
language of the doctrines of National Security and of geopolitics. Within these parameters, it
brought together the concerns of the Army with the Northern borders, following the
elimination, after 1975, of internal threats of subversion. In keeping with traditional concepts
of Brazilian geopolitics, Project Calha Norte—as it was later named—also expressed with
greater force military concerns with avoiding foreign interference in the Amazon region,
considering Amazônia to be the responsibility of the countries of the region, within the spirit
of the TCA.
Hence, it is possible to see in this as much the calculated perceptions of the Cold
War (the interference of Cuba in the internal politics of neighbouring countries, considered in
this case to be improbable), as “also the direct intervention of the North American
government, which tended to overestimate the possibility of communist expansion in the
area” (Conselho de Segurança Nacional 1985). It was in this way that the current concerns
of the Army with the defence of Amazônia were delineated. Resistance to American
intentions of limiting Brazilian programmes from sensitive technology came to be lumped
together with perceptions of threats centred on international greed for Amazônia (Martins
Filho 2003).
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The five years following 1987 were not a propitious time for strategic reflection.
During this period, the Armed Forces initially concentrated on their activities vis-à-vis the
Constitutional convention of 1988, with the principal objective of guaranteeing their
institutional prerogatives, which they achieved with considerable success (Zaverucha 1994,
193ff.). At the beginning of the Fernando Collor government in 1990, they confronted a
political agenda of budget cuts and civilian control over the military, along with the
disestablishment of the National Information Service (SNI), the primary national intelligence
agency, which was controlled by the military. Externally, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989
and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union created a surprising disruption of the world
order as it had been structured since 1947. Along with these events, the Gulf War, at the
beginning of 1991, alerted the military to the new conditions of military intervention in the
post-Cold War period. The resume of an article on strategy on the threshold of the Third
Millennium defines quite well the Brazilian military view of these processes: “The end of the
Cold war, the dismantling of the Soviet Union, and the collapse of communism inaugurated a
period of transition in the world order, [one] characterised by de-polarisation, by hegemonic
dissociation and by transnationalisation” (Gigolotti 2005, 55).
As for Amazônia, the Collor government initiated a process of dismantling the
policies of regional integration conservative modernisation established during the military
regime, as well as fulfilling a constitutional obligation to demarcate the Yanomami territories
which put on the back burner the Army’s Calha Norte project. In the political context that
preceded the hosting of ECO-92 in Rio de Janeiro, Collor’s policies sought to demonstrate to
the world that Brazil was a country in alignment with the goals of the world ecology
movement. None of this affected the Army’s policy of deploying large operational units in the
Amazon region, in which emphasis was placed on transferring an infantry brigade from
Petrópolis (in the State of Rio de Janeiro) to Tefé (in the State of Amazonas) in 1992-93, and
a brigade from Santo Ângelo (in the State of Rio Grande do Sul) to Boa Vista (in the State or
Roraima) in 1992-93 (Máximo 1999, 199-200; Silva 1999).
THE ARMY AND RESISTANCE IN AMAZÔNIA
The Collor government (1990-1992) marked a decisive change in the political
thinking of the military. Even while a crisis in military identity was then being discussed, the
Army was formulating a new doctrine, one that addressed the adaptation of the Army to the
immediate post-Cold War conjuncture. Among the dominant military views, the principal
characteristics of this conjuncture was the rise of the US as the only world superpower, no
longer compromised by the bipolar system of alliances, and now in a context in which
overcoming the traditional notions of national sovereignty was debated. And all of this was
within the context of Brazil’s domestic politics, in which the Collor government seemed to
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align itself with the forces that were associated with diminishing the role of the Armed Forces
of the peripheral countries (Martins Filho 2003, 264ff.).
Early in 1991, the military commander in Amazônia declared that the Army
“would transform this [region] into a Vietnam” if there was an invasion of this part of the
country (Martins Filho 2003, 272). At the beginning of 1992, in an address to the troops
during the departure ceremonies for the Rio Grande do Sul brigade, which (as noted above)
was being transferred to the North, its commander, General Luiz Nery da Silva, alluded not
only to the rapprochement with Argentina, but to “alien pressures that threaten our
sovereignty over Amazônia,” such that “the priority of deploying the Armed Forces would be
directed at that rich and coveted area, bravely conquered and maintained by our
predecessors” (Silva 1999, 266).
There is no official history of the formulation of this doctrine. Nonetheless, there
are among its principal authors military officers who participated in combating guerrillas in
Araguaia (in Amazônia) during the first half of the 1970s; they had had experience with the
approach of the Jungle Warfare Instruction Centre (Centro de Instrução de Guerra na Selva,
or CIGS), headquartered in Manaus.5 What appears to have happened was an interesting
and possibly unprecedented process of transforming an anti-communist combat experience,
with roots in the French doctrine of guerre révolutionaire, into a doctrine that sought to
extract strategic and operational lessons from the forces that they had earlier fought, based
on a hypothesis of the future conflict of Brazil with a major power. In reality, the idea of
mirroring the methods of the enemy was not new, and constituted the heart of the French
doctrine (Martins Filho 2004). The new thread was in the effort to integrate the methods of
irregular guerrilla warfare with conventional war and regular forces, in “the face of an
incontestably stronger military force.”
Around 1991, a strategy capable of being employed in Amazônia was already
under discussion at the Army Joint Chiefs and Command School (Escola de Comando e
Estado Maior do Exército, or ECEME), which included protracted manoeuvres and the
temporary transformation of regular forces into guerrilla forces (Silva 1992). Its theoretical
foundation was the strategy of “wearing down” lassidão of Audré Beaufre:
If the margin of action is great, but the available means of obtaining a military
decision are excessively weak, one can revert to a strategy of prolonging the
duration, seeking to promote a wearing down of morale, and the exhaustion of
the enemy. In order to endure, methods employed will be very rustic, but the
technique of deployment (generally a total war supported by a generalised
guerrilla force) will oblige the adversary to maintain considerably larger forces
than it will be able to support indefinitely. This model of a total prolonged struggle
of low military intensity was generally employed with success in the wars of decolonisation. Its principal theoretician is Mao Tse-Tung (Beaufre 1998, 33).
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In this regard, in a book published in 1995, then Aviator-Colonel Álvaro Pinheiro
referred for the first time to a strategic directive of the Army Joint Chiefs which, in order to
confront the “possibility of the occurrence of conflict against an extra-continental
multinational force endowed with superior combat power,” defined the strategy of Wearing
Down (lassidão) or of Wasting (usura), conceived of as one that would “develop through a
prolonged conflict, of the total kind, which would tend in a majority of cases to be of low
intensity, normally based on guerrilla forces and seeking to obtain a decision through
lowering morale and material exhaustion. In this kind of action, it is fundamental to know how
to endure” (Pinheiro 1995, 13). According to a version offered by General Paulo Roberto
Corrêa Assis, former commander of CIGS and the headquarters of the Joint Chiefs of the
Military Command of Amazônia:
The study of this strategy began in Brasília in 1994, when General Pedrozo, then
vice-chief of the General Services Department, for whom I was his assistant,
knowing in advance that he would be promoted to Army General to take over the
Military Command of Amazônia [CMA], issued his first directive, which was a
type of guerrilla war in CMA. We initiated a joint study with the Land Operations
Command, where we counted on a rich collaboration with Col. Álvaro Pinheiro, in
order to develop this strategy in anticipation of a far superior force before which
we would be incapacitated in confronting a case of intervention in Amazônia
(Assis 2003, 159).
Therefore, as has been seen, there were strong indications that the principles of
the new doctrine had already been defined in 1991. It is possible that the General was
referring to a deepening of aspects of the doctrine under the aegis of the CGIS.6 In any
event, when the Army Planning System (SIPLEX) became known publicly, the Wearing
Down strategy (lassidão) had already been consolidated (Ministério do Exército 1996). At
the operational level, as one of its principal authors explains, it presupposed the adoption of
irregular warfare as a principal form of the conduct of conventional warfare against a military
power clearly superior to Brazil in material and scientific-technological resources. The larger
objective of the new strategy was “to demonstrate to the invader that the price to pay to
maintain domination over a determined region was not compensated by the benefits that
flowed [from this]” (Pinheiro 1995, 13).
For Pinheiro, the Brazilian Army shared with that of the US the same doctrinal
concept of deployment of special forces—where it promotes Detachments of Special Forces
that will establish Operational Areas of Irregular Warfare (AOGI). The difference is that, in
the Brazilian case, they do not foresee actions by Special Forces (FEs) abroad, linked in
some way to a National Revolutionary Movement. Rather, commanders of national FEs
would establish AOGI in the context of a Resistance Movement, “working with Brazilian
communities during a threat or occurrence of an invasion of our territory.” The political
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objective to be obtained is “to re-establish Sovereignty and the Integrity of the National
Patrimony.” In the end, the doctrine is based on the idea that the centre of gravity of the
invader is its national will. Hence, the Wearing Down strategy would have as its objective to
last until the national will of the enemy was weakened (Pinheiro 1995, 13-14).
This new concept of the Army elevated some Marxist texts to the category of
recommended reading at the military training schools. It should not be surprising, then, that
Strategic Problems of Revolutionary War, by Mao Tse-Tung, had already been cited in 1992
in a monograph by Col. Pinto Silva. Another monograph, by Major Fernando Velôzo Gomes
Pedrosa, cited Mao’s text On Protracted War, “as a model that, with adequate adaptations,
can be applied to other conflicts of a similar nature” (Pedrosa 1995, 6). This officer’s text
also inaugurated the study of the struggle of the Vietnamese Army against France and the
US, and affirmed that “considering the justness of the cause and the level of mobilisation of
the Vietnamese people, the final victory of the Vietminh was only a question of time.”7 In this
regard, the military texts themselves underscored that it would not be possible to seek in the
experiences of major countries reflections on strategies of resistance: “the countries from
which Brazil has traditionally sought direction in formulating its military doctrine do not evince
a modus operandi that can serve as a basis for an operational doctrine” (Abreu 2003, 28).
In any case, by the mid-1990s a new doctrine had already been consolidated.
Since then, besides renaming it the Doctrine of Resistance, the Army has worked hard to
sustain it within the strategic and tactical-operational plan. “The Doctrine of Resistance is
being developed with its own character, by means of encouraging the promotion of symposia
and discussions—in military schools and units—and the conduct of doctrinal experimentation
that incorporate the inventive genius and the capacity for improvisation of the men that make
up the ground forces,” said an officer of the Joint Chiefs (Abreu 2003, 28-29).8
Hence, neither the publication of the National Defence Policy, in 1996, nor the
Creation of the Ministry of Defence, in 1999, altered this previously defined course. In the
manual, C-124-1 Strategy, the Army
maintains that resistance “consists in exhausting,
through prolonged conflict, a superior military power, seeking the weakening of its morale
through continued deployment of non-conventional and innovative actions as, for example,
guerrilla tactics” (Ministério da Defesa 2001, 3/12). Already, the manual MD-33-M-04 Military
Defence Doctrine “recognises that the strategy of resistance is characterised by the
development of military actions in a prolonged conflict, of a limited character, in a majority of
cases low intensity, where normally tactics and techniques of guerrilla [warfare] are used”
(Abreu 2003, 27).
Since this document has already been elaborated in the ambit of the Ministry of
Defence, the continuity mentioned above appears to be evident. It can only be presumed,
thus, that the secret documents that constitute the “Military Defence Policy” and the “Military
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Strategy for Defence,” to which this analyst does not have access except very indirectly,
through inferences taken from military monographs, would evince the same line of
reasoning.9 It was possible to affirm in a military analysis at the end of 2005 that “the
doctrine under development by the Brazilian Army for the defence of Amazônia based on
guerrilla actions is unprecedented in military history. Never before has a regular army
prepared itself for an irregular long-term war, from instruction to raising involved logistical
aspects” (Gigolotti 2005, 63-64).
THE NAVY: TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY
As we have seen, since the mid-1970s the dominant thought in the Brazilian
Navy has emphasised the necessity of strategic autonomy—what would be translated into
the definition of a doctrine of deployment unlinked from the imperatives of hemispheric
defence—as well as the creation of an autochthonous technological capacity. The 1990s
saw a Navy confident in the potential for regional integration, principally with Argentina—
which would permit it to define concepts of common defence “unlinked from the specific
interests of the regional hegemonic power” (Vidigal 1995, 60) and convinced of the
correctness of its policy of seeking technological autonomy. Nevertheless, it admitted the
importance of the adaptation of the naval technological evolution to the specific conditions of
Brazil, which would require a compromise between the modernisation and the nationalisation
of war materiel. In its most general aspects, the post-Cold War world awakened in the Navy
concerns similar to those of the Army: the new strategic situation was the expression of “a
gradual shift in the axis of world tensions,” which substituted for the old East-West tensions
the “unjust and, as it could not otherwise be, distancing of the countries of the ‘North,’
developed, powerful, rich and arbiters of the world order, and the countries in development
or underdevelopment of the ‘South’” (Flores 1992, 99).
Naval strategists also view with a lack of confidence the new rhetoric of limited
sovereignty and the emergence of “global themes”—the environment, minority rights, human
rights—which will permit the bypassing of classic concepts of national sovereignty and selfdetermination. These themes justify proposals to reform the military apparatuses of less
powerful countries: in the dominant view of the Navy, they hide the hegemonic intentions of
the powers, above all the US, in the sense of imposing its own agenda of national security
on countries such as Brazil. This is evident in the proposal to use the Brazilian military in
combating the illegal narcotics trade: “the reduction in the capacity for classic defence is
equivalent in practice to the adoption of a model that sanctions the defence of one country
by another power, generally a greater power, not in the traditional terms of mutual defence,
[which is] now in decline, but simply as the product of the unilateral understanding of the
greater power and its associates” (Flores 1992, 105).
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Nevertheless, the specificity of the naval forces conferred on the thinking of the
Navy some of its own characteristics. Above all, following the line of thought that we have
seen since the beginning of the 1970s, naval thinking was concentrated on the tendency of
the new order to consolidate what was configured as a kind of technological apartheid:
It is increasingly difficult to transfer complete technology, [because] of the
allegation that it capacitates the receiver, the same as a middle-range power that
produces weapons of mass destruction and develops long-range missiles so
that, from the viewpoint of developed countries, [these might fall] into the hands
of ‘politically immature’ people and governments, and threaten world peace
(Vidigal 1995, 56-57).
At the same time, with the end of nuclear deterrence, technological innovations
in areas such as the improvement of missiles and satellites acquired new relevance, as did
increasing the control over and cargo capacity of airplanes, improvements in submarines,
the development of torpedoes and mines, as well as the revolution in electronic warfare,
among others. Without access to the new technologies, the Navy would continue to have its
hands tied, and to see itself as unable to develop its own project that might equate the
necessities of modernisation with the possibilities of nationalising its equipment (Vidigal
1995, 72).
However, the most original aspect of the thinking of the Navy in the post-Cold
War era seems to be in the reformulation of doctrine. I refer here to the development of the
concept of conventional deterrence “as the principal mission of military power of the less
powerful countries, which cannot consider a confrontation with countries of far greater
national power than theirs” (Vidigal 1995, 59). Apparently, then, this expresses itself here as
an evolution similar to what we observed in the Army. But there are important differences.
Starting from the idea that the Navy has an important role to fill, as much during peacetime—
through the political use of military power—as in war, naval thinking came to propose the
abandonment of the concepts of “hypotheses of war” and “hypotheses of conflict,” “faced
with the lack of objectivity of these hypotheses and the ambiguity of the situations that could
arise.” In their place, it was suggested that the concept of strategic vulnerabilities be
adopted, or in other words, “the principal points in which a country is vulnerable to the action
of any external enemy, where an attack can cause damages that are difficult to repair and
totally disproportional to the force applied” (Vidigal 1995, 62).10
With this new conceptualisation, the strategic thinking of the Navy intended to
take account of the “inherent instability of the international order” and, at the same time,
define with greater precision a military policy for the country: “a combining of the missions
resulting from all of the strategic vulnerabilities accepted as valid will serve as the basis for
defining necessary military power” (Vidigal 1995, 65). From our perspective the new focus
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has important consequences in terms of military thought. In directing fire at the definition of
the Armed Forces as a permanent instrument of national foreign policy, the Navy rendered
unnecessary the justification of the existence of these forces with regards to any activity not
in national defence. It made it possible, therefore, in all cases that the hypotheses of war in
the pre-1989 period would be bypassed and it removed with greater rigor the need to define
internal enemies. These new concepts opened a pathway so that the Navy could anticipate
the Army in other innovations. Thus naval strategists had by 1995 already predicted the
major collaboration of the armed forces of the Southern Cone, and the need of progressing
military doctrine in the sense of combining military forces and the positive role that the
Ministry of Defence could fill in the formulation of a new doctrine of deployment.
The following years saw the consolidation of these views. At the end of 2002, the
Commander of the Navy, Admiral Sérgio Chagasteles, affirmed that the new document
outlining Brazilian military strategy, then being drafted by the Joint Chiefs of the Armed
Forces, incorporated the idea of bypassing the concept of “hypotheses of war,” adopting
instead the “hypotheses of deployment,” which no longer required the identification of a
specific enemy. In the same text, the Commander of the Navy reiterated the centrality of the
notion of “strategic vulnerabilities” in defining the responses and strategies of the Armed
Forces in the new conjuncture. This new conceptual picture would confer on the Navy
greater capacity to define its Strategic Concept and its needs. From this point on, it would
establish the importance of the notion of rapid deployment that, based on the capacity to
complete missions with broad spectrum deployment, would open a space for flexibility,
versatility and mobility in Navy planning (Chagasteles 2003).
THE FORCE OF INERTIA
In this final topic, we intend to suggest that at the beginning of the Twenty-First
Century and despite the changes analysed in this article, there remained in the Army some
concepts that had been elaborated in the Cold War period and that seemed to have survived
the shocks of the 1990s. Hence, although the Army had abandoned the concept of
hypotheses of war and adopted that of the hypotheses of deployment,11 everything indicates
that it had still not significantly changed the explicit vision in 1996, when the System of
Planning of the Army (SIPLEX) was published. In its Alpha Doctrine, the Army continued to
consider the possibility of acting in internal defence, in “permanent actions of a
PREVENTATIVE character, favouring strategies of NATIONAL PRESENCE and
DETERRENCE, as well as seeking to contribute to the government with force to inhibit the
performance of Adversarial Forces (F Adv) and avoid that such crises evolve to a level
threatening to institutional stability” (Ministério do Exército 1996; capitals for emphasis in the
original). Such a doctrine would require that the Army be “present in all of the National
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Territory, with the purpose of being familiar with the area and following situations with the
potential to generate crises” (Ministério do Exército 1996,12).
Six years later the Strategy of Presence is still considered to be fundamental,
keeping in mind the pioneering role of the Army in the formation of the country, even if the
possibility of a necessary “slow withdrawal” from this is considered. According to the thenCommander of the Army, General Glauber Vieira, “today the capacity to make [ourselves]
present has become more important than being present,” and that “presence should be
selective.” In this view, “the process of withdrawing from a selective presence should be
slow, but observing that pioneering role that, for some time, we will have to exercise” (Vieira
2003, 138-9). In the new version of SIPLEX (Ministério da Defesa 2002), the Alpha Doctrine
remains the same, omitting only the term “adversarial forces.”
In our hypothesis, what one sees here is the major difficulty of the Army in
freeing itself from its historic concern with order. The view that continues to predominate in
this branch seems best expressed in an article defended at the ECEME and published in
1995 in A Defesa Nacional by the title of “The Armed Forces in the Twenty-First Century:”
Even if the law would not foresee such a situation, it would be difficult for society
to accept that the Armed Forces remain passive in the face of chaos and
disorder. It would be illogical and utopian for the State to forego its armed wing in
confronting any threat, external or internal. The old French-Masonic aphorism
that the Armed Forces are a “big mute” [“grande mudo”] only finds a home
among those of poor intentions. Muteness is an organic deficiency incapable of
constituting itself as a military quality” (Carvalho 1995, 64).
In the same sense, the attachment to the concept of security is in
contradistinction to that of defence. In effect, it is possible to infer from the text of the thenDeputy Commander of the Joint Chiefs of the Army, General Rui Monarca da Silveira,
written in 2003, that the Army is included, through revisions to the Policy of National Defence
(written in the context of the civilian Ministry of Defence), in the proposal to insert into the
new version of the document the traditional notion of the ESG. This sees National Security
as “the condition that regards the obtaining and maintenance of the objectives and interests
of the Nation, by means of integration and coordinated deployment of the various
expressions of National Power” (Silveira 2004, 170).
The same text recalls the reflections of Marshall Castello Branco regarding the
differences of application between notions of security and defence, of which he considered
the concept of national security as the most encompassing, understanding it as “the global
defence of institutions, incorporating within this psychological aspects, the preservation of
development” (Silveira 2004,171). It should not be surprising that a recent military
monograph points out that “the military structure is conditioned to respond to past
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challenges, or rather, it is coated by history. The mentality is eminently retrospective,
defensive and endogenous, not corresponding to that which is desirable to those aspiring to
the circle of nations of the first ranking” (Alves 2004, 33).12
Hence, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the analyst of Brazilian
military thought confronts aspects of change and aspects of continuity, whose evolution must
be closely followed over the next few years in order to gain a better understanding of the
changing military mentality. In any event, the principal thesis of this study—that the
understanding of military thought is fundamental to understanding the military question in
Brazil, and to give some basis to whatever attempt is made at formulating a critical dialogue
with the military—seems to be supported.
NOTES
1
Professor of Political Science at the Federal University of São Carlos. This article is part of the project “The
Armed Forces in the Post-Cold War: A New Operational Code?”, supported by CNPq.
2
“The present trend of foreign policy, with its independence on key issues and firm but basically friendly give and
take with the United States on bilateral issues, appears to correspond do majority military opinion” (U.S.
Department of State 1969, 33).
3
“Because some officers wish to show Brazilian independence from the United States or because the services
are seeking advanced types that the US is not ready to supply, considerable interest is presently being shown by
the armed forces in attractively packaged sales offers from third countries” (U.S. Department of State 1991, 61).
4
Bustamante’s work, while fundamental to understanding this phase of Brazilian-US military relations, is flawed
by its lack of understanding the internal debate within the Brazilian Armed Forces in the 1970s and 1980s, about
which there is much more evidence available today, such as that provided by the project for the recovery of
military memory of CPDOC.
5
Two examples are Álvaro de Souza Pinheiro, who was wounded in Araguaia and Carlos Alberto Pinto Silva,
instructor at CIGS in 1973-74 (Silva, 1992:89), both colonels at the beginning of the 1990s.
6
From a formal point of view, the definition of the Land Military Doctrine fell to the Army Joint Chiefs, under the
auspices of the Terrestrial Operations Command.
7
See also, among others: Forjaz (1999; 2000); Forjaz (2003); Abreu (2003) and Gigolotti (2005).
8
See: Machado Filho (2000); Salvani (2000); and Plum (2005).
9
Some consistent ideas of the Brazilian Military Strategy can be inferred from the writings of General Márcio
Bergo (2005, 11-12).
10
Examples of these vulnerabilities would be the dependency on importing energy, the riches of Amazônia or the
length of Brazil’s borders.
11
The new version of SIPLEX defines the hypotheses of deployment as “stemming from accepted scenarios and
the politico-strategic directions of the country, that do not select or characterise any [other] countries as a
potential enemy, and that represent the strategic options of National Defence” (Ministério da Defesa 2002, 33).
12
This author, a lieutenant colonel in the cavalry and the Joint Chiefs in 2004, wrote the only text that we can find
that criticises the current strategic concepts of the Army.
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