PROGRAMA
3º QUADR. 2003
CURSO
: MESTRADO PROFISSIONALIZANTE
DISCIPLINA : FINANÇAS CORPORATIVAS
CÓDIGO
: MEST013
CARGA HORÁRIA: 45 HORAS
CRÉDITOS: 03
PROFESSOR : Ricardo D. Brito (Doutor em Economia – EPGE/FGV)
e-mail: [email protected]
OBJETIVO:
Este curso pretende apresentar o instrumental necessário para a análise de questões relacionadas ao
financiamento das coporações, com ênfase no caráter incompleto dos contratos que envolvem os
provedores de capital.
CONTEÚDO PROGRAMÁTICO
Tópicos
1
Avaliação
1.1) Avaliação sob Certeza
1.2) Avaliação sob Incerteza
1.3) Dificuldades e Fatos Estilizados
2
Estrutura de Capital
2.1) A proposição de Modigliani & Miller
2.2) Efeitos dos Incentivos sob a Estrutura de Capital
3
Informação e Custos de Agência
3.1) A Natureza das Firmas
3.2) Implicações para a Estrutura de Capital
3.3) Política de Remuneração
3.4) Contratos Financeiros
4
Política de Remuneração
5
Reestruturação de Capital
5.1) Abertura de Capital
5.2) Fechamento de Capital
5.3) Fusões e Aquisições
5
Insolvência e Falência
FINANÇAS CORPORATIVAS
PROF. RICARDO BRITO
2
Referências Básicas:
Brealey & Myers (2000) Principles of Corporate Finance, McGraw-Hill. (B&M)
Matos, J. A. (2001) Theoretical Foundations of Corporate Finance, Princeton. (M)
Referênc ias Complementares:
Assaf Neto, A. (2002) Finanças Corporativas e Valor, São Paulo: Editora Atlas.
Campbell, J., A. Lo and A.C. MacKinlay, Chapter 4, The Econometrics of Financial Markets, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Hart, O. (1995) Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Oxford.
Milgrom, P. & J. Roberts (1992) Economics, Organization and Management, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Englewood Cliffs.
Artigos: a maioria dos artigos está disponível em http://www.jstor.org/cgi-bin/jstor/listjournal, com acesso
apenas de dentro do Ibmec.
Andrade, G. & S. Kaplan (1998) “How Costly is financial (not economic) distress? Evidence from highly
leveraged transactions that became distressed,” Journal of Finance, 53, 1443-94.
Aharony, J. and I. Swary (1980) “Quarterly Dividends and Earnings Announcements and Shareholders’
Returns: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Finance, 35, 1-12.
Araújo, A. (2002) “As Leis de Falência: uma abordagem econômica,” BACEN, Trabalhos para discussão
n. 57.
Asquith, P. and D. Mullins Jr. (1983) “The Impact of Initial Dividend Payments on Shareholders’ Wealth,”
Journal of Business, 56, 77-96.
Baker, M. and J. Wurgler (2002) “Market Timing and Capital Structure,” Journal of Finance, ??, ??-??.
Brown, S. and J. Warner (1985) “Using Daily Stock Returns: the case of event studies,” Journal of
Financial Economics, 14, 3-31.
Brown, S. and J. Warner (1980) “Measuring Security Price Perfornance,” Journal of Financial Economics,
8, 205-258.
Castanias, R. (1983) “Bankruptcy Risk and Optimal Capital Structure,” Journal of Finance, 38, 16171635.
Coase, D. (1937) “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, 386-405.
DeAngelo, H. and R. Masulis (1980) “Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 8, 3-29.
Fama, E. (1996) “Discounting under Uncertainty,” Journal of Business, 69, 415-428.
FAMA, E.; FRENCH, K. Testing Trade-off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and
Debt. Review of Financial Studies, v.15, p.1-33, 2002.
FAMA, E.; FRENCH, K. Disappearing Dividends: changing firm characteristics or lower
propensity to pay?. Journal of Financial Economics, v.60, p.3-43, 2001.
FINANÇAS CORPORATIVAS
PROF. RICARDO BRITO
3
FAMA, E.; FRENCH, K. The Corporate Cost of Capital and the Return on Corporate Investment.
The Journal of Finance, v.54, n.6, p.1939-1967, 1999.
Fama, E. & F. French (1997) “Industry Cost of Equity,” Journal of Financial Economics, 43, February:
153-93.
Graham, J. and C. Harvey (2000) “The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field,”
Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.
Green, E., J. Lopez and Z. Wang (2001) “ The Federal Reserve Banks’ Imputed Cost of Equity Capital,”
FRB Working paper.
Grullon, G. and R. Michaely (2002) “Dividends, Share Repurchases, and Substitution Hypothesis,”
Working Paper.
Harris, M. and A. Raviv (1991) “The theory of capital structure,” Journal of Finance 46, 297-355.
Jensen, M. (1986), “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers,” American
Economic Review 76, 323-329.
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling (1976) “Theory of the firm - managerial behavior, agency costs and
ownership structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
LA PORTA, R.; LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F.; SHLEIFER, A.; VISHNY, R. Legal Determinants of
External Finance. The Journal of Finance, v.52, p.1131-1150, 1997.
LA PORTA, R.; LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F.; SHLEIFER, A.; VISHNY, R. Law and Finance.
Journal of Political Economy, v.106, n.6, p.1113-1155, 1998.
LA PORTA, R.; LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F.; SHLEIFER, A.; VISHNY, R. Agency Problems and
Dividens around the World. The Journal of Finance, v.55, n.1, p.1-33, 2000.
MacKie -Mason, J. (1990) “Do Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions?,” Journal of Finance, 45,
1471-1493.
Miller, M. (1988) “The M-M Proposition After 30 Years,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2, 99-120.
Miller, M. (1977) “Debt and taxes,” Journal of Finance 32, 261-275.
Myers, S. (1977) “The determinants of corporate borrowing,” Journal of Financial Economics 5, 147-175.
Myers, S. and N. Majluf (1984) “Corporate financing and investment decis ions when firms have
information that investors do not have,” Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-221.
Nance, D., C. Smith and C. Smithson (1993) “On the determinants of corporate hedging,” Journal of
Finance 48, 267-284.
Rajan, R. and L. Zingales (1995) “What do we know about capital structure: Some evidence from
international data,” Journal of Finance 50, 1421-1460.
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1986) “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,” Journal of Political
Economy, 94, 461-488.
FINANÇAS CORPORATIVAS
PROF. RICARDO BRITO
4
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1997) “A survey of corporate governance,” Journal of Finance 52, 737-783.
SHYAM-SUNDER, L.; MYERS, S. Testing Static Tradeoff against Pecking Order Models of Capital
Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, v.51, p. 219-244, 1999.
Stein, J. (1989) “Efficient capital markets, inefficient forms: A model of myopic corporate behavior,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, 655-669.
Titman, S. and R. Wessels (1988) “The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice,” Journal of Finance 43,
1-19.
Artigos originados por term papers:
Brito, R. e M. Lima (2003) “A Escolha da Estrutura de Capital sob Fraca Garantia Legal: o caso do
Brasil,” Ibmec, Textos para Discussão.
Silva, J. e R. Brito (2003) “Testando as Previsões de Trade-off e Pecking Order sobre
Dividendose Dívida para o Brasil,” Ibmec, Textos para Discussão.
AVALIAÇÃO:
Listas:
20 pontos
Prova intermediária:
20 pontos
Prova final:
30 pontos
Trabalho final (Term paper)
30 pontos