ESCOLA DE ECONOMIA DE SÃO PAULO DA FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS
CENTRO DO COMÉRCIO GLOBAL E INVESTIMENTO
Coordenadoras
Vera Thorstensen
Luciana Maria de Oliveira
RELEITURA DOS ACORDOS DA OMC COMO INTERPRETADOS PELO ÓRGÃO DE APELAÇÃO:
Efeitos na aplicação das regras do comércio internacional
Acordo sobre Agricultura
Organizadora
Adriane Nakagawa Baptista
Autores
Adriane Nakagawa Baptista
Andreia Costa
Carolina Jezler Müller
Cleíse Martins Costa
Geraldo Vidigal Neto
Jackson A. Yoshiura
Marilia Zulini da Costa Loosli
Gustavo Ribeiro de Macedo
1
INTRODUÇÃO
Análise do texto de lei do Acordo sobre Agricultura e da jurisprudência consolidada pelo Órgão de
Solução de Controvérsias (DSB) da OMC.
ACORDO SOBRE AGRICULTURA
PREÂMBULO
Jackson Yoshiura
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Members,
Having decided to establish a basis for initiating a process of reform of trade in agriculture in line with the
objectives of the negotiations as set out in the Punta del Este Declaration;
Recalling that their long-term objective as agreed at the Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round “is to
establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system and that a reform process should be
initiated through the negotiation of commitments on support and protection and through the establishment
of strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines”;
Recalling further that “the above-mentioned long-term objective is to provide for substantial progressive
reductions in agricultural support and protection sustained over an agreed period of time, resulting in
correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets”;
Committed to achieving specific binding commitments in each of the following areas: market access;
domestic support; export competition; and to reaching an agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary issues;
Having agreed that in implementing their commitments on market access, developed country Members
would take fully into account the particular needs and conditions of developing country Members by
providing for a greater improvement of opportunities and terms of access for agricultural products of
particular interest to these Members, including the fullest liberalization of trade in tropical agricultural
products as agreed at the Mid-Term Review, and for products of particular importance to the
diversification of production from the growing of illicit narcotic crops;
Noting that commitments under the reform programme should be made in an equitable way among all
Members, having regard to non-trade concerns, including food security and the need to protect the
environment; having regard to the agreement that special and differential treatment for developing
countries is an integral element of the negotiations, and taking into account the possible negative effects
of the implementation of the reform programme on least-developed and net food-importing developing
countries;
Hereby agree as follows:
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Os Membros,
Tendo decidido estabelecer uma base para iniciar um processo de reforma do comércio em agricultura,
em consonância com os objetivos das negociações, como definidos na Declaração de Punta del Este;
Recordando que o objetivo de longo prazo acordado na Revisão de Meio Período “é o de estabelecer um
sistema de comércio agrícola justo e com orientação de mercado e que um processo de reforma deve ser
2
iniciado por intermédio da negociação de compromissos em matéria de apoio e proteção e por intermédio
do estabelecimento de regras e disciplinas do GATT fortalecidas e operacionalmente mais eficazes”,
Recordando ainda que o objetivo de longo prazo acima mencionado consiste em proporcionar reduções
progressivas substanciais em matéria de apoio e proteção à agricultura, a serem mantidas durante um
período acordado de tempo, resultando na correção e prevenção de restrições e distorções em mercados
agrícolas mundiais;
Decididos a alcançar compromissos específicos de consolidação em cada uma das áreas seguintes: acesso
a mercados, apoio interno, competição em exportações; e a alcançar um acordo sobre as questões
sanitárias e fitossanitárias;
Tendo acordado que ao implementarem seus compromissos em acesso a mercados, os países
desenvolvidos Membros levariam integralmente em consideração as necessidades e condições
particulares dos países em desenvolvimento Membros, ao proporcionarem uma melhoria de
oportunidades e de condições de acesso para produtos agrícolas de especial interesse de tais Membros,
incluindo a mais ampla liberalização do comércio de produtos tropicais, conforme acordado na Revisão
de Meio Período, e para produtos de particular importância para a diversificação da produção com vistas a
permitir o abandono de culturas narcóticas ilícitas;
Tomando nota de que os compromissos assumidos no programa de reforma devem ser assumidos de
forma equitativa por todos os Membros, levando-se em consideração as preocupações não-comerciais,
entre as quais a segurança alimentar e a necessidade de proteção do meio ambiente; levando-se em
consideração o acordo de que o tratamento especial e diferenciado para os países em desenvolvimento é
um elemento integrante das negociações; e, tomando-se em conta os possíveis efeitos negativos da
implementação do programa de reforma nos países de menor desenvolvimento relativo e nos países em
desenvolvimento importadores líquidos de alimentos;
Concordam o seguinte:
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Preâmbulo
III.
Comentários
3

Artigo 1
Jackson Yoshiura
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
PART I
Article 1
Definition of Terms
In this Agreement, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a)
“Aggregate Measurement of Support” and “AMS” mean the annual level of support, expressed in
monetary terms, provided for an agricultural product in favour of the producers of the basic
agricultural product or non-product-specific support provided in favour of agricultural producers
in general, other than support provided under programmes that qualify as exempt from reduction
under Annex 2 to this Agreement, which is:
(i)
with respect to support provided during the base period, specified in the relevant tables of
supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV of a Member's Schedule; and
(ii)
with respect to support provided during any year of the implementation period and
thereafter, calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of this Agreement and
taking into account the constituent data and methodology used in the tables of supporting
material incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Member's Schedule;
(b)
“basic agricultural product” in relation to domestic support commitments is defined as the product
as close as practicable to the point of first sale as specified in a Member's Schedule and in the
related supporting material;
(c)
“budgetary outlays” or “outlays” includes revenue foregone;
(d)
“Equivalent Measurement of Support” means the annual level of support, expressed in monetary
terms, provided to producers of a basic agricultural product through the application of one or
more measures, the calculation of which in accordance with the AMS methodology is
impracticable, other than support provided under programmes that qualify as exempt from
reduction under Annex 2 to this Agreement, and which is:
(i)
with respect to support provided during the base period, specified in the relevant tables of
supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV of a Member's Schedule; and
(ii)
with respect to support provided during any year of the implementation period and
thereafter, calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex 4 of this Agreement and
taking into account the constituent data and methodology used in the tables of supporting
material incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Member's Schedule;
(e)
“export subsidies” refers to subsidies contingent upon export performance, including the export
subsidies listed in Article 9 of this Agreement;
(f)
“implementation period” means the six-year period commencing in the year 1995, except that, for
the purposes of Article 13, it means the nine-year period commencing in 1995;
(g)
“market access concessions” includes all market access commitments undertaken pursuant to this
Agreement;
(h)
“Total Aggregate Measurement of Support” and “Total AMS” mean the sum of all domestic
support provided in favour of agricultural producers, calculated as the sum of all aggregate
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measurements of support for basic agricultural products, all non-product-specific aggregate
measurements of support and all equivalent measurements of support for agricultural products,
and which is:
(i)
with respect to support provided during the base period (i.e. the “Base Total AMS”) and
the maximum support permitted to be provided during any year of the implementation
period or thereafter (i.e. the “Annual and Final Bound Commitment Levels”), as specified
in Part IV of a Member's Schedule; and
(ii)
with respect to the level of support actually provided during any year of the
implementation period and thereafter (i.e. the “Current Total AMS”), calculated in
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, including Article 6, and with the
constituent data and methodology used in the tables of supporting material incorporated
by reference in Part IV of the Member's Schedule;
(i)
year” in paragraph (f) above and in relation to the specific commitments of a Member refers to
the
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
PARTE I
Artigo 1
Definição dos termos
No presente Acordo, a menos que o contexto requeira interpretação diversa:
a)
por “Medida Agregada de Apoio” e “MAA” entende-se o nível de apoio anual, expresso em
termos monetários, fornecido em função de um produto agrícola em favor dos produtores do
produto agrícola básico, ou apoio não especificado por produto fornecido em favor de produtores
agrícolas em geral, excetuado o apoio fornecido sob programas que possam ser considerados
isentos de redução em virtude do Anexo 2 do presente Acordo, apoio que:
i)
com respeito ao apoio fornecido durante o período base, esteja especificado nas tabelas
relevantes do material de apoio, incorporadas por meio de referência na Parte IV da Lista
de um Membro; e
ii)
com respeito ao apoio fornecido durante qualquer um dos anos do período de
implementação ou após, seja calculado em conformidade com as disposições do Anexo 3
do presente Acordo, levando-se em consideração os dados constitutivos e a metodologia
utilizados nas tabelas do material de apoio incorporadas por meio de referência na Parte
IV da Lista de um Membro;
b)
por “produto agrícola básico”, no que se refere a compromissos de apoio interno, entende-se o
produto no estágio mais próximo possível ao da primeira venda, conforme se especifique na Lista
de um Membro e no material de apoio correspondente;
c)
“desembolsos orçamentários” ou “desembolsos” compreendem igualmente a renúncia fiscal;
d)
por “Medida Equivalente de Apoio” entende-se o nível anual de apoio, expresso em termos
monetários, fornecido a produtores de um produto agrícola básico por intermédio da aplicação de
uma ou mais medidas, cujo cálculo em conformidade com a metodologia da MAA é impraticável,
excetuado o apoio fornecido sob programas que possam ser considerados isentos de redução em
virtude do Anexo 2 do presente Acordo, e que:
i)
com respeito ao apoio fornecido durante o período base, seja especificado nas tabelas
relevantes do material de apoio incorporadas por meio de referência na Parte IV da Lista
de um Membro; e
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ii)
com respeito ao apoio fornecido durante qualquer um dos anos do período de
implementação ou após, seja calculado em conformidade com as disposições do Anexo 4
do presente Acordo, tomando em consideração os dados constitutivos e a metodologia
utilizados nas tabelas do material de apoio incorporadas por meio de referência na Parte
IV da Lista de um Membro;
e)
por “subsídios à exportação” entendem-se os subsídios subordinados ao desempenho das
exportações, incluindo-se os subsídios à exportação listados no Artigo 9 do presente Acordo;
f)
por “período de implementação” entende-se o período de seis anos que se inicia no ano de 1995,
exceto para os propósitos do Artigo 13, caso em que se entende o período de nove anos que se
inicia em 1995;
f)
por “concessões em acesso a mercados” entendem-se todos os compromissos em matéria de
acesso a mercados assumidos em conformidade com o presente Acordo;
g)
por “Medida Agregada de Apoio Total” e “MAA Total” entende-se a soma de todo o apoio
interno fornecido em favor de produtores agrícolas, obtida pela soma de todas as medidas
agregadas de apoio para produtos agrícolas básicos, todas as medidas agregadas de apoio não
especificado por produto e todas as medidas equivalentes de apoio para produtos agrícolas, que:
h)
i)
com respeito ao apoio fornecido durante o período base (isto é, a “MAA Total de Base”)
e ao máximo apoio permitido durante qualquer um dos anos do período de
implementação ou após (isto é, os “Níveis de Compromisso Anuais e Finais
Consolidados”), seja especificado na Parte IV da Lista de um Membro; e
ii)
com respeito ao nível do apoio efetivamente fornecido durante qualquer ano do período
de implementação ou após (isto é, a “MAA Total Corrente” ), seja calculado de acordo
com as disposições do presente Acordo, incluindo-se o Artigo 6, e de acordo com os
dados constitutivos e metodologia utilizados nas tabelas do material de apoio
incorporadas por meio de referência na Parte IV da Lista de um Membro;
por “ano”, na letra (f) supra, e em relação aos compromissos específicos de um Membro, entendese o ano calendário, financeiro ou comercial especificado na Lista relativa àquele Membro.
(Decreto 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994)
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
Nenhuma consideração.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 1
a) “Definição de medida agregada de apoio”
Foi discutido no Painel Korea – Various Measures on Beef o apoio interno concedido pela Coréia a sua
indústria de carne, em níveis superiores aos compromissos estabelecidos para 1997 e 1998. A conclusão do
Painel foi posteriormente modificada pelo Órgão de Apelação, tendo sido acolhidos os argumentos dos
representantes, de que a Coréia havia determinado que sua MAA corrente para carne estava abaixo do limiar
de minimis, em consonância com o Artigo 6.4. Assim, a variável do apoio interno não deveria ser incluída
no cálculo da MAA total corrente. Com efeito, o Painel concluiu que os cálculos da MAA total corrente da
Coréia estavam errados; em contrapartida, a Coréia arguiu que tais cálculos estavam corretos, pois
mantinham concordância com os dados e metodologia estabelecidos em seus compromissos (schedules).
b) “Definição de subsídio à exportação”
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De acordo com o Órgão de Apelação, subsídio é uma transferência de recursos econômicos ou uma
contribuição financeira que confere um “benefício”, quando comparados com o valor total que está
disponível no mercado. Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação reconheceu a aplicabilidade e proximidade
de conceitos entre os estabelecidos no ASCM e no Acordo sobre Agricultura em matéria de subsídios. Na
interpretação da existência ou não de subsídios, deve-se ter em mente o Artigo 1.1 do ASCM, ora
reproduzido pela utilidade da referência.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sale's
Corporations (US - FSC), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS108/AB/R, paras. 136 e 141
Para. 136. “We observe that Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture states that the term “export
subsidies” “refers to subsidies contingent upon export performance”. However, we note also that
the Agreement on Agriculture does not contain a definition of the terms “subsidy” or “subsidies”. In our
Report in Canada – Milk, a case that involved “export subsidies” under the Agreement on Agriculture, we
stated that “a 'subsidy' involves a transfer of economic resources from the grantor to the recipient for less
than full consideration. In making this statement, we drew, as context, upon the definition of a “subsidy”
in Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement:
(…) a “subsidy”, within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, arises
where the grantor makes a “financial contribution” which confers a “benefit” on
the recipient, as compared with what would have been otherwise available to the
recipient in the marketplace”
Para.141. “We turn next to the requirement that “export subsidies” under Article 1(e) of the Agreement
on Agriculture be “contingent upon export performance”. We see no reason, and none has been pointed
out to us, to read the requirement of “contingent upon export performance” in the Agreement on
Agriculture differently from the same requirement imposed by the SCM Agreement. The two Agreements
use precisely the same words to define “export subsidies”. Although there are differences between the
export subsidy disciplines established under the two Agreements, those differences do not, in our view,
affect the common substantive requirement relating to export contingency. Therefore, we think it
appropriate to apply the interpretation of export contingency that we have adopted under the SCM
Agreement to the interpretation of export contingency under the Agreement on Agriculture. We also recall
that we have upheld the Panel's finding that the FSC measure involves subsidies contingent upon export
performance under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. In making that finding, the Panel stated:
The subsidy is only available with respect to “foreign trading income”; foreign
trading income arises from the sale or lease of “export property” or the provision
of services relating to the sale or lease of export property; and export property is
limited in effect to goods manufactured, produced, grown or extracted in the
United States which are held for direct use, consumption or disposition outside the
United States. Thus, the existence and amount of the subsidy depends upon the
existence of income arising from the exportation of US goods or the provision of
services relating to the exportation of such goods. The existence of such income,
in turn, depends upon the exportation of US goods or, at a minimum, in the case
of income from services related to the exportation of US goods, upon “anticipated
exportation” within the meaning of footnote 4 to Article 3.1(a) of the SCM
Agreement. (emphasis added)”
c) “Pagamento em espécie”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products (Canada- Dairy), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia,
WT/DS103/AB/R e WT/DS113/AB/R, para. 87
Para. 87. “In our view, the term “payments-in-kind” describes one of the forms in which “direct
subsidies” may be granted. Thus, Article 9.1(a) applies to “direct subsidies”, including “direct subsidies”
granted in the form of “payments-in-kind”. We believe that, in its ordinary meaning, the word
“payments”, in the term “payments-in-kind”, denotes a transfer of economic resources, in a form other
than money, from the grantor of the payment to the recipient. However, the fact that a “payment-in-kind”
7
has been made provides no indication as to the economic value of the transfer effected, either from the
perspective of the grantor of the payment or from that of the recipient. A “payment-in-kind” may be made
in exchange for full or partial consideration or it may be made gratuitously. Correspondingly, a “subsidy”
involves a transfer of economic resources from the grantor to the recipient for less than full consideration.
As we said in our Report in Canada – Aircraft, a “subsidy”, within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM
Agreement, arises where the grantor makes a “financial contribution” which confers a “benefit” on the
recipient, as compared with what would have been otherwise available to the recipient in the
marketplace. Where the recipient gives full consideration in return for a “payment-in-kind” there can be
no “subsidy”, for the recipient is paying market-rates for what it receives. It follows, in our view, that the
mere fact that a “payment-in-kind” has been made does not, by itself, imply that a “subsidy”, “direct” or
otherwise, has been granted.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US – Upland
Cotton), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras. 570-571 e 615
Para. 570. “In previous appeals, the Appellate Body has explained that the WTO-consistency of an
export subsidy for agricultural products has to be examined, in the first place, under the Agreement on
Agriculture; the examination under the SCM Agreement would follow if necessary. Turning, then, to
the Agreement on Agriculture, we note that Article 1(e) of that Agreement defines “export subsidies” as
“subsidies contingent upon export performance, including the export subsidies listed in Article 9 of this
Agreement”.”
Para. 571. “Although an export subsidy granted to agricultural products must be examined, in the first
place, under the Agreement on Agriculture, we find it appropriate, as has the Appellate Body in previous
disputes, to rely on the SCM Agreement for guidance in interpreting provisions of the Agreement on
Agriculture. Thus, we consider the export-contingency requirement in Article 1(e) of the Agreement on
Agriculture having regard to that same requirement contained in Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.”
Para. 615. “[...] Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture defines “export subsides” as “subsidies
contingent upon export performance, including the export subsidies listed in Article 9 of this Agreement”.
(emphasis added) The use of the word “including” suggests that the term “export subsidies” should be
interpreted broadly and that the list of export subsidies in Article 9 is not exhaustive. Even though an
export credit guarantee may not necessarily include a subsidy component, there is nothing inherent about
export credit guarantees that precludes such measures from falling within the definition of a subsidy. An
export credit guarantee that meets the definition of an export subsidy would be covered by Article 10.1 of
the Agreement on Agriculture because it is not an export subsidy listed in Article 9.1 of that Agreement.”
d)
Cálculo da “Medida Agregada de Apoio” (Aggregate Measurement of Support – AMS)
De acordo com o Órgão de Apelação, a MGA deve ser calculada conforme o Anexo 3, considerando os
dados e metodologias utilizada nas tabelas sobre Apoio incorporadas por referência na parte IV da lista de
casa Membro. (Parágrafo 111)
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Korea - Imports Affecting the Importation of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef (Korea - Various Measures on Beef), Demandantes: Austrália e EUA,
WT/DS161/AB/R e WT/DS169/AB/R, para. 111
Para. 111. “To determine whether Korea's Current AMS for beef exceeds 10 per cent of total value of
beef production, we refer again to Article 1(a)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture, which defines Current
AMS. Under this provision, current AMS is to be
calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of this Agreement
and taking into account the constituent data and methodology used in the tables of
supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Member's
Schedule; … (emphasis added)
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Article 1(a)(ii) contains two express requirements for calculating Current AMS. First, Current AMS is to
be “calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of this Agreement”. The ordinary meaning of
“accordance” is “agreement, conformity, harmony”. Thus, Current AMS must be calculated in
“conformity” with the provisions of Annex 3. Second, Article 1(a)(ii) provides that the calculation of
Current AMS is to be made while “taking into account the constituent data and methodology used in the
tables of supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Member's Schedule.” “Take into
account” is defined as “take into consideration, notice”. Thus, when Current AMS is calculated, the
“constituent data and methodology” in a Member's Schedule must be “taken into account”, that is, it must be
“considered”.”
e)
Definição de “Medida Agregada de Apoio Total de Base” (Base Total Aggregate
Measurement of Support)
De acordo com o Órgão de Apelação, a MGA total de base é constituído simplesmente por cifras
absolutas expressas na Lista de cada Membro.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Korea - Imports Affecting the Importation of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef (Korea - Various Measures on Beef), Demandantes: Austrália e EUA,
WT/DS161/AB/R e WT/DS169/AB/R, para. 115
Para. 115. “[...]We believe that it is not necessary or appropriate to conceive of the pertinent provisions
of the Agreement on Agriculture as establishing “multi-year equations”. The treaty definitions of both
AMS and Total AMS, set out in Articles 1(a) and 1(h) respectively, do provide a specific methodology
for calculating Current AMS and Current Total AMS in respect of a particular year during the
implementation period. However, with respect to the other side of a hypothetical equation, the relevant
treaty provisions do not provide for any particular mode of calculation of the “Base Total AMS”, from
which figure the commitment levels for particular years of the implementation period are arithmetically
derived. Article 1(a)(i) of the Agreement on Agriculture dealing with AMS states that “with respect to
support provided during the base period”, a treaty interpreter needs only to go to “the relevant tables of
supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV of a Member's Schedule … “. (emphasis added)
Similarly, Article 1(h)(i) dealing with Total AMS, states that “with respect to support provided during the
base period (i.e., the 'Base Total AMS') and the maximum support permitted to be provided during any
year of the implementation period or thereafter (i.e., the 'Annual and Final Bound Commitment Levels')”,
a treaty interpreter needs only to go to what is “specified in Part IV of a Member's Schedule … “.
(emphasis added) Thus, for purposes of determining whether a Member has exceeded its commitment
levels, Base Total AMS, and the commitment levels resulting or derived there from, are not themselves
formulae to be worked out, but simply absolute figures set out in the Schedule of the Member concerned.
As a result, Current Total AMS which is calculated according to Annex 3, is compared to the
commitment level for a given year that is already specified as a given, absolute, figure in the Member's
Schedule.”
III.
Comentários
Subsídio é uma transferência de recursos econômicos ou uma contribuição financeira que confere um
“benefício” destinado ao desempenho das exportações. A noção de subsídio, neste contexto, é construída
recorrendo-se à elaborada no Acordo sobre Subsídios e Medidas Compensatórias (ASMC), que conforme
já reconhecido pelo Órgão de Apelação no caso US-FSC, serve de guia interpretativo do conceito de
“subsídio agrícola”.
Neste sentido, Melaku Geboye Desta diz que”the term “export subsidy”, defined as a “subsidy
contingent upon performance”, constitutes two elements – that is a subsidy and that it is granted
contingent upon export performance.” (1)
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Ainda, de acordo com o autor: “it has been argued earlier that because the term “subsidy” is not defined
by the text of the Agriculture Agreement, the meaning of “export subsidies” under the latter Agreement
could be interpreted by using the definition given to the root term “subsidy” in the SCM Agreement.” (2)
A norma do Artigo 1 do ASMC diz que:
Definition of a Subsidy
1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within
the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as “government”), i.e.
where:
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans,
and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan
guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g.
fiscal incentives such as tax credits) (3);
(i) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or
purchases goods;
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs
a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to
(iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in
no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments; or
(a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of
GATT 1994; and
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.
1.2 A subsidy as defined in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provisions of Part II
or shall be subject to the provisions of Part III or V only if such a subsidy is
specific in accordance with the provisions of Article 2.
O Acordo sobre a Agricultura não definiu o subsídio, deu apenas uma “definição” (consta no Artigo 1 do
Acordo) para a expressão “subsídio à exportação” mas não se preocupou em desmembrar a expressão, o
que diminuiria a possibilidade de interpretações e criação de “novas” definições, diferente da pretendida
pelos Membros naquele momento. O Artigo 31 (Interpretação dos Tratados) da Convenção de Viena de
1969 determina que, nesse caso, deve levar o contexto no qual está inserido, e, no caso em questão, são os
Acordos da OMC. Assim, tanto a jurisprudência, quanto a doutrina tem utilizado o conceito de subsídios
praticado pelo ASMC.
Sobre a MAA (Medida Agregada de Apoio), O Órgão de Apelação determinou que a MAA total de base
são simplesmente cifras absolutas expressas na Lista de cada Membro. A MAA Total de Base representa
uma média de todo apoio interno que causa distorção ao comercio, conforme definido, fornecido durante
o “período base” (1986-1988), e foi incluída na lista de cada membro. Esta medida foi a base para
Membros da OMC se comprometerem a reduzir o apoio interno (4).
O nível inicial da MAA, que constitui a base para os níveis de compromisso durante o período de
implementação, é chamado de MAA Total de Base. Está registrado na lista de cada Membro (5). A MAA
Total de Base deveria ser reduzida em 20% nos países desenvolvidos (13,3% nos países em
desenvolvimento) durante o período de implementação. Assim, para um país desenvolvido, o nível de
compromisso final seria a MAA Total de Base reduzido em 20%. Esta redução deveria ser feita de
maneira uniforme durante o período de implementação.
Tendo em vista que essas porcentagens foram calculadas considerando a MAA Total de Base no “período
base”, países que já praticavam níveis elevados de apoio, não foram muito prejudicados, pois não tiveram
cortes consideráveis em suas políticas. Ademais, os Membros não poderiam introduzir novas políticas de
apoio, ponto que favoreceu Países que já as praticavam, que eram, em regra, países desenvolvidos.
De acordo com o Órgão de Apelação, a MAA deve ser calculada conforme o Anexo 3, considerando os
dados e metodologias utilizada nas tabelas sobre Apoio incorporadas por referência na parte IV da lista de
casa Membro. (Parágrafo 111) A ideia básica por trás do cálculo MAA é quantificar, em termos
monetários, o apoio anual prestado por todas as políticas que não se enquadram em nenhuma das
categorias isentas.
10
A metodologia utilizada para o cálculo da MAA está expressa no Anexo 3 do Acordo sobre Agricultura,
posição confirmada pelo Órgão de Apelação no caso Korea - Various Measures on Beef. Assim, em
conformidade com o referido Anexo, o cálculo da MAA engloba políticas de suporte ao preço de mercado
de determinado produto, pagamentos diretos aos produtores, desde que não isentos do compromisso, e
qualquer outra forma de apoio e/ou redução de custos de comercialização não isentas dos compromissos
firmados no âmbito destas obrigações.
Todos os apoios “não específicos” serão calculados separadamente, depois somados para obter a MAA
“não específica”. Se exceder o “de minimis”, será incluído no cálculo da MAA Total Corrente. Para que
se compreenda a disciplina aplicada aos subsídios, é necessária a consideração do disposto não somente
no presente Artigo, como também do Artigo 9, analisado a seguir com mais vagar, que se refere aos
modos de subsídios contemplados pelo Acordo sobre Agricultura. Além disso, a Lista de Compromissos
de redução e limites à concessão de subsídios de cada um dos Membros também deve ser observada.
As isenções dos compromissos podem ser resumidas da seguinte forma:
- Países não desenvolvidos
Para os Países em desenvolvimento existem isenções dos compromissos em matéria de apoio interno,
estas que não compõem o cálculo da MAA, e estão previstas no Artigo 6.2 do Acordo sobre a
Agricultura. Já os Países menos desenvolvidos são isentos de todos os compromissos de redução de apoio
interno, mas não podem exceder a MAA total estabelecido para o período base (1986-88).
- Políticas da “Green box”
Estão isentas do cálculo MAA por serem consideradas políticas com pouco efeito de distorção sobre o
comércio agrícola. Podemos encontrar estas políticas no Anexo 2 do Acordo.
- “de minimis”ou “Amber box”
Prevista no Artigo 6 do Acordo, autoriza os Membros excluírem do cálculo da MAA todo apoio destinado
a um determinado produto ou para um produto não específico, se este apoio não ultrapassar o limite
previsto (5% para países desenvolvidos e 10% para países não desenvolvidos).
- “Blue box”
Isenções provenientes dos pagamentos diretos efetuados de forma conjunta com programas de limitação
da produção. Importante salientar que são programas que tem uma relevância direta pra os países
desenvolvidos, consequência do acordo de “Blair House” estabelecido durante o impasse nas negociações
agrícolas no Uruguay Round.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 1: DESTA, Melaku Geboye. The law of international trade in agricultural products: from GATT 1947 to the WTO
agreement on agriculture. Kluwer Law Internacional, 2002. p. 214.
Footnote 2: DESTA, Melaku Geboye. Op. cit., p. 220.
Footnote 3: In accordance with the provisions of Article XVI of GATT 1994 (Note to Article XVI) and the provisions of
Annexes I through III of this Agreement, the exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product
when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have
accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.
Footnote 4: European Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) Reform in the WTO Context South Centre. Geneva, 10 July 2003.
Footnote 5: DAS, Bhagirath Lal. The World Trade Organisation: a guide to the new framework for international trade. St.
Martin's Press, 1999. p. 242.
11

Artigo 2
Cleíse Martins Costa
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 2
Product Coverage
This Agreement applies to the products listed in Annex 1 to this Agreement, hereinafter referred to as
agricultural products.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 2
Cobertura de Produtos
Este Acordo se aplica aos produtos listados no Anexo I do presente Acordo, doravante denominados
produtos agrícolas.
IC.
Comentários sobre a tradução
Nenhum comentário sobre a tradução.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 2
Relatório do Painel no caso Canada - Measures Affecting Dairy Exports (Canada - Dairy),
Demandante: EUA, WT/DS113/R, para. 7.18
A partir do Relatório do Painel, foi estabelecido que o Artigo 2 determina a aplicação do Acordo sobre
Agricultura, especificamente, aos produtos indicados no Anexo I, os quais são indicados como os
constantes do capítulo 4 do Sistema Harmonizado. No caso Canada – Dairy, ambos os representantes
invocaram o Acordo sobre Agricultura, e o Painel, ao analisar a possibilidade de incidência do Acordo
sob as medidas questionadas pelos EUA, verificou que o Artigo 2 dispõe que o Acordo sobre Agricultura
é aplicável aos produtos agrícolas listados em seu Anexo I.
Para. 7.18. “Both complainants invoke the Agreement on Agriculture. Article 2 of this
agreement provides that it applies to the agricultural products listed in Annex I. The ‘agricultural
products’ set out in Annex I include the products at issue in this dispute (butter, cheese and ‘other milk
products’), all of which fall under HS Chapter 4. We thus find that the Agreement on Agriculture applies
to the issue at hand.”
Relatório do Painel no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain
Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS207/R, para. 7.13
No mesmo sentido, o Relatório do Painel no caso Chile – Price Band System confirmou o entendimento
sobre a incidência do Acordo sobre Agricultura. O Painel interpretou que o sistema de banda de preços
chileno aplica-se exclusivamente a produtos agrícolas, tal como definidos no Anexo 1 do Acordo sobre
Agricultura. Assim sendo, como consequência, recai sobre o sistema chileno as regras estipuladas pelo
Acordo sobre Agricultura.
Para. 7.13. “[T]he Chilean PBS applies exclusively to agricultural products, as defined in Annex 1 to the
Agreement on Agriculture. Consequently, the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture are applicable
to the Chilean PBS.”
12
Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/R, paras. 6.37, 7.199 e 7.480
O Painel observou que a principal diferenciação entre os produtos incluídos nas agendas e aqueles não
incluídos na agenda de compromissos dos Membros eram os compromissos estabelecidos para cada um
deles no âmbito do Acordo sobre Agricultura. No caso específico, o Painel concluiu que algodão
herbáceo, e outros produtos englobados pelo programa americano de garantia a subsídios à exportação,
questionado pelos demandantes, eram produtos abrangidos pelo Acordo sobre Agricultura. O Painel em
Estados Unidos - Algodão herbáceo, sustentou que o Acordo sobre Agricultura define o termo similar
produto agrícola básico no Artigo 1(b), termo utilizado nas definições de AMS, EMS e Total AMS, nos
Artigos 1(a), (d) e (h), respectivamente, e em diversos lugares em que são apresentadas metodologias para
o cálculo do “de minimis” do apoio interno para produto específico, conforme o Artigo 6.4 (a)(i). Estes
dispositivos são usados no cálculo de suporte para determinar se as medidas de apoio interno estão de
acordo com o disposto no Artigo 6º, a principal condição estabelecida no caput do parágrafo (b) do Artigo
13. Com efeito, o Painel interpretou que, de acordo com o The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
(1993), a expressão commodity é definida como: “Uma coisa de uso ou valor; espec. uma coisa que é um
objeto de comércio, esp. matéria-prima ou de culturas agrícolas...”. (6) Determinou, portanto, que a
expressão “commodity”, presente no Artigo 13(b)(ii), deve ser interpretada considerando o contexto do
Artigo 2 do Acordo sobre Agricultura; e que os produtos sobre a égide do Acordo sobre Agricultura
possuem uma definição mais restrita do que aquela do The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, pois
o Acordo sobre Agricultura abrange apenas produtos agrícolas, não incluindo as coisas de uso ou valor, as
coisas que são objeto de comércio, e as matérias-primas.
Para. 6.37. In US - Upland Cotton, the Panel observed that “Article 2 and Annex I of the Agreement on
Agriculture set out the product coverage of that agreement; the core distinction between ‘scheduled’ and
‘unscheduled’ products is rooted in the scheduled commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture”.”
Para. 7.199. “The Panel concluded that upland cotton, and the other agricultural products eligible under
the export credit guarantee programmes at issue, are products covered by the Agreement on Agriculture.”
Para. 7.480. “The word ‘commodity’ must be read in the context of Article 2 of the Agreement on
Agriculture which provides that the agreement applies to the products listed in Annex 1 to the Agreement.
The product coverage of the Agreement is narrower than this dictionary definition, because it covers only
agricultural products and not all things of use or value nor all things that are the object of trade nor all raw
materials. The product coverage of the Agreement is broader than an agricultural crop because it covers
products such as livestock, meat, dairy products and wool. All products within the coverage of the
Agreement are covered by the chapeau of paragraph (b) and there is no reason to assume that support to
any of them is excluded from the scope of the condition in subparagraph (ii). Therefore, we will treat the
word ‘commodity’, in this context, as basically synonymous with one of the ‘agricultural products’
defined in Article 2 and Annex 1 but it cannot be assumed that any provision which refers to ‘agricultural
products’, as defined, necessarily applies to a commodity within the meaning of Article 13(b)(ii).”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Customs Classification of Frozen
Boneless Chicken Cuts (EC - Chicken Cuts), WT/DS269/AB/R e WT/DS286/AB/R, para. 189
Em EC - Chicken Cuts, o Órgão de Apelação referiu-se ao Anexo I do Acordo sobre Agricultura ao
analisar a relação entre o Sistema Harmonizado e os Acordos da OMC, considerando ser essa ligação
particularmente verdadeira para produtos agrícolas. Esclareceu que, o Anexo I do Acordo sobre
Agricultura, parte integrante do referido Acordo, define a cobertura de produtos do Acordo, a partir da
referência a posições do Sistema Harmonizado, por meio de capítulos inteiros e dos quatro dígitos em se
tratando de produtos específicos. O Painel ressaltou ser indiscutível a realização de negociações tarifárias
na Rodada Uruguai para produtos agrícolas, com base no Sistema Harmonizado, assim como a utilização
do Sistema Harmonizado para os produtos agrícolas.
13
Para. 189. “Annex 1 to the Agreement on Agriculture, which forms an integral part of that Agreement,
defines the product coverage of that Agreement by reference to headings of the Harmonized System, both
at the level of whole chapters and at the four-digit level in respect of specific products. Moreover, it is
undisputed that the Uruguay Round tariff negotiations for agricultural products were held on the basis of
the Harmonized System and that all WTO Members have followed the Harmonized System in their
Schedules to the GATT 1994 with respect to agricultural products.”
III.
Comentários
FOOTNOTE:
Footnote 6: “A thing of use or value; spec. a thing that is an object of trade, esp. a raw material or agricultural crop.”
14

Artigo 3
Jackson Yoshiura
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 3
Incorporation of Concessions and Commitments
3.1
The domestic support and export subsidy commitments in Part IV of each Member's Schedule
constitute commitments limiting subsidization and are hereby made an integral part of GATT
1994.
3.2
Subject to the provisions of Article 6, a Member shall not provide support in favour of domestic
producers in excess of the commitment levels specified in Section I of Part IV of its Schedule.
3.3
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2(b) and 4 of Article 9, a Member shall not provide export
subsidies listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9 in respect of the agricultural products or groups of
products specified in Section II of Part IV of its Schedule in excess of the budgetary outlay and
quantity commitment levels specified therein and shall not provide such subsidies in respect of
any agricultural product not specified in that Section of its Schedule.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 3
Incorporação de Concessões e Compromissos
3.1
Os compromissos em matéria de apoio interno e de subsídios à exportação consignados na Parte
IV da Lista de cada Membro constituem compromissos de limitação dos subsídios e constituem
parte integral do GATT 1994.
3.2
Sujeito às disposições do Artigo 6, nenhum Membro concederá apoio em favor de produtores
nacionais além dos níveis de compromisso especificados na Seção I da Parte IV de sua Lista.
3.3
Sujeito às disposições dos parágrafos 2 (b) e 4 do Artigo 9, nenhum Membro concederá os
subsídios à exportação listados no parágrafo 1 do Artigo 9 aos produtos agrícolas ou grupos de
produtos especificados na Seção II da Parte IV de sua Lista, além dos níveis de compromisso para
desembolsos orçamentários e quantidades ali especificados e não concederá tais subsídios a
qualquer produto agrícola que não esteja especificado naquela Seção de sua Lista.
(Decreto 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994)
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
Nenhuma consideração.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 3
a) “Artigo 3.1 – Incorporação das concessões e compromissos”
Em EU – Subsidies on Sugar, o Órgão de Apelação referiu-se ao Artigo 3.1, ao considerar que as regras
normais de interpretação:
A questão preliminar para a conclusão, consiste em entender quais as regras aplicáveis ao interpretar
compromissos acerca dos subsídios à importação especificados nos schedules dos Membros sobre o
Acordo sobre Agricultura. O Órgão de Apelação observou que o Artigo 2.7 do GATT/1994 dispõe que
“os schedules anexados aos Acordos fazem parte integral da parte I do GATT/ 1994. Ademais,
acrescentou que o próprio Artigo 3.1 do Acordo sobre Agricultura dispões:
15
b)
“Artigo 3.3 - Interpretação do termo ‘provide’”
De acordo com o Órgão de Apelação, a expressão “provide” significa “making available”.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales
Corporations” (US - FSC), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS108/AB/R, paras. 125
Para. 125. “[...] With respect to unscheduled products, the Panel concluded that the word “provide” in the
second clause of Article 3.3 means “making available”, and the Panel held that, by establishing a statutory
entitlement for qualifying corporations to receive FSC subsidies, the United States was acting
inconsistently with Article 3.3 because it was “providing” or “making available” export subsidies, as
listed in Article 9.1(d), with respect to all unscheduled products.”
c)
“Artigo 3.3 - Aplicação dos subsídios à exportação listados no Parágrafo 1 do Artigo 9”
De acordo com a interpretação do Órgão de Apelação, para os produtos especificados na Seção II da Parte
IV da lista de cada Membro, não pode conceder-se os subsídios à exportação. Em relação aos listados no
Parágrafo 1 do Artigo 9, o limite para concessão são os níveis de compromisso para desembolsos
orçamentários e quantidades ali especificados. Já para os produtos não especificados na lista, há proibição
expressa a quaisquer subsídios à exportação listados no Parágrafo 1 do Artigo 9.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales
Corporations” (US - FSC), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS108/AB/R, paras. 125 e
150-152
Para. 125. “[...] With respect to unscheduled products, the Panel concluded that the word “provide” in the
second clause of Article 3.3 means “making available”, and the Panel held that, by establishing a statutory
entitlement for qualifying corporations to receive FSC subsidies, the United States was acting
inconsistently with Article 3.3 because it was “providing” or “making available” export subsidies, as
listed in Article 9.1(d), with respect to all unscheduled products.”
Para. 150. “With respect to unscheduled agricultural products, Members are prohibited under Article 3.3
from providing any export subsidies as listed in Article 9.1. [...]Thus, with respect to the prohibition
against providing subsidies listed in Article 9.1 on unscheduled agricultural products, we believe that the
FSC measure involves the application of export subsidies, not listed in Article 9.1, in a manner that, at the
very least, “threatens to lead to circumvention” of that “export subsidy commitment” in Article 3.3.”
Para. 151. “With respect to scheduled agricultural products, the nature of the commitment made under
the first clause of Article 3.3 is different. Members are not subject to a general prohibition against
providing export subsidies as listed in Article 9.1; rather, there is a limited authorization for Members to
provide such subsidies up to the level of the reduction commitments specified in their Schedule. [...]”
Para. 152. “As regards scheduled products, when the specific reduction commitment levels have been
reached, the limited authorization to provide export subsidies as listed in Article 9.1 is transformed,
effectively, into a prohibition against the provision of those subsidies.”
d) “Artigo 3.3 - compromissos especificados na Lista de cada Membro”
De acordo com o Órgão de Apelação, os compromissos para desembolsos orçamentários e quantidades
devem ser considerados cumulativamente.
16
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC Sugar), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil e Tailândia, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R e
WT/DS283/AB/R, paras. 193, 196-197 e 200
Para. 193. “[...] Article 3.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture prohibits the granting of export subsidies
(listed in Article 9.1) in excess of the budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels specified in a
Member's Schedule. Article 3.3 does not, however, explicitly state that export subsidy commitments
must be specified in a Member's Schedule in terms of both budgetary outlay and quantity commitment
levels. At the same time, Article 3.3 does not explicitly state that a Member may specify its commitment
level in terms of either of the two forms of commitments. In our view, the use of the conjunctive “and”,
and the corresponding use of the word “levels” in the plural, suggest that the drafters of the Agreement
intended that both types of commitments must be specified in a Member's Schedule in respect of any
export subsidy listed in Article 9.1. Had the drafters intended that a Member could specify one or the
other of the two forms of commitments, they would have chosen the disjunctive “or” and correspondingly
used the word “level” in the singular. Given the choice, Members would choose only one or the other
type of commitment, but not both, so as to minimize their obligations. Therefore, it appears to us that the
drafters intended to ensure that export subsidy commitments are specified in Members' Schedules in
terms of both budgetary outlay and quantity commitments, by using the word “and” as well as the word
“levels” in the text of Article 3.3.”
Para. 196. “Our interpretation that Article 3.3 (as well as Article 9.2) requires that export subsidy
commitments in a Member's Schedule must be expressed in terms of both budgetary outlay and quantity
commitment levels is also in consonance with the object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture.
We note, as did the Panel, that the third paragraph of the Preamble to the Agreement recognizes that the
“long-term objective” of WTO Members, in initiating a reform process to deal with the distortions in the
world agricultural markets, is “to provide for substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support
and protection”. [...] An interpretation that export subsidy commitments must be expressed in a Member's
Schedule in terms of both budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels is more in harmony with the
objectives stated in the Preamble to the Agreement than an interpretation that a Member is only obliged to
fulfil “whatever commitments” it chooses to specify in its Schedule.”
Para. 197. “We are also of the view that if an export subsidy commitment were allowed to be specified in
only one form, budgetary outlay or quantity, as a Member may choose, and its conformity were measured
on the basis of that one commitment alone, it would undermine the export subsidy disciplines of the
Agreement on Agriculture. As we noted above, the drafters recognized the need to deal with budgetary
outlays and quantities together in order to restrain subsidized exports. A commitment on budgetary outlay
alone provides little predictability on export quantities, while a commitment on quantity alone could lead
to subsidized exports taking place that would otherwise have not taken place but for the budgetary
support [...]”
Para. 200. “For all these reasons, we agree with the Panel that Article 3.3 requires a Member to schedule
both budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels in respect of export subsidies listed in Article 9.1
of the Agreement of Agriculture. [...]”
III.
Comentários
De acordo com Melaku Geboye Desta (7):
On the basis of the discipline governing the different forms of export subsidies,
the Agriculture Agreement has created two distinct categories – those listed under
Article 9.1 as export subsidies subject to reduction commitments (hereafter
referred to as listed export subsidies), and those which are export subsidies as
defined under Article 1(e) but which do not fall in any of the enumerations of
Article 9.1 (hereafter referred to as non-listed export subsidies), and hence
apparently not subject to reduction commitments. The categorization is not simply
academic; it has significant practical implications. The most important implication
is that there is no uniform discipline applying to all forms of agricultural export
17
subsidies that may be found to exist under the definition of the term discussed
above.
O Artigo 9.1 enumera seis grupos de práticas de subsídios à exportação e afirma, expressamente, que os
Membros “são sujeitos a compromissos de redução ao abrigo do presente acordo”. Nesta perspectiva, o
Artigo 3.3 estipula que:
Sujeito às disposições dos parágrafos 2 (b) e 4 do Artigo 9, nenhum Membro
concederá os subsídios à exportação arrolados no parágrafo 1 do Artigo 9 aos
produtos agrícolas ou grupos de produtos especificados na Seção II da Parte IV de
sua Lista, além dos níveis de compromisso para desembolsos orçamentários e
quantidades ali especificados e não concederá tais subsídios a qualquer produto
agrícola que não esteja especificado naquela Seção de sua Lista.
Desmembrando o referido Artigo, podemos analisá-lo da seguinte forma:
1. Em um primeiro momento permite o fornecimento dos subsídios à exportação
expressamente previstos no Artigo 9.1;
2. Determina que estes subsídios só possam ser fornecidos aos produtos
especificados na Seção II da Parte IV da Lista de cada Membro;
3. Limita o nível desses subsídios, tendo como teto o que estiver expresso nas
listas;
4. De forma expressa e clara determina que os subsídios previstos no Artigo 9.1,
mesmo que observando os níveis especificados, só podem ser concedidos para os
produtos previstos nas Listas. Assim, produtos que não constam nas listas, não
podem receber tais subsídios.
A obrigação de respeitar os compromissos de redução prevista na lista de cada Membro constitui
condição para a utilização legítima das práticas enumeradas no Artigo supra citado.
These two observations, together, mean that this part of Article 3.3 deals with the
provision of a “specific” group of export subsidies (those listed in Article 9.1) to a
“specific” group of agricultural products (those specified in the Schedules) (8).
Assim, de acordo com o Artigo, o fornecimento dos subsídios à exportação arrolados aos produtos
agrícolas específicos é permitido, mas dentro dos limites estabelecidos pelas listas, ou seja, uma
autorização limitada. Quando os limites forem alcançados, automaticamente, essa autorização se
transforma em proibição.
Em contrapartida, como disposto na última parte do Artigo 3.3, os subsídios à exportação elencados no
Artigo 9.1 não podem ser fornecidos aos produtos agrícolas que não estejam especificados nas listas. De
forma objetiva, de acordo com a norma do Artigo 3.3 o fornecimento de subsídios à exportação arrolados
sobre os produtos agrícolas específicos é permitido, mas dentro dos limites estabelecidos pelos
cronogramas, e o fornecimento de subsídios à exportação listados aos produtos não especificados
agrícolas é proibida.
Neste sentido, a norma do Artigo 10.1 do Acordo sobre a Agricultura diz que: “Os subsídios a exportação
não arrolados no parágrafo 1 do Artigo 9 não serão aplicados de maneira a resultar ou ameaçar
resultar em tentativa de eludir (circumvent) os compromissos em matéria de subsídios à exportação; nem
tampouco as transações não comerciais serão utilizadas para eludir tais compromissos”.
O Artigo 3.3 afirma que os compromissos de subsídios à exportação deve ser especificado na Lista de
cada Membro em termos de desembolso orçamental e em níveis quantitativos. Corroboramos com a
opinião do Órgão de Apelação, ao determinar que uso do “e”, e o uso correspondente da palavra “níveis”,
no plural, sugere que os Membros, ao negociarem o Acordo, pretendiam que ambos os tipos de
compromissos deveriam ser considerados cumulativamente.
Neste sentido, se a intenção fosse considera-los alternativamente, teriam escolhido “ou” e,
consequentemente, teriam usado a palavra “nível” no singular.
18
O mesmo ocorreu com a expressão “provide”, quando o Órgão de Apelação determinou que fosse
considerado de acordo com seu significado literal, ou seja, “making available”. Observamos que, por
mais que a justificativa inicial fosse voltada para uma interpretação literal da norma do Artigo 3.3,
analisando a utilização da conjunção “e”, ao invés de “ou”, e “provide” como “making available”, em um
segundo momento eles atribuem a interpretação, também aos objetivos e propósitos do Acordo.
196. Our interpretation that Article 3.3 (as well as Article 9.2) requires that export
subsidy commitments in a Member's Schedule must be expressed in terms of both
budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels is also in consonance with the
object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture. [...] An interpretation that
export subsidy commitments must be expressed in a Member's Schedule in terms
of both budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels is more in harmony with
the objectives stated in the Preamble to the Agreement than an interpretation that a
Member is only obliged to fulfil “whatever commitments” it chooses to specify in
its Schedule.
De acordo com o Órgão de Apelação e com as palavras do ilustre doutrinador, caso fosse adotada uma
interpretação diversa, teria um prejuízo aos objetivos e propósitos do Acordo, tendo em vista que daria
margem para opção de qual forma utilizar, o que, consequentemente, serviria como manobra para
utilização de práticas contrárias ao Acordo sobre a Agricultura.
The Agriculture Agreement does, inter alia, the following on reduction
commitments: firstly, it defines the two forms of reduction commitments –
quantitative and budgetary – each Member is required to make on export
subsidies; secondly, it defines the base period from which to calculate the
reductions; thirdly, it sets the minimum level of quantitative and outlay
concessions required of each Members to undertake both budgetary as well as
quantitative commitments for each year of the implementation period and specify
the same in their Schedules; and finally, it provides for some room of flexibility so
as to enable countries to adjust themselves to yearly fluctuations both in the
quantity and price of agricultural products. Almost all of these points have their
own more detailed (albeit at times different) versions in the Modalities
Agreement.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 7: DESTA, Melaku Geboye. Op. cit., p. 231.
Footnote 8: DESTA, Melaku Geboye. Op. cit., p.232. Vide também OLIVEIRA, Luciana Maria de. Exportação agrícola: a
regulamentação dos subsídios na OMC. Juruá: São Paulo, 2008. p. 164.
19

Artigo 4
Quem fez esta análise?
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 4
Market Access
4.1
Market access concessions contained in Schedules relate to bindings and reductions of tariffs, and
to other market access commitments as specified therein.
4.2
Members shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind which have been
required to be converted into ordinary customs duties (9), except as otherwise provided for in
Article 5 and Annex 5.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 4
Acesso a Mercados
4.1
As concessões em acesso a mercados contidas nas Listas refere-se à consolidação e reduções de
tarifas e a outros compromissos em matéria de acesso a mercados conforme ali especificados.
4.2
Salvo disposição em contrário do Artigo 5 e do Anexo 5, nenhum Membro manterá, estabelecerá
ou reestabelecerá medidas do tipo daquelas que se tenha determinado ser convertidas em direitos
alfandegários propriamente ditos1.
Footnote 9: These measures include quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import prices,
discretionary import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through state-trading enterprises, voluntary export restraints, and
similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties, whether or not the measures are maintained under country-specific
derogations from the provisions of GATT 1947, but not measures maintained under balance-of-payments provisions or under
other general, non-agriculture-specific provisions of GATT 1994 or of the other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to
the WTO Agreement.
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
A tradução não capturou o significado exato da expressão “have been required”. A aposição da locução
adverbial “desde então” oferece a dimensão temporal de continuidade que se busca neste Artigo. Faltou a
tradução de “ordinary customs duties” ao texto, o que infelizmente retira a clareza do dispositivo.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 4
1. Artigo 4.2
a)
“Escopo”
O Painel reconhece a relevância do Artigo 4.2., porém ressalva que desde o início que este Artigo não é
necessariamente mais específico que o Artigo II.1 (b) GATT. O Órgão de Apelação reverte esta decisão,
além de estabelecer que ainda que medidas não tenham sido convertidas ao tempo da Rodada Uruguai,
prospera a proibição de seu uso e manutenção.
1
Estas medidas incluem restrições quantitativas à importação, taxas variáveis, preços mínimos, licenças discricionárias de importação, medidas
não-tarifárias mantidas por empresas de comércio estatal, restrições voluntárias de exportação, e medidas de fronteira similares que não sejam
direitos alfandegários propriamente ditos, independentemente de serem as medidas aplicadas ou não em função de derrogações por país
específico de acordo com as disposições do GATT 1947, desde que não sejam medidas mantidas por razões de balanço de pagamentos ou por
outra disposição de caráter geral, não especificamente relacionada à Agricultura, do GATT 1947 ou de outro Acordo Comercial Multilateral do
Anexo 1A do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC.
20
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band), Demandante: Argentina,
Demandado: Chile, WT/DS207/AB/R, para. 187
Para.187. “Article 4.2 prevents WTO Members from circumventing their commitments on “ordinary
customs duties” by prohibiting them from “maintaining, reverting to, or resorting to” measures other than
“ordinary customs duties”. The first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 also deals with
“ordinary customs duties”, by requiring Members not to impose “ordinary customs duties” in excess of
those recorded in their Schedules. Thus, the obligations in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture
and those in the first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT both deal with “ordinary customs duties”
and market access for imported products. As we see it, the difference between the two provisions is that
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture deals more specifically with preventing the circumvention of
tariff commitments on agricultural products than does the first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT
1994.”
b)
“any measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs
duties”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band), Demandante: Argentina,
Demandado: Chile, WT/DS207/AB/R, paras. 205, 209 e 212
Para. 205. “We begin with a consideration of the use of the present perfect tense in the phrase “any
measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties”. Chile sees
a special significance in the use of this tense; Argentina does not. Chile asserts that the use of the present
perfect tense (that is, “have been required to be converted”) in Article 4.2 should be borne in mind when
interpreting this provision (10).”
Para. 209. “The wording of footnote 1 to the Agreement on Agriculture confirms our interpretation. The
footnote imparts meaning to Article 4.2 by enumerating examples of “measures of the kind which have
been required to be converted”, and which Members must not maintain, revert to, or resort to, from the
date of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. Specifically, and as both participants agree (11), the
use of the word “include” in the footnote indicates that the list of measures is illustrative, not exhaustive.
And, clearly, the existence of footnote 1 suggests that there will be “measures of the kind which have
been required to be converted” that were not specifically identified during the Uruguay Round
negotiations. Thus, in our view, the illustrative nature of this list lends support to our interpretation that
the measures covered by Article 4.2 are not limited only to those that were actually converted, or were
requested to be converted, into ordinary customs duties during the Uruguay Round.”
Para. 212. “Thus, the obligation in Article 4.2 not to “maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the
kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties” applies from the date of the
entry into force of the WTO Agreement — regardless of whether or not a Member converted any such
measures into ordinary customs duties before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. The mere fact that no
trading partner of a Member singled out a specific “measure of the kind” by the end of the Uruguay
Round by requesting that it be converted into ordinary customs duties, does not mean that such a measure
enjoys immunity from challenge in WTO dispute settlement. The obligation “not [to] maintain” such
measures underscores that Members must not continue to apply measures covered by Article 4.2 from the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.” (12)
c) “significado de ‘convert’”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band), Demandante: Argentina,
Demandado: Chile, WT/DS207/AB/R, paras. 216, 232 e 234
21
Para. 216. “Article 4.2 speaks of “measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into
ordinary customs duties”. The word “convert” means “undergo transformation” (13). The word
“converted” connotes “changed in their nature”, “turned into something different”. (14) Thus, “measures
which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties” had to be transformed into
something they were not — namely, ordinary customs duties. The following example illustrates this
point. The application of a “variable import levy”, or a “minimum import price”, as the terms are used in
footnote 1, can result in the levying of a specific duty equal to the difference between a reference price
and a target price, or minimum price. These resulting levies or specific duties take the same form as
ordinary customs duties. However, the mere fact that a duty imposed on an import at the border is in the
same form as an ordinary customs duty, does not mean that it is not a “variable import levy” or a
“minimum import price”. Clearly, as measures listed in footnote 1, “variable import levies” and
“minimum import prices” had to be converted into ordinary customs duties by the end of the Uruguay
Round. The mere fact that such measures result in the payment of duties does not exonerate a Member
from the requirement not to maintain, resort to, or revert to those measures.”
Para. 232. “We begin with the interpretation of “variable import levies”. In examining the ordinary
meaning of the term “variable import levies” as it appears in footnote 1, we note that a “levy” is a duty,
tax, charge, or other exaction usually imposed or raised by legal execution or process. (15) An “import”
levy is, of course, a duty assessed upon importation. A levy is “variable” when it is “liable to vary”. (16)
This feature alone, however, is not conclusive as to what constitutes a “variable import levy” within the
meaning of footnote 1. An “ordinary customs duty” could also fit this description. A Member may, fully
in accordance with Article II of the GATT 1994, exact a duty upon importation and periodically change
the rate at which it applies that duty (provided the changed rates remain below the tariff rates bound in the
Member's Schedule). (17) This change in the applied rate of duty could be made, for example, through an
act of a Member's legislature or executive at any time. Moreover, it is clear that the term “variable import
levies” as used in footnote 1 must have a meaning different from “ordinary customs duties”, because
“variable import levies” must be converted into “ordinary customs duties”. Thus, the mere fact that an
import duty can be varied cannot, alone, bring that duty within the category of “variable import levies”
for purposes of footnote 1.”
Para. 234. “However, in our view, the presence of a formula causing automatic and continuous
variability of duties is a necessary, but by no means a sufficient, condition for a particular measure to be a
“variable import levy” within the meaning of footnote 1. (18) “Variable import levies” have additional
features that undermine the object and purpose of Article 4, which is to achieve improved market access
conditions for imports of agricultural products by permitting only the application of ordinary customs
duties. These additional features include a lack of transparency and a lack of predictability in the level of
duties that will result from such measures. This lack of transparency and this lack of predictability are
liable to restrict the volume of imports. As Argentina points out, an exporter is less likely to ship to a
market if that exporter does not know and cannot reasonably predict what the amount of duties will be.
(19) This lack of transparency and predictability will also contribute to distorting the prices of imports by
impeding the transmission of international prices to the domestic market.”
III.
Comentários
Para entender o alcance do dispositivo no Acordo de Agricultura que trata sobre acesso a mercados, é
necessário retomar o histórico de negociações na matéria. O denominador comum foi sem dúvida a
redução das tarifas de importação de produtos agrícolas. Exigiu-se que os países desenvolvidos
reduzissem suas tarifas em 36% em 6 anos, enquanto os países de menor desenvolvimento assumiriam o
compromisso de reduzi-las em 24% em 10 anos. O modo como se procedeu a essas reduções envolveu a
consideração de um sistema de concessões que vai além dos exemplos expostos no Artigo 4 do Acordo,
englobando outros acordos e artigos dentro do próprio Acordo sobre Agricultura. Todavia, como
pudemos ver, este artigo merece atenção pela sua singularidade.
No caso do Artigo 4.2, o Órgão de Apelação reconheceu a especificidade deste para identificação de
eventuais circunvenções nas regras de acesso a mercados para produtos agrícolas. Assim, ainda que
22
provisões do GATT que tangenciem o tema, como o Artigo II:1(b) possam ser invocadas, o exame do
Artigo 4.2 é peremptório. Outro aspecto importante foi a cuidadosa utilização do tempo verbal presente
perfeito na construção anglo-saxã do Artigo. O tempo verbal é importante, pois ele indica a “data” em que
os Membros devem cessar de usar, manter e recorrer às medidas proibidas. Desta forma, para afastar a
interpretação de que mesmo atualmente seria possível converter as medidas em direitos aduaneiros
ordinários, o Órgão de Apelação recorreu ao uso de “have been required” para dizer que mesmo as
medidas cuja conversão tenha sido determinado como resultado da Rodada Uruguai e que, no entanto,
não foram, não podem ser mantidas.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 10: Chile criticizes the Panel's order of analysis within Article 4. In Chile's view, the Panel moved too quickly from
interpreting the terms “any measures of the kind” in paragraph 2 to the specific categories of measures listed in footnote 1. Chile
alleges that, in doing so, the Panel failed to attribute sufficient significance to the entire phrase “which have been required to be
converted into ordinary customs duties” (emphasis added) in the main text of paragraph 2, except to note that this wording did
not necessarily mean that only the measures that were actually converted were banned. Chile refers in particular to paragraphs
7.18-7.19 of the Panel Report. Chile's appellant's submission, para. 87. We note, however, that the text of paragraph 2 itself
directs the interpreter to footnote 1. Given that, in interpreting Article 4.2, we address the terms of the provision in a different
sequence than did the Panel, and because the result of our interpretation is essentially the same as that reached by the Panel, we
do not find it necessary to address Chile's contention in more detail.
Footnote 11: Participants' responses to questioning at the oral hearing.
Footnote 12: The obligation in Article 4.2 “not [to] resort to” can be understood as meaning that Members must not introduce
new measures “of the kind” that it has not had in place in the past; the obligation “not [to] revert to” can be read in the sense that
Members may not, at some later stage after the entry into force of the WTO, reenact measures prohibited by Article 4.2. At the
oral hearing, the participants agreed that the obligations not to “resort to, or revert to” prohibited measures are less relevant to this
dispute than the obligation to “not maintain” such measures.
Footnote 13: The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press), 1993, Vol. I, p. 502.
Footnote 14: Ibid.
Footnote 15: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, supra, footnote 190, p. 1574.
Footnote 16: Ibid., p. 3547.
Footnote 17: Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, supra, footnote 55, para. 46.
Footnote 18: The participants agreed with this in their responses to questioning at the oral hearing.
Footnote 19: Argentina's responses to questioning at the oral hearing.
23

Artigo 5
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IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 5
Special Safeguard Provisions
5.1
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1(b) of Article II of GATT 1994, any Member may
take recourse to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 below in connection with the importation of
an agricultural product, in respect of which measures referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of
this Agreement have been converted into an ordinary customs duty and which is designated in its
Schedule with the symbol “SSG” as being the subject of a concession in respect of which the
provisions of this Article may be invoked, if:
(a)
the volume of imports of that product entering the customs territory of the Member
granting the concession during any year exceeds a trigger level which relates to the
existing market access opportunity as set out in paragraph 4; or, but not concurrently:
(b)
the price at which imports of that product may enter the customs territory of the Member
granting the concession, as determined on the basis of the c.i.f. import price of the
shipment concerned expressed in terms of its domestic currency, falls below a trigger
price equal to the average 1986 to 1988 reference price (20) for the product concerned.
5.2
Imports under current and minimum access commitments established as part of a concession
referred to in paragraph 1 above shall be counted for the purpose of determining the volume of
imports required for invoking the provisions of subparagraph 1(a) and paragraph 4, but imports
under such commitments shall not be affected by any additional duty imposed under either
subparagraph 1(a) and paragraph 4 or subparagraph 1(b) and paragraph 5 below.
5.3
Any supplies of the product in question which were en route on the basis of a contract settled
before the additional duty is imposed under subparagraph 1(a) and paragraph 4 shall be exempted
from any such additional duty, provided that they may be counted in the volume of imports of the
product in question during the following year for the purposes of triggering the provisions of
subparagraph 1(a) in that year.
5.4
Any additional duty imposed under subparagraph 1(a) shall only be maintained until the end of
the year in which it has been imposed, and may only be levied at a level which shall not exceed
one third of the level of the ordinary customs duty in effect in the year in which the action is
taken. The trigger level shall be set according to the following schedule based on market access
opportunities defined as imports as a percentage of the corresponding domestic consumption (21)
during the three preceding years for which data are available:
(a)
where such market access opportunities for a product are less than or equal to 10 per cent,
the base trigger level shall equal 125 per cent;
(b)
where such market access opportunities for a product are greater than 10 per cent but less
than or equal to 30 per cent, the base trigger level shall equal 110 per cent;
(c)
where such market access opportunities for a product are greater than 30 per cent, the
base trigger level shall equal 105 per cent.
In all cases the additional duty may be imposed in any year where the absolute volume of imports
of the product concerned entering the customs territory of the Member granting the concession exceeds
the sum of (x) the base trigger level set out above multiplied by the average quantity of imports during the
24
three preceding years for which data are available and (y) the absolute volume change in domestic
consumption of the product concerned in the most recent year for which data are available compared to
the preceding year, provided that the trigger level shall not be less than 105 per cent of the average
quantity of imports in (x) above.
5.5
The additional duty imposed under subparagraph 1(b) shall be set according to the following
schedule:
(a)
if the difference between the c.i.f. import price of the shipment expressed in terms of the
domestic currency (hereinafter referred to as the “import price”) and the trigger price as
defined under that subparagraph is less than or equal to 10 per cent of the trigger price,
no additional duty shall be imposed;
(b)
if the difference between the import price and the trigger price (hereinafter referred to as
the “difference”) is greater than 10 per cent but less than or equal to 40 per cent of the
trigger price, the additional duty shall equal 30 per cent of the amount by which the
difference exceeds 10 per cent;
(c)
if the difference is greater than 40 per cent but less than or equal to 60 per cent of the
trigger price, the additional duty shall equal 50 per cent of the amount by which the
difference exceeds 40 per cent, plus the additional duty allowed under (b);
(d)
if the difference is greater than 60 per cent but less than or equal to 75 per cent, the
additional duty shall equal 70 per cent of the amount by which the difference exceeds
60 per cent of the trigger price, plus the additional duties allowed under (b) and (c);
(e)
if the difference is greater than 75 per cent of the trigger price, the additional duty shall
equal 90 per cent of the amount by which the difference exceeds 75 per cent, plus the
additional duties allowed under (b), (c) and (d).
5.6
For perishable and seasonal products, the conditions set out above shall be applied in such a
manner as to take account of the specific characteristics of such products. In particular, shorter
time periods under subparagraph 1(a) and paragraph 4 may be used in reference to the
corresponding periods in the base period and different reference prices for different periods may
be used under subparagraph 1(b).
5.7
The operation of the special safeguard shall be carried out in a transparent manner. Any Member
taking action under subparagraph 1(a) above shall give notice in writing, including relevant data,
to the Committee on Agriculture as far in advance as may be practicable and in any event within
10 days of the implementation of such action. In cases where changes in consumption volumes
must be allocated to individual tariff lines subject to action under paragraph 4, relevant data shall
include the information and methods used to allocate these changes. A Member taking action
under paragraph 4 shall afford any interested Members the opportunity to consult with it in
respect of the conditions of application of such action. Any Member taking action under
subparagraph 1(b) above shall give notice in writing, including relevant data, to the Committee on
Agriculture within 10 days of the implementation of the first such action or, for perishable and
seasonal products, the first action in any period. Members undertake, as far as practicable, not to
take recourse to the provisions of subparagraph 1(b) where the volume of imports of the products
concerned are declining. In either case a Member taking such action shall afford any interested
Members the opportunity to consult with it in respect of the conditions of application of such
action.
Where measures are taken in conformity with paragraphs 1 through 7 above, Members undertake
not to have recourse, in respect of such measures, to the provisions of paragraphs 1(a) and 3 of
Article XIX of GATT 1994 or paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
5.8
25
5.9
The provisions of this Article shall remain in force for the duration of the reform process as
determined under Article 20.
Footnote 20: The reference price used to invoke the provisions of this subparagraph shall, in general, be the average c.i.f. unit
value of the product concerned, or otherwise shall be an appropriate price in terms of the quality of the product and its stage of
processing. It shall, following its initial use, be publicly specified and available to the extent necessary to allow other Members
to assess the additional duty that may be levied.
Footnote 21: Where domestic consumption is not taken into account, the base trigger level under subparagraph 4(a) shall apply.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 5
Disposições para Salvaguarda Especial
5.1
Não obstante as disposições do parágrafo 1 (b) do Artigo II do GATT 1994, todo Membro poderá
recorrer às disposições dos parágrafos 4 e 5 abaixo com relação à importação de um produto
agrícola a respeito do qual as medidas do tipo daquelas referidas no parágrafo 2 do Artigo 4 do
presente Acordo tenham sido convertidas em direitos alfandegários propriamente ditos e que
esteja designado em sua Lista com o símbolo “SSG” indicativo de que é objeto de uma concessão
para a qual as disposições deste Artigo podem ser invocadas, se:
a)
O volume das importações daquele produto que entrem durante um ano no território
aduaneiro do Membro que outorga a concessão exceder um nível de gatilho estabelecido
em função das oportunidades existentes de acesso ao mercado, conforme previsto no
parágrafo 4 abaixo; ou, mas não simultaneamente,
b)
O preço pelo qual as importações daquele produto possam entrar no território aduaneiro
do Membro que outorga a concessão, determinado com base no preço de importação
C.I.F. do respectivo carregamento e expresso em termos de sua moeda nacional, for
inferior a um preço de gatilho igual ao preço de referência2 médio do produto em questão
no período de 1986 a 1988.
5.2
As importações realizadas no âmbito dos compromissos para acesso corrente e acesso mínimo
estabelecidos como parte de uma concessão do tipo a que se refere o parágrafo 1 supra serão
consideradas para os propósitos de determinação do volume das importações necessárias para
invocar as disposições da letra (a) do parágrafo 1 e do parágrafo 4, mas as importações realizadas
no âmbito de tais compromissos não serão afetadas por nenhuma tarifa adicional imposta ao
amparo da letra (a) do parágrafo 1 ou do parágrafo 4 ou da letra (b) do parágrafo 1 e do parágrafo
5 abaixo.
5.3
Todo fornecimento do produto em questão que esteja a caminho em função de um contrato
estabelecido antes da imposição da tarifa adicional no âmbito da letra (a) do parágrafo 1 e do
parágrafo 4, ficarão isentos de tal tarifa adicional no entendimento de que se poderá computá-lo
no volume de importações do produto em questão durante o ano subsequente para os propósitos
de acionamento das disposições da letra (a) do parágrafo 1 em tal ano.
5.4
As tarifas adicionais impostas no âmbito da letra (a) do parágrafo 1 serão mantidas unicamente
até o final do ano em que tenham sido impostas e somente poderão ser aplicadas em um nível que
não ultrapasse um terço do nível da tarifa alfandegária propriamente dita vigente no ano em que
se tenha recorrido à ação. O nível de gatilho será estabelecido de acordo com o seguinte
escalonamento, baseado nas oportunidades de acesso ao mercado, definidas como percentual de
2
O preço de referência utilizado para recorrer às disposições deste subparágrafo deverá ser, geralmente, o preço unitário médio c.i.f. do produto
em questão, ou ainda deverá ser o preço apropriado em termos de qualidade do produto e de seu estádio de processamento. O preço de referência,
após sua utilização inicial, deverá ser publicamente especificado e disponível o suficiente para que outros Membros tenham a possibilidade de
calcular o direito adicional que poderá ser cobrado.
26
importações relativas ao consumo interno3 correspondente nos três anos precedentes, para os
quais existam dados disponíveis:
a)
quando tais oportunidades de acesso ao mercado para um produto sejam iguais ou
inferiores a 10 por cento, o nível de gatilho será igual a 125 por cento;
b)
quando tais oportunidades de acesso ao mercado para um produto sejam superiores a 10
por cento mas iguais ou inferiores a 30 por cento, o nível de gatilho de base será igual a
110 por cento;
c)
quando tais oportunidades de acesso ao mercado para um produto forem superiores a 30
por cento, o nível de gatilho será igual a 105 por cento.
Em todos os casos, a tarifa adicional poderá ser imposta em qualquer ano em que o volume absoluto de
importações de um determinado produto que entre o território aduaneiro do Membro outorgante da
concessão ultrapassar a soma de (x) do nível do gatilho de base estabelecida supra, multiplicado pela
quantidade média de importações realizadas durante os três anos precedentes para os quais existam dados
disponíveis, mais (y) a variação do volume absoluto do consumo interno do produto em questão no ano
mais recente para o qual existam dados disponíveis comparado ao ano precedente; no entendimento de
que o nível de gatilho não será inferior a 105 por cento da quantidade média de importações em (x)
acima.
5.5
5.6
3
A tarifa adicional imposta ao amparo da letra (b) do parágrafo 1 será estabelecida de acordo com
o seguinte escalonamento:
a)
se a diferença entre o preço de importação C.I.F. de determinado carregamento, expresso
em termos da moeda nacional (doravante denominado “preço de importação”), e o preço
de gatilho, conforme definido pela letra (b) do parágrafo 1 for igual ou inferior a 10 por
cento do preço de gatilho, nenhuma tarifa adicional será imposta;
b)
se a diferença entre o preço de importação e o preço de gatilho (doravante denominada
“diferença”) for superior a 10 por cento mas igual ou inferior a 40 por cento do preço de
gatilho, a tarifa adicional deverá ser igual a 30 por cento do montante da diferença acima
dos 10 por cento;
c)
se a diferença for superior a 40 por cento mas inferior ou igual a 60 por cento do preço de
gatilho, a tarifa adicional será igual a 50 por cento do montante da diferença acima dos 40
por cento, mais a tarifa adicional permitida em (b);
d)
se a diferença for superior a 60 por cento mas inferior ou igual a 75 por cento, a tarifa
adicional será igual a 70 por cento do montante da diferença acima dos 60 por cento do
preço de gatilho, mais as tarifas adicionais permitidas em (b) e (c);
e)
se a diferença for superior a 75 por cento do preço de gatilho, a tarifa adicional será igual
a 90 por cento do montante da diferença acima dos 75 por cento, mais as tarifas
adicionais permitidas em (b), (c) e (d).
Para os produtos perecíveis e sazonais, as condições estabelecidas acima serão aplicadas de
maneira que leve em conta as características específicas de tais produtos. Em particular, poderão
ser utilizados períodos de tempo mais curtos no âmbito da letra (a) do parágrafo 1 e do parágrafo
4 com referência aos prazos correspondentes do período de base e poderão ser utilizados, no
âmbito da letra (b) do parágrafo 1, diferentes preços de referência para diferentes períodos.
Quando o consumo doméstico não for levado em conta, o nível-base de gatilho do subparágrafo (a) será aplicável.
27
5.7
A aplicação da salvaguarda especial será feita de maneira transparente. Qualquer Membro que
recorra a ação no âmbito da letra (a) do parágrafo 1 acima dela informará o Comitê de
Agricultura, por escrito, incluindo-se os dados pertinentes, com a maior antecedência possível e,
em qualquer caso, dentro dos 10 dias seguintes à aplicação das medidas. Nos casos em que
variações nos volumes de consumo devam ser alocadas a linhas tarifárias sujeitas a medidas
adotadas com relação ao parágrafo 4, figurarão, entre os dados pertinentes, a informação e os
métodos utilizados para alocar tais variações. Um Membro que recorrer a medidas no âmbito do
parágrafo 4 proporcionará aos Membros interessados a oportunidade de realizar consultas a
respeito das condições de aplicação de tais medidas. Qualquer Membro que recorrer à letra (b) do
parágrafo 1 supra, dela informará o Comitê de Agricultura, por escrito, incluindo-se os dados
pertinentes, dentro dos 10 dias seguintes à aplicação da primeira de tais medidas, ou, se se tratar
de produtos perecíveis e sazonais, informará da primeira medida de qualquer período. Os
Membros se comprometem, na medida do possível, a não recorrer às disposições da letra (b) do
parágrafo 1 quando o volume das importações dos produtos em questão esteja diminuindo. Em
qualquer dos casos, o Membro eu recorrer a tal ação proporcionará aos Membros interessados a
oportunidade de realizar consultas a respeito das condições para aplicação de tal recurso.
5.8
Nos casos em que as medidas forem tomadas em conformidade com as disposições dos
parágrafos 1 a 7 supra, os Membros se comprometem a não recorrer, com respeito a tais medidas,
às disposições dos parágrafos 1 (a) e 3 do Artigo XIX do GATT 1994 ou do parágrafo 2 do
Artigo 8 do Acordo sobre Salvaguardas.
5.9
As disposições do presente Artigo permanecerão em vigor durante o período de duração do
processo de reforma determinado pelo Artigo 20.
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
Nenhuma consideração.
II.
1.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 5
Artigo 5.1(b)
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Importation of
Certain Poultry Products (EC - Poultry), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/AB/R, paras. 143, 145-146 e
151-153
No caso dos produtos avícolas, entre Brasil e Comunidades Europeias, o Órgão de Apelação
primeiro investigou a dimensão prática da questão do preço c.i.f. e dos encargos de importação,
chegando à conclusão que não é um ponto relevante se o preço de importação e o preço de
importação mais os encargos de importação estão abaixo ou acima do preço definido como
gatilho. Para aquele órgão, o foco seria a diferença entre o preço de ingresso na alfândega e o
preço de ingresso no mercado doméstico, sendo que, para o Órgão, os redatores do Acordo tinham
em mente o preço exatamente antes do ingresso no território da alfândega.
Para. 143. “This dispute has no practical significance if both the c.i.f. import price and the c.i.f. import
price plus customs duties fall above or below the trigger price. If both prices are above the trigger price,
then additional duties cannot be imposed. And, if both prices fall below the trigger price, then additional
duties may be imposed regardless of which definition of the relevant import price is adopted. However,
the practical significance of this dispute becomes apparent whenever the trigger price falls between the
other two prices, that is, when the trigger price is greater than the c.i.f. import price but smaller than the
c.i.f. import price plus customs duties. … [I]f the relevant price is defined as the c.i.f. import price plus
customs duties, additional duties may not be imposed since the relevant price is well above the trigger
price. If, on the other hand, it is defined as the c.i.f. import price only (that is, without customs duties),
additional duties may be imposed because the relevant price is below the trigger price. Thus, to adopt one
28
definition, rather than another, will determine whether or not an importing Member may impose
additional safeguard duties.”
Para. 145. “The relevant import price in Article 5.1(b) is described as ‘the price at which imports of that
product may enter the customs territory of the Member granting the concession, as determined on the
basis of the c.i.f. import price of the shipment concerned’. It is noteworthy that the drafters of the
Agreement on Agriculture chose to use as the relevant import price the entry price into the customs
territory, rather than the entry price into the domestic market. This suggests that they had in mind the
point of time just before the entry of the product concerned into the customs territory, and certainly before
entry into the domestic market, of the importing Member. The ordinary meaning of these terms in Article
5.1(b) supports the view that the ‘price at which that product may enter the customs territory’ of the
importing Member should be construed to mean just that — the price at which the product may enter the
customs territory, not the price at which the product may enter the domestic market of the importing
Member. And that price is a price that does not include customs duties and internal charges. It is upon
entry of a product into the customs territory, but before the product enters the domestic market, that the
obligation to pay customs duties and internal charges accrues.”
O Órgão de Apelação também chamou a atenção para o fato de que o Acordo sobre Agricultura não
define a expressão “preço de importação c.i.f.”, considerando apenas o uso costumeiro dessa
expressão no comercio internacional.
Para. 146. “There is no definition of the term ‘c.i.f. import price’ in the Agreement on Agriculture or in
any of the other covered agreements. However, in customary usage in international trade, the c.i.f. import
price does not include any taxes, customs duties, or other charges that may be imposed on a product by a
Member upon entry into its customs territory. (22)(23) We think it significant also that ordinary customs
duties are not mentioned as a component of the relevant import price in the text of Article 5.1(b). Article
5.1(b) does not state that the relevant import price is ‘the c.i.f. price plus ordinary customs duties’.
Accordingly, to read the inclusion of customs duties into the definition of the c.i.f. import price in Article
5.1(b) would require us to read words into the text of that provision that simply are not there.”
O Órgão de Apelação identificou “anomalias” que poderiam emergir da interpretação dada ao
Artigo 5.1(b) pelo Painel do caso dos Produtos Agrícola entre Brasil e Comunidades Europeias. É
relevante notar a conclusão do Órgão de Apelação sobre o preço a que faz referência o Acordo
sobre Agricultura.
Para. 151. “Certain anomalies would arise from the interpretation adopted by the majority of the Panel.
One of these anomalies was cited in the opinion of the dissenting member of the Panel. (24)(25) If
tariffication of non-tariff barriers on a certain product took the form of specific duties that were greater
than the trigger price, then an importing Member may never be able to invoke Article 5.1(b). The truth of
this observation is evident from the fact that the c.i.f. import price plus customs duties may never fall
below the trigger price. This consequence is not limited to the case of specific duties that exceed the
trigger price. It could also occur in cases where tariffication takes the form of ad valorem duties. We
know that tariffication has resulted in tariffs which are, in a large number of cases, very high. The
probability is strong, therefore, that the ad valorem duties could exceed the percentage decrease in the
c.i.f. import price by a substantial margin. In such cases, the decrease in the c.i.f. price would have to be
very deep before the relevant import price would fall below the trigger price. Thus, the provisions of
Article 5.1(b) would not be operational in many cases. It is doubtful that this was intended by the drafters
of the ‘Special Safeguard Provisions’.”
Para. 152. “Another anomaly that would arise from defining the relevant import price as the c.i.f. import
price plus ordinary customs duties would be that the right of Members to invoke the provisions of Article
5.1(b) would depend on the level of tariffs resulting from tariffication. Faced with a certain decline in the
c.i.f. price — say, 20 per cent — some Members would find themselves in a situation where they could
not invoke the price safeguard; others would have the right to do so. The first category would comprise
those Members with a relatively high level of tariffied duties; the second would be those with a relatively
29
moderate level. Thus, the rights of Members would ultimately depend on the level of their tariffied duties.
It is doubtful, too, that this was intended by the drafters of the ‘Special Safeguard Provisions’.”
Para. 153.”[W]e interpret the ‘price at which the product concerned may enter the customs territory of
the Member granting the concession, as determined on the basis of the c.i.f. import price’ in Article 5.1(b)
as the c.i.f. import price not including ordinary customs duties.”
2.
Artigo 5.5
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Importation of
Certain Poultry Products (EC - Poultry), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 168
Ainda no caso dos Produtos Avícolas, entre Brasil e Comunidades Europeias, o Órgão de
Apelação aponta para a imposibilidade de se definir o método de comparação entre o preço de
importação c.i.f. e o preço gatilho como certeiro no Acordo de Agricultura, Artigo. 5.5 para o
mecanismo das salvaguardas especiais.
Para. 168. “[N]either the text nor the context of Article 5.5 of the Agreement on Agriculture permits us to
conclude that the additional duties imposed under the special safeguard mechanism in Article 5 of the
Agreement on Agriculture may be established by any method other than a comparison of the c.i.f. price of
the shipment with the trigger price.”
3.
Relação do Artigo 5 com outros Artigos
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System)(Article 21.5 - Argentina),
Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/AB/RW, paras. 173-174
Neste caso, o Órgão de Apelação identifica o Artigo 5 como uma exceção às obrigações impostas
pelo Artigo 4.2 a todos os Membros da OMC.
Para. 173. “In the original proceedings, the Appellate Body acknowledged the importance of agricultural
products to many developing country Members of the WTO, and the role of special and differential
treatment for developing country Members under the Agreement on Agriculture. At the same time, the
Appellate Body recognized that the requirements of the Agreement on Agriculture apply to developing
country Members except where otherwise provided. Article 4.2 expressly identifies two exceptions to the
obligations that it imposes on all WTO Members, namely, Article 5 and Annex 5 to the Agreement on
Agriculture. Annex 5 exempts developing country Members from these disciplines in specific
circumstances. Article 5 specifies that a Member may, under certain conditions, impose a special
safeguard on imports of an agricultural product ‘in respect of which measures referred to in [Article 4.2]
have been converted into an ordinary customs duty’. The provisions of Article 5 establish the conditions
in which a Member may have recourse to such a special safeguard, set out rules on the form and duration
of such safeguard measures, and establish certain transparency requirements that attach to their use. One
circumstance in which a qualifying Member may be authorized to adopt a special safeguard is when the
price of imports of a relevant agricultural product falls below a specified trigger price. However, pursuant
to Article 5, a special safeguard can be imposed only on those agricultural products for which measures
within the meaning of footnote 1 were converted into ordinary customs duties and for which a Member
has reserved in its Schedule of Concessions a right to resort to these safeguards. Because Chile reserved
no such right in respect of wheat and wheat flour, Chile cannot avail itself of the mechanism set out in
Article 5 for imports of these products.”
Para. 174. “The existence of an exemption from the market access requirements in the form of a special
safeguard under Article 5 suggests that this provision (in addition to Annex 5) was the narrowly
circumscribed vehicle to be used by those Members who reserved their rights to do so in order to derogate
from the requirements of Article 4.2. We note that paragraph 9 of Article 5 provides that Article 5 is to
30
remain in force for the duration of the process of reform. Negotiations for the process of reform are
envisaged in Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture and form part of the Doha Development Agenda.
(26) The establishment of a special safeguard mechanism for developing country Members forms part of
the Doha Work Programme on agriculture. (27) We, however, are charged with reviewing the Panel’s
interpretation of an existing obligation. We recall, in this regard, that Article 4.2 must be interpreted in a
way that does not deprive Article 5 of proper meaning and effect.” (28)
III.
Comentários
A interpretação dada pelo Órgão de Apelação ao Artigo 5 do Acordo sobre Agricultura, no caso dos
Produtos Avícolas entre Brasil e Comunidades Europeias permite vislumbrar o viés prático do Órgão, em
detrimento de um purismo teórico e intelectual. Seu foco foi estabelecer o conceito correto de preço
gatilho, tomando como parâmetro o preço de importação c.i.f.. Este parâmetro serve para a aplicação de
medidas de salvaguardas, que são utilizadas em regime de exceção ao Artigo 4.2 do Acordo.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 22: Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, adopted 14 November 2001, para. 13.
Footnote 23: We note that the Incoterms 1990 of the International Chamber of Commerce explains that the acronym “c.i.f.”
means “cost, insurance and freight”, but does not give a definition of “c.i.f. import price”. However, according to customary
usage in international trade, c.i.f. import price, or simply c.i.f. price, is equal to the price of the product in the exporting country
plus additional costs, insurance and freight to the importing country. This definition may also be inferred from paragraph 2 of the
Attachment to Annex 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
Footnote 24: See paragraph 42 of Annex A of the Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004 (the “July
Package”), WT/L/579, as well as paragraph 7 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(05)/DEC, adopted 18
December 2005.
Footnote 25: Panel Report, para. 291.
Footnote 26: Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, adopted 14 November 2001, para. 13.
Footnote 27: See paragraph 42 of Annex A of the Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004 (the “July
Package”), WT/L/579, as well as paragraph 7 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(05)/DEC, adopted 18
December 2005.
Footnote 28: Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, para. 217.
31

Artigo 6
Carolina Jezler Müller
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
PART IV
Article 6
Domestic Support Commitments
6.1
The domestic support reduction commitments of each Member contained in Part IV of its
Schedule shall apply to all of its domestic support measures in favour of agricultural producers
with the exception of domestic measures which are not subject to reduction in terms of the
criteria set out in this Article and in Annex 2 to this Agreement. The commitments are expressed
in terms of Total Aggregate Measurement of Support and “Annual and Final Bound Commitment
Levels”.
6.2
In accordance with the Mid-Term Review Agreement that government measures of assistance,
whether direct or indirect, to encourage agricultural and rural development are an integral part of
the development programmes of developing countries, investment subsidies which are generally
available to agriculture in developing country Members and agricultural input subsidies generally
available to low-income or resource-poor producers in developing country Members shall be
exempt from domestic support reduction commitments that would otherwise be applicable to
such measures, as shall domestic support to producers in developing country Members to
encourage diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops. Domestic support meeting the
criteria of this paragraph shall not be required to be included in a Member's calculation of its
Current Total AMS.
6.3
A Member shall be considered to be in compliance with its domestic support reduction
commitments in any year in which its domestic support in favour of agricultural producers
expressed in terms of Current Total AMS does not exceed the corresponding annual or final
bound commitment level specified in Part IV of the Member's Schedule.
6.4
(a)
6.5
A Member shall not be required to include in the calculation of its Current Total AMS and
shall not be required to reduce:
(i)
product-specific domestic support which would otherwise be required to be
included in a Member's calculation of its Current AMS where such support does
not exceed 5 per cent of that Member's total value of production of a basic
agricultural product during the relevant year; and
(ii)
non-product-specific domestic support which would otherwise be required to be
included in a Member's calculation of its Current AMS where such support does
not exceed 5 per cent of the value of that Member's total agricultural production.
(b)
For developing country Members, the de minimis percentage under this paragraph shall
be 10 per cent.
(a)
Direct payments under production-limiting programmes shall not be subject to the
commitment to reduce domestic support if:
(i)
such payments are based on fixed area and yields; or
(ii)
such payments are made on 85 per cent or less of the base level of production; or
32
(iii)
(b)
IB.
livestock payments are made on a fixed number of head.
The exemption from the reduction commitment for direct payments meeting the above
criteria shall be reflected by the exclusion of the value of those direct payments in a
Member's calculation of its Current Total AMS.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 6
Compromissos em Matéria de Apoio Interno
6.1
Os compromissos de redução do apoio interno de cada membro contidos na Parte IV de sua Lista
serão aplicados à totalidade de suas medidas de apoio interno em favor de produtores agrícolas,
com exceção das medidas internas que não estejam sujeitas a redução nos temos dos critérios
estabelecidos no presente Artigo e no Anexo 2 do presente Acordo. Os compromissos são
expressos em termos da Medida Agregada de Apoio Total e dos “Níveis de Compromisso Anual e
Final Consolidados”.
6.2
Em conformidade com o acordo alcançado na Revisão de Meio Período no sentido de que as
medidas governamentais de assistência, direta ou indireta, para estimular o desenvolvimento
agrícola e rural constituem parte integrante dos programas de desenvolvimento de países em
desenvolvimento, os subsídios para investimento que estejam geralmente disponíveis à
agricultura nos países em desenvolvimento Membros e os produtores de baixa renda ou de
recursos limitados em países em desenvolvimento Membros ficarão isentos dos compromissos de
redução do apoio interno que seriam normalmente aplicáveis a tais medidas, assim como também
ficará isento de compromissos o apoio interno dado a produtores nos países em desenvolvimento
Membros para estimular a diversificação da produção com vistas a permitir o abandono de
culturas narcóticas ilícitas. O apoio interno que atender aos critérios enunciados neste parágrafo
não terá que ser incluído nos cálculos de MAA Total Corrente de um Membro.
6.3
Considerar-se-á que um Membro cumpriu seus compromissos de redução do apoio interno em
todos os anos em que seu apoio interno em favor de produtores agrícolas, expresso em termos de
MAA Total Corrente, não ultrapassar o correspondente nível de compromisso anual ou final
consolidado, especificado na Parte IV de sua Lista.
6.4
a)
6.5
Nenhum Membro terá obrigação de incluir no cálculo de seu MAA Total Corrente, nem
reduzir:
(i)
O apoio interno por produto específico que normalmente seria obrigatoriamente
incluído no cálculo de seu MAA Corrente, quando tal apoio não ultrapassar 5 por
cento do valor total de sua produção de um produto agrícola básico durante o ano
correspondente; e
(ii)
O apoio interno não especificado por produto que normalmente seria
obrigatoriamente incluído no cálculo de seu MAA Corrente, quando tal apoio não
ultrapassar 5 por cento do valor de sua produção agrícola total.
b)
No caso dos países em desenvolvimento Membros, o percentual de
estabelecido no presente parágrafo será de 10 por cento.
a)
Os pagamentos diretos realizados no âmbito de programas de limitação da produção não
estarão sujeitos ao compromisso de redução do apoio interno se:
1.
de minimis
tais pagamentos se basearem em áreas de produção fixas;
33
b)
2.
tais pagamentos forem feitos em relação a 85 por cento ou menos do nível de
produção de base; ou
3.
No caso de pagamentos relativos a rebanhos, forem feitos em relação a um
número fixo de cabeças.
A isenção de compromissos de redução para os pagamentos diretos que atendam aos
critérios supra refletir-se-á na exclusão do valor de tais pagamentos diretos do cálculo do
MAA Total Corrente de um membro.
(Decreto 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994)
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
Nada a observar.
II.
1.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 6
Artigo 6: Apoio interno (domestic support)
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, para. 368
O Órgão de Apelação determinou os produtos objeto de apoio interno os quais o Artigo 6 visa a regular.
No caso, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que as medidas abrangidas pelo Artigo 6 incluem todas as
medidas específicas por produto e não específicas da caixas amarela e, em relação aos incisos 6.2 e 6.5, as
medidas das caixas de tratamento especial e diferenciado e azul, respectivamente. Ademais, as medidas
abrangidas pelo caput do Artigo abrangem aquelas específicas por produto e não específicas contidas
dentro dos limites de minimis.
Para. 368. “Measures covered by Article 6 include both product-specific and non-product-specific amber
box support subject to reduction commitments. In addition, measures covered by the chapeau also include
product-specific and non-product-specific support within de minimis levels. They further include blue box
support provided in accordance with Article 6.5, as well as development box support, provided according
to the provisions of Article 6.2, for both of which the distinction between product-specific and nonproduct specific support for purposes of the AMS calculation has little practical relevance (29).”
2. Artigo 6.3
a) “Limitação do apoio interno (domestic support) e relação com a proibição de subsídios à
exportação”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras. 544-545
O Órgão de Apelação esclareceu a relação entre a limitação ao apoio interno, previsto no Artigo 6.3, e a
proibição aos subsídios à exportação previstos no ASMC, afirmando que subsídios feitos em
conformidade com os limites impostos pelo Artigo 6.3 não necessariamente estarão em conformidade
com a proibição de subsídios à exportação.
Para. 544. “Like paragraph 7 of Annex 3, Article 6.3 does not explicitly refer to import substitution
subsidies. Article 6.3 deals with domestic support. It establishes only a quantitative limitation on the
amount of domestic support that a WTO Member can provide in a given year. The quantitative limitation
34
in Article 6.3 applies generally to all domestic support measures that are included in a WTO Member's
AMS. (...)”
Para. 545. “Article 6.3 does not authorize subsidies that are contingent on the use of domestic over
imported goods. It only provides that a WTO Member shall be considered to be in compliance with its
domestic support reduction commitments if its Current Total AMS does not exceed that Member's annual
or final bound commitment level specified in its Schedule. It does not say that compliance with Article
6.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture insulates the subsidy from the prohibition in Article 3.1(b). (...)”
III.
Comentários
Há na jurisprudência da OMC poucas interpretações sobre a aplicação do Artigo 6. Entretanto, o caso US
- Cotton traz dois elementos que merecem destaque. Em primeiro lugar, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu a
abrangência do escopo do Artigo 6, evidenciando sua aplicabilidade a todas as medidas de apoio
doméstico, específicas por produto ou não específicas, classificadas nas caixas amarela, azul e de
tratamento especial e diferenciado.
Em seguida, a relação do Artigo 6.3 do Acordo sobre Agricultura com o ASMC foi explorada. O Órgão de
Apelação afirmou que a conformidade de determinada medida com o Artigo 6.3 não exclui a incidência
do ASMC referente a subsídios contingentes ao uso de conteúdo doméstico. O Órgão de Apelação
promoveu, assim, uma análise sistemática dos acordos da OMC, evitando que houvesse um conflito entre
os dispositivos do Acordo sobre Agricultura e o ASMC.
FOOTNOTE:
Footnote 29: The only type of domestic support clearly excluded from support covered by Article 13(b) is green box support,
which does not need to conform with the provisions of Article 6, but rather must conform with the provisions of Annex 2. Green
box support, however, qualifies for the exemption from actions provided by Article 13(a).
35

Artigo 7
Carolina Jezler Müller
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 7
General Disciplines on Domestic Support
7.1
Each Member shall ensure that any domestic support measures in favour of agricultural producers
which are not subject to reduction commitments because they qualify under the criteria set out in
Annex 2 to this Agreement are maintained in conformity therewith.
7.2
(a)
Any domestic support measure in favour of agricultural producers, including any
modification to such measure, and any measure that is subsequently introduced that
cannot be shown to satisfy the criteria in Annex 2 to this Agreement or to be exempt from
reduction by reason of any other provision of this Agreement shall be included in the
Member's calculation of its Current Total AMS.
(b)
Where no Total AMS commitment exists in Part IV of a Member's Schedule, the Member
shall not provide support to agricultural producers in excess of the relevant de minimis
level set out in paragraph 4 of Article 6.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 7
Disciplinas Gerais em Matéria de Apoio Interno
7.1
Cada Membro garantirá que as medidas de apoio interno em favor de produtores agrícolas, que
não estejam sujeitas aos compromissos de redução em virtude de atenderem aos critérios
enunciados no Anexo 2 do presente Acordo, sejam mantidas em conformidade com tais critérios.
7.2
a)
Estarão compreendidas no cálculo do MAA Total Corrente de um Membro quaisquer
medidas de apoio interno estabelecidas em favor de produtores agrícolas, incluindo-se as
possíveis modificações das mesmas, e quaisquer medidas que sejam subsequentemente
introduzidas que não demonstrem atender aos critérios do Anexo 2 do presente Acordo ou
que estejam isentas de redução em virtude de qualquer outra disposição do presente
Acordo.
b)
Nos casos em que não constem na Parte IV da Lista de um Membro quaisquer
compromissos de MAA Total, tal membro não concederá apoio a produtores agrícolas
além do correspondente nível de de minimis estabelecido no parágrafo 4 do Artigo 6.
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
Nada a observar.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 7
O Artigo 7 não foi analisado em nenhum caso do DSB da OMC.
III.
Comentários
Nada a observar, uma vez que este Artigo não foi objeto de análise pelo DSB da OMC.

Artigo 8
36
Geraldo Vidigal
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 8
Export Competition Commitments
Each Member undertakes not to provide export subsidies otherwise than in conformity with this
Agreement and with the commitments as specified in that Member’s Schedule.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 8
Compromissos em Matéria de Competição em Exportações
Cada Membro se compromete a não conceder subsídios à exportação que não estejam em conformidade
com o presente Acordo e com os compromissos especificados em sua Lista.
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
Nada a observar.
II.
1.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 8
Função geral
Relatório do Painel no caso Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the
Exportation of Diary Products (Canada - Dairy), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia, WT/DS103/R
e WT/DS113/R, para. 7.27
Este é o primeiro caso em que número significativo de provisões do Acordo de Agricultura atinentes a
subsídios à exportação agrícola foi questionado. Por isso, nele o painel procurou abordar definições
relevantes para a matéria. Neste relatório, o painel determinou que o Artigo 8 é a “disposição geral
fundamental” do Acordo de Agricultura referente aos subsídios à exportação.
Para.7.27. “The fundamental general provision of the Agreement on Agriculture concerning export
subsidies is Article 8 (...).”
Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Cotton) Demandante:
Brasil, WT/DS267/R, paras. 7.659 e 7.921
Nesta controvérsia, o painel observou o efeito do Artigo 8 de proibição geral. O Artigo proíbe o use de
subsídios à exportação (listados ou não no Artigo 9), além dos níveis de compromisso de redução, no caso
de produtos constantes da Lista do Membro, e de qualquer forma incompatível com os comprimissos de
redução e as disposições do Acordo de Agricultura.
Para. 7.659. “ The qualified prohibition in Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture is supported by the
more specific prohibitions in respect of “scheduled” and “non-scheduled” products in Article 3.3 of the
Agreement on Agriculture. (…)”
Para. 7.921. “(...) The parties to this dispute agree that Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture,
pursuant to which Members undertake “not to provide export subsidies otherwise than in conformity with
this Agreement and with the commitments as specified in that Member's Schedule” serves to prohibit the
use of listed and non listed export subsidies in excess of reduction commitment levels in the case of
scheduled products and to prohibit the use of export subsidies otherwise than in conformity with
reduction commitments and the provisions of the Agreement.”
37
2.
Cumulatividade das obrigações do Acordo sobre Agricultura e dos compromissos das Listas
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC Subsidies on Sugar), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil e Tailândia, WT/DS265/AB/R,
WT/DS266/AB/R e WT/DS283/AB/R, paras. 216 e 220
Na controvérsia EC – Subsidies on Sugar esta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que, em
virtude do Artigo 8, as limitações aos subsídios impostas pelo Acordo de Agricultura e pela Lista de
compromissos dos Membros são cumulativas, e não alternativas. Mais ainda, a interpretação do Órgão de
Apelação foi de que as Listas devem ser compatíveis com o Acordo sobre Agricultura, e seu conteúdo
não pode servir para isentar um Membro das obrigações determinadas pelo Acordo.
Para. 216. “It is clear from the plain wording of Article 8 that Members are prohibited from providing
export subsidies otherwise than in conformity with the Agreement on Agriculture and the commitments as
specified in their Schedules. Thus, compliance with both is obligatory. As compliance with the provisions
of the Agreement on Agriculture is obligatory, it is clear that the commitments specified in a Member’s
Schedule must be in conformity with the provisions of the Agreement. Only then would the export
subsidies be in compliance with the requirements of Article 8.”
Para. 220. “Similarly, in this case, we find no provision under the Agreement on Agriculture that
authorizes Members to depart, in their Schedules, from their obligations under that Agreement. Indeed, as
we have noted, Article 8 requires that, in providing export subsidies, Members must comply with the
provisions of both the Agreement on Agriculture and the export subsidy commitments specified in their
Schedules. This is possible only if the commitments in the Schedules are in conformity with the
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture. Thus, we see no basis for the European Communities’
assertion that it could depart from the obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture through the
claimed commitment provided in Footnote 1.”
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 8 constitui o “dispositivo geral fundamental” referente a subsídios à exportação do Acordo de
Agricultura (Painel em Canada – Dairy). Trata-se de uma disposição guarda-chuva, que explicita a
proibição de conceder subsídios à exportação para além do disposto no Acordo de Agricultura e nas
Listas de cada Membro. Violações do Artigo 8, portanto, surgem como consequência de subsídios à
exportação que violem artigos do Acordo de Agricultura ou contrariem compromissos assumidos pelo
Membro em sua Lista de compromissos.
Conforme a interpretação dada pelo Órgão de Apelação em EC – Sugar, o Artigo 8 determina que
subsídios à exportação devem respeitar tanto as limitações contidas na Lista de compromissos específicos
do Membro quanto as obrigações gerais previstas no Acordo de Agricultura. Em consequência, os
compromissos da Lista devem ser compatíveis com as disposições do Acordo, não significando
derrogações destas.
38

Artigo 9
Geraldo Vidigal
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 9
Export Subsidy Commitments
9.1
9.2
The following export subsidies are subject to reduction commitments under this Agreement:
(a)
the provision by governments or their agencies of direct subsidies, including paymentsin-kind, to a firm, to an industry, to producers of an agricultural product, to a cooperative
or other association of such producers, or to a marketing board, contingent on export
performance;
(b)
the sale or disposal for export by governments or their agencies of non-commercial stocks
of agricultural products at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like
product to buyers in the domestic market;
(c)
payments on the export of an agricultural product that are financed by virtue of
governmental action, whether or not a charge on the public account is involved, including
payments that are financed from the proceeds of a levy imposed on the agricultural
product concerned or on an agricultural product from which the exported product is
derived;
(d)
the provision of subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural
products (other than widely available export promotion and advisory services) including
handling, upgrading and other processing costs, and the costs of international transport
and freight;
(e)
internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated by
governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments;
(f)
subsidies on agricultural products contingent on their incorporation in exported products.
(a)
Except as provided in subparagraph (b), the export subsidy commitment levels for each
year of the implementation period, as specified in a Member's Schedule, represent with
respect to the export subsidies listed in paragraph 1 of this Article:
(b)
(i)
in the case of budgetary outlay reduction commitments, the maximum level of
expenditure for such subsidies that may be allocated or incurred in that year in
respect of the agricultural product, or group of products, concerned; and
(ii)
in the case of export quantity reduction commitments, the maximum quantity of
an agricultural product, or group of products, in respect of which such export
subsidies may be granted in that year.
In any of the second through fifth years of the implementation period, a Member may
provide export subsidies listed in paragraph 1 above in a given year in excess of the
corresponding annual commitment levels in respect of the products or groups of products
specified in Part IV of the Member's Schedule, provided that:
(i)
the cumulative amounts of budgetary outlays for such subsidies, from the
beginning of the implementation period through the year in question, does not
exceed the cumulative amounts that would have resulted from full compliance
39
with the relevant annual outlay commitment levels specified in the Member's
Schedule by more than 3 per cent of the base period level of such budgetary
outlays;
(ii)
the cumulative quantities exported with the benefit of such export subsidies, from
the beginning of the implementation period through the year in question, does not
exceed the cumulative quantities that would have resulted from full compliance
with the relevant annual quantity commitment levels specified in the Member's
Schedule by more than 1.75 per cent of the base period quantities;
(iii)
the total cumulative amounts of budgetary outlays for such export subsidies and
the quantities benefiting from such export subsidies over the entire
implementation period are no greater than the totals that would have resulted
from full compliance with the relevant annual commitment levels specified in the
Member's Schedule; and
(iv)
the Member's budgetary outlays for export subsidies and the quantities benefiting
from such subsidies, at the conclusion of the implementation period, are no
greater than 64 per cent and 79 per cent of the 1986-1990 base period levels,
respectively. For developing country Members these percentages shall be 76
and 86 per cent, respectively.
9.3
Commitments relating to limitations on the extension of the scope of export subsidization are as
specified in Schedules.
9.4
During the implementation period, developing country Members shall not be required to
undertake commitments in respect of the export subsidies listed in subparagraphs (d) and (e) of
paragraph 1 above, provided that these are not applied in a manner that would circumvent
reduction commitments.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 9
Compromissos em Matéria de Subsídios à Exportação
9.1
Os seguintes subsídios à exportação estão sujeitos aos compromissos de redução assumidos em
virtude do presente Acordo:
a)
a concessão pelos governos ou por organismos públicos a uma empresa, a uma indústria,
a produtores de um produto agrícola, a uma cooperativa ou outra associação de tais
produtores ou a entidade de comercialização, de subsídios diretos, incluindo pagamentos
em espécie, subordinada ao desempenho de suas exportações;
b)
a venda ou a distribuição para exportação, realizada pelos governos ou por organismos
públicos, de estoques não comerciais de produtos agrícolas a preço inferior ao preço
comparável cobrado por produto similar a compradores no mercado interno;
c)
os pagamentos para exportação de um produto agrícola financiado por medidas
governamentais que representem ou não um ônus ao tesouro nacional, incluindo os
pagamentos financiados com recursos procedentes de uma taxa, imposto ao referido
produto agrícola ou imposta a um produto agrícola a partir do qual o produto exportado é
obtido;
d)
a concessão de subsídios para reduzir os custos de comercialização das exportações de
produtos agrícolas (exceto os serviços de promoção à exportação e de consultoria
40
amplamente disponíveis), incluindo os custos de manuseio de aperfeiçoamento e outros
custos de processamento, assim como os custos de transporte e frete internacionais;
9.2
e)
as tarifas de transporte interno e de frete para carregamentos à exportação estabelecidas
ou impostas pelos governos em termos mais favoráveis do que aqueles para
carregamentos internos;
f)
Os subsídios a produtos agrícolas subordinados à incorporação de tais produtos a
produtos exportados.
a)
Exceto pelo estabelecido na letra (b), os níveis de compromisso em matéria de subsídios à
exportação correspondentes a cada ano do período de implementação especificados na
Lista de um Membro representam, no que se refere aos subsídios à exportação listados no
parágrafo 1 do presente Artigo:
b)
i)
no caso de compromissos de redução dos desembolsos orçamentários, o nível
máximo de gastos destinados a tais subsídios, que podem ser previstos ou
incorridos naquele ano para o produto agrícola ou grupo de produtos
considerados; e
ii)
no caso de compromissos para redução da quantidade exportada, a quantidade
máxima de um produto agrícola ou de um grupo de produtos em favor dos quais
tais subsídios à exportação possam ser concedidos naquele ano.
Em quaisquer anos entre o segundo e o quinto ano do período de implementação, um
Membro poderá conceder em um determinado ano subsídios à exportação listados no
parágrafo 1 supra além dos níveis correspondentes de compromisso anuais relativos aos
produtos ou grupos de produtos especificados na Parte IV da Lista daquele Membro,
desde que:
f)
as quantias acumuladas dos desembolsos orçamentários para tais subsídios, desde
o inicio do período de implementação até o ano em questão, não ultrapassem as
quantias acumuladas que teriam resultado do pleno cumprimento dos níveis
correspondentes de compromissos anuais de desembolso especificados na Lista
de um Membro em mais de 3 por cento do nível de tais desembolsos
orçamentários no período base,
ii)
as quantidades acumuladas exportadas com o benefício de tais subsídios à
exportação, desde o início do período de implementação até o ano em questão,
não ultrapassem as quantidades acumuladas que teriam resultado do pleno
cumprimento dos níveis correspondentes de compromissos anuais de quantidades
especificados na Lista de um Membro em mais de 1,75 por cento das quantidades
do período base,
iii)
as quantias acumuladas totais dos desembolsos orçamentários destinados a tais
subsídios à exportação e as quantidades que se beneficiem de tais subsídios à
exportação durante a totalidade do período de implementação não sejam
superiores aos totais que teriam resultado do pleno cumprimento dos níveis
correspondentes de compromisso anuais especificados na Lista de um Membro e,
iv)
os desembolsos orçamentários de um Membro destinados aos subsídios à
exportação e as quantidades que se beneficiam de tais subsídios ao final do
período de implementação não sejam superiores a respectivamente 64 por cento e
79 por cento dos níveis do período base de 1986-1990. No caso de países em
41
desenvolvimento Membros, tais percentuais serão de 76 e de 86 por cento
respectivamente.
9.3
Os compromissos relativos à limitação da ampliação do escopo dos subsídios à exportação são
aqueles especificados nas Listas.
9.4
Durante o período de implementação os países em desenvolvimento Membros não serão
obrigados a assumir compromissos no que se refere aos subsídios à exportação listados nas letras
(d) e (e) do parágrafo 1 supra, desde que tais subsídios não sejam aplicados de maneira a eludir os
compromissos de redução.
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
A tradução de “financed by virtue of governmental action” para “financiado por medidas
governamentais”, no Artigo 9.1(c), pode dar margem a uma interpretação restritiva segundo a qual a
medida governamental deve financiar diretamente o pagamento para que se configure o subsídio. O texto
original, como se verá, permitiu ao Órgão de Apelação considerar que necessário apenas um nexo de
causalidade entre a medida governamental e o pagamento, ainda que feito por terceiros.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 9
1.
Artigo 9.1 – Tipos de Subsídio à Exportação
a)
“subsídios à exportação”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC Sugar), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil e Tailândia, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R e
WT/DS283/AB/R, para. 269
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que a caracterização de um subsídio à exportação e sua
sujeição às regras do Acordo de Agricultura dependem apenas do cumprimento dos requisitos do Artigo
9.1. Não há, portanto, necessidade de considerar critérios externos aos do artigo e alínea específico
invocados – no caso, a alegada inexistência de benefício para os agricultores, que não é exigido para
configurar o subsídio referido na alínea (c).
Para. 269. “The chapeau of Article 9.1 provides: “The following export subsidies are subject to reduction
commitments”. Hence, Article 9.1 sets forth a list of practices that, by definition, involve export
subsidies. In other words, a measure falling within Article 9.1 is deemed to be an export subsidy within
the meaning of Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture. We observe that Article 9.1(c) requires no
independent enquiry into the existence of a “benefit”.”
b)
“sujeitos aos compromissos de redução”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC –
Sugar), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil e Tailândia, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R e
WT/DS283/AB/R, para. 206
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação respondeu ao argumento das CE de que as alíneas do Artigo 9.1 não
impunham redução de subsídios, mas permitiam que compromissos nessas áreas fossem assumidos nas
Listas de cada Membro. O Órgão de Apelação discordou, estabelecendo que os subsídios contidos nas
alíneas estão todos sujeitos a redução. Determinou que os subsídios das CE, não se encaixando na
exceção do Artigo 9.2(b), ficam sujeitos aos compromissos de redução do Artigo 9.1. Esclareceu ainda
que o limite do Artigo 9.2(b)(iv) se aplica como limite, ao fim do período de implementação, ainda que
42
um Membro não tenha feito uso da flexibilidade do período de implementação permitida pelo Artigo
9.2(b).
Para. 206. “The chapeau of Article 9.1 says that the subsidies listed in that Article “are subject to
reduction commitments under this Agreement”. The export subsidies given to ACP/India equivalent
sugar, which admittedly fall within the ambit of Article 9.1(a), are therefore subject to reduction
commitments. Furthermore, as noted by the Panel, the provisions of Article 9.2(b)(iv) apply to Members
that take advantage of the flexibility provisions of Article 9.2(b). Article 9.2(b)(iv) specifies the reduction
levels to be achieved at the conclusion of the implementation period with respect to both budgetary
outlays and quantities. The provisions of Article 9.2(b)(iv) lend contextual support to the view that export
subsidies listed in Article 9.1 are subject to reduction commitments. (30) We further note that Article
9.2(a)(i) and (ii) also make it clear that both budgetary outlay and quantity commitments specified in a
Member's Schedule for each year of the implementation period are “reduction” commitments. It follows
that the export subsidies provided to ACP/India equivalent sugar are subject to reduction commitments in
terms of Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.”
2.
Artigo 9.1(a) – Subsídios diretos
a)
“subsídios diretos, incluindo pagamentos em espécie”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada – Measures Affecting Dairy Products (Canada –
Dairy), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia, WT/DS103/AB/R e WT/DS113/AB/R, para. 87
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu serem “pagamentos em espécie” uma das formas
possíveis de “subsídios diretos”. Observou, entretanto, que nem todo “pagamento em espécie” – em outro
bem que não dinheiro – constitui subsídio, visto que esse pagamento pode ser dado em troca de
contraprestação equivalente.
Para. 87. “In our view, the term “payments-in-kind” describes one of the forms in which “direct
subsidies” may be granted. Thus, Article 9.1(a) applies to “direct subsidies”, including “direct subsidies”
granted in the form of “payments-in-kind”. We believe that, in its ordinary meaning, the word
“payments”, in the term “payments-in-kind”, denotes a transfer of economic resources, in a form other
than money, from the grantor of the payment to the recipient. However, the fact that a “payment-in-kind”
has been made provides no indication as to the economic value of the transfer effected, either from the
perspective of the grantor of the payment or from that of the recipient. A “payment-in-kind” may be made
in exchange for full or partial consideration or it may be made gratuitously. Correspondingly, a “subsidy”
involves a transfer of economic resources from the grantor to the recipient for less than full consideration.
As we said in our Report in Canada – Aircraft, a “subsidy”, within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM
Agreement, arises where the grantor makes a “financial contribution” which confers a “benefit” on the
recipient, as compared with what would have been otherwise available to the recipient in the marketplace.
(31) Where the recipient gives full consideration in return for a “payment-in-kind” there can be no
“subsidy”, for the recipient is paying market-rates for what it receives. It follows, in our view, that the
mere fact that a “payment-in-kind” has been made does not, by itself , imply that a “subsidy”, “direct” or
otherwise, has been granted.”
b) “pelos governos ou por organismos públicos”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada – Measures Affecting Dairy Products (Canada –
Dairy), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia, WT/DS103/AB/R e WT/DS113/AB/R, para. 97
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação definiu o que considera um “organismo público” no sentido do
Artigo 9.1(a): uma entidade que exerce poderes dos quais foi imbuída por um governo para executar
funções de caráter governamental: “regular”, “limitar”, “supervisionar” ou “controlar” a ação de pessoas
privadas.
43
Para. 97. “We start our interpretive task with the text of Article 9.1(a) and the ordinary meaning of the
word “government” itself. According to Black's Law Dictionary, “government” means, inter alia, “[t]he
regulation, restraint, supervision, or control which is exercised upon the individual members of an
organized jural society by those invested with authority “. (32) (emphasis added) This is similar to
meanings given in other dictionaries. (33) The essence of “government” is, therefore, that it enjoys the
effective power to “regulate”, “control” or “supervise” individuals, or otherwise “restrain” their conduct,
through the exercise of lawful authority. This meaning is derived, in part, from the functions performed
by a government and, in part, from the government having the powers and authority to perform those
functions. A “government agency” is, in our view, an entity which exercises powers vested in it by a
“government” for the purpose of performing functions of a “governmental” character, that is, to
“regulate”, “restrain”, “supervise” or “control” the conduct of private citizens. As with any agency
relationship, a “government agency” may enjoy a degree of discretion in the exercise of its functions. (34)
c)
“subordinada ao desempenho de suas exportações”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, para. 582
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que a subordinação do subsídio ao desempenho das
exportações fica configurada a partir do momento em que se identificar um subsídio vinculado às
exportações. O fato de subsídio equivalente ser vinculado às vendas no mercado interno não neutraliza a
existência de subsídio à exportação.
Para. 582. “In sum, we agree with the Panel's view that Step 2 payments are export-contingent and,
therefore, an export subsidy for purposes of Article 9 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article 3.1(a)
of the SCM Agreement. The statue and regulations pursuant to which Step 2 payments are granted, on
their face, condition payments to exporters on exportation. (35) In order to claim payment, an exporter
must show proof of exportation. If an exporter does not provide proof of exportation, the exporter will not
receive a payment. This is sufficient to establish that Step 2 payments to exporters of United States
upland cotton are “conditional upon export performance” or “dependent for their existence on export
performance”. (36) That domestic users may also be eligible to receive payments under different
conditions does not eliminate the fact that an exporter will receive payment only upon proof of
exportation.”
3.
Artigo 9.1(c) – Pagamentos pela exportação financiados por medidas governamentais
a)
“pagamentos” e parâmetro a utilizar para determiná-los
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada – Measures Affecting Dairy Products (Canada –
Dairy), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia, WT/DS103/AB/R e WT/DS113/AB/R, paras. 107-108
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação interpretou o significado da expressão “pagamentos”, no Artigo
9.1(c), como compreendendo tanto pagamentos em dinheiro quanto pagamentos em outra forma, como
bens e serviços.
Para. 107. “We have found that the word “payments”, in the term “payments-in-kind” in Article 9.1(a),
denotes a transfer of economic resources. (37) We believe that the same holds true for the word
“payments” in Article 9.1(c). The question which we now address is whether, under Article 9.1(c), the
economic resources that are transferred by way of a “payment” must be in the form of money, or whether
the resources transferred may take other forms. As the Panel observed, the dictionary meaning of the
word “payment” is not limited to payments made in monetary form. In support of this, the Panel cited the
Oxford English Dictionary, which defines “payment” as “the remuneration of a person with money or its
equivalent”. (38) (emphasis added) Similarly, the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary describes a
“payment” as a “sum of money (or other thing) paid”. (39) (emphasis added) Thus, according to these
meanings, a “payment” could be made in a form, other than money, that confers value, such as by way of
44
goods or services. A “payment” which does not take the form of money is commonly referred to as a
“payment in kind”.”
Para. 108. “We agree with the Panel that the ordinary meaning of the word “payments” in Article 9.1(c)
is consistent with the dictionary meaning of the word. Under Article 9.1(c), “payments” are “financed by
virtue of governmental action” and they may or may not involve “a charge on the public account”.
Neither the word “financed” nor the term “a charge” suggests that the word “payments” should be
interpreted to apply solely to money payments. A payment made in the form of goods or services is also
“financed” in the same way as a money payment, and, likewise, “a charge on the public account” may
arise as a result of a payment, or a legally binding commitment to make payment by way of goods or
services, or as a result of revenue foregone.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC Sugar), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil e Tailândia, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R e
WT/DS283/AB/R, paras. 262-265 e 268-269
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que o Artigo 9.1(c) proíbe “pagamentos”, independente
de qual seja a entidade pagante e qual a receptora. Também observou não ser essa proibição vinculada à
identificação de benefícios concretos; o mero pagamento para exportação, ainda que compensado de outra
forma e com resultado zero para o produtor é o objeto da proibição.
Para. 262. “We note, first, that Article 9.1(c) does not qualify the term “payments” by reference to the
entity making, or the entity receiving the payment. This may be contrasted with, for instance, Articles
9.1(a) and 9.1(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture, which specifically refer to the entities making and
also, in the case of Article 9.1(a), to the entity receiving the alleged export subsidy. Moreover, Article
9.1(c), on its face, does not qualify the meaning of the term “payments”, other than by requiring that the
alleged “payments” be “on the export of an agricultural product” and “financed by virtue of governmental
action”.”
Para. 263. “As we noted above, the European Communities submits, first, that a “payment” within the
meaning of Article 9.1(c) requires, by definition, the presence of two distinct legal entities. We agree with
the European Communities that a “payment”, within the meaning of Article 9.1(c), certainly occurs when
one entity transfers economic resources to another entity. For instance, the Panel found — and the
European Communities did not appeal the Panel's finding — that beet growers transfer economic
resources to sugar producers by means of below-cost sales of C beet. In this instance, two distinct
economic operators exist, and the “payment” is made by one to the other.”
Para. 264. “This, however, does not imply that the term “payment” necessarily requires, in each and
every case, the presence of two distinct entities. In other words, contrary to the European Communities'
argument, we do not see, a priori, any reason why “payments”, within the meaning of Article 9.1(c),
cannot include, in the particular circumstances of this dispute, transfers of resources within one economic
entity. (40) The “payment” in this case is not merely a “purely notional “(41) one but, rather, reflects a
very concrete transfer of economic resources to C sugar production. In the specific dispute before us, C
sugar is being sold on the world market by European Communities' sugar producers/exporters at a price
that does not “even remotely” (42) cover its average total cost of production. (43) In the light of the
enormous difference between the price of C sugar and its average total cost of production, we do not see
how the “payment” identified by the Panel was “purely notional”. (44)”
Para. 265. “The European Communities' approach is, in our view, too formalistic. To illustrate, one could
envisage a scenario under which the producers of C sugar are legally distinct from the producers of A and
B sugar. (45) In this situation, the European Communities' approach could recognize that a “payment”
under Article 9.1(c) could exist because there would be a transfer of economic resources between
different parties. (46) If, however, these same producers of A, B, and C sugar were integrated producers
and organized as single legal entities, a payment under Article 9.1(c) would not exist, because the transfer
45
would be merely “internal”. We do not believe that the applicability of Article 9.1(c) should depend on
how an economic entity is legally organized.”
Para. 268. “Having addressed, and rejected, the European Communities' argument that the Panel's
finding is in error, because the “payment” at issue is only an “internal allocation” of resources and it is
“notional”, we turn to another argument put forward by the European Communities. The European
Communities argues that, because the alleged “cross-subsidization” involves no “transfer of resources” to
the sugar producers, it confers no benefit upon these producers and, therefore, cannot be considered to
provide a subsidy. (47) The European Communities disagrees with the Panel's finding that Article 9.1(c)
does not require the demonstration of a benefit for a measure to constitute a “payment” within the
meaning of that provision.”
Para. 269. “The chapeau of Article 9.1 provides: “The following export subsidies are subject to reduction
commitments”. Hence, Article 9.1 sets forth a list of practices that, by definition, involve export
subsidies. In other words, a measure falling within Article 9.1 is deemed to be an export subsidy within
the meaning of Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture. We observe that Article 9.1(c) requires no
independent enquiry into the existence of a “benefit”.”
(i) Parâmetro para pagamentos em espécie – caso dos preços administrados
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products - Second Recourse to the Article 21.5 of the DSU (Canada – Dairy
(21.5 II)), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia, WT/DS103/AB/RW e WT/DS113/AB/RW, paras.
73-76 e 81
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação considerou que “pagamentos para exportação” podem tomar a
forma de preços administrados pelo governo, se fixados em valor mais baixo que o de mercado. Para
aferir qual o preço de comparação, entretanto, não basta compará-lo com o preço determinado pelo
governo para vendas no mercado interno – já que este pode estar acima do preço de mercado, como uma
forma de política social governamental.
Para. 73. “Although we did not have to examine whether the benchmarks used by the panel in the
original proceedings were appropriate, our findings in those proceedings provide guidance in identifying
when “payments” are made under Article 9.1(c). We recall that we upheld the original panel's finding that
“the provision of discounted milk to processors or exporters under Special Classes 5(d) and 5(e) involves
'payments' within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture.” (48) (emphasis added)
In reaching this conclusion, we noted that, where milk is sold at “reduced rates (that is, at below marketrates), 'payments' are, in effect, made to the recipient of the portion of the price that is not charged.” (49)
(emphasis added) We noted that the producer of the milk “foregoes” the uncharged portion of the price.
(50) In short, we indicated that there are “payments” under Article 9.1(c) when the price charged by the
producer of the milk is less than the milk's proper value to the producer. (51)”
Para.74. “Thus, the determination of whether “payments” are involved requires a comparison between
the price actually charged by the provider of the goods or services – the prices of CEM in this case – and
some objective standard or benchmark which reflects the proper value of the goods or services to their
provider – the milk producer in this case. We do not accept Canada's argument that as the producer
negotiates freely the price with the processor, and CEM prices are, therefore, market-determined, it is not
necessary to compare these prices with an objective standard.”
Para. 75. “Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture does not expressly identify any standard for
determining when a measure involves “payments” in the form of payments-in-kind. The absence of an
express standard in Article 9.1(c) may be contrasted with several other provisions involving export
subsidies which do provide an express standard. Thus, for instance, even within Article 9.1 itself, subparagraphs (b) and (e) expressly provide that the domestic market constitutes the appropriate basis for
comparison. (52)”
46
Para. 76. “We believe that it is significant that Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture does not
expressly identify a standard or benchmark for determining whether a measure involves “payments”. It is
clear that the notion of “payments” encompasses a diverse range of practices involving a transfer of
resources, either monetary or in-kind. Moreover, the “payments” may take place in many different factual
and regulatory settings. Accordingly, we believe that it is necessary to scrutinize carefully the facts and
circumstances of a disputed measure, including the regulatory framework surrounding that measure, to
determine the appropriate basis for comparison in assessing whether the measure involves “payments”
under Article 9.1(c).”
Para. 81. “The domestic price in this case is an administered price fixed by the Canadian government as
part of the regulatory framework established by it for managing the supply of milk destined for
consumption in the domestic market. As with administered prices in general, this price expresses a
government policy choice based, not only on economic considerations, but also on other social objectives.
The Canadian regulatory framework for managing domestic milk supply, including the establishment of
the administered price, is not in dispute in this case. There can be little doubt, however, that the
administered price is a price that is favourable to the domestic producers. Consequently, sale of CEM by
the producer at less than the administered domestic price does not, necessarily, imply that the producer
has foregone a portion of the proper value of the milk to it. In the situation where the producer, rather
than the government, chooses to produce and sell CEM in the marketplace at a price it freely negotiates,
we do not believe it is appropriate to use, as a basis for comparison, a domestic price that is fixed by the
government.”
b)
“Parâmetro – Preços mundiais vs. preços internos”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products - Second Recourse to the Article 21.5 of the DSU (Canada - Dairy
(21.5 II)), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia, WT/DS103/AB/RW e WT/DS113/AB/RW, paras.
83-84
Neste trecho, o Órgão de Apelação examinou o uso dos preços praticados no mercado mundial como
parâmetro para determinar se há subsídio. Na interpretação do Órgão de Apelação, entretanto, esse
parâmetro é falho, visto que o preço de venda pode ser equivalente aos preços praticados no mercado
global justamente em virtude do subsídio oferecido (IREP - “Import for Re-export Program”; CEM =
commercial export milk”).
Para. 83. “The alternative “benchmark” which the Panel relied upon to determine whether CEM prices
involve “payments” was the terms and conditions on which alternative supplies are available to
processors on world markets, through IREP. (53) In reviewing this benchmark, we recall that, in these
proceedings, the standard used to determine whether there are “payments” under Article 9.1(c) must be
based on the proper value of the milk to the producer, in order to determine whether the producer
foregoes a portion of this value. If a producer wishes to sell milk for export processing, it is obvious that
the price of the milk to the processor must be competitive with world market prices. If it is not, the
processor will not buy the milk, as it will not be able to produce a final product that is competitive in
export markets. Accordingly, the range of world market prices determines the price which the producer
can charge for milk destined for export markets. (54) World market prices do, therefore, provide one
possible measure of the value of the milk to the producer.”
Para. 84. “However, world market prices do not provide a valid basis for determining whether there are
“payments”, under Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture, for, it remains possible that the reason
CEM can be sold at prices competitive with world market prices is precisely because sales of CEM
involve subsidies that make it competitive. Thus, a comparison between CEM prices and world market
prices gives no indication on the crucial question, namely, whether Canadian export production has been
given an advantage. Furthermore, if the basis for comparison were world market prices, it would be
possible for WTO Members to subsidize domestic inputs for export processing, while taking care to
47
maintain the price of these inputs to the processors at a level which equalled or marginally exceeded
world market prices. There would then be no “payments” under Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on
Agriculture and WTO Members could easily defeat the export subsidy commitments that they have
undertaken in Article 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture. (55)”
c)
“Parâmetro – Custo de produção”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products (Second Recourse to the Article 21.5 of the DSU) (Canada – Dairy
(21.5 II)), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia, WT/DS103/AB/RW e WT/DS113/AB/RW, paras.
87-97
Neste trecho, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que o custo de produção é um parâmetro adequado para
determinar a existência de pagamentos. Lembrou que uma política de apoio interno, desde que compatível
com o Acordo de Agricultura, pode produzir efeitos sobre o preço de exportação do produto sem que
esses configurem incompatibilidade com a proibição ao subsídio à exportação. Observou, entretanto, que
o Acordo não pode permitir que a exportação seja subsidiada por meio de um apoio formalmente interno.
Na interpretação do Órgão de Apelação, o “pagamento” fica configurado quando o preço de exportação
for menor que o custo de produção, este calculado dividindo-se os custos fixos e variáveis da produção de
todo o leite, seja destinado ao mercado doméstico ou à exportação, pelo número total de unidades de leite
produzidas para esses dois mercados.
Para. 87. “Although the proceeds from sales at domestic or world market prices represent two possible
measures of the value of milk to the producer, we do not see these as the only possible measures of this
value. For any economic operator, the production of goods or services involves an investment of
economic resources. In the case of a milk producer, production requires an investment in fixed assets,
such as land, cattle and milking facilities, and an outlay to meet variable costs, such as labour, animal
feed and health-care, power and administration. These fixed and variable costs are the total amount which
the producer must spend in order to produce the milk and the total amount it must recoup, in the longterm, to avoid making losses. To the extent that the producer charges prices that do not recoup the total
cost of production, over time, it sustains a loss which must be financed from some other source, possibly
“by virtue of governmental action”.”
Para. 88. “In our view, reliance upon the total cost of production, in this dispute, as a basis for
determining whether there are “payments” within the meaning of Article 9.1(c), is in harmony with the
domestic support and export subsidies disciplines of the Agreement on Agriculture. Under Article 3 of the
Agreement on Agriculture, WTO Members are entitled to provide “domestic support “to agricultural
producers within the limits of their domestic support commitments. The same Article establishes separate
disciplines on export subsidies which prohibit WTO Members from providing such subsidies in excess of
their export subsidy commitments.”
Para. 89. “It is possible that the economic effects of WTO-consistent domestic support in favour of
producers may “spill over” to provide certain benefits to export production, especially as many
agricultural products result from a single line of production that does not distinguish whether the
production is destined for consumption in the domestic or export market.”
Para. 90. “We believe that it would erode the distinction between the domestic support and export
subsidies disciplines of the Agreement on Agriculture if WTO-consistent domestic support measures were
automatically characterized as export subsidies because they produced spill-over economic benefits for
export production. Indeed, this is another reason why we do not agree with the Panel that sales of CEM at
any price below the administered domestic price for milk can be regarded as “payments” under Article
9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture. Such a basis for comparison would tend to collapse the
distinction between these two different disciplines.”
48
Para. 91. “However, we consider that the distinction between the domestic support and export subsidies
disciplines in the Agreement on Agriculture would also be eroded if a WTO Member were entitled to use
domestic support, without limit, to provide support for exports of agricultural products. Broadly stated,
domestic support provisions of that Agreement, coupled with high levels of tariff protection, allow
extensive support to producers, as compared with the limitations imposed through the export subsidies
disciplines. Consequently, if domestic support could be used, without limit, to provide support for
exports, it would undermine the benefits intended to accrue through a WTO Member's export subsidy
commitments.”
Para 92. “In our view, by relying upon the total cost of production in this dispute, to determine whether
there are “payments”, the integrity of the two disciplines is best respected. The existence of “payments” is
determined by reference to a standard that focuses upon the motivations of the independent economic
operator who is making the alleged “payments” – here the producer – and not upon any government
intervention in the marketplace. More importantly, using this basis for comparison, the potential for WTO
Members to export their agricultural production is preserved, provided that any export-destined sales by a
producer at below the total cost of production are not financed by virtue of governmental action. The
export subsidy disciplines of the Agreement on Agriculture will also be maintained without erosion.”
Para 93. “Our approach is supported by the standards used in items (j) and (k) of the Illustrative List of
the SCM Agreement. Item (j) is concerned with export subsidies that arise through the provision by the
government of a variety of export credit guarantee and insurance programmes. Under item (j), the
provision of such services by the government involves export subsidies when the premium rates charged
do not “cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes”. (emphasis added) Thus, the
measure of value under item (j) is the overall cost to the government, as the service provider, of providing
the service. Likewise, in item (k), where the government provides export credits, the measure of the value
of the service provided by the government is the amount “which [governments] actually have to pay for
the funds so employed (or would have to pay if they borrowed on international capital markets…)”.
Again, the measure of value is by reference to the cost to the government, as the service provider, of
providing the service. Therefore, items (j) and (k) give contextual support and rationale, for using the cost
of production as a standard for determining whether there are “payments” under Article 9.1(c) of the
Agreement on Agriculture in these proceedings.”
Para. 94. “A producer's cost of production may be measured in, at least, two ways. First, for any given
unit of production, for instance a hectolitre of milk, there is an average total cost of production, which is
the total cost of production divided by the total number of units produced, regardless of whether the
production is destined for the domestic or export markets. The total cost of production includes all fixed
and variable costs incurred in the production of all the units in question. Second, there is also the marginal
cost of production which includes only the additional costs incurred by the producer in producing an extra
unit of production. Generally, the marginal cost of production does not include any amount for the fixed
costs of production. Although a producer may very well decide to sell goods or services if the sales price
covers its marginal costs, the producer will make losses on such sales unless all of the remaining costs
associated with making these sales, essentially the fixed costs, are financed through some other source,
such as through highly profitable sales of the product in another market.”
Para. 95. “In the ordinary course of business, an economic operator chooses to invest, produce and sell,
not only to recover the total cost of production, but also in the hope of making profits.”
Para. 96. “Accordingly, in the circumstances of these proceedings, where the alleged payment is made by
an independent economic operator and where the domestic price is administered, we believe that the
average total cost of production represents the appropriate standard for determining whether sales of
CEM involve “payments” under Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture. The average total cost of
production would be determined by dividing the fixed and variable costs of producing all milk, whether
destined for domestic or export markets, by the total number of units of milk produced for both these
markets.”
49
Para. 97. “We observe that, in this part of our findings, we are examining only whether there are
“payments” within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture. Although sales by a
producer below average total cost of production might involve “payments”, this does not, by itself, mean
that such sales involve export subsidies. The export subsidy described in Article 9.1(c) comprises of
several elements, the first of which is that there must be “payments”. But the “payments” will be an
export subsidy only when they are financed by virtue of governmental action. Thus, on the basis of the
standard of average total cost of production, there will be an export subsidy only if the below-cost portion
of an export sale is “financed by virtue of governmental action”.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC –
Subsidies on Sugar), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil e Tailândia, WT/DS265/AB/R,
WT/DS266/AB/R e WT/DS283/AB/R, paras. 266-267 e 287-288
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou a aplicabilidade do parâmetro “custo de produção” para
avaliar a existência de “pagamentos”. Observou ainda que divisões jurídicas efetuadas por um Membro
entre diferentes tipos de produto não afetam o cálculo, o qual deve ser efetuado tendo-se em conta tudo o
que é produzido numa determinada cadeia produtiva e todos os custos em que incorre o produtor.
Para. 266. “Accordingly, we do not share the European Communities' objections to the Panel's findings
on “cross-subsidization” in the case before us. In this respect, we are also mindful of the fact that, in the
ordinary course of business, an economic operator makes a decision to produce and sell a product
expecting to recover the total cost of production and to make profits. Clearly, sales below total cost of
production cannot be sustained in the long term, unless they are financed from some other sources. This is
especially true when the volume of the loss-making sales is substantial. It may be noted that between
1997 and 2002, C sugar exports varied between 1.3 and 3.3 million tonnes (56), with the sales price not
“even remotely” covering the average total cost of production of sugar. (57)”
Para. 267. “Finally, we believe that the Panel did not err when it applied, in ascertaining the existence of
“payments” under Article 9.1(c), the average total cost of production benchmark, which the Appellate
Body held was appropriate in the circumstances in Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US).
Given the huge volumes of C sugar exports and the price at which C sugar is being sold on the world
market, we concur with the Panel that such production quantities cannot be deemed “incidental”. (58) We
note in this context that C sugar represents between 11 and 21 per cent of the European Communities'
total quota production, and that between 1997 and 2002, exports ranged between 1.3 and 3.3 million
tonnes. As we have already noted, C sugar is being sold on the world mar-ket for prices that do not “even
remotely” cover its average total cost of production. (59)”
Para. 287. “The European Communities argues that, even if the Appellate Body were to conclude that
“cross-subsidization” may constitute a “payment” within the meaning of Article 9.1(c), the Panel's
finding is “seriously flawed”. (60) The European Communities contends that, in ascertaining the
existence of “payments”, the Panel erred in using as a benchmark the average total cost of production of
all sugar. According to the European Communities, the Panel should have used, instead, the average total
cost of producing C sugar, because the beet used in the production of C sugar is purchased at prices that
are “generally lower” than the minimum prices for A and B beet. (61)”
Para. 288. “The average total cost of production of sugar includes the cost of all economic resources used
in sugar production, which means the cost of all economic resources invested in beet production,
transport, and processing of beet into sugar, which is only notionally classified into A, B, and C sugar. It
is for this reason that the Panel emphasized that “[s]ugar is sugar whether or not produced under an EC
created designation of A, B or C sugar.” (62) The Panel further emphasized that “A, B or C sugar are part
of the same line of production” (63) and that “[t]here is no independent production of C sugar.” (64) It
follows, in our view, that the average total cost of production of C sugar must be the same as the average
total cost of production of all sugar. The European Communities' argument is flawed because the price of
C beet does not determine the average total cost of production of C sugar. For these reasons, we do not
agree with the European Communities that the Panel's use of the average total cost of production of all
50
sugar as a benchmark for ascertaining the existence of payments was flawed in the particular
circumstances of this case.”
d)
“Critério – Totalidade do setor vs. produtores individuais”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products (Second Recourse to the Article 21.5 of the DSU) (Canada – Dairy
(21.5 II)), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia, WT/DS103/AB/RW2 e WT/DS113/AB/RW2 paras.
96-97
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação detalhou a interpretação do “custo de produção” para efeitos de
comparação com o preço de venda. Esse custo e esse preço não devem ser examinados para produtores
individuais, mas para toda a produção e venda daquele produto atribuída ao Membro em questão – visto
que é sobre este que incidem as obrigações da OMC.
Para. 96. “We believe that the standard for determining the existence of “payments”, under Article
9.1(c), should reflect the fact that the obligation at issue is an international obligation imposed on Canada.
The question is not whether one or more individual milk producers, efficient or not, are selling CEM at a
price above or below their individual costs of production. The issue is whether Canada, on a national
basis, has respected its WTO obligations and, in particular, its commitment levels. It, therefore, seems to
us that the benchmark should be a single, industry-wide cost of production figure, rather than an
indefinite number of cost of production figures for each individual producer. The industry-wide figure
enables cost of production data for producers, as a whole, to be aggregated into a single, national standard
that can be used to assess Canada's compliance with its international obligations.”
Para. 97. “By contrast, if the benchmark were to operate at the level of each individual producer, there
would be a proliferation of standards, requiring individual-level inquiry and application of Article 9.1(c),
as if the obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture involved rights and obligations of individual
producers, rather than WTO Members.”
e)
“Custos atribuídos pelo Painel”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products (Second Recourse to the Article 21.5 of the DSU) (Canada – Dairy
(21.5 II)), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia, WT/DS103/AB/RW2 e WT/DS113/AB/RW2, paras.
102-104 e 107-108
Neste trecho, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou que nos “custos de produção” deve ser incluído o preço do
trabalho. No caso de trabalho exercido pelo produtor e por seus familiares, o painel pode atribuir a esse
trabalho um preço. Também deve ser incluído no custo de produção o custo do capital. Finalmente, o
Órgão de Apelação determinou que algum lucro deve ser incluído entre os custos de produção – lucro
esse que deve existir após contabilizados os custos do trabalho e do capital. A contabilidade desses fatores
pode ser efetuada utilizando-se como base as diretrizes de contabilidade vigentes (GAAP) ou por outra
forma determinada pelo Painel por meio de uma “metodologia objetiva que seja razoável nas
circunstâncias”.
Para. 102. “In these proceedings, the purpose of the COP standard is precisely to determine whether
supplies of CEM involve payments-in-kind that are made in a form other than money. If the COP
standard were confined solely to cash costs, as Canada argues, this would overlook the possibility of
“payments” being made in the form of non-cash resources invested in the production of milk. Thus, the
COP standard must cover all of the economic resources invested in the production of milk and which may
be transferred, irrespective of whether the resources involve an actual cash cost.”
51
Para. 103. “We are satisfied that any labour or management services provided by the farmer's family to
the dairy enterprise are relevant economic resources invested in the production of milk and must be
included in the COP standard. For the dairy farmer, and his or her family, the investment of services in
the dairy enterprise has an economic cost, as those services cannot be put to an alternative remunerative
use. We observe that both the United States and New Zealand submitted evidence to the Panel in support
of the view that, from the perspective of economic theory, any labour and management services provided
to an enterprise involve such an economic “opportunity” cost. (65) Moreover, we believe that
remuneration of family labour and management services is not part of the profits of the dairy farm.
Rather, profits are the proceeds remaining after all costs, including such salary costs, have been accounted
for.”
Para. 104. “The same is also true of any equity the owner invests in the dairy enterprise. The allocation
of such capital is, clearly, an investment of economic resources and carries an economic opportunity cost
to the owner because the capital cannot simultaneously be invested elsewhere. (66) Again, the profits of
the dairy enterprise are the proceeds after all costs, including the cost of equity, have been accounted for.”
Para. 107. “Although it is clear that the COP standard includes all economic costs, even if they are
noncash costs, we acknowledge that a specific value cannot be as readily ascribed to non-cash costs as it
can to cash costs. However, we do not believe, as suggested by Canada, that this practical difficulty
precludes the application of an objective COP standard.”
Para. 108. “In some situations, it may be appropriate for a panel to value non-monetary costs using a
methodology set forth in a Member's Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”). In that
respect, we observe that Canada did not contest the amounts the Canadian Dairy Commission (the
“CDC”) ascribed to depreciation using the rules in Canadian GAAP. (67) However, although GAAP
provide an objective valuation methodology for some non-monetary costs, they may not address all such
costs. (68) If GAAP rules do not provide an appropriate basis for valuing a particular cost, a panel should
attempt to determine a value for relevant non-monetary costs using an objective methodology that is
reasonable in the circumstances. Clearly, a panel must base itself on the evidence before it, applying the
applicable rules on burden of proof.”
f)
“Custos da venda do produto e da compra de quotas”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products (Second Recourse to the Article 21.5 of the DSU) (Canada – Dairy
(21.5 II)), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia, WT/DS103/AB/RW2 e WT/DS113/AB/RW2, paras.
113-114
Neste trecho, o Órgão de Apelação observou que “custos de produção” incluem não apenas os custos
associados à produção, mas também aqueles associados à venda do produto em questão – no caso do
produtos agrícolas, as despesas extra-fazenda (transporte, comercialização e administração). Finalmente,
quaisquer custos derivados da compra de direitos (cotas) de produção também devem ser incluídos na
determinação do custo de produção. Uma venda abaixo desse custo significa uma transferência efetiva de
recursos do produtor para o processador do produto.
Para. 113. “We recall that the COP standard represents the producer's investment of economic resources
in milk and, hence, in these proceedings, the proper value of the milk to the producer. (69) In our view,
costs incurred by the producer in selling milk are as much a part of the economic resources the producer
invests in the milk as are farm-based production costs. Indeed, the costs incurred to make sales are a vital
part of the process by which the producer earns revenues through producing milk. If the producer sells
milk at a price sufficient to cover only the farm-based production costs, it transfers to the processor any
resources invested in selling the milk, such as the value of transport, marketing, and administration. There
would, in such circumstances, be a “payment” of the value of these additional selling costs. Accordingly,
these costs must be included in the COP standard in the comparison with the sales price of CEM.”
52
Para. 114. “In addition, we can see no reason to exclude the cost of quota from the COP standard. On the
contrary, to the extent that the acquisition or retention of quota involves economic costs for the dairy
producer, these costs should be reflected in the COP standard. In that respect, we are not persuaded by
Canada that the cost of quota should be excluded from the COP standard because it relates solely to the
domestic market. In the first Article 21.5 proceedings, we held that the COP standard must be determined
for “all milk, whether destined for domestic or export markets”. (70) Thus, in principle, the costs of quota
form part of the COP standard. It remains, however, to decide how quota costs are to be incorporated into
the standard.”
g)
“beneficiários”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products - Second Recourse to the Article 21.5 of the DSU (Canada – Dairy
(21.5 II)), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia, WT/DS103/AB/RW2 e WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para.
152
Neste trecho, o Órgão de Apelação definiu que não é necessário que todos os produtores de uma
determinada mercadoria sejam beneficiados pela medida para que ela seja considerada ilícita.
Para. 152. “Before concluding, we wish to comment on Canada's arguments concerning the
approximately 100 producers out of the 8,000 who sell CEM, and out of the total of 19,000 producers that
do not participate in the domestic market at all and sell solely CEM. (71) Canada argues that the Panel
erred in finding that, for these producers, sales of CEM involve payments “financed by virtue of
governmental action”. We do not believe that it is necessary for us to make any findings regarding these
100 producers. The complaint made by New Zealand and the United States is that Canada has acted
inconsistently with its export subsidy commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture. Canada may act
inconsistently with these commitments, as we have found, even if some producers never make payments
financed by virtue of governmental action.”
h)
“por medidas governamentais”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products (Second Recourse to the Article 21.5 of the DSU) (Canada - Dairy
(21.5 II)), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia, WT/DS103/AB/RW e WT/DS113/AB/RW, paras.
112-113
Neste trecho, o Órgão de Apelação interpretou o significado de “medidas governamentais”. Determinou
que por “medidas” se designa a totalidade das atividades essenciais do governo: o poder de regular,
controlar e supervisionar indivíduos, assim como o de limitar sua conduta por meio da autoridade legal.
Observou ainda que, para caracterizar o subsídio, deve haver um nexo de causalidade entre a “medida” e
o financiamento dos pagamentos efetuados.
Para. 112. “Although the phrase “financed by virtue of governmental action” must be understood as a
whole, it is useful to consider separately the meaning of the different parts of this phrase. Taking the
words “governmental action” first, we observe that the text of Article 9.1(c) does not place any
qualifications on the types of “governmental action” which may be relevant under Article 9.1(c). In the
original proceedings, we stated that “[t]he essence of 'government' is … that it enjoys the effective power
to 'regulate', 'control' or 'supervise' individuals, or otherwise 'restrain' their conduct, through the exercise
of lawful authority.” (72) In our opinion the word “action” embraces the full-range of these activities,
including governmental action regulating the supply and price of milk in the domestic market.”
Para. 113. “Mere governmental action is not, however, sufficient for a finding that there is an export
subsidy under Article 9.1(c). The words “by virtue of “ indicate that there must be a demonstrable link
between the governmental action at issue and the financing of the payments, whereby the payments are,
in some way, financed as a result of, or as a consequence of, the governmental action. In our view, the
53
link between governmental action and the financing of payments will be more difficult to establish, as an
evidentiary matter, when the payment is in the form of a payment-in-kind rather than in monetary form,
and all the more so when the payment-in-kind is made, not by the government, but by an independent
economic operator. In any event, it will not be sufficient simply to demonstrate that a payment occurs as a
consequence of governmental action because the word “financed”, in Article 9.1(c), must also be given
meaning.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products (Second Recourse to the Article 21.5 of the DSU) (Canada – Dairy
(21.5 II)), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia, WT/DS103/AB/RW2 e WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para.
87
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que o “pagamento”, no caso do Artigo 9.1(c), desde que
“financiado por medidas governamentais”, pode ser feito não pelo governo mas por entes privados.
Definiu que a determinação de se houve “pagamentos” deve ocorrer após escrutínio cuidadoso da
situação factual e regulatória da medida.
Para. 87. “In examining this question in the first Article 21.5 proceedings, we took into account that
Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture describes an unusual form of subsidy in that “payments”
can be made by private parties, and need not be made by government. (73) Moreover, “payments” need
not be funded from government resources, provided they are “financed by virtue of governmental action”.
(74) Article 9.1(c), therefore, contemplates that “payments” may be made and funded by private parties,
without the type of governmental involvement ordinarily associated with a subsidy. Furthermore, the
notion of payments encompasses a diverse range of practices involving monetary transfers, or transfersin-kind. We, therefore, determined that, in identifying whether “payments” are made, it is necessary to
consider the particular features of the alleged “payments”, by whom they are made, and in what
circumstances. Thus, we found that the standard for determining the existence of “payments” under
Article 9.1(c) must be identified after careful scrutiny of the factual and regulatory setting of the measure.
(75)”
i)
“Medidas governamentais vs. medidas privadas”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products (Second Recourse to the Article 21.5 of the DSU) (Canada – Dairy
(21.5 II)), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia, WT/DS103/AB/RW2 e WT/DS113/AB/RW2, paras.
95, 127-128 e 147
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que, embora o Artigo 9.1(c) se refira a pagamentos
feitos por entes privados, os compromissos assumidos pelos Membros da OMC implicam serem estes os
responsáveis pelo seu cumprimento integral. Pagamentos privados contam, portanto, para o limite de
pagamentos totais definido na lista de compromissos dos Membros. O Artigo requer apenas que esses
pagamentos ocorram em virtude de medidas governamentais, tenham ou não caráter obrigatório para os
entes privados. Nesse sentido, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que as medidas do Canadá vão muito
além do estabelecimento de um quadro regulatório, fornecendo aos produtores envolvidos os incentivos e
os recursos necessários para vender seu produto abaixo do custo de produção.
Para. 95. “However, under Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture, it is not solely the conduct of
WTO Members that is relevant. We have noted that Article 9.1(c) describes an unusual form of export
subsidy in that “payments” can be made and funded by private parties, and not just by government. (76)
The conduct of private parties, therefore, may play an important role in applying Article 9.1(c). Yet,
irrespective of the role of private parties under Article 9.1(c), the obligations imposed in relation to
Article 9.1(c) remain obligations imposed on Canada. It is Canada, and not private parties, which is
responsible for ensuring that it respects its export subsidy commitments under the covered agreements.
Thus, under the Agreement on Agriculture, any “export subsidies” provided through private party action
54
in Canada are deemed to be provided by Canada, and count towards Canada's export subsidy commitment
levels.”
Para. 127. “As regards “governmental action”, we held in the first Article 21.5 proceedings that “the text
of Article 9.1(c) does not place any qualifications on the types of 'governmental action' which may be
relevant under Article 9.1(c).” (77) Instead, the provision gives but one example of governmental action
that is “included” in Article 9.1(c) — however, this example is merely illustrative. (78) Accordingly, we
stated that Article 9.1(c) “embraces the full-range” of activities by which governments “'regulate',
'control' or 'supervise' individuals”. (79) In particular, we said that governmental action “regulating the
supply and price of milk in the domestic market” might be relevant “action” under Article 9.1(c). (80)
Moreover, the governmental action may be a single act or omission, or a series of acts or omissions.”
Para. 128. “We observe that Article 9.1(c) does not require that payments be financed by virtue of
government “mandate”, or other “direction”. Although the word “action” certainly covers situations
where government mandates or directs that payments be made, it also covers other situations where no
such compulsion is involved.” (81)
Para. 147. “We do not agree with Canada that the circumstances indicate that the Canadian government
has merely created a regulatory framework whereby it has enabled producers to sell CEM at prices that
are below the costs of production. Certainly, producers decide for themselves whether and when to sell
CEM. However, governmental action in the domestic market goes further than simply creating a
regulatory environment in which producers choose to make export payments using their own resources.
Rather, as we have said, Canadian governmental action is instrumental in providing a significant
percentage of producers with the resources that enable them to sell CEM at below the costs of
production.”
j)
por (“by virtue of”)
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Affecting Dairy Exports (Canada –
Dairy), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia, WT/DS103/AB/R e WT/DS113/AB/R, paras. 119-120
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação examinou o nexo causal que deve haver entre as “medidas
governamentais” e os “pagamentos”. Estabeleceu que o subsídio “por” (“by virtue of”) medidas
governamentais fica caracterizado quando, ainda que não seja o governo a arcar com o custo da
exportação a preços reduzidos, medidas governamentais sejam indispensáveis para a transferência de
recursos que permite esses preços reduzidos.
Para. 119. “In assessing whether the Panel erred in finding that the “payments” made under Special
Classes 5(d) and 5(e) are “financed by virtue of governmental action”, it is appropriate to look to the
“governmental” involvement as whole and not just to the role of the provincial milk marketing boards.
The functioning of the system depends on a complex regulatory web involving the CDC and the
CMSMC, acting together with the provincial milk marketing boards. It is, therefore, the “action” of all
these bodies together which must be examined.”
Para. 120. “While the “cost of selling milk at a reduced price for export is not borne by the government”
(82), “governmental action” is, in our view, indispensable to the transfer of resources that takes place as a
result of the operation of Special Classes 5(d) and 5(e). The factors relied upon by the Panel, which we
have summarized above (83), demonstrate that at every stage in the supply of milk under Special Classes
5(d) and 5(e), from the determination of the volume and the authorization of the purchase of milk for
processing for export, to the calculation of the price of the milk to the processors and the return to the
producers, “governmental action” is not simply involved; it is, in fact, indispensable to enable the supply
of milk to processors for export, and hence the transfer of resources, to take place. In the regulatory
framework, “government agencies” stand so completely between the producers of the milk and the
processors or the exporters that we have no doubt that the transfer of resources takes place “by virtue of
governmental action”.”
55
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC –
Subsidies on Sugar), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil e Tailândia, WT/DS265/AB/R,
WT/DS266/AB/R e WT/DS283/AB/R, paras. 237-239
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação sublinhou a necessidade de fazer uma análise caso a caso no
nexo de causalidade entre uma medida governamental e o financiamento de pagamentos a fim de
determinar a existência de subsídios. Sem elaborar um teste preciso, o Órgão notou que a política das CE
criava incentivos para a venda de um produto [beterraba tipo C, para exportação] abaixo do preço de
custo, com a finalidade de garantir a venda de outros produtos [beterraba tipos A e B] a preços mais altos.
O mais próximo de uma fórmula específica elaborada pelo Órgão de Apelação foi manifestar não ter
“nenhuma dúvida de que, sem os preços altamente vantajosos para beterraba tipos A e B, garantidos pelo
regime de açúcar das CE, as vendas lucrativas de beterraba tipo C abaixo do custo de produção não
ocorreriam”.
Para. 237. “With respect to the words “by virtue of”, the Appellate Body has previously held that there
must be a “nexus” or “demonstrable link” between the governmental action at issue and the financing of
payments. (84) The Appellate Body clarified that not every governmental action will have the requisite
“nexus” to the financing of payments. (85) For instance, the Appellate Body held that the “demonstrable
link” between “governmental action” and the “financing” of payments would not exist in a scenario in
which “governmental action ... establish[es] a regulatory framework merely enabling a third person freely
to make and finance 'payments'. (86) In this situation, the link between the governmental action and the
financing of payments would be “too tenuous”, such that the “payments” could not be regarded as
“financed by virtue of governmental action” within the meaning of Article 9.1(c). (87) Rather, according
to the Appellate Body, there must be a “tighter nexus” between the mechanism or process by which the
payments are financed (even if by a third person) and governmental action. (88) In this respect, the
Appellate Body clarified that, although governmental action is essential, Article 9.1(c) contemplates that
“payments may be financed by virtue of governmental action even though significant aspects of the
financing might not involve government.” (89) Thus, even if government does not fund the payments
itself, it must play a sufficiently important part in the process by which a private party funds “payments”,
such that the requisite nexus exists between “governmental action” and the “financing”. (90) The alleged
link must be examined on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the particular character of the
governmental action at issue and its relationship to the payments made. (91)”
Para. 238. “Turning to the specific circumstances of the present dispute, we note that, in its finding that
“payments” in the form of sales of C beet below its total cost of production are “financed by virtue of
governmental action”, the Panel relied on a number of aspects of the EC sugar regime. The Panel
considered, inter alia, that: the EC sugar regime regulates prices of A and B beet and establishes a
framework for the contractual relationships between beet growers and sugar producers with a view to
ensuring a stable and adequate income for beet growers (92); C beet is invariably produced together with
A and B beet in one single line of production (93); a significant percentage of beet growers are likely to
finance sales of C beet below the total cost of production as a result of participation in the domestic
market by making “highly remunerative” sales of A and B beet (94); the European Communities
“controls virtually every aspect of domestic beet and sugar supply and management”, including through
financial penalties imposed on sugar producers that divert C sugar into the domestic market (95); the
European Communities' Sugar Management Committee “overviews, supervises and protects the
[European Communities'] domestic sugar through, inter alia, supply management” (96); the growing of C
beet is not “incidental”, but rather an “integral” part of the governmental regulation of the sugar market
(97); and C sugar producers “have incentives to produce C sugar so as to maintain their share of the A and
B quotas”, while C beet growers “have an incentive to supply as much as is requested by C sugar
producers with a view to receiving the high prices for A and B beet and their allocated amount of ... C
beet”. (98)”
Para. 239. “We agree with the Panel that, in the circumstances of the present case, all of these aspects of
the EC sugar regime have a direct bearing on whether below-cost sales of C beet are financed by virtue of
governmental action. As a result, we are unable to agree with the European Communities' first argument
56
on appeal, namely, that the Panel applied a test under which an Article 9.1(c) subsidy was deemed to exist
“simply because [governmental] action 'enabled' the beet growers to finance and make payments”. (99)
Rather, we believe that the Panel relied on aspects of the EC sugar regime that go far beyond merely
“enabling” or “permitting” beet growers to make payments to sugar producers. Indeed, in our view, there
is a tight nexus between the European Communities' “governmental action” and the financing of
payments in the case before us. We have no doubt that, without the highly remunerative prices guaranteed
by the EC sugar regime for A and B beet, sales of C beet could not take place profitably at a price below
the total cost of production.”
k)
“financiado”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products (Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU) (Canada - Dairy (21.5
II)), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia, WT/DS103/AB/RW2 e WT/DS113/AB/RW2, paras. 132133 e 139-140
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação interpretou a palavra “financiado”, notando que uma possível
leitura – na qual o financiamento com recursos governamentais seria essencial para a infração – é
excluída pelo próprio artigo. Ainda assim, determinou, para configurar o necessário nexo de causalidade é
preciso que o governo tenha um papel suficientemente importante no processo pelo qual um ente privado
realiza os pagamentos. No caso, as vendas abaixo do custo são “financiadas” pelo fato de que outras
vendas são efetuadas de forma extremamente vantajosa, pagando parte ou a totalidade dos custos fixos.
Torna-se então possível vender abaixo do preço de custo, bastando que o preço de venda da unidade
adicional seja mais alto do que o custo marginal de fabricá-la.
Para. 132. “This brings us to the meaning of the word “financing”. The word refers generally to the
mechanism or process by which financial resources are provided to enable “payments” to be made. The
word could, therefore, be read to mean that government itself must provide the resources for producers to
make payments. However, Article 9.1(c) expressly precludes such a reading, as it states that “payments”
need not involve “a charge on the public account”. This is borne out by the fact that the text indicates that
“financing” need only be “by virtue of governmental action”, rather than “by government” itself. Article
9.1(c), therefore, contemplates that “payments may be financed by virtue of governmental action even
though significant aspects of the financing might not involve government.” (100) Indeed, as we have said,
payments may be made, and funded, by private parties. (101)”
Para. 133. “The word “financing” must, nonetheless, be given meaning. Accordingly, even if
government does not fund the payments itself, it must play a sufficiently important part in the process by
which a private party funds “payments”, such that the requisite nexus exists between “governmental
action” and “financing”.”
Para. 139. “Where fungible goods, such as milk, are produced using a single line of production, but sold
in two different markets, the fixed costs of production are, in principle, shared between sales revenues
from both markets. However, in the event that one of the two markets offers much higher revenues, a
disproportionately large part, possibly even all, of the shared fixed costs may be borne by sales made in
the more remunerative market.”
Para. 140. “Where sales in the more remunerative market bear more than their relative proportion of
shared fixed costs, sales in the other market do not need to cover their relative proportion of the shared
fixed costs in order to be profitable. (102) Rather, these sales can be made profitably below the average
total cost of production. If the more remunerative sales cover all fixed costs, sales in the other market can
be made profitably at any price above marginal cost. In these situations, the higher revenue sales
effectively “finance” a part of the lower revenue sales by funding the portion of the shared fixed costs
attributable to the lower priced products.”
l)
“subsídios cruzados”
57
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC Sugar), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil e Tailândia, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R e
WT/DS283/AB/R, paras. 263-265 e 273-275
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação rejeitou o que considerou uma “visão excessivamente formalista” da
noção de pagamento, que requereria diferentes entidades jurídicas realizando “pagamentos” umas para as
outras. Enfatizou, em vez disso, a extremamente concreta transferência de recursos econômicos para a
produção de açúcar tipo C, o qual termina por ser vendido no mercado global a preço muito abaixo de seu
custo médio de produção. Rejeitou assim a legalidade do “subsídio cruzado”, no qual o produtor vende
um produto abaixo do preço de custo para vender outros a preço mais vantajoso (ver também Relatório do
Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada – Dairy (21.5 II), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia,
WT/DS103/AB/RW2 e WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para. 148.
Para. 263. “As we noted above, the European Communities submits, first, that a “payment” within the
meaning of Article 9.1(c) requires, by definition, the presence of two distinct legal entities. We agree with
the European Communities that a “payment”, within the meaning of Article 9.1(c), certainly occurs when
one entity transfers economic resources to another entity. For instance, the Panel found — and the
European Communities did not appeal the Panel's finding — that beet growers transfer economic
resources to sugar producers by means of below-cost sales of C beet. In this instance, two distinct
economic operators exist, and the “payment” is made by one to the other.”
Para. 264. “This, however, does not imply that the term “payment” necessarily requires, in each and
every case, the presence of two distinct entities. In other words, contrary to the European Communities'
argument, we do not see, a priori, any reason why “payments”, within the meaning of Article 9.1(c),
cannot include, in the particular circumstances of this dispute, transfers of resources within one economic
entity. (103) The “payment” in this case is not merely a “purely notional” (104) one but, rather, reflects a
very concrete transfer of economic resources to C sugar production. In the specific dispute before us, C
sugar is being sold on the world market by European Communities' sugar producers/exporters at a price
that does not “even remotely” (105) cover its average total cost of production. (106) In the light of the
enormous difference between the price of C sugar and its average total cost of production, we do not see
how the “payment” identified by the Panel was “purely notional”. (107)”
Para. 265. “The European Communities' approach is, in our view, too formalistic. To illustrate, one could
envisage a scenario under which the producers of C sugar are legally distinct from the producers of A and
B sugar. (108) In this situation, the European Communities' approach could recognize that a “payment”
under Article 9.1(c) could exist because there would be a transfer of economic resources between
different parties. (109) If, however, these same producers of A, B, and C sugar were integrated producers
and organized as single legal entities, a payment under Article 9.1(c) would not exist, because the transfer
would be merely “internal”. We do not believe that the applicability of Article 9.1(c) should depend on
how an economic entity is legally organized.”
Para. 273. “The European Communities argues that the Panel misinterpreted the requirement that a
payment be “on the export” of an agricultural product, as contained in Article 9.1(c). (…)”
Para. 274. “(…) the Panel based its findings on the following reasoning:
C sugar [can] only be sold for export. If not reclassified, C sugar “may not be
disposed of in the Community's internal market and must be exported without
further processing.” Because of that legal requirement, advantages, payments or
subsidies to C sugar, that must
be exported, are subsidies “on the export” of that product. (110) (footnote
omitted)”
58
Para. 275. “We agree with the Panel. Under Article 13(1) of EC Regulation 1260/2001, C sugar “must be
exported”. (111) It follows that payments in the form of “cross-subsidization” are, by definition,
“payments” “on the export”.”
4.
Artigo 9.1(d) – Subsídio para “reduzir os custos de comercialização”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales
Corporations” (US - FSC), Demandante: CE, WT/DS108/AB/R, paras. 130-131
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação reverteu uma decisão do Painel. Esta considerava que o imposto
de renda reduzido, permitido pelo regime FSC para a renda derivada de exportações, implicava uma
redução do custo de comercialização dessas exportações, e era, portanto, incompatível com o Artigo
9.1(d). O Órgão de Apelação entendeu que só havia relação entre o benefício e a comercialização em
sentido bastante amplo, e que aceitá-la implicaria aceitar que quase qualquer custo de uma empresa que
exporte está ligado à comercialização de exportações.
Para. 130. “The text of Article 9.1(d) lists “handling, upgrading and other processing costs, and the costs
of international transport and freight” as examples of “costs of marketing”. The text also states that
“export promotion and advisory services” are covered by Article 9.1(d), provided that they are not
“widely available”. These are not examples of just any “cost of doing business” that “effectively
reduce[s] the cost of marketing” products. (112) Rather, they are specific types of costs that are incurred
as part of and during the process of selling a product. They differ from general business costs, such as
administrative overhead and debt financing costs, which are not specific to the process of putting a
product on the market, and which are, therefore, related to the marketing of exports only in the broadest
sense.”
Para. 131. “It seems to us that income tax liability under the FSC measure can also be viewed as related
to the business of marketing exports only in the very broadest sense. Income tax liability under the FSC
measure arises only when goods are actually sold for export, that is, when they have been the subject of
successful marketing. Such liability arises because goods have, in fact, been sold, and not as part of the
process of marketing them. Furthermore, at the time goods are sold, the costs associated with putting
them on the market – costs such as handling, promotion and distribution costs – have already been
incurred and the amount of these costs is not altered by the income tax, the amount of which is calculated
by reference to the sale price of the goods. In our view, if income tax liability arising from export sales
can be viewed as among the “costs of marketing exports”, then so too can virtually any other cost
incurred by a business engaged in exporting. This cannot be what was intended by Article 9.1(d). We,
therefore, hold that income tax liability arising from export sales is not part of the “costs of marketing” a
product.”
5.
Artigo 9.2 – Níveis de compromisso em desembolsos orçamentários e quantidade
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC Sugar), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil e Tailândia, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R e
WT/DS283/AB/R, para. 194
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação utilizou como contexto de interpretação diversas alíneas e
incisos do Artigo 9.2. Esses dispositivos fazem referência conjunta a limites quantitativos e orçamentários
à concessão de subsídios. Evidenciam, segundo o Órgão de Apelação, a impossibilidade de a lista de
compromissos de um Membro incluir uma limitação quantitativa sem correspondente limitação
orçamentária.
Para. 194. “We find contextual support for the above interpretation in Article 9.2(b)(iv) of the Agreement
on Agriculture (…). This provision prescribes the export subsidy commitment levels to be reached at the
conclusion of the implementation period (and to be maintained thereafter), and those commitment levels
are expressed in terms of both budgetary outlays and quantities. We do not see how a Member could
comply with Article 9.2(b)(iv), or for that matter Article 9.2(a), without having specified its export
59
subsidy commitments in terms of both budgetary outlays and quantities. We also consider it significant
that both Article 9.2(b)(iii) and Article 9.2(b)(iv) use the expression “budgetary outlays for export
subsidies and the quantities benefiting from such subsidies”. (emphasis added) This shows the drafters'
recognition of the need to address the budgetary outlays and quantities together.”
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 9 determina as obrigações dos Membros em matéria de subsídios à exportação de produtos
agrícolas. O Artigo 9.1 enumera os tipos de subsídio à exportação sujeitos a limitações, enquanto o Artigo
9.2 especifica o nível de subsídios permitido, tanto em termos orçamentários quanto em termos de
quantidade de produto que pode ser subsidiada a cada ano. O Artigo 9.3, que explicita a obrigação dos
Membros de respeitar os limites de ampliação do escopo dos subsídios previstos nas Listas de
compromisso, e o Artigo 9.4, o qual isentava os países em desenvolvimento de algumas restrições durante
o período de implementação, não foram referidos ao DSB.
O Artigo 9.1 foi objeto de extensa interpretação pelo Órgão de Apelação. Essa interpretação se
caracteriza, sobretudo, por seu caráter teleológico, orientado pela necessidade de dar efetividade aos
compromissos assumidos pelos Membros. Em diversas ocasiões o Órgão de Apelação evitou a criação de
“testes” formais, preferindo a eles um exame das circunstâncias específicas do caso concreto. O essencial
é que sejam cumpridos os objetivos de redução de subsídios estabelecidos pelo Acordo de Agricultura.
Dentro desse quadro, o Órgão de Apelação tem privilegiado a flexibilidade sobre o formalismo na
interpretação do que constitui, efetivamente, um subsídio à exportação.
Nesse sentido, configuram os subsídios do Artigo 9.1(a) não apenas o pagamento em dinheiro, mas todas
as medidas que, sob qualquer forma, impliquem transferências de recursos. Isso inclui pagamentos em
espécie, considerados subsídios diretos, e ainda transferências de recursos ao produtor mediante
contrapartida, se esta não tiver valor equivalente ao dos recursos fornecidos pelo governo ou organismo
público. A interpretação do que seja um “organismo público” também independe do estatuto formal do
ente em questão: avalia-se a função por ele exercida – de regular, controlar, supervisionar ou restringir a
conduta de entes privados – e a autoridade em que se firma, derivada do poder do governo.
Também o Artigo 9.1(c) foi interpretado de maneira a afastar o formalismo, verificando-se em vez disso a
existência de pagamentos concretos. Em primeiro lugar, o Órgão de Apelação definiu, em consonância
com o texto do artigo, que não é necessário que o pagamento saia do caixa governamental para que se
configure o subsídio. Determinou ainda que um “pagamento para exportação... financiado por medidas
governamentais” não precisa ser financiado pelo governo, mas apenas ocorrer “por” (“by virtue of”, em
virtude de) uma medida governamental. Pode-se, portanto, caracterizar esse tipo de subsídio ainda que
todas as transações envolvidas sejam realizadas entre agentes privados. Basta que a regulamentação em
vigor tenha por efeito levar os produtores a produzir e mercadoria para exportação além do que seria
esperado num regime de mercado, demonstrando a existência de “pagamentos”.
A mesma análise teleológica permitiu afastar a aplicação do Artigo. Em US – FSC, o Órgão de Apelação
definiu que o imposto de renda mitigado incidente sobre a renda derivada de exportações não constituía
“concessão de subsídios para reduzir os custos de comercialização” nos termos do Artigo 9.1(d). A
aplicação do artigo foi rejeitada apesar de a relação entre benefício e exportação se encaixar nos
requisitos elaborados pelo Órgão de Apelação para detectar subsídios em outros casos. Numa
interpretação claramente teleológica, o Órgão de Apelação argumentou que, caso se fosse considerar o
imposto de renda como parte dos custos de comercialização, então qualquer custo pago por uma empresa
que exporta teria esse caráter – o que “não pode ser a intenção do Artigo 9.1(d)”.
O Artigo 9.2, o qual isentava os Membros do cumprimento estrito de seus compromissos até 1999, deu
margem a duas interpretações importantes. A primeira é de que, findo o período de implementação, o
limite do Artigo 9.2(b)(iv) aplica-se mesmo aos Membros que não fizeram uso da isenção temporária do
Artigo 9.2(b). E a segunda é de que os compromissos nas listas devem ser interpretados como implicando
tanto a redução dos desembolsos orçamentários como a redução da quantidade exportada.
60
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 30: In our view, the reduction commitment levels to be achieved at the conclusion of the implementation period, as
specified in Article 9.2(b)(iv), apply equally to all Members whether they avail themselves of the flexibility provisions of Article
9.2(b)(iv), or not.
Footnote 31: Supra, footnote 49, paras. 156 and 157.
Footnote 32: Black's Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co., 1990), p. 695. The same dictionary states that “[t]he term 'jural
society' is used as the synonym of 'state' or 'organized political community'“, p. 851.
Footnote 33: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Lesley Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), Vol. I, p. 1123;
Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Frederick Mish (ed.) (Merriam Webster Inc., 1993), p. 504.
Footnote 34: Black's Law Dictionary, supra, footnote 73, pp. 62 and 63.
Footnote 35: Panel Report, para. 7.734.
Footnote 36: See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 47.
Footnote 37: Supra, para 87.
Footnote 38: Panel Report, para. 7.92.
Footnote 39: The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, C.T. Onions (ed.) (Guild Publishing, 1983), Vol. II, p. 1532
Footnote 40: In any event, we also note that the Panel did not describe “cross-subsidization” - the “payment” at issue - as
consisting merely of an “internal allocation”, within one single economic entity, of that entity's resources. Rather, the Panel
considered the cumulative advantages that sugar producers receive from the operation of the EC sugar regime to be a key
component of the “payment” in the form of cross-subsidization. The Panel went on to state that “to the extent that the fixed costs
of A, B and C [sugar production] are largely paid for by the profits made on sales of A and B sugar, the EC sugar regime
provides the advantage which allows ... sugar producers to produce and export C sugar at below total cost of production.” (Panel
Reports, para. 7.310) (footnote omitted) The Panel concluded that “this cross-subsidization constitutes a payment in the form of a
transfer of financial resources.” (Ibid.)
Footnote 41: European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 199. (emphasis added)
Footnote 42: Panel Reports, para. 7.301.
Footnote 43: We also recall that C sugar production represents “11-21 per cent of the total EC sugar production”. (Panel
Reports, para. 7.320) (footnote omitted)
Footnote 44: European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 199.
Footnote 45: This scenario assumes that the economic circumstances of sugar production are the same as in a scenario where A,
B, and C sugar producers are legally integrated.
Footnote 46: We note that, in paragraph 7.294 of the Panel Reports, the Panel referred to such a hypothetical scenario.
Footnote 47: European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 191.
Footnote 48: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy, supra, footnote 2, para. 114.
Footnote 49: Ibid., para. 113.
Footnote 50: Ibid.
Footnote 51: We will examine below the concept of the proper value of goods to the producer, in the context of these
proceedings. See, infra, paras. 86 to 96.
Footnote 52: See also, items (c), (d), (f), (g), (h), (j) and (k) of the Illustrative List of the SCM Agreement, each of which
expressly identifies one or more benchmarks to be used as a basis for comparison in determining whether a measure involves
export subsidies. See further, paragraphs 8 and 13 of Annex 3, and paragraph 2 of Annex 4, of the Agreement on Agriculture,
which expressly identify one or more benchmarks for calculating the amount of domestic support.
Footnote 53: Panel Report, paras. 6.22 ff. See, supra, para. 67. We note that, in examining the terms and conditions on which
IREP is available, the Panel focused exclusively on the requirements to obtain a discretionary permit and to pay an administrative
fee. In assessing whether alternative sources of supply are available on more favourable terms, we consider that panels should
take account of all the factors which affect the relative “attractiveness” in the marketplace of the different goods or services. The
primary consideration must be price, while the importance of administrative formalities will depend on their nature and
characteristics. For instance, if an import permit were granted to importers as a matter of course, in the context of
straightforward import procedures, and if import fees were only administrative charges to cover expenses, these formalities
would be unlikely, on their own, to mean that imports were available on less favourable terms and conditions.
Footnote 54: New Zealand acknowledged, before the Panel, that the price of CEM “will be essentially world market prices”.
(New Zealand's first submission to the Panel, para. 4.05) Canada also argued that the processor offers producers a price for CEM
that is based on world market conditions. (Canada's first submission to the Panel, para. 37; Canada's second submission to the
Panel, para. 13; Canada's oral statement before the Panel, paras. 21, 30, 49 and 51; Canada's appellant's submission, para. 39 and
footnote 32 thereto)
Footnote 55: We note that none of the participants in these proceedings argued that world market prices are the appropriate
benchmark for determining whether supplies of CEM involve “payments” within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement
on Agriculture. See also, supra, footnote 43.[Footnote 43: Ibid., para. 125.].
Footnote 56: European Communities' response to Question 36 posed by the Panel.
Footnote 57: Panel Reports, para. 7.301.
Footnote 58: Ibid., paras. 7.290 and 7.320.
Footnote 59: Ibid., para. 7.301. We recognize that commercial entities, in the normal course of their business, make sales at
“marginal” profit by covering only the variable costs of the “marginal” production, after having covered all the fixed costs
through other sales. However, where such “marginal” sales are the result of government subsidies, an examination is required of
the nature and extent of these sales. Such examination should take into consideration, inter alia, the magnitude of the “marginal”
61
sales, the degree to which the marginal sales are below total cost of production, the period over which such sales take place (that
is, whether in the short term or on a regular and sustained basis), and the nature of the regulatory regime, which underpins such
sales. In particular, on this last point, the examination should consider whether the regulatory regime requires exportation of the
subsidized product or export of the product in which the subsidized product is incorporated. As we stated in Canada – Dairy, the
facts and circumstances of each case and the features of the regulatory regime must be examined carefully to determine that the
total average cost of production benchmark used in Canada – Dairy would appropriately apply to the export subsidies at issue in
the case under examination. In the circumstances of this dispute, with respect to export of C sugar, which, under the EC sugar
regime must be exported, we are of the view that the application of this benchmark to C sugar (as well as to C beet) is
appropriate.
Footnote 60: European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 257.
Footnote 61: Ibid., para. 258.
Footnote 62: Panel Reports, para. 7.310.
Footnote 63: Ibid.
Footnote 64: Ibid., paras. 6.10 and 7.306.
Footnote 65: Exhibit NZ-23 submitted by New Zealand to the Panel; Exhibit US-35 submitted by the United
States to the Panel.
Footnote 66: The documentary evidence submitted by New Zealand and the United States is equally supportive of
the view that, in economic theory, investment of equity involves an economic opportunity cost. (Ibid.)
Footnote 67: CDC Handbook, pp. 23-24, Exhibit NZ-4 submitted by New Zealand to the Panel; Exhibit US-22 submitted by the
United States to the Panel.
Footnote 68: We note that GAAP typically provide accounting rules for corporations, often publicly listed, and not for smaller
family-run enterprises. As such, many countries' GAAP may not provide rules on imputed costs for family labour, management,
or owner's equity.
Footnote 69: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 96.
Footnote 70: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 96. (original italics;
underlining added).
Footnote 71: See supra, footnote 124. [Footnote 124: According to Canada, approximately 100 milk producers produce CEM
without, at the same time, holding a domestic quota. (Canada's response to Question 2(c) posed by the Panel during the Panel
proceedings, confirmed by Canada's response to questioning at the oral hearing) These 100 producers represent approximately
0.5% of all 19,000 Canadian milk producers and 1.25% of all 8000 CEM producers. (Panel Report, paras. 3.70 and 5.55)
Moreover, the export market represents only 3.62 percent, by volume, of the total Canadian milk production. (Canada's response
to questioning at the oral hearing).
Footnote 72: Exhibit NZ-23 submitted by New Zealand to the Panel; Exhibit US-35 submitted by the United States to the Panel.
Footnote 73: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), paras. 113 and 115.
Footnote 74: Ibid., para. 114.
Footnote 75: Ibid., para. 76.
Footnote 76: Supra, para. 87.
Footnote 77: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 112.
Footnote 78: The example given is “payments that are financed from the proceeds of a levy imposed on the agricultural product
concerned or on an agricultural product from which the exported product is derived”.
Footnote 79: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 112.
Footnote 80: Ibid.
Footnote 81: Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture may be contrasted with Article 9.1(e) of the Agreement on
Agriculture, as well as with Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement, and items (c), (d), (j), and (k) of the Illustrative List of
Export Subsidies (the “Illustrative List”) of the SCM Agreement. In these provisions, some kind of government mandate,
direction, or control is an element of a subsidy provided through a third party.
Footnote 82: Panel Report, para. 5.85
Footnote 83: Ibid., para 5.89
Footnote 84: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 113; Appellate Body Report,
Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para. 130.
Footnote 85: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para. 131.
Footnote 86: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 115. (emphasis added)
Footnote 87: Ibid.
Footnote 88: Ibid.
Footnote 89: Ibid., para. 114.
Footnote 90: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para. 133.
Footnote 91: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para. 134 (referring to Appellate
Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 115).
Footnote 92: Panel Reports, para. 7.283. We recall that the Panel found that the price of C beet is approximately 60 per cent of
the C sugar world market price. (Ibid., paras. 7.265 and 7.283).
Footnote 93: Ibid., para. 7.283. The Panel also stated, in paragraph 6.10 of the Panel Reports, that “there is no independent
production of C beet.”
Footnote 94: Ibid., para. 7.291.
Footnote 95: Ibid.
Footnote 96: Ibid.
Footnote 97: Ibid., para. 7.290.
Footnote 98: Ibid., para. 7.288. (original emphasis).
62
Footnote 99: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand )
Footnote 100: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 114.
Footnote 101: Supra, para. 87.
Footnote 102: Even if sales in the more remunerative market do not cover all of the shared fixed costs, they may bear a higher
relative proportion of those costs, such that sales in the less remunerative market can be made at a price below the average total
cost of production, because these sales do not need to cover their entire relative proportion of shared fixed costs.
Footnote 103: In any event, we also note that the Panel did not describe “cross-subsidization” — the “payment” at issue — as
consisting merely of an “internal allocation”, within one single economic entity, of that entity's resources. Rather, the Panel
considered the cumulative advantages that sugar producers receive from the operation of the EC sugar regime to be a key
component of the “payment” in the form of cross-subsidization. The Panel went on to state that “to the extent that the fixed costs
of A, B and C [sugar production] are largely paid for by the profits made on sales of A and B sugar, the EC sugar regime
provides the advantage which allows ... sugar producers to produce and export C sugar at below total cost of production.” (Panel
Reports, para. 7.310) (footnote omitted) The Panel concluded that “this cross-subsidization constitutes a payment in the form of a
transfer of financial resources.” (Ibid.)
Footnote 104: European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 199. (emphasis added)
Footnote 105: Panel Reports, para. 7.301.
Footnote 106: We also recall that C sugar production represents “11-21 per cent of the total EC sugar production”. (Panel
Reports, para. 7.320) (footnote omitted)
Footnote 107: European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 199.
Footnote 108: This scenario assumes that the economic circumstances of sugar production are the same as in a scenario where A,
B, and C sugar producers are legally integrated.
Footnote 109: We note that, in paragraph 7.294 of the Panel Reports, the Panel referred to such a hypothetical scenario.
Footnote 110: Ibid., para. 7.321 (quoting Article 13(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/2001).
Footnote 111: Of course, C sugar may also be carried forward, in which case it will count as part of a producer's sugar quota in
another marketing year.
Footnote 112: See Panel Report, para. 7.155.
63

Artigo 10
Geraldo Vidigal
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 10
Prevention of Circumvention of Export Subsidy Commitments
10.1
Export subsidies not listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9 shall not be applied in a manner which
results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of export subsidy commitments; nor shall
non-commercial transactions be used to circumvent such commitments.
10.2
Members undertake to work toward the development of internationally agreed disciplines to
govern the provision of export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes and,
after agreement on such disciplines, to provide export credits, export credit guarantees or
insurance programmes only in conformity therewith.
10.3
Any Member which claims that any quantity exported in excess of a reduction commitment level
is not subsidized must establish that no export subsidy, whether listed in Article 9 or not, has been
granted in respect of the quantity of exports in question.
10.4
Members donors of international food aid shall ensure:
IB.
(a)
that the provision of international food aid is not tied directly or indirectly to commercial
exports of agricultural products to recipient countries;
(b)
that international food aid transactions, including bilateral food aid which is monetized,
shall be carried out in accordance with the FAO “Principles of Surplus Disposal and
Consultative Obligations”, including, where appropriate, the system of Usual Marketing
Requirements (UMRs); and
(c)
that such aid shall be provided to the extent possible in fully grant form or on terms no
less concessional than those provided for in Article IV of the Food Aid Convention 1986.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 10
Prevenção contra Tentativas de Eludir os Compromissos de Subsídios à Exportação
10.1
Os subsídios à exportação não arrolados no parágrafo 1 do Artigo 9 não serão aplicados de
maneira a resultar ou a ameaçarem resultar em tentativa de eludir (circumvent) os compromissos
em matéria de subsídios à exportação, nem tampouco as transações não comerciais serão
utilizadas para eludir tais compromissos.
10.2
Os Membros se comprometem a esforçar-se pela elaboração de disciplinas internacionalmente
acordadas para reger a concessão de créditos à exportação, garantias de créditos à exportação ou
programas de seguro e, após acordo, tais disciplinas a conceder os créditos à exportação, as
garantias de créditos à exportação ou os programas de seguro em conformidade unicamente com
as mesmas.
10.3
Qualquer Membro que alegue que uma quantidade exportada acima do nível de compromisso de
redução não esta subsidiada deverá demonstrar que para a quantidade exportada em questão não
se concedeu qualquer subsídio à exportação, esteja ele ou não arrolado no Artigo 9.
10.4
Os Membros doadores de ajuda alimentar internacional garantirão:
64
IC.
a)
que a concessão de ajuda alimentar internacional não estará direta ou indiretamente
vinculada a exportações comerciais de produtos agrícolas para os países recipiendários;
b)
que todas as operações de ajuda alimentar, incluindo-se a ajuda alimentar bilateral em
moeda, se realizarão de acordo com os “Princípios da FAO sobre Distribuição de
Excedentes e Obrigações de Consultas” e inclusive, quando cabível, do sistema de
Requisitos Usuais de Comercialização (RUM); e
c)
que tal ajuda seja concedida, na medida do possível, integralmente a título de doação ou
em termos não menos favoráveis do que aqueles previstos no Artigo IV da Convenção de
1986 sobre Ajuda Alimentar.
Comentários sobre a tradução
No Artigo 10.1, uma tradução mais literal, baseada na versão em espanhol, é preferível à tradução oficial
brasileira: os subsídios “não serão aplicados de forma que constitua, ou ameace constituir, elusão dos
compromissos” assumidos pelos membros. A inclusão da palavra “tentativa” pode causar debate
desnecessário sobre a obrigação veiculada.
O Artigo 10.2 apresenta tradução confusa. Em lugar de “e, após acordo, tais disciplinas a conceder”,
deve-se ler “e, após acordo sobre tais disciplinas, a conceder”.
II.
1.
Interpretação e aplicação do Artigo 10
Geral
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US – Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, para. 616
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação realiza interpretação geral do Artigo 10, à luz do seu título,
“Prevenção contra Tentativas de Eludir os Compromissos de Subsídios à Exportação”. Determina que a
interpretação dos Parágrafos do Artigo deve tomar em consideração esse título, que revela o objetivo dos
dispositivos contidos no Artigo.
Para. 616. “We find it significant that paragraph 2 of Article 10 is included in an Article that is titled the
“Prevention of Circumvention of Export Subsidy Commitments”. As Brazil correctly points out, each
paragraph in Article 10 pursues this aim. (113) Article 10.1 provides that WTO Members shall not apply
export subsidies not listed in Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture “in a manner which results in,
or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of export subsidy commitments; nor shall noncommercial
transactions be used to circumvent such commitments”. Article 10.3 pursues the aim of preventing
circumvention of export subsidy commitments by providing special rules on the reversal of burden of
proof where a Member exports an agricultural product in quantities that exceed its reduction commitment
level; in such a situation a WTO Member is treated as if it has granted WTO-inconsistent export subsidies
for the excess quantities, unless the Member presents adequate evidence to “establish” the contrary. (114)
Article 10.4 provides disciplines to prevent WTO Members from circumventing their export subsidy
commitments through food aid transactions. Similarly, Article 10.2 must be interpreted in a manner that is
consistent with the aim of preventing circumvention of export subsidy commitments that pervades Article
10. Otherwise, it would not have been included in that provision.”
2.
Artigo 10.1
a)
“compromissos”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales
Corporations” (US – FSC), Demandante: CE, WT/DS108/AB/R, para. 144
65
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação explicitou a relação específica entre o Artigo 10 e os Artigos 3,
8 e 9 do Acordo de Agricultura. É às obrigações estabelecidas nestes três outros Artigos que o Artigo 10.1
se refere.
Para. 144. “The word “commitments” generally connotes “engagements” or “obligations”. (115) Thus,
the term “export subsidy commitments” refers to commitments or obligations relating to export subsidies
assumed by Members under provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture, in particular, under Articles 3, 8
and 9 of that Agreement.”
b) “subsídios à exportação” não listados no Artigo 9.1
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products (Canada - Dairy (21.5)), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia,
WT/DS103/AB/RW e WT/DS113/AB/RW, para. 121
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que o Artigo 10.1 tem caráter residual em relação ao
Artigo 9.1, abarcando apenas subsídios que não sejam cobertos por este último. Em consequência, os
Artigos 9.1 e 10.1 são mutuamente excludentes, no sentido de que só pode violar o Artigo 10.1 uma
medida que não se enquadre no Artigo 9.1.
Para. 121. “It is clear from the opening clause of Article 10.1 that this provision is residual in character to
Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. If a measure is an export subsidy listed in Article 9.1, it
cannot simultaneously be an export subsidy under Article 10.1. In light of the facts available to us, we
have found that we are unable to determine whether the measure at issue is an export subsidy listed in
Article 9.1(c). However, it remains possible that the measure is such an export subsidy. Clearly, in that
event, the opening clause of Article 10.1 means that the measure could not also be an export subsidy
under Article 10.1. In these circumstances, where we are unable to determine the legal character of the
measure under Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, we are similarly unable to rule upon the legal
character of the measure under Article 10.1 of that Agreement.”
c)
“Elusão efetiva”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales
Corporations” (US – FSC), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS108/AB/R, paras. 148152
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que o termo “elusão” deve ser entendido como
sinônimo de “evasão”. Nos termos do artigo, a elusão não precisa ser efetiva: para que seja aplicável o
Artigo 10.1, basta que subsídios sejam “aplicados de forma que constitua, ou ameace constituir, elusão
dos compromissos” dos membros. São incompatíveis com o Artigo, portanto, as medidas que permitam
aos Membros transferir aos agente econômicos – ainda que na forma de isenção tributária – recursos que
aqueles estariam proibidos de transferir em virtude dos compromissos estabelecidos no Acordo de
Agricultura e em suas Listas. O Órgão de Apelação esclareceu ainda que, em relação a subsídios
arrolados na lista, um Membro poderia aplicar outros subsídios até os limites previstos nas listas, mas que
subsídios ausentes das Listas estão absolutamente proibidos.
Para. 148. “We turn next to whether the subsidies under the FSC measure are “applied in a manner which
results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of export subsidy commitments”. (emphasis
added) The verb “circumvent” means, inter alia, “find a way round, evade…”. (116) Article 10.1 is
designed to prevent Members from circumventing or “evading” their “export subsidy commitments”. This
may arise in many different ways. We note, moreover, that, under Article 10.1, it is not necessary to
demonstrate actual “circumvention” of “export subsidy commitments”. It suffices that “export subsidies”
are “applied in a manner which … threatens to lead to circumvention of export subsidy commitments”.”
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Para. 149. “In determining whether the FSC measure in this case is “applied in a manner which
…threatens to lead to circumvention of export subsidy commitments”, it is important to consider the
structure and other characteristics of that measure. The FSC measure creates, in itself, a legal entitlement
for recipients to receive export subsidies, not listed in Article 9.1, with respect to agricultural products,
both scheduled and unscheduled. As we understand it, that legal entitlement arises in the recipient when it
complies with the statutory requirements and, at that point, the government of the United States must
grant the FSC tax exemptions. There is, therefore, no discretionary element in the provision by the
government of the FSC export subsidies. If the statutory eligibility requirements are met, then an FSC is
entitled by law to the statutorily established tax exemption. Furthermore, there is no limitation on the
amount of exempt foreign trade income that may be earned by an FSC. Therefore, the legal entitlement
that the FSC measure establishes is unqualified as to the amount of export subsidies that may be claimed
by FSCs. There is, in other words, no mechanism in the measure for stemming, or otherwise controlling,
the flow of FSC subsidies that may be claimed with respect to any agricultural products. In this respect,
the FSC measure is unlimited.”
Para. 150. “With respect to unscheduled agricultural products, Members are prohibited under Article 3.3
from providing any export subsidies as listed in Article 9.1. Article 10.1 prevents the application of export
subsidies which “results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention” of that prohibition. Members
would certainly have “found a way round”, a way to “evade”, this prohibition if they could transfer,
through tax exemptions, the very same economic resources that they are prohibited from providing in
other forms under Articles 3.3 and 9.1. Thus, with respect to the prohibition against providing subsidies
listed in Article 9.1 on unscheduled agricultural products, we believe that the FSC measure involves the
application of export subsidies, not listed in Article 9.1, in a manner that, at the very least, “threatens to
lead to circumvention” of that “export subsidy commitment” in Article 3.3.”
Para. 151. “With respect to scheduled agricultural products, the nature of the commitment made under
the first clause of Article 3.3 is different. Members are not subject to a general prohibition against
providing export subsidies as listed in Article 9.1; rather, there is a limited authorization for Members to
provide such subsidies up to the level of the reduction commitments specified in their Schedule. Given
that the nature of the “export subsidy commitment” differs as between scheduled and unscheduled
products, we believe that what constitutes “circumvention” of those commitments, under Article 10.1,
may also differ.”
Para. 152. “As regards scheduled products, when the specific reduction commitment levels have been
reached, the limited authorization to provide export subsidies as listed in Article 9.1 is transformed,
effectively, into a prohibition against the provision of those subsidies. However, as we have seen, the
FSC measure allows for the provision of an unlimited amount of FSC subsidies, and scheduled
agricultural products may, therefore, benefit from those subsidies when the reduction commitment levels
specified in the United States' Schedule for those agricultural products have been reached. In our view,
Members would have found “a way round”, a way to “evade”, their commitments under Articles 3.3 and
9.1, if they could transfer, through tax exemptions, the very same economic resources that they were, at
that time, prohibited from providing through other methods under the first clause of Article 3.3 and under
9.1.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US – Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, para. 626
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação estabeleceu o que deve ser demonstrado pelo Membro que invoca a
proibição do Artigo 10.1. Em primeiro lugar, o Membro reclamante deve demonstrar que a medida
questionada é um subsídio à exportação. Tendo demonstrado isso, precisa então demonstrar que a medida
é aplicada de forma a resultar em, ou ameaçar levar a, elusão dos compromissos de redução à exportação.
Para. 626. “Accordingly, we do not believe that Article 10.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture exempts
export credit guarantees, export credits and insurance programs from the export subsidy disciplines in the
Agreement on Agriculture. This does not mean that export credit guarantees, export credits and insurance
67
programs will necessarily constitute export subsidies for purposes of the Agreement on Agriculture.
Export credit guarantees are subject to the export subsidy disciplines in the Agreement on Agriculture
only to the extent that such measures include an export subsidy component. If no such export subsidy
component exists, then the export credit guarantees are not subject to the Agreement's export subsidy
disciplines. Moreover, even when export credit guarantees contain an export subsidy component, such an
export credit guarantee would not be inconsistent with Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture
unless the complaining party demonstrates that it is “applied in a manner which results in, or which
threatens to lead to, circumvention of export subsidy commitments”. Thus, under the Agreement on
Agriculture, the complaining party must first demonstrate that an export credit guarantee program
constitutes an export subsidy. If it succeeds, it must then demonstrate that such export credit guarantees
are applied in a manner that results in, or threatens to lead to, circumvention of the responding party's
export subsidy commitments within the meaning of Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.”
d)
“Ameaça de tentativa de elusão”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US – Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras. 704-710, 713 e 717
Neste trecho, o Órgão de Apelação especificou o sentido da “ameaça” de constituir elusão proibida pelo
Artigo 10.1. Não é preciso a certeza de que a elusão ocorrerá, nem é necessário que seja criado um direito
à transferência de recursos. Basta a existência de uma probabilidade de elusão. Por outro lado, foi
rejeitado o argumento de que os Membros devem tomar medidas afirmativas, prevenindo-se contra a
possibilidade da elusão. O Órgão observou que, uma vez demonstrada a violação do artigo em virtude de
elusão real, torna-se desnecessário examinar se a mesma medida cria, com relação aos mesmos produtos,
uma ameaça de elusão.
Para. 704. “The Appellate Body has explained that “under Article 10.1, it is not necessary to demonstrate
actual 'circumvention' of 'export subsidy commitments'“. (117) It suffices that “export subsidies” are
“applied in a manner which … threatens to lead to circumvention of export subsidy commitments”. (118)
We note that the ordinary meaning of the term “threaten” includes “[c]onstitute a threat to”, “be likely to
injure” or “be a source of harm or danger”. (119) Article 10.1 is concerned not with injury, but rather with
“circumvention”. Accordingly, based on its ordinary meaning, the phrase “threaten [ ] to lead to ...
circumvention” would imply that the export subsidies are applied in a manner that is “likely to” lead to
circumvention of a WTO Member's export subsidy commitments. Furthermore, we observe that the
ordinary meaning of the term “threaten” refers to a likelihood of something happening; the ordinary
meaning of “threaten” does not connote a sense of certainty. (120)
Para. 705. “The concept of “threat” has been discussed by the Appellate Body within the context of the
Agreement on Safeguards and the Anti-Dumping Agreement. It has explained that “threat” refers to
something that “has not yet occurred, but remains a future event whose actual materialization cannot, in
fact, be assured with certainty”. (121) In US – Line Pipe, the Appellate Body stated that there is a
continuum that ascends from a “threat of serious injury” up to the “serious injury” itself. (122) We
emphasize that the Appellate Body's discussion of the concept of “threat” in previous appeals related to
the interpretation of other covered agreements that contain obligations relating to injury that differ from
those relating to circumvention of export subsidy reduction commitments contained in Article 10.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture. Our interpretation of “threat” in Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture
is consistent with the Appellate Body's interpretation of the term “threat” in these other contexts.”
Para. 706. “The Panel explained that, in its view, “threat” of circumvention under Article 10.1 requires
that there be a “an unconditional legal entitlement”. (123) We see no basis for this requirement in Article
10.1. The Panel also stated that “[i]n order to pose a 'threat' within the meaning of Article 10.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture, [it did] not believe that it is sufficient that an export credit guarantee
programme might possibly, or theoretically, be used in a manner which threatens to lead to circumvention
of export subsidy commitments”. (124) In both of these statements, the Panel seems to conflate the phrase
“threaten to lead to .... circumvention” with certainty that the circumvention will happen. We find it
68
difficult, moreover, to reconcile the Panel's interpretation with the ordinary meaning of the term
“threaten”, which, as we indicated earlier, connotes that something is “likely” to happen. (125) We also
find it difficult to reconcile these statements of the Panel with its own view that it did “not believe that the
'mandatory/discretionary' distinction is the sole legally determinative one for our examination of whether
or not 'threat' of circumvention of export subsidy commitments within the meaning of Article 10.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture has been proven to the required standard”. (126)
Para. 707. “Nor are we prepared to accept Brazil's suggestion that the concept of “threat” in Article 10.1
should be read in a manner that requires WTO Members to take “anticipatory or precautionary action”.
(127) The obligation not to apply export subsidies in a manner that “threatens to lead to” circumvention
of their export subsidy commitments does not extend that far. There is no basis in Article 10.1 for
requiring WTO Members to take affirmative, precautionary steps to ensure that circumvention of their
export subsidy reduction commitments does not occur. (128)
Para. 708. “In concluding as it did, the Panel appears to have relied on the Appellate Body Report in US
– FSC for guidance. (129) In our view, however, the Panel misapplies that analysis. We recall that, in US
– FSC, the Appellate Body underscored the importance of considering “the structure and other
characteristics of [the] measure” when examining whether the specific measure at issue is “applied in a
manner which ... threatens to lead to circumvention of export subsidy commitments”. (130) The Appellate
Body then went on to note that the specific measure at issue in that dispute created “a legal entitlement for
recipients to receive export subsidies, not listed in Article 9.1, with respect to agricultural products, both
scheduled and unscheduled”. (131) This meant that there was “no discretionary element in the provision
by the government of the FSC export subsidies”. (132) Furthermore, the Appellate Body noted that the
“legal entitlement that the FSC measure establishes is unqualified as to the amount of export subsidies
that may be claimed”. (133) This meant that the measure was “unlimited” because there was “no
mechanism in the measure for stemming, or otherwise controlling the flow of ... subsidies that may be
claimed with respect to any agricultural products”. (134)
Para. 709. “A proper reading of the Appellate Body's statement in US – FSC, however, reveals that it did
not intend to provide an exhaustive interpretation of threat of circumvention under Article 10.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture. In noting that the measure at issue in that dispute created a “legal entitlement”
and had no “discretionary element”, the Appellate Body was merely describing characteristics of the
measure at issue in that case that it found relevant for its analysis of “threat”. In other words, the
Appellate Body did not foreclose, in US – FSC, the possibility that a measure that does not create a “legal
entitlement” or that has a “discretionary element” could be found to “threaten [ ] to lead to
circumvention” under Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.”
Para. 710. “We therefore modify the Panel's interpretation, in paragraphs 7.882-7.883 and 7.896 of the
Panel Report, of the phrase “threatens to lead to .... circumvention” in Article 10.1 of the Agreement on
Agriculture to the extent that the Panel's interpretation requires “an unconditional legal entitlement” to
receive the relevant export subsidies as a condition for a finding of threat of circumvention.”
Para. 713. “We are not persuaded that the arguments put forward by Brazil establish that the United
States' export credit guarantee programs are applied in a manner that threatens to lead to circumvention of
the United States' export subsidy commitments in respect of scheduled products other than rice and
unscheduled products not supported under the programs. In our view, the fact alone that exports of certain
products are eligible for export credit guarantees is not sufficient to establish a threat of circumvention.
This is particularly the case where there is no evidence in the record that exports of such products have
been “supported” by export credit guarantees in the past. (135) As we stated earlier, Article 10.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture does not require WTO Members to take affirmative, precautionary steps to
ensure that circumvention of their export subsidy reduction commitments never happens. Nor is it
sufficient for Brazil to have alleged that the United States has provided export credit guarantees to exports
of other unscheduled products or to exports of scheduled products in excess of its export subsidy
reduction commitments. Therefore, we agree with the Panel that Brazil has not established that the United
States applies its export credit guarantee programs to scheduled agricultural products other than rice and
69
other unscheduled agricultural products (not “supported” under the programs) “in a manner ... which
threatens to lead to ... circumvention” of the United States' export subsidy commitments.”
Para. 717. “We believe the Panel was within its discretion in declining to examine whether scheduled
products other than rice and unscheduled products supported by the programs are applied in a manner that
“threatens to lead to” circumvention. The Panel had already found that the United States acted
inconsistently with Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture because it applied its export credit
guarantee program in a manner that “results in” (actual) circumvention of its export subsidy commitments
for these products. We do not see why the Panel had to examine also whether the United States acted
inconsistently with the same provision in respect of the same products, but on the basis of there being a
threat of circumvention, rather than actual circumvention.”
e)
“Transações não comerciais”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US – Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, para. 619
Neste trecho, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que nem o Artigo 10.2 nem o Artigo 10.4 estabelecem
exceções ao Artigo 10.1. Ambos constituem disciplinas específicas, cujo cumprimento é necessário em
adição ao cumprimento do Artigo 10.1.
Para. 619. “(…) International food aid is covered by the second clause of Article 10.1 to the extent that it
is a “non-commercial transaction”. Article 10.4 provides specific disciplines that may be relied on to
determine whether international food aid is being “used to circumvent” a WTO Member's export subsidy
commitments. There is no contradiction in the Panel's approach to Article 10.2 and its approach to Article
10.4. The measures in Article 10.2 and the transactions in Article 10.4 are both covered within the scope
of Article 10.1. As Brazil submits, “Article 10.4 provides an example of specific disciplines that have
been agreed upon for a particular type of measure and that complement the general export subsidy rules”
but, like Article 10.2, it does not “establish any exceptions for the measures that [it] covers”. (136) WTO
Members are free to grant as much food aid as they wish, provided that they do so consistently with
Articles 10.1 and 10.4. Thus, Article 10.4 does not support the United States' reading of Article 10.2.”
6. Artigo 10.2 - Garantias de créditos à exportação
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US – Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras. 615-616, 619, 623, 625-626 e 628
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determina que o Artigo 10.1 se aplica na ausência das “disciplinas
internacionalmente acordadas” previstas pelo Artigo 10.2 para reger a concessão de créditos à exportação.
Para. 615. “Although Article 10.2 commits WTO Members to work toward the development of
internationally agreed disciplines on export credit guarantees, export credits and insurance programs, it is
in Article 10.1 that we find the disciplines that currently apply to export subsidies not listed in Article 9.1.
A plain reading of Article 10.1 indicates that the only export subsidies that are excluded from its scope
are those “listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9”. The United States and Brazil agreed that export credit
guarantees are not listed in Article 9.1. (137) Thus, to the extent that an export credit guarantee meets the
definition of an “export subsidy” under the Agreement on Agriculture, it would be covered by Article
10.1. Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture defines “export subsides” as “subsidies contingent
upon export performance, including the export subsidies listed in Article 9 of this Agreement”. (emphasis
added) The use of the word “including” suggests that the term “export subsidies” should be interpreted
broadly and that the list of export subsidies in Article 9 is not exhaustive. Even though an export credit
guarantee may not necessarily include a subsidy component, there is nothing inherent about export credit
guarantees that precludes such measures from falling within the definition of a subsidy. (138) An export
70
credit guarantee that meets the definition of an export subsidy would be covered by Article 10.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture because it is not an export subsidy listed in Article 9.1 of that Agreement.”
Para. 616. “(…) Similarly, Article 10.2 must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the aim of
preventing circumvention of export subsidy commitments that pervades Article 10. Otherwise, it would
not have been included in that provision.”
Para. 617. “The United States submits that Article 10.2 contributes to the prevention of circumvention
because it commits WTO Members to work toward the development of internationally agreed disciplines
and to provide export credit guarantees, export credits and insurance programs only in conformity with
these disciplines once an agreement has been reached. (139) We are not persuaded by this argument. The
necessary implication of the United States' interpretation of Article 10.2 is that, until WTO Members
reach an agreement on international disciplines, export credit guarantees, export credits and insurance
programs are subject to no disciplines at all. In other words, under the United States' interpretation, WTO
Members are free to “circumvent” their export subsidy commitments through the use of export credit
guarantees, export credits and insurance programs until internationally agreed disciplines are developed,
whenever that may be. We find it difficult to believe that the negotiators would not have been aware of
and did not seek to address the potential that subsidized export credit guarantees, export credits and
insurance programs could be used to circumvent a WTO Member's export subsidy reduction
commitments. Indeed, such an interpretation would undermine the objective of preventing circumvention
of export subsidy commitments, which is central to the Agreement on Agriculture.”
Para. 619. “(…) Article 10.4 provides specific disciplines that may be relied on to determine whether
international food aid is being “used to circumvent” a WTO Member's export subsidy commitments.
There is no contradiction in the Panel's approach to Article 10.2 and its approach to Article 10.4. The
measures in Article 10.2 and the transactions in Article 10.4 are both covered within the scope of Article
10.1. (…)”
Para. 623. “We agree with the Panel that the meaning of Article 10.2 is clear from the provision's text, in
its context and in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture, consistent with
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. (140) The Panel did not think it necessary to resort to negotiating
history for purposes of its interpretation of Article 10.2. Even if the negotiating history were relevant for
our inquiry, we do not find that it supports the United States' position. This is because it does not indicate
that the negotiators did not intend to discipline export credit guarantees, export credits and insurance
programs at all. To the contrary, it shows that negotiators were aware of the need to impose disciplines on
export credit guarantees, given their potential as a mechanism for subsidization and for circumvention of
the export subsidy commitments under Article 9. Although the negotiating history reveals that the
negotiators struggled with this issue, it does not indicate that the disagreement among them related to
whether export credit guarantees, export credits and insurance programs were to be disciplined at all. In
our view, the negotiating history suggests that the disagreement between the negotiators related to which
kinds of specific disciplines were to apply to such measures. The fact that negotiators felt that
internationally agreed disciplines were necessary for these three measures also suggests that the
disciplines that currently exist in the Agreement on Agriculture must apply pending new disciplines
because, otherwise, it would mean that subsidized export credit guarantees, export credits, and insurance
programs could currently be extended without any limit or consequence.”
Para. 625. “We do not agree with the United States' submission in this regard. There could have been
several reasons why Members chose not to include export credit guarantees, export credits and insurance
programs under Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. One reason, for instance, may be that they
considered that their export credit guarantee, export credit or insurance programs did not include a
subsidy component, so that there was no need to subject them to export subsidy reduction commitments.
There could have been other reasons. Thus, the fact that export credit guarantees, export credits and
insurance programs were not included in Article 9.1 does not support the United States' interpretation of
Article 10.2. We also observe that whether WTO Members with export credit guarantee programs have
reported them in their export subsidy notifications is not determinative for purposes of our inquiry into
71
the meaning of Article 10.2. In any event, the United States and Brazil disagree about whether such
programs are subject to notification requirements. (141)”
Para. 626. “Accordingly, we do not believe that Article 10.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture exempts
export credit guarantees, export credits and insurance programs from the export subsidy disciplines in the
Agreement on Agriculture. This does not mean that export credit guarantees, export credits and insurance
programs will necessarily constitute export subsidies for purposes of the Agreement on Agriculture.
Export credit guarantees are subject to the export subsidy disciplines in the Agreement on Agriculture
only to the extent that such measures include an export subsidy component. If no such export subsidy
component exists, then the export credit guarantees are not subject to the Agreement's export subsidy
disciplines. Moreover, even when export credit guarantees contain an export subsidy component, such an
export credit guarantee would not be inconsistent with Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture
unless the complaining party demonstrates that it is “applied in a manner which results in, or which
threatens to lead to, circumvention of export subsidy commitments”. Thus, under the Agreement on
Agriculture, the complaining party must first demonstrate that an export credit guarantee program
constitutes an export subsidy. If it succeeds, it must then demonstrate that such export credit guarantees
are applied in a manner that results in, or threatens to lead to, circumvention of the responding party's
export subsidy commitments within the meaning of Article 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.”
Para. 628. “Before proceeding further, we refer to the order followed by the Panel in its analysis of
Brazil's claims against the United States' export credit guarantee programs. We do not find that the Panel's
order of analysis was wrong or that it constituted legal error. Nor has the United States made such a claim
on appeal. Nevertheless, we are struck by the fact that the Panel addressed Article 10.2 only at the end of
its analysis, especially given that this provision constituted the core of the United States' defence that the
disciplines of the Agreement on Agriculture currently do not apply to export credit guarantees at all.”
7.
Artigo 10.3 – Inversão do ônus da prova
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products (Canada - Dairy (21.5 II)), Demandantes: EUA e Nova Zelândia,
WT/DS103/AB/RW2 e WT/DS113/AB/RW2, paras. 66, 68-71 e 73-75
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação detalhou o conteúdo do Artigo 10.3. Determinou-se que o Artigo se
aplica quando se verificar que o Membro defensor exporta um produto além da quantia permitida em sua
Lista de compromissos. Nesse caso, cabe ao defensor demonstrar que os produtos exportados além do
limite o foram sem subsídios; caso pairem dúvidas, presume-se que o Membro defensor forneceu
subsídios à exportação incompatíveis com os Acordos da OMC.
Para. 66. “(…) under the usual allocation of the burden of proof, a responding Member's measure will be
treated as WTO-consistent, until sufficient evidence is presented to prove the contrary. We will not
readily find that the usual rules on burden of proof do not apply, as they reflect a “canon of evidence”
accepted and applied in international proceedings.”
Para. 68. “[Article 10.3] requires that a specific Member, in defined circumstances, “establish that no
export subsidy … has been granted”. We begin by identifying the specific Member and circumstances to
which Article 10.3 applies. The provision refers to a Member making a “claim” that certain exports are
“not [being] subsidized”. Although the word “claim” usually refers to an assertion by a complaining
Member that a measure is WTO-inconsistent, in this provision the word “claim” refers to an assertion by
a responding Member that a measure is WTO-consistent. The “claim” to which Article 10.3 refers is,
therefore, a defensive argument made by the responding Member.”
Para. 69. “Article 10.3 does not impose any substantive obligations regulating the grant of export
subsidies under the Agreement on Agriculture. Rather, Article 10.3 provides a special rule for proof of
export subsidies that applies in certain disputes under Articles 3, 8, 9, and 10 of the Agreement on
Agriculture.”
72
Para. 70. “In identifying the nature of the special rule, it is useful to analyze the character of claims
brought under these provisions. Pursuant to Article 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, a Member is
entitled to grant export subsidies within the limits of the reduction commitment specified in its Schedule.
(142) Where a Member claims that another Member has acted inconsistently with Article 3.3 by granting
export subsidies in excess of a quantity commitment level, there are two separate parts to the claim. First,
the responding Member must have exported an agricultural product in quantities exceeding its quantity
commitment level. If the quantities exported do not reach the quantity commitment level, there can be no
violation of that commitment, under Article 3.3. However, merely exporting a product in quantities that
exceed the quantity commitment level is not inconsistent with the commitment. The commitment is an
undertaking to limit the quantity of exports that may be subsidized and not a commitment to restrict the
volume or quantity of exports as such. The second part of the claim is, therefore, that the responding
Member must have granted export subsidies with respect to quantities exceeding the quantity
commitment level. There is, in other words, a quantitative aspect and an export subsidization aspect to the
claim.”
Para. 71. “Under the usual rules on burden of proof, the complaining Member would bear the burden of
proving both parts of the claim. However, Article 10.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture partially alters the
usual rules. The provision cleaves the complaining Member's claim in two, allocating to different parties
the burden of proof with respect to the two parts of the claim we have described.”
Para. 73. “If the complaining Member succeeds in proving the quantitative part of the claim, and the
responding Member contests the export subsidization aspect of the claim, then, under Article 10.3, the
responding Member “must establish that no export subsidy … has been granted” in respect of the excess
quantity exported. (emphasis added) The language of Article 10.3 is clearly intended to alter the
generally-accepted rules on burden of proof. The verb “establish” is synonymous with the verbs
“demonstrate” and “prove”. (143) Moreover, the auxiliary verb “must” conveys that the responding
Member has an obligation — or legal burden — to “establish” or “prove” that “no export subsidy … has
been granted”.”
Para. 74. “(…) The significance of Article 10.3 is that, where a Member exports an agricultural product
in quantities that exceed its quantity commitment level, that Member will be treated as if it has granted
WTO-inconsistent export subsidies, for the excess quantities, unless the Member presents adequate
evidence to “establish” the contrary. This reversal of the usual rules obliges the responding Member to
bear the consequences of any doubts concerning the evidence of export subsidization. Article 10.3 thus
acts as an incentive to Members to ensure that they are in a position to demonstrate compliance with their
quantity commitments under Article 3.3.”
Para. 75. “With respect to the export subsidization part of the claim, the complaining Member, therefore,
is relieved of its burden, under the usual rules, to establish a prima facie case of export subsidization of
the excess quantity, provided that this Member has established the quantitative part of the claim. (…)”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US – Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, para. 652
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu o a aplicabilidade do Artigo 10.3 aos produtos não
arrolados na Lista de um Membro. Nesse caso, não basta ao demandante provar que houve alguma
exportação do produto em questão. É preciso demonstrar também que houve subsídio.
Para. 652. “We disagree with the Panel's view that Article 10.3 applies to unscheduled products. Under
the Panel's approach, the only thing a complainant would have to do to meet its burden of proof when
bringing a claim against an unscheduled product is to demonstrate that the respondent has exported that
product. Once that has been established, the respondent would have to demonstrate that it has not
provided an export subsidy. (144) This seems to us an extreme result. In effect, it would mean that any
export of an unscheduled product is presumed to be subsidized. In our view, the presumption of
73
subsidization when exported quantities exceed the reduction commitments makes sense in respect of a
scheduled product because, by including it in its schedule, a WTO Member is reserving for itself the right
to apply export subsidies to that product, within the limits in its schedule. In the case of unscheduled
products, however, such a presumption appears inappropriate. Export subsidies for both unscheduled
agricultural products and industrial products are completely prohibited under the Agreement on
Agriculture and under the SCM Agreement, respectively. The Panel's interpretation implies that the
burden of proof with regard to the same issue would apply differently, however, under each Agreement: it
would be on the respondent under the Agreement on Agriculture, while it would be on the complainant
under the SCM Agreement.”
8.
Artigo 10.4 – “ajuda alimentar”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US – Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras. 616 e 618-619
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determina que a disciplina do Artigo 10.4 aplica-se adicionalmente,
e não alternativamente, à disciplina geral de prevenção da elusão contida no Artigo 10.1. O fato de haver
um artigo específico não estabelece uma exceção à regulação geral dos subsídios.
Para. 616. “(…) Article 10.4 provides disciplines to prevent WTO Members from circumventing their
export subsidy commitments through food aid transactions. (…)”
Para. 618. “The United States submits that, under the Panel's approach, international food aid
transactions would be subject to the “full array of export subsidy disciplines” because they are not
expressly excluded from Article 10.1. (145) (…)”
Para. 619. “We are unable to subscribe to the United States' arguments because we do not see Article
10.4 (146) as excluding international food aid from the scope of Article 10.1. (147) International food aid
is covered by the second clause of Article 10.1 to the extent that it is a “non-commercial transaction”.
Article 10.4 provides specific disciplines that may be relied on to determine whether international food
aid is being “used to circumvent” a WTO Member's export subsidy commitments. There is no
contradiction in the Panel's approach to Article 10.2 and its approach to Article 10.4. The measures in
Article 10.2 and the transactions in Article 10.4 are both covered within the scope of Article 10.1. As
Brazil submits, “Article 10.4 provides an example of specific disciplines that have been agreed upon for a
particular type of measure and that complement the general export subsidy rules” but, like Article 10.2, it
does not “establish any exceptions for the measures that [it] covers”. (148) WTO Members are free to
grant as much food aid as they wish, provided that they do so consistently with Articles 10.1 and 10.4.
Thus, Article 10.4 does not support the United States' reading of Article 10.2.”
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 10 do Acordo de Agricultura complementa o Artigo 9. Seu objetivo, inscrito no título dado ao
artigo, é a “Prevenção contra a Elusão dos Compromissos em Matéria de Subsídios à Exportação”.* A
interpretação teleológica, voltada para o cumprimento desse objetivo, tem sido a marca dos
pronunciamentos do Órgão de Apelação referentes ao Artigo 10.
Assim, o Órgão de Apelação notou que o Artigo 10.1 tem caráter residual em relação ao Artigo 9.1. Todo
subsídio que não se encaixe numa das alíneas deste último pode ser examinado para verificar se sua
aplicação não ameaça eludir os compromissos do Membro em matéria de subsídio à exportação. Não é
necessário que a elusão tenha ocorrido, nem é necessário demonstrar que ela irá ocorrer com certeza, nem
é preciso que o Membro tenha a intenção de eludir seus compromissos. Uma ameaça de elusão – uma
probabilidade de que a medida questionada seja usada de forma a eludir compromissos – é suficiente para
tornar a medida incompatível com o Artigo 10.1. Por outro lado, não é necessário que os Membros
adotem políticas afirmativas com o fim de evitar a elusão.
74
Uma interpretação relevante dada pelo Órgão de Apelação é a de que nem o Artigo 10.2 nem o Artigo
10.4 constituem exceções à proibição geral do uso de medidas para eludir os compromissos em matéria de
subsídio à exportação. As regulações específicas para ajuda alimentar e aquelas (por serem criadas) para
“créditos à exportação, garantias de créditos à exportação ou programas de seguro” apenas suplementam a
regra geral do Artigo 10.1.
O Artigo 10.3 produz a inversão no ônus da prova, sempre que se verifique que um Membro exporta um
produto cujo subsídio seja autorizado em quantidade superior àquela que consta de sua Lista de
compromissos. É então esse Membro, e não o reclamante, quem deve provar que a quantidade exportada
excedente não é beneficiada por subsídio à exportação. Produtos cuja exportação não é permitido
subsidiar em absoluto, entretanto, não se encaixam na regra – em outras palavras, não basta comprovar
que ocorre alguma exportação de produtos fora da Lista para que se presuma o subsídio. Nesses casos, o
Membro demandante precisa provar tanto a exportação como a ocorrência de subsídio.
* Redação adaptada da versão em espanhol, mais condizente com a interpretação dada pelo DSB do que a
versão oficial brasileira.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 113: Brazil's appellee's submission, para. 951. See Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para. 148 and Appellate Body
Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), para. 74.
Footnote 114: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US), para. 74.
Article 10.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides: Any Member which claims that any quantity exported in excess of a
reduction commitment level is not subsidized must establish that no export subsidy, whether listed in Article 9 or not, has been
granted in respect of the quantity of exports in question.
Footnote 115: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, supra, footnote 148, p. 452. (Footnote 148: The New Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary, Lesley Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), Vol. I, p. 1700).
Footnote 116: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, supra, footnote 148, Vol. I, p. 40.
Footnote 117: Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para. 148. (original emphasis).
Footnote 118: Ibid., para. 148.
Footnote 119: Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th ed., W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2002),
Vol. 2, p. 3251.
Footnote 120: Both participants agree that the determination of threat of circumvention has to be done on case-by cases basis.
(Brazil’s and the United States’responses to questioning at the oral hearing).
Footnote 121: Appellate Body Report, US - Lamb, para. 125. (original emphasis) The Appellate Body was interpreting the
phrase “threat of serious injury” within the context of Article 4.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards. Article 4.1(b) defines
“threat of serious injury” as “serious injury that is clearly imminent, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2. A
determination of the existence of a threat of serious injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or
remote possibility”.
Footnote 122: The Appellate Body explained that “[i]n terms of the rising continuum of an injurious condition of a domestic
industry that ascends from a 'threat of serious injury' up to 'serious injury', we see 'serious injury'-because it is something beyond
a 'threat'-as necessarily including the concept of a 'threat' and exceeding the presence of a 'threat'“. (Appellate Body Report, US Line Pipe, para. 170) (original emphasis)
Footnote 123: Panel Report, para. 7.883.
Footnote 124: Ibid,, para. 7.893.
Footnote 125: Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), para. 85.
Footnote 126: Panel Report, para. 7.886.
Footnote 127: Brazil’s other appellant’s submission, para. 100.
Footnote 128: We note in this respect that Article 10 is titled “Prevention of Circumvention of Export Subsidy Commitments.”
Brazil’s assertion that Article 10.1 requires WTO Members to take precautionary action would imply that the aim of the
provision would also include the prevention of threat of circumvention.
Footnote 129: In a footnote, the Panel states that the United States’export credit guarantee programs that it was “examining are
of fundamentally different nature than the mandatory and essentially unlimited subsidy (in the form of revenue forgone that is
otherwise due) examined in US – FSC”. (Panel Report, footnote 1082 to para. 7.894).
Footnote 130: Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para. 149.
Footnote 131: Ibid. (original emphasis)
Footnote 132: Ibid., para 149.
Footnote 133: Ibid. (original emphasis)
Footnote 134: Ibid., para. 149.
Footnote 135: “Supported” products are described, supra, para. 676.
Footnote 136: Brazil's appellee's submission, para. 950.
Footnote 137: Panel Report, para. 7.788.
75
Footnote 138: For discussion of the definitional elements of a subsidy in the context of the Agreement on Agriculture, see
Appellate Body Report, US - FSC, para. 136, and Appellate Body Report, Canada - Dairy, para. 87.
Footnote 139: United States' appellant's submission, para. 346.
Footnote 140: Panel Report, para. 7.933.
Footnote 141: The notification requirements are set out in Notification Requirements and Formats under the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture (PC/IPL/12, 2 December 1994), submitted by the United States to the Panel as Exhibit US-99. The United States
argues that the absence of a reporting requirement for export credit guarantees provides further proof that such measures are not
subject to export subsidy disciplines under the Agreement on Agriculture. (United States' appellant's submission, paras. 384-385)
Brazil disagrees and submits that, to the extent export credit guarantees constitute export subsidies, such measures are subject to
notification requirements. (Brazil's appellee's submission, para. 934)
Footnote 142: Under Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, “commitments limiting subsidization” of exports are
specified in the Schedule in terms of “budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels”.
Footnote 143: The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, C.T. Onions (ed.) (Guild Publishing, 1983), Vol. I, p. 682; Roget's
Thesaurus of English words and phrases (Longman Group Limited, 1982), p. 809.
Footnote 144: As the Appellate Body explained, when the special rule on burden of proof in Article 10.3 applies, then “the
complaining party is not required to lead in the presentation of evidence to panels, and it might well succeed in its claim even if it
presents no evidence—should the responding Member fail to meet its legal burden to establish that no export subsidy has been
granted with respect to the excess quantity”. (Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and the US
II), para. 75)
Footnote 145: United States' appellant's submission, para. 349.
Footnote 146: Article 10.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides:
4. Members donors of international food aid shall ensure:
(a) that the provision of international food aid is not tied directly or indirectly to commercial exports of agricultural products to
recipient countries;
(b) that international food aid transactions, including bilateral food aid which is monetized, shall be carried out in accordance
with the FAO “Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations”, including, where appropriate, the system of Usual
Marketing Requirements (UMRs); and
(c) that such aid shall be provided to the extent possible in fully grant form or on terms no less concessional than those provided
for in Article IV of the Food Aid Convention 1986.
A new Food Aid Convention was concluded in 1999.
Footnote 147: Brazil's appellee's submission, para. 940.
Footnote 148: Brazil's appellee's submission, para. 950.
76

Artigo 11
Geraldo Vidigal
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 11
Incorporated Products
In no case may the per-unit subsidy paid on an incorporated agricultural primary product exceed the perunit export subsidy that would be payable on exports of the primary product as such.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 11
Produtos Incorporados
Em nenhum caso poderá o subsídio por unidade pago a um produto agrícola primário incorporado
ultrapassar o subsídio à exportação por unidade que seria pagável às exportações do produto primário
como tal.
(Decreto 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994)
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
Nada a observar.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 11
Nenhuma jurisprudência relevante dos órgãos competentes. Citações:
Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/R, para. 7.660, nota 847
Nesse caso, o Painel observou que o Artigo 11 havia ficado fora da argumentação das partes.
Nota 847. “Article 11 of the Agreement on Agriculture (entitled “Incorporated products” and relating to
commitments on subsidies on agricultural products contingent upon their incorporation in exported
products) was not directly invoked in this dispute.”
Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC - Sugar),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS266/R, para. 7.196, nota 498
Neste caso, o Painel rejeitou a validade de um limite ao subsídio de açúcar, determinado numa nota de
rodapé, que fosse meramente quantitativo, e não contivesse limite orçamentário. As CE argumentavam
que o limite de subsídios a produtos incorporados seria apenas orçamentário, e não quantitativo, e que,
portanto, não haveria necessidade de ambos os limites para configurar um compromisso válido.
Nota. 498. “The European Communities draws a third analogy between the Footnote and the case of
incorporated products, for which only one form of commitment (budgetary) was scheduled, as
specifically envisaged in the Modalities Paper. Moreover, the Panel fails to recognize any similarity
between the content of Footnote 1 and “incorporated products”. The only provision of the Agreement on
Agriculture dealing with “incorporated” agricultural products is Article 11, which is of no relevance to
the present dispute.”
III.
Comentários
77
O Artigo 11 dispõe sobre o regime de subsídios aplicável aos produtos processados que, não sendo eles
próprios subsidiados, incorporam produtos primários legalmente subsidiados. O GATT original de 1947
trazia uma regulação unificada, e bastante branda, para os subsídios. Foi após a emenda aprovada em
1955 (mas ratificada por poucas partes contratantes) que o Artigo XVI do GATT, que regulava os
subsídios à exportação, passou a diferenciar entre dois tipos de produtos. À maioria dos produtos se
aplicava o regime geral, que proibia os subsídios à exportação que significassem preço menor no exterior
do que no mercado interno. Para os produtos primários, contudo, vigorava norma bem menos rigorosa: as
partes “deveriam esforçar-se para evitar” subsídios, e não deveriam absorver “mais que uma parte
equitativa do comércio mundial”. Essa dicotomia criava uma zona cinzenta, a dos produtos agrícolas
processados.
Na década de 1980, a questão foi levada a um Painel do GATT pelos EUA, que questionavam o subsídio
pago aos produtores de macarrão europeus. O Painel determinou que “macarrão não era um produto
primário, mas um produto agrícola processado” (149) – ao qual, portanto, se aplicaria o regime geral que
proibia a concessão de subsídios à exportação. As Comunidades Europeias argumentavam que o subsídio
constituía apenas uma compensação aos processadores de macarrão pelos altos preços a que a matéria
prima, sem o benefício dos subsídios europeus à exportação, era vendida dentro da Europa.
O Artigo 11 parece adotar a linha europeia. Admite subsídios para compensar o “prejuízo” dos produtores
ao adquirirem produtos internamente, sem a vantagem do subsídio à exportação, limitando o valor
daqueles subsídios ao valor que seria pago se os insumos fossem exportados. Entretanto, o artigo é
formulado de maneira negativa. Uma interpretação possível é que ele cria um “direito de subsídio à
exportação” para os produtos que incorporam produtos primários. Outra interpretação, entretanto, é a de
que se trata de uma simples obrigação adicional, cujo cumprimento não desobriga os Membros de
cumprir suas outras obrigações da OMC.
A questão é saber se se trata de “disposições específicas que lidam especificamente com a mesma
matéria”, e que, portanto, constituem lex specialis, deslocando as regras gerais. (150) Neste caso, o Artigo
XVI:4 do GATT 1994, o qual proíbe subsídios à exportação para quaisquer produtos que não produtos
primários – incluindo, presumivelmente, produtos que incorporem produtos agrícolas – constituiria uma
obrigação vigente e exigível, independente do Acordo de Agricultura. Esta segunda interpretação impõese particularmente quando a questão é examinada à luz da limitação temporária, e já expirada, prevista no
Artigo 13(c)(ii) do Acordo de Agricultura.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 149: Relatório do Painel em EEC – Pasta, SCM/43 [não adotado], para 4.2 (“pasta was not a primary product but was
a processed agricultural product”).
Footnote 150: Ver o Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso US – Cotton, paras. 531-533, 544-546.
78

Artigo 12
Geraldo Vidigal
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 12
Disciplines on Export Prohibitions and Restrictions
12.1
Where any Member institutes any new export prohibition or restriction on foodstuffs in
accordance with paragraph 2(a) of Article XI of GATT 1994, the Member shall observe the
following provisions:
(a)
the Member instituting the export prohibition or restriction shall give due consideration to
the effects of such prohibition or restriction on importing Members’ food security;
(b)
before any Member institutes an export prohibition or restriction, it shall give notice in
writing, as far in advance as practicable, to the Committee on Agriculture comprising
such information as the nature and the duration of such measure, and shall consult, upon
request, with any other Member having a substantial interest as an importer with respect
to any matter related to the measure in question. The Member instituting such export
prohibition or restriction shall provide, upon request, such a Member with necessary
information.
12.2
The provisions of this Article shall not apply to any developing country Member, unless the
measure is taken by a developing country Member which is a net-food exporter of the specific
foodstuff concerned.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 12
Disciplinas em Matéria de Proibições e Restrições à Exportação
12.1
12.2
Quando um Membro institui uma nova proibição ou restrição à exportação de alimentos em
conformidade com o parágrafo 2 (a) do Artigo XI do GATT 1994, o Membro observará as
seguintes disposições:
a)
o Membro que instituir a proibição ou restrição à exportação tomará devidamente em
consideração os efeitos de tal proibição ou restrição sobre a segurança alimentar dos
Membros importadores;
b)
antes de estabelecer a proibição ou restrição à exportação, o Membro que a estabelecer
dela informará por escrito, com a maior antecedência possível, o Comitê de Agricultura,
ao qual fornecerá ao mesmo tempo informação sobre aspectos tais como a natureza e
duração de tal medida e realizará consultas, quando solicitadas, com qualquer outro
Membro que tenha um interesse substancial como importador no que se refere a qualquer
questão relacionada com a medida em questão. O Membro que estabelece a proibição ou
restrição à exportação fornecerá, quando solicitado, a necessária informação a esse outro
Membro.
As disposições do presente Artigo não serão aplicadas a nenhum país em desenvolvimento
Membro, a menos que a medida seja tomada por um país em desenvolvimento Membro
exportador líquido do alimento específico em questão.
(Decreto 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994)
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
79
Nada a observar
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 12
Nenhuma jurisprudência relevante dos órgãos competentes.
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 12 regula medidas de proibição ou restrição à exportação de alimentos. Dada a proliferação do
uso desse tipo de política nos últimos anos (151), a ausência de controvérsias envolvendo este artigo é
bastante notável, e deve ser atribuída ao pouco rigor da disciplina multilateral na matéria. A obrigação
contida no Artigo 12.1(a), de “tomar [ ] devidamente em consideração” os efeitos da proibição ou
restrição sobre outros Membros, embora possa ter relevância política, é juridicamente pouco limitadora.
Por sua vez, as obrigações do Artigo 12.1(b), de “informar [ ] por escrito...o Comitê de Agricultura”,
“realizar [ ] consultas” e “fornecer [ ]...a necessária informação”, são meramente procedimentais e não
limitam ou disciplinam o conteúdo das medidas em questão.
A única obrigação material criada pelo Artigo encontra-se no corpo do Artigo 12.1, pelo qual novas
proibições ou restrições à exportação de alimentos deverão ser aplicadas “em conformidade com o
parágrafo 2(a) do Artigo XI do GATT 1994”. Em outras palavras, o Artigo não isenta essas medidas de
cumprir os requisitos do GATT.
Um eventual questionamento de uma medida de proibição ou restrição de exportações agrícolas, assim,
deve concentrar-se nas limitações impostas pelo acordo geral: de que a proibição ou restrição seja
“aplicada temporariamente” e “para prevenir ou remediar uma escassez aguda de produtos alimentícios
ou de outros produtos essenciais” (152) para o Membro exportador. Observe-se por fim que o Artigo 12.2
isenta países em desenvolvimento das limitações determinadas pelo próprio Acordo de Agricultura, mas
não daquelas impostas pelo GATT.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 151: Ver Ramesh Sharma, “Food Export Restrictions: Review of the 2007-2010 Experience and Consideration for
Disciplining Restrictive Measures”, FAO Commodity and Trade Policy Research Working Paper nº 32, disponível em
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/est/PUBLICATIONS/Comm_Working_Papers/EST-WP32.pdf. Acesso em: 18.8.2011.
Footnote 152: Versão adaptada da versão original em espanhol. A versão do artigo em português contida na lei brasileira produz
ambiguidade.
80

Artigo 12
Geraldo Vidigal
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 12
Disciplines on Export Prohibitions and Restrictions
12.1
Where any Member institutes any new export prohibition or restriction on foodstuffs in
accordance with paragraph 2(a) of Article XI of GATT 1994, the Member shall observe the
following provisions:
(a)
the Member instituting the export prohibition or restriction shall give due consideration to
the effects of such prohibition or restriction on importing Members’ food security;
(b)
before any Member institutes an export prohibition or restriction, it shall give notice in
writing, as far in advance as practicable, to the Committee on Agriculture comprising
such information as the nature and the duration of such measure, and shall consult, upon
request, with any other Member having a substantial interest as an importer with respect
to any matter related to the measure in question. The Member instituting such export
prohibition or restriction shall provide, upon request, such a Member with necessary
information.
12.2
The provisions of this Article shall not apply to any developing country Member, unless the
measure is taken by a developing country Member which is a net-food exporter of the specific
foodstuff concerned.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 12
Disciplinas em Matéria de Proibições e Restrições à Exportação
12.1
12.2
Quando um Membro institui uma nova proibição ou restrição à exportação de alimentos em
conformidade com o parágrafo 2 (a) do Artigo XI do GATT 1994, o Membro observará as
seguintes disposições:
a)
o Membro que instituir a proibição ou restrição à exportação tomará devidamente em
consideração os efeitos de tal proibição ou restrição sobre a segurança alimentar dos
Membros importadores;
b)
antes de estabelecer a proibição ou restrição à exportação, o Membro que a estabelecer
dela informará por escrito, com a maior antecedência possível, o Comitê de Agricultura,
ao qual fornecerá ao mesmo tempo informação sobre aspectos tais como a natureza e
duração de tal medida e realizará consultas, quando solicitadas, com qualquer outro
Membro que tenha um interesse substancial como importador no que se refere a qualquer
questão relacionada com a medida em questão. O Membro que estabelece a proibição ou
restrição à exportação fornecerá, quando solicitado, a necessária informação a esse outro
Membro.
As disposições do presente Artigo não serão aplicadas a nenhum país em desenvolvimento
Membro, a menos que a medida seja tomada por um país em desenvolvimento Membro
exportador líquido do alimento específico em questão.
(Decreto 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994)
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
81
Nada a observar
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 12
Nenhuma jurisprudência relevante dos órgãos competentes.
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 12 regula medidas de proibição ou restrição à exportação de alimentos. Dada a proliferação do
uso desse tipo de política nos últimos anos (153), a ausência de controvérsias envolvendo este artigo é
bastante notável, e deve ser atribuída ao pouco rigor da disciplina multilateral na matéria. A obrigação
contida no Artigo 12.1(a), de “tomar [ ] devidamente em consideração” os efeitos da proibição ou
restrição sobre outros Membros, embora possa ter relevância política, é juridicamente pouco limitadora.
Por sua vez, as obrigações do Artigo 12.1(b), de “informar [ ] por escrito...o Comitê de Agricultura”,
“realizar [ ] consultas” e “fornecer [ ]...a necessária informação”, são meramente procedimentais e não
limitam ou disciplinam o conteúdo das medidas em questão.
A única obrigação material criada pelo Artigo encontra-se no corpo do Artigo 12.1, pelo qual novas
proibições ou restrições à exportação de alimentos deverão ser aplicadas “em conformidade com o
parágrafo 2(a) do Artigo XI do GATT 1994”. Em outras palavras, o Artigo não isenta essas medidas de
cumprir os requisitos do GATT.
Um eventual questionamento de uma medida de proibição ou restrição de exportações agrícolas, assim,
deve concentrar-se nas limitações impostas pelo acordo geral: de que a proibição ou restrição seja
“aplicada temporariamente” e “para prevenir ou remediar uma escassez aguda de produtos alimentícios
ou de outros produtos essenciais” (154) para o Membro exportador. Observe-se por fim que o Artigo 12.2
isenta países em desenvolvimento das limitações determinadas pelo próprio Acordo de Agricultura, mas
não daquelas impostas pelo GATT.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 153: Ver Ramesh Sharma, “Food Export Restrictions: Review of the 2007-2010 Experience and Consideration for
Disciplining Restrictive Measures”, FAO Commodity and Trade Policy Research Working Paper nº 32, disponível em
<http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/est/PUBLICATIONS/Comm_Working_Papers/EST-WP32.pdf>, acessado em
18.8.2011.
Footnote 154: Versão adaptada da versão original em espanhol. A versão do artigo em português contida na lei brasileira produz
ambiguidade.
82

Artigo 13
Geraldo Vidigal
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 13
Due restraint
During the implementation period, notwithstanding the provisions of GATT 1994 and the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (referred to in this Article as the “Subsidies Agreement”):
(a)
domestic support measures that conform fully to the provisions of Annex 2 to this
Agreement shall be:
(i) non-actionable subsidies for purposes of countervailing duties (155);
(ii) exempt from actions based on Article XVI of GATT 1994 and Part III of the
Subsidies Agreement; and
(iii) exempt from actions based on non-violation nullification or impairment of the
benefits of tariff concessions accruing to another Member under Article II of
GATT 1994, in the sense of paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994;
(b)
(c)
domestic support measures that conform fully to the provisions of Article 6 of this
Agreement including direct payments that conform to the requirements of paragraph 5
thereof, as reflected in each Member’s Schedule, as well as domestic support within de
minimis levels and in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 6, shall be:
(i)
exempt from the imposition of countervailing duties unless a determination of
injury or threat thereof is made in accordance with Article VI of GATT 1994 and
Part V of the Subsidies Agreement, and due restraint shall be shown in initiating
any countervailing duty investigations;
(ii)
exempt from actions based on paragraph 1 of Article XVI of GATT 1994 or
Articles 5 and 6 of the Subsidies Agreement, provided that such measures do not
grant support to a specific commodity in excess of that decided during the 1992
marketing year; and
(iii)
exempt from actions based on non-violation nullification or impairment of the
benefits of tariff concessions accruing to another Member under Article II of
GATT 1994, in the sense of paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994,
provided that such measures do not grant support to a specific commodity in excess
of that decided during the 1992 marketing year;
export subsidies that conform fully to the provisions of Part V of this Agreement, as
reflected in each Member’s Schedule, shall be:
(i)
subject to countervailing duties only upon a determination of injury or threat
thereof based on volume, effect on prices, or consequent impact in accordance
with Article VI of GATT 1994 and Part V of the Subsidies Agreement, and due
restraint shall be shown in initiating any countervailing duty investigations; and
(ii)
exempt from actions based on Article XVI of GATT 1994 or Articles 3, 5 and 6
of the Subsidies Agreement.
Footnote 155: “Countervailing duties” where referred to in this Article are those covered by Article VI of GATT 1994 and Part
V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
83
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 13
Devida Moderação
Durante o período de implementação, não obstante as disposições do GATT 1994 e do Acordo sobre
Subsídios e Medidas Compensatórias (‘Acordo sobre Subsídios’),
a)
b)
c)
As medidas de apoio interno que estejam totalmente em conformidade com as disposições do
Anexo 2 do presente Acordo:
i)
constituirão subsídios não-acionáveis para os propósitos de direitos compensatórios4;
ii)
estarão isentas de ações baseadas no Artigo XVI do GATT 1994 e da Parte III do
Acordo sobre Subsídios; e
iii)
estarão isentas de ações baseadas em anulação ou prejuízo, em situação de nãoviolação dos benefícios advindos de concessões tarifárias resultantes, para um outro
Membro, do Artigo II do GATT 1994, no sentido do parágrafo 1 (b) do Artigo XXIII
do GATT 1994.
As medidas de apoio interno consubstanciadas na Lista de cada Membro que estejam
totalmente em conformidade com as disposições do Artigo 6 do presente Acordo, incluindo
os pagamentos diretos que atendam aos critérios enunciados no parágrafo 5 de tal Artigo,
assim como o apoio interno dentro dos limites dos níveis de de minimis e em conformidade
com as disposições do parágrafo 2 do Artigo 6:
i)
estarão isentas da imposição de direitos compensatórios, a menos que a existência de
uma determinação de dano ou ameaça de dano sejas estabelecida de acordo com o
Artigo VI do GATT 1994 e da Parte V do Acordo sobre Subsídios, e utilizar-se-á a
devida moderação para a abertura de quaisquer investigações em matéria de direitos
compensatórios;
ii)
estarão isentas de ações baseadas no parágrafo 1 do Artigo XVI do GATT 1994 ou
nos Artigos 5 e 6 do Acordo sobre Subsídios, desde que tais medidas não concedam
apoio a um produto de base específico, além do apoio fixado durante o ano
comercial de 1992; e
iii)
estarão isentas de ações baseadas na anulação ou prejuízo em situação de nãoviolação dos benefícios advindos de concessões tarifárias resultantes para um outro
Membro do Artigo II do GATT 1994, no sentido do parágrafo 1 (b) do Artigo XXIII
do GATT 1994, desde que tais medidas não concedam apoio a um produto de base
específico, além do apoio fixado durante o ano comercial de 1992.
Os subsídios à exportação que estejam totalmente em conformidade com as disposições da
Parte V do presente Acordo consubstanciados na Lista de cada Membro:
i)
estarão sujeitos a direitos compensatórios unicamente a partir da determinação da
existência de dano ou ameaça de dano baseada no volume, efeito em preços, ou
conseqüente impacto de acordo com o Artigo VI do GATT 1994 e com a Parte V do
Acordo sobre Subsídios e utilizar-se-á a devida moderação para a abertura de
quaisquer investigações em matéria de direitos compensatórios; e
“Direitos Compensatórios”, no sentido deste artigo, são aqueles cobertos pelo Artigo VI do GATT 1994 e pela Parte V do Acordo sobre
subsídios e Medidas compensatórias.
4
84
ii)
IC.
estarão isentos de ações baseadas no Artigo XVI do GATT 1994 ou nos Artigos 3, 5
e 6 do Acordo sobre Subsídios.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
Nada a observar.
II.
1.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 13
Geral
a)
“Finalidade do Artigo 13”
Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB, paras. 7.503-7.504
Neste caso, o Painel entendeu que o propósito do Artigo 13 era determinar uma isenção e não produzir
uma obrigação para os Membros. Para determinar a aplicabilidade dessa isenção, o Painel podia examinar
fatos ocorridos anteriormente ao período determinado nos Termos de Referência.
Para. 7.534. “The purpose of the Panel's examination as to whether measures satisfy the conditions in
Article 13 is not to determine whether or not they are consistent with obligations in the SCM Agreement
or Article XVI of the GATT 1994. A finding that measures do or do not satisfy the conditions in Article
13 does not lead to any recommendation or relief. Rather, it determines whether or not measures benefit
from particular exemptions from actions. This is a matter of evidence, not terms of reference.”
b)
“Inexistência de categoria intermediária entre os artigos 13(a) e 13(b)”
Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB, paras. 7.503-7.504
Neste trecho, o painel determinou que a inexigibilidade garantida pelo Artigo 13 só se aplica caso
respeitadas as condições impostas por uma de suas alíneas. Categorias intermediárias de subsídios, que
não se encaixem em nenhuma delas, não cumprem as condições e não podem beneficiar-se da isenção
concedida pelo Artigo.
Para. 7.503. “(…) It suffices for us to observe that, to the extent that non-product-specific domestic
support can specify commodities to which support is in some way delivered (a question which we do not
decide), an interpretation of Article 13(b)(ii) that excluded all non-product-specific domestic support
would create a novel and potentially large category of support which did not fall within Article 13(a), nor
fully within Article 13(b), which would be subject to the chapeau of Article 13(b) but not the additional
condition in the proviso. This would ignore the subject of the proviso which is “such measures” without
any basis in the text or context nor any justification in the object and purpose of the provision. This would
be some unknown kind of “pale amber”, non-product-specific box which the drafters clearly did not
intend to create.”
Para. 7.504. “(…) If implementation period support were limited to product-specific support, the
comparison under Article 13(b)(ii) would primarily be a comparison of deficiency payments, which were
tied to the production of specific commodities, and the later measures, which are principally tied to
production of those specific commodities in a base period. The text of Article 13 and the architecture of
the Agreement on Agriculture make clear that such a shift should only be determinative where the change
in method of delivery is a shift to green box support or to support that is not granted to a specific
commodity. Therefore, the Panel's interpretation does not “rob” Members of their ability to shift to
decoupled payments and still comply with the Article 13. Decoupled payments that conform fully to the
provisions of Annex 2 automatically comply with the conditions in Article 13(a), and others that conform
fully with Article 6 and the additional condition in Article 13(b)(ii), also comply with Article 13.”
85
2.
Artigo 13(b)(ii)
a)
“Geral”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US – Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, para. 391
Em seu relatório, o Órgão de Apelação reafirmou o propósito do Artigo 13(b)(ii).
Em seu relatório, o Órgão de Apelação reafirmou o propósito do Artigo 13(b)(ii).
Para. 391. “We recall, once again, that the proviso to Article 13(b)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture
sets forth that, during the implementation period in which Article 13 applies, non-green box domestic
support measures must not “grant support to a specific commodity in excess of that decided during the
1992 marketing year”, if such measures are to enjoy exemption from actions “based on paragraph 1 of
Article XVI of GATT 1994 or Articles 5 and 6 of the Subsidies Agreement”.
We also note, however, that fairly detailed calculations regarding the values attributable to United States
implementation period support is available to us in these proceedings.”
b)
“Interpretação de “apoio a um produto de base específico” no Artigo 13(b)(ii)”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras. 359-366, 370 e 372
Neste trecho, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que deve haver uma ligação identificável entre uma
medida de apoio governamental e o produto de base beneficiado para que se configure o “apoio a um
produto de base específico” mencionado no Artigo 13. Esse apoio a um produto específico pode estar
explícito na medida, mas também pode ser inferido de suas características e seu desenho.
Para. 359. “We address first the meaning of the phrase “support to a specific commodity” in
Article 13(b)(ii). We then discuss the application of this interpretation to four domestic support measures:
production flexibility contract payments, market loss assistance payments, direct payments and countercyclical payments. These four measures did not exist in 1992. Therefore, this part of the United States'
appeal affects the calculation of only the support granted during the implementation period.”
Para. 360. “We note that payments in respect of each of these measures are calculated by reference to
“base acres” upon which certain commodities (including upland cotton) were grown in a base period, but
upon which a producer currently may or may not grow upland cotton. We refer to these four types of
payment in this section as the “base acre dependent payments”.”
Para. 361. “We turn to our analysis of the phrase “such measures ... grant[ing] support to a specific
commodity” in Article 13(b)(ii). The Panel found and the participants do not dispute that the relevant
United States measures grant “support”; similarly, the Panel found and the participants agree that upland
cotton is a “commodity” in the sense of that provision.”
Para. 362. “The key element, however, is the significance of the qualifying word “specific” in this
phrase. The Panel described the ordinary meaning of the term “specific” as “clearly or explicitly defined;
precise; exact; definite” and as “specially or peculiarly pertaining to a particular thing or person, or a class
of these; peculiar (to)”. In our view, the term “specific” in the phrase “support to a specific commodity”
means the “commodity” must be clearly identifiable. The use of term “to” connecting “support” with “a
specific commodity” means that support must “specially pertain” to a particular commodity in the sense
of being conferred on that commodity. In addition, the terms “such measures ... grant” indicates that a
discernible link must exist between “such measures” and the particular commodity to which support is
granted. Thus, it is not sufficient that a commodity happens to benefit from support, or that support ends
86
up flowing to that commodity by mere coincidence. Rather, the phrase “such measures” granting “support
to a specific commodity” implies a discernible link between the support-conferring measure and the
particular commodity to which support is granted.”
Para. 363. “Therefore, we agree with the Panel insofar as it found that the ordinary meaning of the phrase
“such measures ... grant[ing] support to a specific commodity” includes “non-green box measures that
clearly or explicitly define a commodity as one to which they bestow or confer support”. This is because
the Panel's test requires that a commodity be specified in the measure, and that the support be conferred
on that commodity. We believe, however, that the terms of this definition do not exhaust the scope of
measures that may grant “support to a specific commodity”. We note in this regard that the Panel looked,
in applying its test, to factors such as eligibility criteria and payment rates, as well as the relationship
between payments and current market prices of the commodity in question. In our view, the Panel was
correct to consider such matters, as the requisite link between a measure granting support and a specific
commodity may be discerned not just from an explicit specification of the commodity in the text of a
measure, as the Panel's test—on its face—seems to imply, but also from an analysis of factors such as the
characteristics, structure or design of that measure.”
Para. 364. “Moving to the context of the proviso to Article 13(b)(ii), we note that the United States
argues that “support to a specific commodity” should be interpreted as meaning “product-specific
support”. The United States emphasizes the similarities between the phrase “support to a specific
commodity” in Article 13(b)(ii) and two phrases in Article 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture that refer
to product-specific support: “support for basic agricultural products” and “support ... provided for an
agricultural product in favour of the producers of the basic agricultural product”. The United States
argues that the meaning of all of these phrases must be the same.”
Para. 365. “These phrases do provide important context for the interpretation of Article 13(b)(ii). In our
view, “support to a specific commodity” certainly includes “product-specific” support. However, like
the Panel, we do not believe that the scope of the phrase “support to a specific commodity” in the proviso
to Article 13(b)(ii) is exhausted by taking into account the category of product-specific support alone.”
Para. 366. “This is for at least two reasons. First, we note that the drafters chose not to use phrases such
as support “provided for an agricultural product in favour of the producers of the basic agricultural
product” or “support for basic agricultural products” in Article 13(b)(ii), but rather chose the distinct
phrase “support to a specific commodity”. This choice of different words by the drafters gives a
preliminary indication that they may have intended to convey different meanings. (156)”
Para. 367. “Secondly, and more importantly, the United States' argument fails to reckon with the fact that
the scope of domestic support measures that may grant “support to a specific commodity” under
Article 13(b)(ii) is broader than just “product-specific support” in the sense of Article 1 and Annex 3. The
proviso to Article 13(b)(ii) mentions only the term “such measures” granting support; but the meaning of
this term can be clarified by reference to the chapeau of Article 13(b) because, as the Panel noted, “[t]he
chapeau of paragraph (b) and subparagraph (ii) form part of a single sentence.” The chapeau identifies the
categories of support measures covered by that provision.”
Para. 370. “Indeed, as the United States correctly points out, Article 13(b)(ii) serves to create a discipline
upon Members that seek the shelter of the peace clause during the implementation period. We are not
convinced, however, that this discipline is limited to “product-specific support” as defined in Article 1 of
the Agreement on Agriculture. Rather, it extends to all measures that grant “support to a specific
commodity”, in the sense that the support is conferred on a specific commodity, and there is a discernible
link between the measure and the specific commodity concerned.”
Para. 372. “As we have explained above, the term “such measures ... grant support to a specific
commodity” comprises two elements: first, a non-green box measure actually confers support on the
specific commodity in question; and second, there is a discernible link between the measure and the
commodity, such that the measure is directed at supporting that commodity. Such a discernible link may
be evident where a measure explicitly defines a specific commodity as one to which it bestows support.
87
Such a link might also be ascertained, as a matter of fact, from the characteristics, structure or design of
the measure under examination. Conversely, support that does not actually flow to a commodity or
support that flows to a commodity by coincidence rather than by the inherent design of the measure
cannot be regarded as falling within the ambit of the term “support to a specific commodity”.”
c)
“Necessidade de comparação específica”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US – Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB, paras. 377 e 384
Neste trecho, o Órgão de Apelação corrige o cálculo do Painel, determinando que a comparação entre
valores deve ser feita tendo por objeto apenas o produto de base específico em debate.
Para. 377. “We agree with the United States that payments made with respect to historical upland cotton
base acres to commodities other than upland cotton or to producers who produced no commodities at all
cannot be deemed to be support granted to upland cotton for purposes of the Article 13(b)(ii) comparison.
The Article 13(b)(ii) assessment must be limited to support conferred on planted upland cotton; support
flowing to other commodities that were planted, or support that was given where no commodities were
produced must of course be removed from the assessment. We reject, therefore, the Panel's calculation
methodology to the extent that it failed to limit the Article 13(b)(ii) calculation to payments with respect
to upland cotton base acres corresponding to physical acres actually planted with upland cotton.”
Para. 384. “For the reasons stated above, we conclude that payments with respect to upland cotton base
acres to producers currently growing upland cotton under the production flexibility contract, market loss
assistance, direct payment and counter-cyclical payment measures, calculated in accordance with the
“cotton to cotton” methodology, are support granted to the specific commodity upland cotton in the sense
of Article 13(b)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture.”
d)
Diferença entre “conceder” e “fixar”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US – Upland
Cotton), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, para. 382
Neste trecho, o Órgão de Apelação observa que as medidas de comparação relevantes são o “apoio fixado
durante o ano comercial de 1992” e o apoio “conced[ido]” em outros anos. O que vale para estes, assim,
não é o valor decidido pelo legislador naquele ano, mas o valor desembolsado pelo governo.
Para. 382. “The United States finds support for this view in the terms “grant” and “decided” in
Article 13(b)(ii), and claims that “the focus of the Peace Clause comparison is on the support a Member
decides”. We note that the verbs “grant” and “decided” have distinct meanings. We agree with the
observation of the Panel that “'[d]ecided' refers to what the government determines, but 'grant' refers to
what its measures provide.” In Article 13(b)(ii), each of these words has been chosen to govern one side
of the comparison required by that proviso. In the light of the distinct meanings of these words, and the
distinct roles they play in the context of Article 13(b)(ii), we reject the idea that the word “grant”, which
is applicable to implementation period support, must be read to mean the same thing as “decided”, which
is applicable to the 1992 benchmark level of support.”
e)
“Pagamentos realizados em virtude de medidas já expiradas”
Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US – Upand Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/R, para. 7.529
Neste trecho, o Painel determinou que os pagamentos que compõem o limite dado no Artigo 13(b)(ii)
incluem pagamentos feitos em virtude de medidas cuja vigência jurídica expirou.
88
Para. 7.529. “Consequently, the tense of the proviso “provided that such measures do not grant …” does
not limit the scope of Article 13(b) to measures which are currently in effect. It refers to any domestic
support measures covered by paragraph (b) which are or have been in force during the implementation
period of nine years commencing in 1995. Therefore, the Panel finds that these payments under expired
measures can be taken into account in the examination of consistency of the United States domestic
support measures with Article 13(b)(ii).”
3.
Artigo 13(c)
a)
“Geral”
Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upand Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/R, para. 7.675
Neste trecho, o Painel delimita as disposições que devem ser cumpridas para que um Membro possa se
beneficiar da inexigibilidade das alíneas do Artigo 13(c).
Para.7.675. “The conditions set out in the chapeau of Article 13(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture refer
to compliance with particular substantive provisions in Part V of the Agreement on Agriculture (which
includes Articles 8 through 11, as well as, by reference, Article 3.3, of that Agreement) and export
subsidy reduction commitments in each Member's Schedule.”
b)
“Relação com o ASMC”
Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US – Upland Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/R, paras. 7.910-7.911
Neste trecho, o Painel determina que a ausência de previsão explícita, em artigos do Acordo de Subsídios
e Medidas Compensatórias, de que o artigo em questão está submetido ao Artigo 13 do Acordo de
Agricultura, é indicativo de que a forma de subsídio em questão não é protegida pela inexigibilidade
determinada pelo Artigo 13. A interpretação foi confirmada sem maiores detalhes no relatório do Órgão
de Apelação em US – Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para. 763(e)(i).
Para.7.910. “There is not even any indication along the lines of the caveat in Articles 5 and 6.9 of the
SCM Agreement, which both stipulate that they do “not apply to subsidies maintained on agricultural
products as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture”. In turn, Article 13(c)(ii) of the
Agreement on Agriculture explicitly indicates that certain measures are “exempt from actions” based on
certain provisions of the SCM Agreement and Article XVI of the GATT 1994 upon fulfilment of certain
conditions.”
Para. 7.911. “The absence in Article 10.2 of such an explicit stipulation supports our view that the
general export subsidy anti-circumvention disciplines apply pending development of the “internationally
agreed disciplines” referred to in Article 10.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. While those
internationally agreed disciplines are under negotiation, the general disciplines on export subsidies
included in the Agreement on Agriculture (and, subject to the provisions of Article 13(c) and the terms of
the SCM Agreement, the export subsidy prohibition in Article 3 of the SCM Agreement) apply. Members
have agreed to undertake to work toward the development of internationally agreed disciplines. If
Members do conclude an agreement on these specific disciplines, the second part of Article 10.2 would
be triggered (or, more likely, would be taken into account and modified by the specific disciplines)
following any appropriate action by WTO Members.”
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 13 contém a chamada Cláusula da Paz, expirada em 1º de janeiro de 2004 mas vigente durante
os nove anos do período de implementação do Acordo de Agricultura (157). O efeito da cláusula foi
impedir, até a expiração do período de implementação, o uso do sistema de solução de controvérsias para
89
exigir o cumprimento de disposições do Acordo referentes a apoio interno. Em outras palavras, ainda que
haja proibição formal do subsídio em questão, essa obrigação é inexigível dentro do sistema jurídico da
OMC. A cláusula teve relevância prática no caso US – Upland Cotton, visto que o pedido de Painel
ocorreu em fevereiro de 2003. Determinou-se, entretanto, que a cláusula não constituía uma proibição
absoluta ao exame pelo DSB de controvérsias referentes a subsídios agrícolas. Ademais, mesmo o efeito
de inexigibilidade perante o DSB dependia de que as medidas em questão estivessem “totalmente em
conformidade” com as disposições do próprio Acordo de Agricultura e seus anexos. Dado que as medidas
dos EUA não cumpriam esses requisitos, passava a se aplicar o regime muito mais rígido do Acordo
sobre Subsídios e Medidas Compensatórias. No início da Rodada Doha, uma das demandas dos países
desenvolvidos era obter, em troca de compromissos de redução de subsídios agrícolas, uma extensão da
Cláusula da Paz – com a intenção de proteger seus subsídios agrícolas do escrutínio multilateral. (158) A
interpretação dada pelo Painel e confirmada pelo Órgão de Apelação, entretanto, restringiu
significativamente o escopo da “imunidade” concedida aos subsídios agrícolas pela cláusula. Dado que a
cláusula expirou há quase uma década, e considerando-se que dificilmente os países que não subsidiam
seus agricultores concordarão com uma nova redação que imunize os subsídios hoje proibidos em virtude
de expiração da cláusula, é improvável que uma nova Cláusula da Paz seja incluída na Rodada Doha.
FOOTNOTE:
Footnote 156: We note in this regard that, for example, Article 6.4(a)(i) of the Agreement on Agriculture mentions “productspecific domestic support”, whereas Article 13 does not mention or cross-refer to it.
Footnote 157: Acordo de Agricultura, Artigo 1(f).
Footnote 158: Assis Moreira, “Americanos propõem nova 'cláusula da paz' no comércio agrícola até 2013”, Valor Econômico,
11.10.2005.
90

Artigo 14
Caroline Alves Henrique Bender
Adriane Nakagawa Baptista
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 14
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Members agree to give effect to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 14
Medidas Sanitárias e Fitossanitárias
Os Membros concordam em colocar em vigor o Acordo sobre a Aplicação de Medidas Sanitárias
e Fitossanitárias.
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
Há uma imprecisão quanto ao uso da expressão “to give effect”. Traduzida como “colocar em vigor” no
Decreto, o propósito do Artigo 14 é compatibilizar a aplicação do Acordo sobre Agricultura com as
disposições do Acordo sobre Medidas Sanitárias e Fitossanitárias. Assim, melhor seria se ao invés de
“colocar em vigor” se tivesse escolhido “aplicar”, dando lugar à seguinte construção: “Os Membros
concordam em aplicar o Acordo sobre a Aplicação de Medidas Sanitárias e Fitossanitárias.”
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 14
Relatório do Painel Japan - Measures Affecting The Importation Of Apples (Japan - Apples),
Demandante: EUA, WT/DS245/RW, paras. 1.2-1.3
Neste caso, o painel não se deteve na análise do Artigo 14 do Acordo sobre Agricultura. Entretanto,
comentando o propósito do Acordo sobre Aplicação de Medidas Sanitárias e Fitossanitárias, assentou a
sua relevância no âmbito do comércio de bens agrícolas.
Para. 1.2. “The United States stated that since 1994, Japan had applied quarantine restrictions on US
apples imported into Japan to protect against the introduction of fire blight (Erwinia amylovora). These
restrictions included, interalia, the prohibition of imported apples from orchards in which any fire blight
is detected, the requirement that export orchards be inspected three times yearly for the presence of fire
blight, the disqualification of any orchard from exporting to Japan should fire blight be detected within a
500-metre buffer zone surrounding such orchard, and a post-harvest treatment of exported apples with
chlorine. The United States alleged that Japan’s measures were inconsistent with Article XI of GATT
1994; Articles 2.2, 2.3, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.6, 6.1, 6.2 and 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement; and Article
14 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Consultations were held on 18 April 2002, but failed to settle the
dispute.”
Para. 1.3. “In a communication dated 7 May 2002, the United States requested the Dispute Settlement
Body (“DSB”) to establish a panel pursuant to Article 6 of the DSU, with standard terms of reference as
set out in Article 7.1 of the DSU. 5 The US claims of inconsistency in their Request for the
Establishment of a Panel were identical to those set out in their request for consultations, except for
additional claims of inconsistency under Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement and Article 4.2 of the
91
Agreement on Agriculture, and omission of the previous claim under Article 14 of the Agreement on
Agriculture.”
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 14 do Acordo de Agricultura ratifica o Acordo sobre a Aplicação de Medidas Sanitárias e
Fitossanitárias. Nesse sentido, o dispositivo consolida entendimento fundamental acerca da interligação
entre o comércio de bens agrícolas e a necessidade de se estabelecer parâmetros de proteção à saúde e a
vida humana, dos animais e plantas. A presença deste artigo no Acordo de Agricultura atua como
interface na aplicação de regras atinentes a questões Sanitárias e Fitossanitárias que são, por vezes,
levantadas em disputas que envolvem produtos agrícolas.
A exemplo disso, pode-se citar o caso Japan-Apples, no qual as importações de maçãs dos EUA para o
Japão sofreram quarentena a fim dar proteção contra uma bactéria denominada Erwinia amylovora.
92

Artigo 15
Adriane Nakagawa Baptista
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 15
Special and Differential Treatment
15.1
In keeping with the recognition that differential and more favourable treatment for developing
country Members is an integral part of the negotiation, special and differential treatment in
respect of commitments shall be provided as set out in the relevant provisions of this Agreement
and embodied in the Schedules of concessions and commitments.
15.2
Developing country Members shall have the flexibility to implement reduction commitments over
a period of up to 10 years. Least-developed country Members shall not be required to undertake
reduction commitments.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 15
Tratamento Especial e Diferenciado
15.1
Tendo-se reconhecido que o tratamento diferenciado e mais favorável a países em
desenvolvimento Membros constitui parte integrante da negociação, deverá conceder-se
tratamento especial e diferenciado no que se refere aos compromissos, conforme estabelecido nas
disposições pertinentes do presente Acordo e consubstanciado nas Listas de concessões e
compromissos.
15.2
Os países em desenvolvimento terão flexibilidade para implementar os compromissos de redução
ao longo de um período de até 10 anos. Não se exigirá dos países de menor desenvolvimento
relativo Membros que assumam compromissos de redução.
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
Nenhum comentário.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 15
Pedido de consultas United States - Tariff Rate Quota for Imports of Groundnuts, Demandante:
Argentina, WT/DS111/1
O governo argentino solicitou consultas no que concerne a aplicação de quotas tarifárias para imposto de
importação de amendoim para os EUA. De acordo com a Argentina a interpretação estrita de seus
compromissos de redução e dos seus requisitos, eliminam eventuais benefícios diretos e indiretos que a
Argentina poderia obter a partir do GATT 1994 e de outros Acordos.
“The Government of Argentina considers that the particularly narrow interpretation by the United States
both of the obligation contained in its national schedule and of the requirements for Argentina to benefit
fully from the concessions granted, nullifies or impairs the benefits accruing to Argentina directly or
indirectly under the GATT 1994 and various WTO Agreements, and impedes its attainment of the
objectives of those Agreements and of the GATT 1994.”
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 15 contempla o tratamento diferenciado para os países em desenvolvimento externados ao longo
do Acordo sobre Agricultura. Possibilidades de tratamento diferenciado também podem ser encontradas
nos Artigos 6, 9, 12, Anexo 2 e Anexo 5B que tratam sobre os compromissos de redução e acesso a
mercados. Não há jurisprudência acerca da aplicação dos anexos. Para os demais casos, consultar os
comentários feitos aos artigos supramencionados.
93

Artigo 16
Cleíse Martins Costa
IA.
Texto do Artigo em inglês
Article 16
Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries
16.1
Developed country Members shall take such action as is provided for within the framework of
the Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme
on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries. (159)
16.2
The Committee on Agriculture shall monitor, as appropriate, the follow-up to this Decision.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 16
Países de Menor Desenvolvimento Relativo e Países em Desenvolvimento Importadores
Líquidos de Alimentos
16.1
Os países em desenvolvimento Membros adotarão as medidas previstas no âmbito da Decisão
sobre Medidas Relativas aos Possíveis Efeitos Negativos do Programa de Reforma em Países de
Menor Desenvolvimento Relativo e em Países em Desenvolvimento Importadores Líquidos de
Alimentos.
16.2
O Comitê de Agricultura acompanhará, conforme apropriado, o seguimento dado a tal Decisão.
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
Nada a observar.
II.
1.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 16
Artigo 16.1
Nenhuma jurisprudência relevante dos órgãos competentes. O que se verifica ao analisar o Artigo são
recomendação das Conferências Ministeriais.
(a) Text of the Decision
The text of the Decision and materials on its interpretation appear below at the end of this Chapter.
(b) Recommendations of the Singapore Ministerial Conference
In the light of the Committee’s discussions on the follow-up to the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on
Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and
Net Food-Importing Developing Countries (NFIDC Decision), the Committee on Agriculture submitted
the following recommendations for consideration by the Singapore Ministerial Conference, which were
approved by Ministers:
“(i) that, in anticipation of the expiry of the current Food Aid Convention in June 1998 and in
preparation for the renegotiation of the Food Aid Convention, action be initiated in 1997 within
the framework of the Food Aid Convention, under arrangements for participation by all
interested countries and by relevant international organizations as appropriate, to develop
recommendations with a view towards establishing a level of food aid commitments, covering as
94
wide a range of donors and donable foodstuffs as possible, which is sufficient to meet the
legitimate needs of developing countries during the reform programme. These recommendations
should include guidelines to ensure that an increasing proportion of food aid is provided to leastdeveloped and net food-importing developing countries in fully grant form and/or on appropriate
concessional terms in line with Article IV of the current Food Aid Convention, as well as means
to improve the effectiveness and positive impact of food aid;
The Food Aid Convention 1999 was adopted under the auspices of the United Nations on 24 March 1999.
It provisionally entered into force on 1 July 1999 for an initial duration of three years. The Convention
has been subsequently extended several times by the Food Aid Committee pending the outcome of the
Doha negotiations on agriculture.
(ii) that developed country WTO Members continue to give full consideration in the context
of their aid programmes to requests for the provision of technical and financial assistance to
least-developed and net food-importing developing countries to improve their agricultural
productivity and infrastructure;
(iii)
that the provisions of paragraph 4 of the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision, whereby
Ministers agreed to ensure that any agreement relating to agricultural export credits makes
appropriate provision for differential treatment in favour of least-developed and net foodimporting developing countries, be taken fully into account in the agreement to be negotiated on
agricultural export credits;
(iv) G/L/125, adopted by the Singapore Ministerial Conference, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, para. 13.
That WTO Members, in their individual capacity as members of relevant international financial
institutions, take appropriate steps to encourage the institutions concerned, through their
respective governing bodies, to further consider the scope for establishing new facilities or
enhancing existing facilities for developing countries experiencing Uruguay Round-related
difficulties in financing normal levels of commercial imports of basic foodstuffs.”
(c) Recommendations approved at the Doha Ministerial Conference
In advance of the Doha Ministerial Meeting, the Committee reported on its work on implementation
related issues and made the following recommendations. Concerning food aid, the Committee
recommended:
“(a) that early action be taken within the framework of the Food Aid Convention 1999 (which
unless extended, with or without a decision regarding its renegotiation, would expire on 30 June
2002) and of the UN World Food Programme by donors of food aid to review their food aid
contributions with a view to better identifying and meeting the food aid needs of least-developed
and WTO net food-importing developing countries;
(b) G/AG/11, Section B-I: WTO Members which are donors of food aid shall, within the
framework of their food aid policies, statutes, programmes and commitments, take appropriate
measures aimed at ensuring: (i) that to the maximum extent possible their levels of food aid to
developing countries are maintained during periods in which trends in world market prices of
basic foodstuffs have been increasing; and (ii) that all food aid to least developed countries is
provided in fully grant form and, to the maximum extent possible, to WTO net food-importing
developing countries as well.”
Concerning technical and financial assistance in the context of aid programmes to improve agricultural
productivity and infrastructure, the Committee recommended:
95
“(a) that developed country WTO Members should continue to give full and favourable
consideration in the context of their aid programmes to requests for the provision of technical
and financial assistance by least-developed and net food-importing developing countries to
improve their agricultural productivity and infrastructure;
(b) G/AG/11, Section B-II: that, in support of the priority accorded by least-developed and net
food-importing developing countries to the development of their agricultural productivity and
infrastructure, the WTO General Council call upon relevant international development
organisations, including the World Bank, the FAO, IFAD, the UNDP and the Regional
Development Banks to enhance their provision of, and access to, technical and financial
assistance to least-developed and net food-importing developing countries, on terms and
conditions conducive to the better use of such facilities and resources, in order to improve
agricultural productivity and infrastructure in these countries under existing facilities and
programmes, as well as under such facilities and programmes as may be introduced.”
Concerning financing difficulties for commercial imports of basic foodstuffs, the Committee
recommended:
“(a) that the provisions of paragraph 4 of the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision, which provide
for differential treatment in favour of least-developed and WTO net food-importing developing
countries, shall be taken fully into account in any agreement to be negotiated on disciplines on
agricultural export credits pursuant toArticle 10.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture;
(b) that an inter-agency panel of financial and commodity experts be established, with the
requested participation of the World Bank, the IMF, the FAO, the International Grains Council
and the UNCTAD, to explore ways and means for improving access by least-developed and
WTO net food-importing developing countries to multilateral programmes and facilities to assist
with short term difficulties in financing normal levels of commercial imports of basic foodstuffs,
as well as the concept and feasibility of the proposal for the establishment of a revolving fund
in G/AG/W/49 and Add.1 andCorr.1. The detailed terms of reference, drawing on the Marrakesh
NFIDC Decision, should be submitted by the Vice-Chairman of the WTO Committee on
Agriculture, following consultations with Members, to the General Council for approval by not
later than 31 December 2001. The inter-agency panel shall submit its recommendations to the
General Council by not later than 30 June 2002.”
WT/MIN(01)/17, Para. 2.2: The Ministerial Conference took note of these recommendations.
G/AG/12: An Inter-Agency Panel on Short-Term Difficulties in Financing Normal Levels of Commercial
Imports of Basic Foodstuffs was established and the General Council approved terms of reference for its
work.
G/AG/13: The Panel submitted its report on 28 June 2002.
(d) List of least-developed and net food-importing developing countries
At its meeting of 21 November 1995, the Committee on Agriculture adopted a decision on establishment
of a WTO list of net food-importing developing countries eligible as beneficiaries in respect of measures
provided for in the NFIDC Decision.
The decision to establish this list was taken on the understanding that
G/AG/R/4, Para. 17: “‘[B]eing listed would not as such confer automatic benefits since, under
the mechanisms covered by the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision, donors and the institutions
96
concerned would have a role to play.’ The agreed criteria provided that the following countries
would be eligible for the list:
‘a) Least developed countries as recognized by the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations.
b) G/AG/3: Any developing country Member of the WTO which was a net importer of basic
foodstuffs in any three years of the most recent five-year period for which data are available and
which notifies the Committee of its decision to be listed as a Net Food-Importing Developing
Country for the purpose of the decision.’”
G/AG/5/Rev.9: as of 30 September 2011, the most recent list includes the least-developed countries as
recognized by ECOSOC, plus 29 other countries.
The 29 other countries were Barbados, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire,
Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Gabon, Grenada, Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya,
Maldives, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago and Tunisia.
2. Artigo 16.2
(a) “General”
163.
G/AG/W/42 and Revs. 1–14: O exercício de monitoramento anual acerca da decisão do NFIDC
como um papel que tem sido tomando a cada reunião do mês de novembro do comitê de agriculta
Hoje estamos aqui no Brasil para tratar de medidas especificas acerca do comércio internacional. Os
requisitos para notificação
the annual monitoring exercise on the follow-up to the NFIDC Decision as a whole has been undertaken
at each November meeting of the Committee on Agriculture, on the basis of Table NF:1 notifications by
donor Members as well as contributions by the observer organizations, contributions by Members and
observer organizations, and a background note by the Secretariat summarizing information on the
implementation of the NFIDC Decision.
(b) “Notification requirements”
164. For notification requirements and formats concerning the follow-up to the NFIDC Decision,
see paragraphs 173–177 below.
(c) “Opportunities for consultation”
165. Paragraph 18 of the Organization of Work and Working Procedures of the Committee on
Agriculture: With respect to the adoption of the document, see Para. 172 of this Chapter. states:
G/AG/1, para. 18: “There shall be an opportunity at any regular meeting of the Committee to
raise any matter relating to the Decision on Measures concerning the Possible Negative Effects
of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries.”
(d) “Effectiveness”
166.
At its meeting on 15 December 2000, the General Council decided that:
97
WT/L/384, Para. 1.2: “The Committee on Agriculture shall examine possible means of
improving the effectiveness of the implementation of the Decision on Measures Concerning the
Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net FoodImporting Developing Countries and report to the General Council at the second regular meeting
of the Council in 2001.”
167.
WT/MIN(01)/17, para. 2.2: c/c G/AG/11: Pursuant to this mandate, the Committee on
Agriculture submitted seven recommendations that were adopted by the Doha Ministerial Conference.
The recommendations concerned:
(i) food aid;
(ii) technical and financial assistance in the context of aid programmes to
improve agricultural productivity and infrastructure;
(iii) financing normal levels of commercial imports of basic foodstuffs; and
(iv) review of follow-up.
African Group proposal: TN/CTD/W/3/Rev.2, para. 52, 17 July 2002: between 2003 and 2006, the
Committee on Agriculture also considered, at each of its regular meetings, a proposal by the African
Group calling for developed-country Members to, inter alia, contribute to a revolving fund for normal
levels of food imports.
See G/AG/16, paragraph 19(c). Progress reports relating to the African Group proposal:
G/AG/17 and Corr.1; G/AG/20; G/AG/22: in September 2004, the Committee on Agriculture decided to
revert to this matter on the basis of the recommendation contained in its report to the General Council on
Implementation-Related Issues.
G/AG/16/Add.1, Paras. 11–12, 13 June 200: informal consultations specifically dedicated to that proposal
were also held in May 2005 and again in February 2006, as part of the discussions on implementationrelated issues. The outcome of such consultations is reflected in the Committee’s follow-up report to the
General Council.
G/AG/W/70/ and revisions: Further to a request by the Committee on Agriculture in 2008, the Secretariat
prepared a compendium of documents that are directly or indirectly relevant to the implementationrelated issues under its purview, and that have been circulated since the last report to the General Council
in June 2006. The Compendium is regularly updated and circulated to Members.
III.
Comentários
De acordo com o Artigo 16 é necessário criar mecanismos para evitar que dois grupos de países,
especialmente sensíveis à liberalização do comércio agrícola, tenham efeitos negativos associados a tal
processo. São eles: países de menor desenvolvimento relativo (PMDRs) e países em desenvolvimento
(PEDs) importadores líquidos de alimentos.
Diferentemente da maior parte do entendimento acerca dos dispositivos do Acordo sobre Agricultura, os
quais são estabelecidos mediante a interpretação a partir de precedentes jurisprudenciais do DSB, o
Artigo 16.1 possui recomendações sugeridas pelo Comitê de Agricultura às Conferências Ministeriais, as
quais são aprovadas ou não. Tais sugestões podem, de certo modo, indicar os objetivos e a diferenciação
estabelecida entre Membros desenvolvidos e aqueles Estados que são considerados como sensíveis. Notase grandes esforços dos Membros da OMC em incentivar medidas apropriadas para estabelecer novas
98
facilidades em favor dos PEDs que enfrentavam dificuldades para financiar níveis normais de importação
comercial de alimentos básicos. Complementando a diferenciação entre os Membros da OMC, verifica-se
o estabelecimento de compromissos em matéria de ajuda alimentar.
Para alcançar os objetivos contidos no próprio Acordo sobre Agricultura há a necessidade do
estabelecimento de uma diretriz específica de modo a induzir que os PDs a conceder ajuda em relação a
transferência de tecnologia.
O Artigo 16.2 trata basicamente de questões referentes a procedimento de notificação e consulta frente
aos Membros para acompanhar as decisões acolhidas pelas Conferências Ministeriais. A preocupação
principal funda-se no monitoramento das decisões para verificar a sua implementação.
FOOTNOTE:
Footnote 159: The Decision adopted by the Ministerial Conference at Marrakesh is referenced in Section XXIX of this Chapter.
99

Artigo 17
Quem fez está análise?
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 17
Committee on Agriculture
A Committee on Agriculture is hereby established.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 17
Comitê de Agricultura
Estabelece-se, em virtude do presente Acordo, um Comitê de Agricultura.
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
Nenhuma consideração.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 17
O Artigo 17 não foi analisado em nenhum caso do DSB.
III.
Comentários
Nenhuma consideração.
100

Artigo 18
Quem fez esta análise?
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 18
Review of the Implementation of Commitments
18.1
Progress in the implementation of commitments negotiated under the Uruguay Round reform
programme shall be reviewed by the Committee on Agriculture.
18.2
The review process shall be undertaken on the basis of notifications submitted by Members in
relation to such matters and at such intervals as shall be determined, as well as on the basis of
such documentation as the Secretariat may be requested to prepare in order to facilitate the review
process.
18.3
In addition to the notifications to be submitted under paragraph 2, any new domestic support
measure, or modification of an existing measure, for which exemption from reduction is claimed
shall be notified promptly. This notification shall contain details of the new or modified measure
and its conformity with the agreed criteria as set out either in Article 6 or in Annex 2.
18.4
In the review process Members shall give due consideration to the influence of excessive rates of
inflation on the ability of any Member to abide by its domestic support commitments.
18.5
Members agree to consult annually in the Committee on Agriculture with respect to their
participation in the normal growth of world trade in agricultural products within the framework of
the commitments on export subsidies under this Agreement.
18.6
The review process shall provide an opportunity for Members to raise any matter relevant to the
implementation of commitments under the reform programme as set out in this Agreement.
18.7
Any Member may bring to the attention of the Committee on Agriculture any measure which it
considers ought to have been notified by another Member.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 18
Revisão da Implementação dos Compromissos
18.1
O Comitê de Agricultura examinará os progressos realizados na implementação dos
compromissos negociados no âmbito do programa de reforma da Rodada Uruguai.
18.2
O processo de revisão será realizado com base nas notificações apresentadas pelos Membros,
relativas a questões determinadas e em Intervalos estabelecidos, e com base na documentação que
se solicite ao Secretariado da OMC preparar, com vistas a facilitar o processo de revisão.
18.3
Além das notificações a serem apresentadas em conformidade com o parágrafo 2, notificar-se-á
prontamente qualquer nova medida de apoio interno ou modificação de uma medida existente
para a qual solicite-se isenção dos compromissos de redução. Esta notificação conterá pormenores
sobre a nova medida ou a medida modificada e sobre sua conformação aos critérios acordados
enunciados, seja no Artigo 6 ou no Anexo 2.
18.4
Os Membros, no processo de revisão, darão a devida consideração à influência de taxas de
inflação excessivas na capacidade de um Membro em cumprir com seus compromissos em
matéria de apoio interno.
101
18.5
Os Membros concordam em anualmente realizar consultas no Comitê de Agricultura, no que se
refere à sua participação no crescimento normal do comércio mundial de produtos agrícolas no
contexto dos compromissos em matéria de subsídios à exportação em virtude do presente Acordo.
18.6
O processo de revisão proporcionará aos Membros a oportunidade de suscitar qualquer questão
relativa à implementação dos compromissos assumidos no âmbito do programa de reforma
estabelecido pelo presente Acordo.
18.7
Todo Membro poderá trazer à atenção do Comitê de Agricultura qualquer medida que julgue
devesse ter sido notificada por um outro Membro.
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
No Artigo 18.3, há uma ênclise indevida: para qual solicite-se. O correto seria: para a qual se solicite.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 18
O Artigo 18 não foi analisado em nenhum caso do DSB.
III.
Comentários
Nenhuma consideração.
102

Artigo 19
Adriane Nakagawa Baptista
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 19
Consultation and Dispute Settlement
The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994, as elaborated and applied by the Dispute
Settlement Understanding, shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes under this
Agreement.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 19
Consultas e Solução de Controvérsias
As disposições dos Artigos XXII e XXIII do GATT 1994, conforme elaboradas e aplicadas pelo
Entendimento sobre a Solução de Controvérsias, deverão aplicar-se às consultas e à solução de
controvérsias neste Acordo.
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução do Artigo 19
Nada a observar.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 19
O Artigo 20 não foi analisado em nenhum caso do DSB.
III.
Comentários
Esta disposição recepciona os Artigos XXII e XXIII do GATT que tratam sobre entendimentos acerca do
cumprimento do Acordo. Apesar de não serem esses artigos o fulcro da presente análise (vide análise do
Projeto Releitura sobre o GATT), alguns comentários são pertinentes.
O Artigo XXII aborda em linhas gerais o dever de cooperação entre os Membros no período de consultas.
É dito que os “Membros se comprometem a considerar com compreensão e a oferecer oportunidades
adequadas para consultas”. Já o Artigo XXIII trata da anulação ou prejuízo de benefício conferido nos
termos do Acordo sobre Agricultura. Assim, essa disposição permite o acesso ao mecanismo de solução
de controvérsias na hipótese de Estado parte falhar no cumprimento do Acordo, pela “aplicação pela outra
parte de qualquer medida, em conflito ou não com os requisitos do Acordo, ou a existência de qualquer
outra situação.” (160)
103

Artigo 20
Quem fez esta análise?
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 20
Continuation of the Reform Process
Recognizing that the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in support and protection
resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing process, Members agree that negotiations for continuing
the process will be initiated one year before the end of the implementation period, taking into account:
IB.
(a)
the experience to that date from implementing the reduction commitments;
(b)
the effects of the reduction commitments on world trade in agriculture;
(c)
non-trade concerns, special and differential treatment to developing country Members,
and the objective to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system, and
the other objectives and concerns mentioned in the preamble to this Agreement; and
(d)
what further commitments are necessary to achieve the above mentioned long-term
objectives.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 20
Continuação do Processo de Reforma
Reconhecendo que o objetivo de longo prazo das reduções progressivas e substanciais em apoio e
proteção que resultem em uma reforma fundamental e um processo contínuo, os Membros concordam que
as negociações para a continuidade de tal processo serão iniciadas um ano antes do término do período de
implementação, levando-se em consideração:
IC.
(a)
a experiência adquirida até essa data na implementação dos compromissos de redução;
(b)
os efeitos dos compromissos de redução no comércio mundial no setor agrícola;
(c)
as preocupações não-comerciais, o tratamento especial e diferenciado para países em
desenvolvimento Membros e o objetivo de estabelecer um sistema de comércio agrícola
justo e com orientação de mercado, assim como os demais objetivos e preocupações
mencionados no preâmbulo do presente Acordo; e
(d)
outros compromissos que sejam necessários para alcançar os objetivos de longo prazo
acima mencionados.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
Nenhuma consideração.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 20
O Artigo 20 não foi analisado em nenhum caso do DSB.
III.
Comentários
Nenhuma consideração.
104
FOOTNOTE:
Footnote 160: THORSTENSEN, Vera. A OMC - Organização Mundial do Comércio e as negociações sobre investimentos e
concorrência. Rev. bras. polít. int. [online]. 1998, vol.41, n.1 [cited 2012-12-09], pp. 57-89 . Available from:
<http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73291998000100004&lng=en&nrm=iso>. ISSN 0034-7329.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0034-73291998000100004.
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Artigo 21
Geraldo Vidigal
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article 21
Final Provisions
21.1
The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the
WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement.
21.2
The Annexes to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of this Agreement.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo 21
Disposições Finais
21.1
Aplicar-se-ão as disposições do GATT 1994 e dos demais Acordos Multilaterais de Comércio que
figuram no Anexo 1A do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC, sujeitos às disposições do presente
Acordo.
21.2
Os Anexos do presente Acordo constituem parte integrante do mesmo.
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
Nada a observar.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 21
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland
Cotton), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras. 531-532
Para. 531. “Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, which deals more broadly with the relationship
between that Agreement and the other covered agreements relating to the trade in goods, provides:
The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in
Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this
Agreement. (161)”
Para. 532. “We agree that Article 21.1 could apply in the three situations described by the Panel, namely:
(...) where, for example, the domestic support provisions of the Agreement on
Agriculture would prevail in the event that an explicit carve-out or exemption
from the disciplines in Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement existed in the text of
the Agreement on Agriculture. Another situation would be where it would be
impossible for a Member to comply with its domestic support obligations under
the Agreement on Agriculture and the Article 3.1(b) prohibition simultaneously.
Another situation might be where there is an explicit authorization in the text of
the Agreement on Agriculture that would authorize a measure that, in the absence
of such an express authorization, would be prohibited by Article 3.1(b) of the
SCM Agreement.
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The Appellate Body has interpreted Article 21.1 to mean that the provisions of the GATT 1994 and of
other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A apply, “except to the extent that the Agreement on
Agriculture contains specific provisions dealing specifically with the same matter”. There could be,
therefore, situations other than those identified by the Panel where Article 21.1 of the Agreement on
Agriculture may be applicable.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (Chile – Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina,
WT/DS207/AB/R, paras. 186 e 190
Para. 186. “It is clear, as a preliminary matter, that Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture applies
specifically to agricultural products, whereas Article II:1(b) of the GATT applies generally to trade in
all goods. Moreover, Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides, in relevant part, that the
provisions of the GATT 1994 apply “subject to the provisions” of the Agreement on Agriculture.”
Para. 190. “(…) Indeed, and as we have already pointed out, Article 21.1 of the Agreement on
Agriculture mandates that the provisions of the GATT 1994 apply subject to the provisions of the
Agreement on Agriculture. Hence, any finding under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 would be subject
to further inquiry under the Agreement on Agriculture. In contrast, if we were to find first that Chile's
price band system is inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, we would not need to
make a separate finding on whether the price band system also results in a violation of Article II:1(b) of
the GATT 1994 in order to resolve this dispute. This is because a finding that Chile's price band system
as such is a measure prohibited by Article 4.2 would mean that the duties resulting from the application of
that price band system could no longer be levied—no matter what the level of those duties may be.
Without a price band system, there could be no price band duties.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras,
México e EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 155
Para. 155. “The question remains whether the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture allow market
access concessions on agricultural products to deviate from Article XIII of the GATT 1994. The preamble
of the Agreement on Agriculture states that it establishes “a basis for initiating a process of reform of
trade in agriculture” and that this reform process “should be initiated through the negotiation of
commitments on support and protection and through the establishment of strengthened and more
operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines”. The relationship between the provisions of the
GATT 1994 and of the Agreement on Agriculture is set out in Article 21.1 of the Agreement on
Agriculture:
The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in
Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this
Agreement. Therefore, the provisions of the GATT 1994, including Article XIII,
apply to market access commitments concerning agricultural products, except to
the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture contains specific provisions dealing
specifically with the same matter.
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Therefore, the provisions of the GATT 1994, including Article XIII, apply to market access commitments
concerning agricultural products, except to the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture contains specific
provisions dealing specifically with the same matter.”
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 21 traz as disposições finais do Acordo sobre Agricultura. O Artigo 21.1 determina a relação
entre o Acordo sobre Agricultura e os demais acordos multilaterais de comércio. Já o Artigo 21.2
confirma que os anexos ao Acordo sobre Agricultura são parte integrante desse acordo. Enquanto este
último parágrafo tem teor pouco controverso até o momento, o primeiro adquiriu grande importância, em
particular porque a disposição ali contida contrasta com o histórico dos resultados das negociações sobre
produtos agrícolas no GATT.
Na aparência, o Artigo 21.1 apenas traz determinação similar àquela da Nota Interpretativa Geral ao
Anexo 1A (Comércio de Bens) da OMC. Esta estabelece a prevalência das disposições dos acordos
multilaterais específicos – Acordo Antidumping, Acordo sobre Subsídios e Medidas Compensatórias
(ASCM) etc. – sobre as disposições gerais conflitantes contidas no GATT 1994. O Artigo 21.1 determina
que, no que concerne aos produtos agrícolas, as disposições do Acordo de Agricultura prevalecem sobre
aquelas contidas nos demais acordos do Anexo 1A.
Em princípio, trata-se apenas do cânone interpretativo segundo o qual lex specialis derogat generali. A
questão relevante é saber qual norma vige no silêncio da lex specialis agrícola – se a norma geral, com
frequência bastante restritiva, ou se norma alguma. Na vigência do GATT 1947, o setor de bens agrícolas
sempre foi considerado problemático, e deixou de ser incluído em diversas rodadas de negociações. Até
mesmo produtos industrializados podiam ser subsidiados na medida em que o subsídio concedido fosse
correspondente a um “produto primário incorporado” (ver controvérsia CEE – Massas, Relatório do
Painel do GATT (SCM/43)).
O Artigo 21.1 é relevante porque não determina que apenas o Acordo sobre Agricultura regula o
comércio de bens agrícolas – o que implicaria que, na ausência de disposição específica no Acordo sobre
Agricultura, os Membros da OMC seriam livres para adotar as políticas que desejassem para o setor. Ao
contrário: na ausência de disposição específica no Acordo sobre Agricultura, vale para os bens agrícolas a
disciplina geral.
Essa disposição é particularmente relevante no que se refere a subsídios, já que estes constituem uma das
formas mais comuns de protecionismo agrícola. No caso EUA – Algodão, O Órgão de Apelação entendeu
que também nessa área o ASCM é aplicável na ausência de disposição específica no Acordo sobre
Agricultura. Essa conclusão foi tomada por maioria, contrastando com uma Opinião Separada (paras.
631-641) que enfatizou o preâmbulo do Acordo sobre Agricultura – o qual descreve o esse acordo como
“uma base para iniciar um processo de reforma do comércio em agricultura” – e a linguagem do Artigo
10.2 (“Os Membros se comprometem a esforçar-se pela elaboração de disciplinas internacionalmente
acordadas para reger a concessão de créditos à exportação”).
A decisão da maioria implica uma regulação do comércio de bens agrícolas significativamente mais
rigorosa do que aquela que decorreria da argumentação minoritária. As obrigações de “esforços” e de
“negociação” não isentam os Membros de cumprir, no que concerne aos produtos agrícolas, as obrigações
substantivas derivadas de outros acordos da OMC: qualquer exceção à disciplina geral, para ser aplicável
aos bens agrícolas, deve estar explícita no Acordo sobre Agricultura.
FOOTNOTE:
Footnote 161: The SCM Agreement is among the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement.
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