ORGANIZATIONAL TOLERANCE: EXPLAINING DIVERSITY OF COMPLEX
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
[email protected]
Apresentação Oral-Estrutura, Evolução e Dinâmica dos Sistemas Agroalimentares e
Cadeias Agroindustriais
DECIO ZYLBERSZTAJN; SILVIA MORALES DE QUEIROZ CALEMAN.
UNIVERSIDADE DE SÃO PAULO, SÃO PAULO - SP - BRASIL.
Organizational Tolerance: Explaining Diversity of Complex Institutional
Arrangements1
(Unedited version-do not quote without permission)
Grupo de pesquisa: Estrutura, Evolução e Dinâmica dos SAGs e Cadeias
Agroalimentares
Resumo
Arranjos institucionais (IA) são mecanismos micro-institucionais de governança que são
desenhados para oferecer incentivos de cooperação às firmas, sendo essas caracterizadas
pela independência de suas estruturas de propriedade. Em qualquer indústria observam-se
diferentes perfis de arranjos institucionais cuja explicação é ainda objeto de discussão entre
os diferentes aportes teóricos. Este artigo explora a observada diversidade de arranjos
institucionais e desenvolve uma análise comparativa das explicações oferecidas por
diferentes teorias, principalmente dois ramos da “Economia dos Custos de Transação”
(ECT) e a “Teoria Baseada em Recursos”. O artigo propõe o conceito de “tolerância
organizacional” para tratar as razões da diversidade nos observados arranjos institucionais.
O conceito é exemplificado e ilustrado por meio de casos do sistema agroindustrial.
Estruturas institucionais complexas são a norma e não a exceção na literatura
contemporânea da Economia das Organizações. Cada aporte teórico focaliza uma
particular dimensão do problema para explicar tamanho, abrangência e estruturas internas
dos arranjos observados. Com os mesmos constructos que embasam as teorias, pode-se
explicar o fenômeno da diversidade organizacional e sugerir hipóteses testáveis. Mesmo na
presença dos fortes argumentos oferecidos pela ECT – hipóteses de alinhamento – a
observação do mundo real demonstra que é também necessário explorar outras razões
explanatórias da diversidade. Se concordarmos que a Nova Economia Institucional é
focada no “mundo real” então, o conceito de “tolerância organizacional” pode iluminar
uma possível maneira de se explicar a diversidade.
Palavras-chaves: diversidade, complexidade, arranjos institucionais, sistemas
agroindustriais
Abstract
1
This paper was prepared for the 2009 Congress of the Brazilian Association of Agricultural Economics.
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Institutional arrangements (IA) are observed micro-institutional mechanisms of
governance. Usually they are designed to offer incentives for cooperation of different
firms, each one with independent ownership structure. In any industry we can observe
different profiles of institutional arrangements which explanation is yet a motivation for
debate among different theories. The article places attention on the observed degree of
diversity of IA, and analyses comparatively the explanatory reasons offered by different
theories, mainly two branches of Transaction Cost Economics and Resources Based View.
The paper drafts the concept of organizational tolerance to explain the reasons of diversity
in the observed IA. Agro-Industrial related cases are used to offer examples to illustrate the
concept. Complex institutional structures are the norm and not the exception in modern
organization economics literature. Each theory focuses on a particular explanatory
dimension to explain size, scope and internal structure. With the same constructs that base
the theories, one can find support to explain the phenomena of organizational variety and
suggest testable hypothesis. Even in presence of strong arguments offered by TCEalignment hypothesis, the observation of the real world shows that we need to work more
the explanatory reasons for diversity. If we agree that New Institutional Economics is
focused in the “real world” of organizations then the concept of organizational tolerance
can illuminate one possible way to explain diversity.
Key Words: diversity, complexity, institutional arrangements, agri-chains
1. Introduction
Agriculture based supply and marketing systems have been studied in the literature
of complex or hybrid governance mechanisms. These systems comprehend the chains and
networks of food, fiber and energy production2. A variety of empirical examples are
reviewed in some cases serving to reinforce existing theories of vertical coordination,
sometimes serving to challenge the existing knowledge. Seen as complex institutional
arrangements it is relevant to shape our understanding on the reasons why we observe so
much diversity in apparently similar agriculture based systems? Why do they differ? What
are the causes of variability?
Relevant for policy makers, practitioners and social scientists in agriculture based
chain organization, is the knowledge about how chains are governed and how to identify
and implement efficient mechanisms of coordination. The evolution in the field of
economic organization applied to agriculture based vertical systems and networks, is very
impressing. Important research centers have been dedicated to this topic in Europe
(Wageningen University in The Netherlands, Copenhagen University in Denmark,
University of Bonn in Germany, ATOM in France), in US (CORI at the University of
Missouri), in Latin America (PENSA at the University of São Paulo), just to mention some
cases. Different models have been devised, some based on more descriptive approaches
(Trienekens,1999), others adopting an analysis of efficiency applied to the choice of
alternative institutional arrangements in agriculture based systems as seen in Maze (1992),
Menard (1999), Karantininis and Zylbersztajn (2007) and Hendrikse and Bijman (2002).
2
Nowadays the agro related systems also can consider the production of environmental as well as social
services.
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Replacing the models based on neo-classical economics, the institutional analysis
has influenced most of the existing research. The characteristic of the predominant
approach is the relevance of formal and informal institutions that have an effect on the
choice of the institutional arrangement of production. The usual explanations for the
existence of multiple arrangements are based on eventual failures of institutional,
organizational or market nature, as well as transitory departures from the efficient
alignment. Therefore arguments based on asymmetric information, market power, path
dependence, existence of specific resources are common in the literature.
Bounding our motivation in the present study are Coases´s motivation to study the
real world instead to the models that exist in our minds (Coase, 1991)3. His arguments
suggest the analysis of the institutional structure of production focusing the diversity of
arrangements as a rule, instead of the exception. Being diversity the rule, the literature so
far existent is rich in offering descriptive analysis of alternative institutional arrangements
that coexists in time but it is not so conclusive to explain the reasons and the logic of such
a large family of institutional arrangements. This paper does not intend to review the vast
literature on the topic instead the objective is to base the analysis on the measurement cost
approach, in some way neglected in the literature.
In agriculture based systems the rule is the diversity of institutional arrangements
that are observed and such diversity persists through time in many cases. Research efforts
to understand the genesis and survival as multiple and diverse systems deserve to be
followed. The aim of this paper is to introduce and explore the concept of “organizational
tolerance” as it applies to the study of complex institutional arrangements involving
multiple agents that share common strategies. The focus on agriculture related systems is
due to our particular interest in the examples of complex or hybrid formats that can be
detected in this area, which represents a fascinating research subject, however the concept
should apply to other complex organizations as well.
This paper intends to explore measurement costs of transaction dimensions as an
explanatory reason of the coexistence of different arrangements in agriculture based
systems. In order to reach this goal it is organized in five parts. Part two outlines some
theories that are commonly adopted to explain complex institutional arrangements mainly
vertical coordination mechanisms. Part three presents the concept of organizational
tolerance based on the under explored measurement branch of transaction cost economics.
Part four presents cases and evidences of different levels of organizational tolerance in
agriculture related chains and networks. The chapter presents cases of persistent multiple
complex institutional arrangements and cases of intolerant systems characterized by one
single institutional arrangement. Part five concludes suggesting that the coexistence of
alternative institutional arrangements depends on the proportion of rights that are protected
by formal or informal mechanisms. Therefore solutions tend to be strongly affected by
locally devised and informal mechanisms of interaction among players in the agriculture
related systems.
2. Family of Theories
3
Roanld Coases´ precise citation is: “What is studied is a system that lives in the minds of economists and
not on the heart”.
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The literature of economics of organization as applied to agro related systems can
be structured in three dimensions. First, the concepts based on technology, prices and costs
that ignore the relevance of institutions and transaction costs to explain the observed
arrangements. This is where most of the neoclassical economic analysis is grounded.
Second the theories that do consider the relevance of institutions but that differ in terms of
emphasis of the determinants of institutional arrangements. This literature presents several
branches based on efficiency arguments that are rooted in the governance mechanisms and
transaction cost incentives as presented in Williamson (1985) and Ménard (2004). The
third is based on the existence of specific and non transferable knowledge, suggesting that
other cognitive elements might set the reasons of observable multiple institutional
arrangements (Foss,1996; Langlois,1991), and also the literature on Capabilities as
presented in Foss, Brian and Loasby (1998). Both, transaction cost economics and resource
based views are so far alternative explanations for the phenomena of simultaneous multiple
institutional arrangements and also the literature on Resource Based Theory and
Capabilities as presented in Foss, Brian and Loasby (1998).
The governance branch of transaction cost economics is rooted in the efficient
alignment hypothesis that suggests the existence of a correspondence between the
institutional arrangement and two main determinants, namely: the transaction
characteristics, mainly the asset specificity, and, second, the institutional environment.
Given the assumption that institutions change slowly, the observance of the asset specific
investments related to the production decision, should place a strong empirical potential to
the theory. As expressed by Williamson (2000,2008), the transaction cost economics
literature represent a vigorous branch of the literature on organizations but yet there are
competing arguments. By saying that the transaction cost economics approach is a case of
success, Williamson highlights the fact that economic agents are forward looking and
define strategies considering the protection of the future value of the specific, nonredeployable investments. The literature presents empirical support to the alignment
hypothesis based on transaction cost elements. This theoretical vein is being explored in
the study of agri-systems extensively as in Menard (1996), in Zylbersztajn (1996) and
many other that followed this path.
On a parallel track, the arguments proposed by the Resource Based Approach have
likewise been relevant. The focus is placed on arguments to explain diversity instead of
convergence of mechanisms of governance. The alignment hypothesis as proposed in
Williamson (1996,pp. 46-47) offers vigorous arguments to explain convergence and RBV
as presented by Langlois (op. cit) offer arguments to explain persistent diversity in the
observed institutional arrangements. These arguments are based on the specific knowledge
or competences that evolve from very particular experiences and that are not tradable or
transferable. Also a growing literature is observed in the complex agriculture based system
analysis, based on this theoretical construct, however with less quantitative inspiration than
the transaction cost literature.
Complex Arrangements: Agriculture based systems present a variety of
organizational arrangements. Also scholars adopt a variety of different lenses to study the
same phenomena. The contractual approach to agrifood systems is a growing trend
(MacDonald,2004; Zylbersztajn,2005). The focus on simultaneous transactions partially
based on formal contracts and partially bounded by informal and relational motivations are
also recognized (Menard & Klein 2004). The literature on chains and networks represent
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the most important evolution in the post war literature on the economics of agricultural
organizations. Since the path-breaking study of Goldberg (1968) that introduced the
agribusiness system approach to the contemporaneous network analysis, we observe a
relevant evolution on the way we deal with the phenomena of coordination of complex
systems.
Individual contracts have been the focus of studies, as seen in Allen & Lueck
(2002). Chain analysis followed, suggesting that agrisystems could be approached as a set
of simultaneous transactions where decision rights were allocated in an efficient manner.
From chains to networks, we added more complexity and realism as well to the analysis.
The basic question that pushes this research literature is to reveal the coordination
mechanisms of such complex systems.
Placing the analysis on a multiple transactions, Menard (2002) concludes that the
empirical literature supports the existence of a relationship between transaction attributes
and hybrid institutional arrangements. Some of the examples he discusses are agrifood
system analysis and his view reinforces and expands Williamson´s main conclusion. The
concept of strictly coordinated supply system proposed by Zylbersztajn (1999) stresses the
existence of multiple observable arrangements for similar transactions in food related
systems (figure 2). In any typical agriculture based system, we observe not one, but many
sub-systems that have the same objective to reach a given market. Each represents specific
institutional arrangement not always convergent. Competing with each other, the observed
institutional arrangements might persist through time, or converge to a homogeneous
system. The paper reinforces the need to further engage in efforts to explain its genesis
and permanence.
<place figure 2 here>
On the one hand, Menard (op. cit.) offered a good synthesis of explanatory reasons
for complexity of institutional arrangements, anchored in transaction cost arguments. His
approach to hybrids is based on an expansion of transaction cost economics main
argument, rooted in the deeper observation of different levels of asset specificity. He
mentioned but did not elaborate on other relevant explanation, namely the resource based
view approach.
An alternative and largely under-utilized approach is the measurement branch of
transaction cost economics, as presented by Barzel(op. cit.), which is the frame I’ll adopt in
the next section. This branch of the theory adds to Resource Based View and to the
governance alignment. In addition to specific routines and path dependence arguments, and
in addition to the protection of quasi rents arguments, the measurement cost approach
suggests a rational related to the existence of formal and informal mechanisms to protect
property rights.
The fundamental construct of the measurement cost branch of transaction cost
economics is based on the existence of value related to the performance of transactions. In
the presence of mechanisms that properly define and protect property rights, transactions
will be performed at a lower cost. If property rights are not properly defined or enforced,
then some value will remain in public domain, therefore subject to capture. From this
approach it follows that the observed institutional arrangement represents a blend of formal
institutional protection associated with legal rights, and informal institutional protection,
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associated with economic rights (figure 1). Formal and informal mechanisms provide the
set of incentives that shape organization.
<place figure 1 here>
Measurement Costs and Diversity of Institutional Arrangements:
The existence of one or multiple efficient arrangements is approached by
measurement cost arguments in the following way: First, transactions can be decoupled in
many dimensions, each related to specific rights that are exchanged. In food chains they
can be related with a particular food attribute. Second, the measurement of the exchanged
attribute varies between dimensions that are exchanged. One can observe a range of easy to
measure attributes, or difficult to measure attributes. In food chains some attributes are
easy to measure, as weight, color and other attributes are difficult to measure, as religious
characteristics or fat content. Third, easy to measure attributes are protected by formal
institutions and are aligned with legal rights. Difficult to measure attributes are protected
by informal institutions, mostly relational and reputation mechanisms and are aligned with
economic rights.
The main argument for the degree of diversity of institutional arrangements we
present here follows from the proportion of formal and informal mechanisms to protect
property rights. Easy to measure attributes, as related to legal rights represent incentives
for convergence since the legal system induces more homogeneous solutions when
disputes arise. Alternatively, difficult to measure attributes places incentives for diversity,
since informal arrangements are more prone to local and topic solutions, usually build
based on mutual trust that is difficult to replicate. This argument adds to the traditional
resource based approach, which relies on specific knowledge based on non transferable
routines.
3. Organizational Tolerance
Considering the model of property rights index presented in figure 1, if PR1 = 1,
then it represents a world with zero transaction costs and therefore markets will prevail, as
expressed in Williamson (op. cit). As we have the PR1<1, then the structure of formal and
informal modes to protect the value associated with the transaction becomes relevant. As
expressed by Dixit (2004, p.1): “problems arise if no mechanisms – governmental or non
governmental – exist to deter theft, then any one person can wait for someone else to create
property or produce output and then steal it…” . The family of theories of the firm4 rooted
in the new institutional economics framework agrees that the design and structure of
governance of transactions is the result of efforts to protect property rights. We rely on the
concept of institutional structure of production proposed by Coase (op. cit).
Our aim is to discuss the variability of observed institutional arrangements.
Departing from technological determinism, in most of cases several institutional
arrangements are observed. What determines the variety of possible arrangements? Why
not just one single superior mechanism?
4
We adopt the concept of family of theories of the firm as presented in Barzel (xx)
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This question has been discussed in every branch of the family of theories of the
firm. Path dependence explanations, specific and non transferable knowledge, monopoly
explanations, all share some room in the literature. The question becomes yet more
relevant when we deal with hybrid or complex forms, where simultaneous transactions are
performed simultaneously by economic agents located in a given network organization.
The concept introduced in Barzel (op. cit) is relevant for our purposes. Given an
institutional environment, the legal system protects property rights in some degree. Legal
rights are associated with easy to measure transaction attributes. The proportion of
property rights under the legal protection determines more homogeneous institutional
arrangements. On the contrary, the proportion of rights protected by alternative and
informal mechanisms, are much more variable, since it results from very specific
mechanisms anchored in cultural profile of agents. We propose that reputation mechanisms
are associated with more variable modes of organization. Testable hypothesis can be
derived from the following proposition:
Proposition: The larger the proportion of rights protected by formal institutions,
the smaller the variability of institutional arrangements in a given hybrid form.
The concept of organizational tolerance is defined as the variety of institutional
arrangements observed for similar transactions. A unique solution represents the
observance of one and just one institutional arrangement. A fundamental hypothesis
follows. The larger the proportion of legal rights related to a given transaction, the smaller
the variety of institutional arrangements observed. Otherwise, dispersion of institutional
arrangements is associated with the predominance of informal and specific institutional
mechanisms to protect property rights. Very tolerant organizational systems are
represented by multiple observable arrangements due to specific relational rules not
adapted to the same system but with different players.
<place figure 3 here>
4. Agri-Systems Related Cases
The recent literature of hybrid forms and complex contracts places considerable
focus on agricultural related transactions. Since the introduction of the agribusiness
systems analysis by Godberg (op. cit.), the study of agriculture related phenomena
departed from the isolated analysis of the farm, and moved towards the system of complex
transactions.
Zylbersztajn (1996) placed the analysis of agri systems in a transaction cost
framework, being nowadays a predominant approach. Later on, the concept of strictly
coordinated supply systems (Zylbersztajn, 1999) has been shaped considering the
variability of institutional arrangements observed within the agribusiness systems. What
Goldberg considered as having a homogeneous profile, in fact is composed by several
specific arrangements that differ in the way authority is allocated within the chain or
network, in other words, the rules to solve disputes and the mechanisms to distribute value.
Now we move one step further by considering that the variety of arrangements
observed in the agro-system result from the structure of property rights and the different
ways that are available to control transaction costs. The agriculture based system, is
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presented as the series of interconnected transactions, bounded on one side by the
institutional environment, and on the other side by the organizations. Since institutions are
structured formal and informally, the proportion of informal institutions play a role to
explain diversity
The following examples are relevant to support our hypothesis:
a) Ethanol Chain: Recent study done by Pedroso Jr. (2008) describes the institutional
arrangements on the ethanol system in Brazil. He shows that institutional
arrangements differ strongly in areas of traditional production of sugar cane and the
new areas recently converted in sugar-cane production. He presents arguments that
the differences in the contracts are associated with informal relations between the
processing industry and the land owners. Under the same formal institutional
environment, a large part of the transaction dimensions are ruled by informal and
relational contracts, leaving room for variability and transaction specific variability.
b) Orange Juice Industry: The supply chain of orange juice industry is characterized
by a small number of processors. About 10 companies process the total Brazilian
production. Studies of the Brazilian orange industry show the vertical integration
profile where industries own 30% of the production area and contract under a very
homogeneous contractual mechanism the remaining supply needs. Conflicts are
observed and the judiciary is playing the expected role, in dispute resolution needs.
Informal relations are very rare and most of the contracts are very impersonal. The
observed arrangements are very homogeneous.
c) Timber Contracts: The Brazilian pulp and paper industry is moving from an
integrated profile towards an increase of proportion of supply contracts with
farmers. Companies inform that between 10-15% of total supply of wood for
cellulose is done under contracts. Examining the profile of contracts, study done by
Fisher (2007) suggests that a very homogeneous profile of institutional
arrangements is observed. Since the transaction is characteristically of a long term,
different generations of farmers might be involved. Therefore one expects that
formal rights are predominant in determining the observed institutional
arrangement.
d) Contracts in the meat processing industry: Regarding the Brazilian meat processing
industry, a distinction must be made to the beef chain. Whereas for poultries and
hogs the coordination is predominantly done by standardized contracts of supply,
the beef is characterized by its diversity and complexity. Different subsystems are
observed, ranging from spot market governance to strategic alliances which
accomplish to specific market niches like those represented by organic beef. There
are multiple forms of coordination evidenced by the existence of Quality Programs,
formal contracts among feedlot producers and meat processing industry, beyond an
increasing trend of vertical integration exemplified by industry investment in
feedlot structures for animal termination. In some subsystems transactions are
based on one attribute, for example, animal weigh, being the spot market the
coordination mode. In other subsystems, the relation involves contracting a set of
attributes that indicates the quality of the product – weight, age of the animal, fat
cover thickness, gender and condition of the carcass - what results in hybrid forms
of governance, even with informal contracts. Meanwhile, specific organizational
arrangements, just like Marketing Alliances, establish its own standards in
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accordance with the consumer demands. Summing up, a diversity of governance
forms coexists. Institutionally speaking, the Brazilian bovine carcass classification
is an ancient demand, however, its regulations and effective application is still
under discussion. In the same way, traceability is ordered exclusively to those
animals oriented to European market.
The approach as applied to agri-systems shows that at each system different Strictly
Coordinated Sub Systems are observed. Each characterized by a different mechanism of
governance. Formal institutions work in the direction of inducing more homogeneous
arrangements, provided that we keep technology controlled. When differences are
identified, the informal mechanisms of protection of property rights play a role to induce
diversity in the observed institutional arrangements.
5. Conclusions
Theoretical developments that focus on some form of rigid alignment between
transaction characteristics and institutional arrangements do not cover but a strict range of
cases. A large number of situations present very specific ad-hoc solutions, always that
economic rights play a predominant role in determining the institutional structure of
production.
We also observe that the observed arrangements might be classified based on a
nested structure. The traditional governance approach o transaction cost economics is
consistent to make a first level typology classifying transactions in terms of markets,
hierarchies or contracts. At a second level of precision we are surprised with the variety of
specific arrangements that we classify as “contracts”. The organization scientist might be
interested in revealing the details of the particular institutional arrangements. Then the
measuring cost approach plays a relevant role.
For very practical purposes, we observe a motivated audience formed by policy
makers and non-governmental organizations trying to transplant institutional arrangements
in agriculture based systems. The present study points to the need to identify the specific
informal institutions that in many cases are on the main vein to explain the success of
particular institutional arrangements.
The same applies to strategies of supply chain and marketing channels in food, fiber
and bio-energy products. The details of specific informal institutions must be recognized
by private strategists, in order to reach the desired goals.
As a final consideration, I point to the fact that the impressing evolution of the field
of economic organization, particularly applied to agri-systems, is still at the initial stage.
From the neoclassical production function to the agri-chains and networks approach, we
move very fast. Now we must dig into the details and provoke the debate on the theoretical
approach to be adopted. It is clear to me that an audience of organization scientists will be
interested in the results.
6. References
Allen,D., Lueck,D.2002. The Nature of the Farm: Contracts, Risk, and Organization in
Agriculture. MIT Press.
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Ménard,C. 2004. The Economics of Hybrid Organizations. Journal of Institutional and
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