Toodifficulttomanage,toobigtoignore:
Partychoiceinmultipartypresidentialsystems*
Very,VeryPreliminaryVersion
CarlosPereira,SamuelPessoa,FredericoBertholiniandHelloanaMedeiros
Abstract:
Inconsensual(proportional)highlyfragmentedmultipartysettings,political
partieshavetwohistoricalchoicestomakeorpathwaystofollow:i)playinga
majoritarianrolebyofferingcrediblecandidatestotheheadoftheexecutive;orii)
playingthemedianlegislatorgame.Eachofthosechoiceswillhaveimportant
consequencesnotonlyforthepartysystembutalsoforthegovernment.The
purposeofthispaperistoinvestigatetheroleplayedbymedianlegislatorparties
oncoalitionmanagementstrategiesofpresidentsinacomparativeperspective.We
analyzeindepththeBraziliancasewherethePartidodoMovimentoDemocrático
Brasileiro(PMDB)hasbasicallyfunctionedasthemedianlegislatorpartyin
Congressbyavoidingtheapprovalofextremepolicies,bothontheleftandonthe
right.BasedonanexpertsurveyinLatinAmerica,webuiltanindexofPmdbismo
andidentifiedthatthereisapositivecorrelationbetweenpartisanfragmentation
andmedianlegislatorparties.Inaddition,weinvestigatetheeffectofhavinga
medianlegislatorpartyinthegoverningcoalition.Wefoundthatitischeaperand
lessdifficultforthegovernmenttomanagethecoalitionhavingthemedian
legislativepartyonboard.
*Thispreliminarypaperwaspreparedtobepresentedattheworkshop“InstitutionalDeterminants
ofLegislativeCoalitionManagement”thatwilltakeplaceinTelAviv,Israel,onNovember16-19.We
aregratefultoFGVappliedresearchprogramforfundingthisproject.WethankNataliaRezendefor
researchassistance.
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1)Introduction:
Coalitionalpresidentialismhasbecomeincreasinglycommoninthe
democraticworld:itisnowthemodalformofdemocraticgovernanceinLatin
America,andanalogousregimesexistinAfrica,Asia,andpost-communistEuropeas
well.Itisalreadyknownthatitisverycostlytogovernamultipartypresidential
coalitionwithtoomanyparties,ideologicallyheterogeneous,andwithoutsharing
proportionalpowerwiththem(Pereira,BerthiliniandRaile2015).
However,therole-playedbytheorganizationalprofileandstructureof
politicalpartiestothemanagementofapresidentialcoalitionhasbeenunder
investigated.Infact,theimpactofthepartychoice(playingamajoritarianversusa
medianlegislatorgame)oncoalitionmanagementofmultipartypresidential
regimeshasbeenundertheorized.Inthecomparativeliteratureandintheexisting
theoreticalmodels,coalitionalpresidentialismoccupiesavaguespacebetween
classicworksonU.S.presidentialism(whereone-partisangovernmentsarethe
norm)andonEuropeanparliamentarism(inwhichmultipartycabinetsareroutine,
butinwhichisthereisnodirectlyelectedexecutiveandthefunctioningof
governmentsisdistinctfrommultipartypresidentialism).
Doesithelporharm,forinstance,thepresident’scoalitiontorelyonthe
supportofalargepartner,whichhasampledistributioninthenationalterritoryof
thecountry,bygoverningseveralmunicipalitiesandmanystatesandbyholdinga
substantialnumberofseatsinCongress?Atthesametime,thispoliticalallyhas
beenideologicallyamorphous,withoutaclear-cutpoliticalagendaorplatform,has
playedtheroleofthemedianlegislator,andhasbeenfulfilledbymanyregional
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leaderstryingtomaximizetheirownpoliticalinterestsandsurvival.Ontheone
hand,havingapartylikethisonboardmayhelpthepresidenttoachievea
confortablemajorityinCongress.Ontheotherhand,itcanmakethepresident
politicallyvulnerablebyfacingpotentialholdupproblemsandincreasing
difficultiesofgoverning.
InBrazil,forinstance,thecentristPartidodoMovimentoDemocrático
Brasileiro(PMDB)isthelargestpoliticalpartyinthecountryandhasparticipatedin
aboutallgoverningcoalitionregardlessoftheideologicalorientationofthe
government.ThePMDBhasbasicallyfunctionedasthemedianvoterpartyin
Congressbyavoidingtheapprovalofextremepolicies,bothontheleftandonthe
right.Nevertheless,therearegrowingconcernsthatgoverningwithanallylikethe
PMDBhasgeneratedpredatorypoliciesandrentseekingbehaviors.
Mainwaringetal(2015)arguethatBrazilhasanespecialcombinationan
exceptionallyfragmentedpartysystemincongressandaconsistentdominanceof
thesametwopartiesovermany(six)presidentialelections.Theyclaimthatthis
specificcombination“isuniqueinthehistoryofpresidentialdemocracies.Inother
presidentialdemocracieswithhighlyfragmentedcongressionalpartysystems,no
setoftwopartieshasconsistentlydominatedpresidentialelections(…)The
differencesinthepartysystemacrosstheselevelsaresogreatthatitmakessenseto
distinguishbetweenthepresidentialandthecongressionalpartysystemsinBrazil.”
Thepurposeofthispaperistoinvestigatetheroleplayedbypartieslikethe
PMDBoncoalitionmanagementstrategiesofpresidentsinacomparative
perspective.Particularly,weaimatanalyzingtheconsequencesofhavingcoalition
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alliessimilartothePMDBonboard.Towhatextenttheexistenceofapoliticalparty,
withthecharacteristicsofthePMDB,isparticularfeatureoftheBrazilianpolitical
systemoritisacommonfeatureofothermultipartypresidentialregimes?Ifitisso,
isiteasierforthepresidenttomanageamajoritycoalitionwithafull-sizepartisan
allyorwithamyriadofsmallparties?Andhowabouttheideologicaldistanceof
thosecoalitionpartners?
Wearealsoconcernedinthispaperwiththedegreeofdifficultyapresident
facesifthegoverningcoalitionwouldhavetorelyonthesupportofamedian
legislatorpartyinordertogovern.Precisely,weaimatanalyzingtheeffectofthe
sizeofthemedianlegislatoronthecostanddifficultofgoverning.Ontheonehand,
trustingonthesupportofthemedianlegislatorcouldgenerateaconfortable
majorityfortheexecutive.Ontheotherhand,thepresidentcouldfaceholdup
problems.Sincetheliteratureisnotconclusiveabouttheeffectofpartysizein
coalitioncostsandnoformalmodelwasabletorespondsuchquestionin
generalizedterms,wewillseektoprovideanempiricalanswerfortheBrazilian
case.
Thepaperisorganizedasfollows.Inthenextsessionwedevelopourtheory
arguingthatpoliticalpartiesinconsensualmultipartypresidentialregimeshave
twostrategicchoicestomake.Consensualsystemsarecharacterizedbyavarietyof
institutionalizedpoliticalpolesthatdividethepoliticalauthoritywithinthesystem,
thusgivingroomfortheemergenceoftwodifferentgamesthatpartieshaveto
choose:themajoritarianandthemedianlegislatorgame.Thefirstpartofthe
theoreticaldevelopmentsaccountsforthedifferencesbetweenthosetwogames,
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thusexplainingtheirfunctioningandspecificcharacteristics.Thesecondpart
accountsforthehistoricalconstraintsthatchoosingaspecifictrackmightimpose
onpoliticalparties,andthecostsandbenefitstheymightachieveiftheydecideto
switchtheirpoliticalstrategy.
Thehistoricalchoicespartiesmakeinthepastshapetheircontextual
environmentinthepresentandtheirprospectiveaspirationsforplayingeitherthe
majoritarianorthemedianlegislatorgame.Therefore,analyzingtheroleofPMDB
asthemedianlegislatorofrecentgovernmentsinBrazil,itiscrucialtounderstand
thehistoricaldevelopmentofthepartyinordertofullycomprehendhowtheparty’s
decisionsandtheirresultshaveshapeditspoliticalnature.Thusweprovidethis
historicalbackgroundhighlightingtheparty’searlydevelopmentinmilitaryregime
asamajoritarianplayeranditsswitchtothemedianlegislatorgameinrecentyears.
Thethirdsessionofthispaperanswersthefollowingquestion:isthePMDBa
particularitytoBrazilianpoliticalsystem?Weinvestigatethisempiricalquestionby
investigatingtheextenttowhichotherpartiesinLatinAmericanmultiparty
presidentialsystemsbearparticularsimilaritiesweidentifywiththePMDB,
featuresthatwehypothesizedthatalsocharacterizesmedianlegislatorplayersin
general.Wefoundthatmedianlegislatorparties’characteristicsaremorelikelyto
occurinfragmentedpartysystems,thusprovidingevidencefortheSartorian
theoreticalclaimthatinsystemswithcentrifugaltendenciesthecenterprovidesa
comfortzoneforpartymembersandgovernmentsinmultipartysystems.
Thelastsectionofthepaperprovidesempiricalevidenceforthecostsand
difficultiesthatgovernmentsfacewhileformingtheircoalitionwithmedian
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legislatorparties.Isitcheaperormoreexpensivetogovernwithmedianlegislators?
Wefoundthatalthoughmedianlegislatorpartiesreceivethebiggestshareof
governmentperks,therelativecostofaseatforthegovernmentissmallerthanthe
relativecostofsmallerparties.Inconclusion,weclaimthatthoughinfragmented
systemsthecentertendenciesbecomeamoresecurepointforpartiespositioning,
thusenhancingtheprobabilityofmedianlegislatorpartiestoemerge;the
underpaymentofitsmembersmightprovideincentivesfordispersion.A
preliminaryexplanationforsuchcontradictoryresultsisthuspresented.
2)Theory
Thegreatmajorityofthecomparativeliteratureonpoliticalpartieshasbeen
intellectuallyrootedinthehistoricallegacyofparliamentaryregimesintheWestern
Europe(Janda1993).Itbecameacommonwisdomtheideathatstrongand
institutionalizedpoliticalpartiesaresynonymofparliamentaryregimeandthatthe
studyofparliamentarypartiesisthestudyofpoliticalparties.SamuelsandShugart
(2010:7)arguethatthe“startingpointformuchresearchisnotinstitutional
structurebutrathersocialstructure,focusingonhowcultureandeconomic
cleavagestranslateintopartiesandpartySystem.”
However,itispossibletoidentifyasubstantialnumberofscholarsthatalso
haveextensivelyexploredpartypoliticsinpresidentialregimes:partysystemand
structure(CoxandShugart1995);partystrategicvotingandcoordination(Cox
1997;Ames1995);partyrepresentation(Samuels2000;MainwaringandShugart
1997;BarryAmes1994;Crisp1997);howpoliticalpartiesareaffectedbydifferent
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electoralsystems(Durverger1954;CareyandShugart1995);andonthe
relationshipbetweenseparationofpowerssystemandpoliticalpartiesthemselves
inthesensethatpresidentialconstitutionsencouragethedevelopmentof
presidentializedparties,whicharecharacterizedbythecombinationofweakand
nationalizedparties(SamuelsandShugart2010).
Nonethelesstheliteraturesofarhasignoredtheroleplayedbythe
majoritarianandconsensualcomponentsofapoliticalsystemonthepoliticalchoice
partiesmaketoplaythemedianlegislatorgame.Inthefollowingsectionweaimat
analyzingthetheoreticalspecificitiesthatmultipartypresidentialismimposeonthe
coalitionformationprocess,formulatinganinnovativetheorythathighlightsthe
problemsthatpartiesfacebothinthemajoritarianandintheproportionalsettings.
2.1)Dividedauthorityinmultipartypresidentialsystems:majoritarianandmedian
legislatorgames
Inamajoritarianinstitutionalsetting(singlememberpastthepost),ifthere
weretwopoliticalparties,themedianvotertheory,proposedbyAnthonyDowns,
predictsthatthosepartieswouldtendtowardtothecenteroftheideological
spectrumproducingcentristpoliticalpreferencesandpolicyresults.1Thatis,there
wouldhaveendogenoussurvivalincentivesinthemajoritarianelectoralsystemto
pushpartiestowardthepositionofthemedianvoterinordertowintheelection.A
partythatdoesmovetothemediancanalwaysdefeatthepartythatfailsto
1Onasingle-issuedimensionifitisassumedtatthepreferencesofvotersaresingle-picked,the
positionofthemedianvoteristheonlypolicythatispreferredtoallothersbyamajorityofvoters.
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convergenearlytothemedian.Thekeystageforthemajoritarianenvironmentis
thereforetheelectoralcompetition.
Onceelected,thesingle-partymajoritythatwasabletobetterlocateitselfat
themedianpreferencewouldformanidentifiableandresponsiblegovernmentthat
wouldbeessentiallyunconstrainedbyotherpartiesinthepolicymakingprocess.
Thatis,thewinnerpartywillsubsequentlydominatethepolicymakingprocessand
implementthepromisedpolicyplatformconsistenttothemedianvoterpreferences.
Theremainingpolicymakingroomfortheoppositioninthismajoritariangameis
minorandassuchtherewouldbeasmallchanceofpartisancooperationwiththe
government.
Revisitingthedownsianparadigm,Sartori(1976)stressesthatwhilethe
medianvotertheoremcanworkconsiderablywellforexplainingthefunctioningof
partysystemscomposedoffourpartiesorless,forsomemultipartysystems(with
morethanfiverelevantparties)Downs’theoreticalframeworkcannotprovidea
reliableexplanation.WhatSartoriearlyperceivedisthatDowns’theoryassumesa
centripetalforcedrivingparties’electoralcompetitionthatisabsentinsome
multipartysystems.Therefore,asanelectoralsystemthatpermitsmultipartism,
proportionalrepresentationcanchangethewaythecompetitivesystemsoperates,
affectingthestrategiesandfunctioningofpoliticalparties(Sartori,1976).
ProportionalRepresentationelectoralsystemsmightalsobeexpectedto
producecentristresultsifmorecentristpartieshavebetterbargainingpositions
thanmoreextremistparties,hencearemorelikelytogetintoandhaveinfluenceon
government(seeCox1997;HuberandPowell1994).Nevertheless,itisalso
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reasonabletoexpectthatinproportionalsystemspartiesdonotcompetewitheach
otheralongsideacontinuousideologicalspectrum.BecausethePRelectoralsystem
permitsamoreinclusiverepresentationoftheelectorates’diversity,partiescan
maximizetheirutilitybyfocusingonsubgroupsofvotersconsistentwiththeir
preferences.Therefore,thecompetitioninaPRsystemisdiscontinuousinthesense
thatitprovidesamaximizationareathatislimitedtotheparties’closest
competitors.
Therefore,thestrategiesandprofilepoliticalpartiesdecidetofollowandthe
partypoliticstheychoosetoimplementdifferunderdistinctinstitutional
environments.Someparties,forinstance,mayhistoricallyprioritizetofocustheir
actionsonexecutivepositionsandtoplayaprotagonistrolepursuingtheirpolicy
platformsandpoliticalagendas.Otherparties,however,mayprefertoadjusttheir
politicalambitionsbyplayingasupportingroleforthegovernmentinthelegislative
branchtryingtopositionitselfasthemedianlegislatorofthegoverningcoalition.
Weclaimthat,inamajoritariansystem,politicalpartieshavenochoiceother
thanplayingamedianvotergame.Thatis,themedianvoterstrategyandbehavior
ofpoliticalpartiesisendogenousinawinnertakesallsystemandbecomesthe
protagoniststrategyifthepartyambitiousistowintheelection.Ifsomeposition
otherthanthemedianisadopted,thanaminorityhasprevailedoveramajority.
Inaproportionalrepresentationsystem,however,partiesdohavedifferent
choicestomake.Theymayeitherplaythemajoritariangameorthemedian
legislatorgame.Therefore,inmultipartypresidentialsystemswehavetwo
dimensionsforparties(andvoteralike)tocompete:amajoritydimension,
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representedintheraceforthepresidency;andaproportionaldimensionofthe
competitivegame,inwhichpartieshavetomaximizetheirvotesinordertoobtaina
relevantnumberofseatsinsidetheCongress(StromandNyblade2007).Although
scholarshaveassumedthatvotersandpartypreferenceswouldnaturallyalignin
bothdimensions,thereisnoclearreasonforsuchalignmentinpresidential
multipartysystems.
Whileinthepresidentialracethemajoritarianrulesselectasinglemedian
voterpreference,inthelegislativeracetheproportionalrepresentationrulesselect
severaldifferentsub-medianpreferencesthatdifferentpartieswilltrytomaximize.
Itsismisleadingthereforetoassumethatinproportionalrepresentationapartyon
theleftisdirectlycompetingwithapartyontherightforvoter’spreferences.Onthe
contrary,differentpartiesontheleftarecompetingwitheachothertowinthe
representationofthisspecificsubgroup.Dependingonthedominanceand
centrality(Roozendaal1990;Jelnov2014,StomandNayblade2007)ofeachparty
aftertheelection,theywilltrytolocatethemselvesforthemedianlegislative
positionbetweenthegovernment’smajoritarianpreferenceandtheCongress’s
preference.Itisexpectedthatthepartythatsuccessfullymanagestooccupythe
medianlegislativepositionwillnotbeboundedbystrongcommitmentsinorderto
flexiblytonegotiatewithwhoeverwonthepresidentialelection,andlocateasthe
medianlegislatorinafragmentedenvironment.
Whereasplayingthemajoritariangamemeanstoperformtheroleof
protagonistintheexecutivebranch,themedianlegislatorgamerepresentsto
performthe‘supportingactor’roleinthelegislativebranch.Weassumethatthe
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preferenceoftheelectorateisdistributedoverthosetwodimensions.Thus,while
voterscanhavesimilardistributionofpreferencesfortheexecutiveandforthe
legislative,especiallyinsystemswherethepartyidentificationwiththeelectorateis
weak,theremightbeincentivesfordisconnectionofvoters’preferencesbetween
theexecutiveandCongress.Itmeansthatthesamepartystrategycanbeawinnerin
theproportionalgameand,atthesametime,alooserstrategyforthemajoritarian
race,andvice-versa.Inotherwords,inmultipartypresidentialregimes,themedian
preferenceofthepresident’spartycouldbeverydistinctfromthemedian
preferenceinCongress,configuringthustheequivalentofadividedgovernmentina
classicpresidentialpluralitysystem,inwhichapartywouldholdthepresidencyand
itsoppositionwouldholdthemajorityinCongress.
Playing the majoritarian game means more than just a party presenting a
competitivecandidateforthepresidency.Itmeansthatapartyiswillingtopresent
aconsistentpolicyportfolioforvotersandwilingtomanageitsintrapartyconflicts,
coordinating cohesively over a single candidate’s platform in order to plausibly
competeforthenationalmedianvoterpreferences.Ontheotherhand,toplaythe
medianlegislatorgame,apartymustbeabletogatherenoughseatsfromasingleor
several discontinuous median voters, spread over distinct electoral districts and –
once in office – to coordinate cohesively towards the center of the executivelegislative distribution of preferences. Therefore, the nature of both competition
structures becomes inherently different, engendering almost contradictory
demands for party organization and linkages inside either the majoritarian or the
medianlegislatorgame.
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Itisimportanttobearinmindthatthepartychoiceforeitherthe
majoritarianormedianlegislatorgameishistoricallycontextualized,basedonthe
incentivesandconstraintsgeneratedbypastelectoralperformancesaswellason
payoffsobtainedbyeachparticularstrategy.
Furthermore,bothmajoritarianandmedianlegislatorstrategiesengender
costsandbenefits.Underthemajoritariangame,forinstance,partiesmightachieve
ahigherpayoffbyoccupyingthepresidency(SeeFigure1).Thisisparticularlytrue
inpoliticalenvironmentsinwhichpresidentsareconstitutionallypowerfuland
enjoygreatdiscretiononbudgetarypoliciesandotherpoliticalandbureaucratic
resources.Thus,oncesuccessisachievedinthepresidentialelection,itisverylikely
thatthispartywillkeepplayingthemajoritariangameaimingataccumulatingthe
highestpayoffgeneratedinthepoliticalsystem.
Figure1here
However,incaseoflosingthepresidentialelection,majoritarianpartieshave
tobereadytobearthecostsofplayingtheoppositiongameforawhile.Itmeansto
getpoorerandpowerlessbythetimethepartyplaystheoppositiongamebecause
thegreatmajorityofpoliticalandfinancialrentsgeneratedbythepoliticalmarket
willbemostlyallocatedtothewinnerandtoitsfaithfulpoliticalalliesinCongress.
Evengettingpoliticalandfinancialpoorer,losers,especiallysecondrunnersinclose
elections,mightprefertokeepplayingthemajoritariangameasoppositionifthey
believetheyhaverealchancesandcrediblecandidatestobecomewinnersinthe
nextelection.Theyalsomayconsideradjustingtheirambitionandplayingthe
medianlegislatorgame,especiallyiftheyhadapoorperformanceinthe
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presidentialelection.Inthatcase,theywillprobablytrytoplaywhatwecallthe
“embarrassedmedian”legislatorgame.Insuchcondition,theembarrassedmedian
willprobablyenjoyalessadvantageouspayoffintheshortrunthanifitwouldhad
playedthemedianlegislatorsincethebeginningratherthantooktheriskofplaying
themajoritarianrace.
Inadditiontothecostsassociatedtolosingapresidentialelection,parties
havealsototakeintoaccountthatchoosingtoparticipateinpresidentialraces
engendersinternalcoordinationcostsofdealingwithpartisanfactions,which
sometimesmightbeextremelycontroversialandcompetitive.Someofthose
factionsmaygetverydisappointedanddecidetoleavethepartyandtrytobettheir
ownchancesofbuildinganewparty,forinstance.
Positioningatthemedianlegislatorisnotcostlesseither.Themedianparty,
almostbydefinition,givesuptheprotagonistroleofthepresidencyina
proportionalrepresentationsystemandthegreatmajorityofthepoliticaland
financialbenefitsthatthistoppositionoffersandconcentrates.Ontheotherhand,
themedianpartycouldbeabletoextractsomerentscontrolledbytheexecutivein
exchangeforthemedianlegislatorpoliticalsupportinCongressintypicalporkfor
policygame(AlstonandMueller2006).Themedianlegislatorwouldbethe
equivalentofa“comfortzone”,achievinganintermediatepayoffbetweenthe
majoritarianwinnerandthemajoritarianloser.
PereiraandRenno(2013:76)claimsthatrunningforreelectionandplaying
themedianlegislatorgameisthesafestbetstrategybecausetheprobabilityof
winningishigherforthosewhoattemptreelectionthanforthoserunningforany
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otheroffice.Thekeyfortheelectoralsuccessoflegislatorsistohaveaccesstorents
controlledbytheexecutive.Thatis,playingthemedianlegislatorgameina
multipartypresidentialregimemaynotgeneratethehighestpayoff,butitwould
provideenoughresourcestosurviveandtokeepplayingthepoliticalgamewhile
waitingforawindowofopportunitytoswitchforthemorerewarding,though
riskier,majoritariantrack.
2.2)TheCostsofSwitchingPoliticalTracks
Themajoritarianandthemedianlegislatorstrategicchoicesfunctionas
pathwaysortracksforpoliticalparties,whichdefinetheirspecificnature.Oncea
politicaltrackischosenandconsistentlyplayed,bothpartymembersandvoters
relyonthispathforfurtherinformationandpositioning.Nevertheless,choosinga
particulartrackcannotbeunderstoodasastraitjacket.Thatis,onceapartytakesa
particulartrackitcanchangeforadifferentone.However,changingpoliticaltracks
generatescostsofallsorts.Forinstance,apartythatonceplayedthemedian
legislatorroleanddecidedtochangethestrategytoplaythemajoritariangamewill
havetobeartheriskoflosingthemajoritarianelectionandgetasmallerpayoffthan
themedianlegislatorstrategyusedtoprovide.Similarly,ifapartyplayedthe
majoritariantrackandfaileditmayswitchtrackandstartplayingthemedian
legislatorgame.But,dependingonhowbitterandcompetitivethepresidential
campaignwas,itmighttakealongtimeforthemajoritarianlosertobuildbridgesof
cooperationwiththemajoritarianwinner.
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Itisimportanttobearinmindthatthosecostsarenotthesameforall
partiesthough.Thecostsarealsoaffectedbytheprobabilityofbeatingthe
incumbentexecutive.Thehigherthethreattheformermedianlegislatorpartyposes
totheincumbentexecutive,thehighertheprobabilityofchangingthepoliticaltrack.
Inotherwords,ifapartyevaluatesthatitschanceofwinningtheelectionishigh,
thispartymaydecidetotaketherisk,consideringex-anteuncertaintyofplayingthe
majoritariangame.
However,ifthispartyrevealsitselfastrongcontenderanddoesperformwell
intheelectionbutnotenoughtobethewinner,therewouldprobablyhaveapointof
noreturnforthispartyinthemajoritariangame.Howcomeasecondrunnerupora
close3rdplaceinamajoritarianracewouldimmediatelyjointhewinningcoalition,
gatheringforceswiththeonesthattheyvociferouslydebatedduringthecampaign?
Itturnsoutthatifapartyposesacrediblethreattotheincumbent,anddecidesto
playthemajoritariangame,thereputationalcostofchangingtrackbacktothe
medianlegislatorbecomeunbearable.
Anotheraspectisthesizeofthepartyanditspositionontheideological
spectrum.Thepartythathasconsistentlyenjoyedalargeportionofseatsin
Congressisapotentialtrackswitcherbecauseitcanposeacontinuouscredible
threattotheincumbent,aslongasitspositioninthepoliticalspectrumcansupport
atrackswitch.Therefore,thesizeoftheparty,notonlyintermsofthenumberof
seatsinCongressbutalsoconcerningthenumberofgubernatorialandmayoral
positionsitholdsinthenationalterritory,seemstobeanecessaryconditionfor
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trackchanging.Itmaysignalareliablemeasureoftheparty’sautonomoussurvival
inthecaseitdecidestochallengetheincumbent.
Usuallyaforgottenaspectofpathdependence,theorganizationalstructure
ofpartiescanalsoaffecttheirabilitytoperformasuccessfulswitch.Asbefore
mentioned,themajoritarianandthemedianlegislatorgamescreateopposing
pressuresoveraparty’sorganizationstructure,requiringdifferentspecificrules
androutinizedpatternsoffunctioning.Thuswecanexpectthatthemoreaparty
choosestoplaysuccessivelyasinglegame,themoreitlosesitscapacitytoswitch
fromit.Therefore,althoughitcanextracthighersuccessrates,astronglyrooted
organizationstructure,veryspecializedinasinglestrategicgame,isalsohighly
vulnerabletodrasticchangesintheenvironment,sinceitsorganizational
specializationwouldmakeitlesslikelytoquicklychangeandadaptits
organizationalformat.
Thedegreeofpartisanfragmentationisanothercomponentforthepartisan
strategytofollowamedianlegislatortrack.Itisreasonabletoexpectthatthe
greaterthefragmentationofthepartysystemthehighertheincentivesforaparty
toplaythemedianlegislatorrole.
Additionally,asSartori(1976)haspointedout,fragmentedsystems-with
morethanfiveparties-engendera“competitivepatternthatisnolonger
centripetalbutcentrifugal”.Forhim,thecrucialelementisthatthecenterofthe
distributionbecomesaveryappealingpositioninwhichpartiesandvotersalike
compete,strugglingforexpansionandcontroloverpolicies.
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AlthoughSartorihasinsightfullyhighlightedthecentrifugalforcesthatdrive
multipartysystems,hehasmistakenlyattributedthistendencytothepresenceof
extremistsandanti-systemicparties.However,thiscomponentcannotexplain,for
instance,theclearexistenceofhyper-fragmentationtendenciesinmultiparty
presidentialregimes,liketheBrazilianpartysystem.
We,otherwisearguethatitisthepresenceofaninstitutionalenvironmentthat
consistentlyunder-rewardsthemedianlegislatorthatcouldberesponsibleforthe
centrifugalforcesthatgeneratesanincentive-structureforpartisanfragmentation.
Thatis,becausesmallpartiestendtobeover-rewardedbytheexecutive,fewparties
wouldhaveincentivestoplaythemedianlegislatorgamegiventhatthepresident
doesnottakeintoaccountthepoliticalpowerandinfluenceofmedianlegislatorparty
intheprocessofallocatingpoliticalandfinancialresourcestopoliticalallies.
Thiscreatesaparadoxicalsituationinwhichtheneedofamedianvoter
legislatorpartyisenhancedinfragmentedpoliticalsystems.Atthesametime,its’
relativelylowerextractionofrentspushesthedispersionevenfurther,byprizing
smallpoliticalcoalitionallies.Managingavarietyofsmallpartiesinthecoalition
mightgeneratesfurthercoordinationproblemsandincreasethecostsofgoverning
forthepresident.Moreover,becausethemedianlegislatorpartyisalargepartythat
positionitselfinthecenterofthepreferencedistribution,itcaneffectivelyswitchits
strategyinthefollowingelections,challengingtheincumbentinthemajoritarian
game.Therefore,thepresident’spartyhasincentivestoprotectitselffromfuture
threatsrepresentedbythemedianlegislatorparty,rewardingitrelativelyfewer
resourcesthantherestofcoalitionpartners.
17
WhoisthisanimalcalledPMDB?
ShorthistoryofPMDB
Brazilianpoliticalinstitutionsareacomplexmixofconsensualrulesthatseek
toenhancerepresentativenessandmajoritarianrulesthatpursuegovernabilityand
accountabilityatsomeexpensetofairnessandrepresentation(Lijphart1999;
Powell2000).Electoralinstitutions,forexample,allowfortherepresentationof
diverseinterestsinthepoliticalgame,butareoftenblamedforencouraginglevels
offragmentationanddecentralizationthatcancomplicatethepolicy-making
process(Ames1995a,1995b).The1988Constitutionmaintainedseveralfeatures
fromtheearlierdemocraticperiod,suchasaPresident;proportionalrepresentation
(PR);anopenlistforthelegislativeelectoralsystem;afragmentedpartysystem;
federalism;andanindependentjudiciary.
Duringthe21yearsofmilitaryregime(1964-1985),however,thepolitical
processwasinsteadverymuchcentralized.Afterbeingunexpectedlydefeatedin
fivestatesinthegubernatorialelectionof1965,themilitarygovernmentdecidedto
extinguishthemultipartysystemandimpose,viatheunilateralact#2,thecreation
ofatwo-partysystem,withapoliticalparty,AliançaRenocadoraNacional(ARENA),
aggregatingthepoliticalinterestsofthegovernmentandtheasecondpolitical
party,MovimentoDemocráticoBrasileiro(MDB),representingtheopposition.
Althoughtheelectoralcompetitionwassomehowrestrictedunderthe
military,theMDBcontinuedtoplaytheelectoralgame,sinceitcouldbeevenworse
iftheydecidedtoabandonachannelfortheofficialopposition.Second,theparty
believedthat,whileelectionswereheld,itwaspossibletoovercomethemilitary
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dictatorshipbyerodingitspopularsupport–whichinfactprovedtobeasuccessful,
thoughprotracted,strategy.
WhiletheMDBdidnothaverealpowerinCongressintheearlyyearsof
militarydictatorship,andthusboycottedtheindirectpresidentialelections,inthe
late1970stheMDBbeganmobilizingnationalsupportandwasabletoelect(still
indirectly)thefirstcivilianpresidentin1984.Theyearof1974isconsideredthe
turningpointofMDB’shistoryfromaminorityoppositiontothemajorpartyinthe
house.Inadditiontothemorecombativelinethatopenedspaceforcommunity
leaders,otherfactorscontributedsignificantlytothegrowthofMDB:theoilcrisis
causedbytheendoftheeconomicmiracleandthecollapseofthearmedstruggle.
TheMDBdefinitelyassumedtheroleoffosteringpopulardissatisfactionatalllevels.
Itbecomesanoppositionfront.ThehelmsmaninthistornwasthedeputyUlysses
Guimarães.TheAuthenticGroupMDB,whichwasalreadymaturingtheideainthe
early70s,decidedtolaunchUlyssesasan“anti-candidate”inthepassageof
GarrastazuMedicigovernmenttoErnestoGeisel’s.Inhisanti-campaign,Ulysses
runsthecountry'scapitalspreachingopposition’sideas.
Despitethefactofaproportionalrepresentationsystem,theinstitutional
bipartisansettingimposedbytheauthoritarianregimerenegadedtothejust-born
MDBalong-termroleinthemajoritarianoppositiongame.Asanoppositiontothe
establishedregime,theMDBmanagedtocoordinateverydifferentfactions(from
socialistsandcommuniststoconservativeformersupportersofthemilitarycoup)
andtocreatestrongboundswiththelocalelitesandconstituencies,whichgavethe
19
partyacompetitiveadvantagewhenthemilitarypowererodedandtheprocessof
liberalizationbecamenon-reversible.
Asaconsequenceofastagnatedeconomyandamoreaggressivepolitical
campaign,intheBrazilian1974electionstheMDBtookalmostenoughseatstogain
amajority.TheMDBusedthecampaignstogaintheattentionoftheglobalmedia,
anddenouncethe"democratic"facadeoftheBraziliandictatorshipandMDBbegan
toscorelegislativegains.Moreover,inthe1974electiontheMDBwasabletoraise
issuesofsocialjusticeandcivilliberties.
MDB’spoliticalorganizationwascharacterizedsinceitsearlyphasebytwo
veryimportantcharacteristics.First,thenecessitytoexpandsupportforthe
oppositionalmovementledthepartytodevelopatop-downorganizational
structure,whichprovidedlocalandregionalpoliticalpenetration.BecauseMDBwas
createdbylegislatorsalreadyestablishedinCongressforcedtotheoppositionby
themilitarycoup,thepartyhadtodevelopconnectionswithregionalandlocal
politicalelitesinordertoopenandsustainsub-nationaloffices.
Second,astheonlypermittedpoliticalpartyintheopposition,theMDBhad
tocoordinateabroadsetofideologicaltracksthatrangedfromsocialistsand
communistspoliticians(thrownintoillegalitybythemilitary)topersonalistand
liberalleaderships,whichgavetheorganizationaveryindefiniteideologicalprofile.
Forinstance,PereiradeMelo(2013:93)demonstratesthatalthoughthemajorityof
MDB’smembersemergedfromformerreformistsandlaborparties,36%ofthe
legend’slegislatorscamefromconservativepoliticalparties.
20
Thetwo-partysystemlasteduntil1979,whenthemultipartysystemwas
reestablishedasamilitarygovernmentstrategyoftryingtoweakentheopposition
party,MDB,whichwasgrowingstronger.Priortothedeeprecessionofthatyear,
theadministrationrestoredthemultipartysystem.Themilitarysoft-linersrealized
thatthetwo-partysystemwasnolongercapableofpreservingthelegislative
majoritysupportingthemilitaryregime.Onthecontrary,itelectorallyconsolidated
theoppositionunderthebigpartisanMDBumbrellathatwasabouttowinnotonly
thecontrolofCongressbutalsostateassembliesandmanymunicipalgovernments
intheupcominggeneralelections,asaresultofatypicalmajoritarianwinner
strategy.
Toavoidthismassivedefeat,thealternativewastofragmenttheopposition
byreestablishingarestricted(noMarxistpartiesallowed)multipartysystemwith
theemergenceofseveralnewparties,especiallyonthecenterandontheleftofthe
ideologicalspectrum.Thisdecisionpleasedsegmentsoftheoppositionandfactions
thatwouldnolongerhavetosqueezeundertheMDBpartisanumbrella.This
militarystrategyofpreservingopen-listproportionalrepresentationwithout
restrictingthenumberofpoliticalpartiesprovedsuccessfulwiththecreationof
severalnewpoliticalparties,includingtheWorker’sParty(PT)foundedby
unionists,intellectuals,andmembersofthechurchundertheleadershipofLuis
InacioLuladaSilva.
TheMDBwasonthevergeofbecomingamasspoliticalpartywhenCongress
dissolveditin1979.Thepartypresident,DeputyUlyssesGuimarães,convincedthe
partyto"addaPtotheMDB"topreservethehard-foughtoppositionimage.In
21
January1985,thecoalitionbetweentheBrazilianDemocraticMovementParty
(PMDB)andthePartyoftheLiberalFront(PFL),knownastheDemocraticAlliance,
undertheleadershipofTancredoNeves,wasindirectlyelectedbyCongressasthe
firstcivilianpresidentinabout25years.Nevertheless,thejustelectedpresident
TancredoNevesdiedinthenighteveofhisinaugurationandthevice-president,
JoséSarneyfromthePFL,tookpowerasthenewpresident.
PerformanceofPMDBsincetheRe-Democratization
Thefirstciviliangovernmentaftertwenty-oneyearsofauthoritarianregime
tookplaceinBrazilundergreatdemandforpoliticalandsocialinclusion,andthe
PMDBwasthenaturalstrongholdofanemergingdemocracy.Inordertoobtain
politicalsupportforthenewgovernment,theDemocraticAlliance,underthe
leadershipofTancredoNevesandJoséSarneyrespectively,gotheavilyinvolvednot
onlyonreformingpoliticalissues,butalsostrongreformpromisesofsocialand
economicnature.
Thegeneralexpectationreliedmostlyonthepersonalabilityandleadership
ofTancredoNeves,whichwouldbeabletoovercomethestructuralweaknessofthe
democraticalliancecoalitionandguaranteetheimplementationoftheNew
Republicambitiousagendaofreform.Theformationofthecoalitionitselfdepended
largelyonthepersonalcredibilityandskillfulnegotiationsofTancredoNeves
himself.Infact,Tancredohadalreadyshownhisnegotiationabilitieswithinhisown
party,beatinghispartisanUlysses-whowasamajorpoliticalfigureduringtheredemocratization-torunasthepresidentialcandidateforthePMDBingeneral
22
elections.ThebrandnewPMDBhad40%oftheseatsinchamberin1982,with168
outof420seats.ThepartyhadthesameshareintheElectoralCollegein1985
presidentialelections(180of686seats)butTancredowasabletomanagea
tremendouswin,with70%ofthevotes.Theseelectoralresultsreinforcedthe
majoritariantrajectorythePMDBwouldtrailinthefollowingyears.
ThenewbornBrazilianpartysystemdidnothaveyetfelttheimpactof
electoralrulesovertime,solegislaturefragmentationwaslow.Therewasadefacto
two-partysystem(sincePMDBandPDScombinedfor92%oftheseats).Thus,likea
bigpartywoulddoinamajoritariansystem,theambitiontocontroltheexecutive,
atthatpoint,wasthemostviabletrackforthePMDB.Accordingtoourtheoretical
frameworkdiscussedearlier,inagivenstateoftheworld,majoritarianormedian
legislator,partieswillobservethenature(elections)todecideonwhichpaththey
willgo.ThePMDBfolloweditsinitialdestinyandgalvanizedtheopposingforcesto
dictatorshipunderTancredo’sumbrella.
Itisveryclearthatpoliticalopportunitystructuresshapeparty’semergence,
evolutionandstrategy(Strom1990),howevercriticaljuncturescanreshufflethe
expectationsinawaythatpartieswillhavetorethinktheirstrategies.Those
unexpectedfactsjointlyconformpartyevolutionaltogetherwiththepolitical
opportunitystructures.TheshockingdeathofTancredoNevesinthenighteveofhis
inaugurationgeneratedhugedisappointmentandraiseddoubtsaboutthecapacity
ofthenewciviliangovernmenttobeabletodeliversuchacomprehensiveagenda
undertheleadershipoftheVice-president,JoséSarney.Sarneywasapoliticalfigure
withaverydifferentprofileandprestige.Theextremelyprotractedprocessof
23
openingoftheBraziliandemocracyandthecircumstancesofanegotiatedtransition
withoutaclearrupturemadetheSarney’sgovernmentevenmoresuspicious.
Sarneyhadlongbeenidentifiedwiththerightwingparty,asheadoftheArena,and
supporterofthemilitarydictatorship.
Thelackofpoliticallegitimacyofthenewpresidentmadethetransitionto
thefirstciviliangovernmentvulnerabletoallkindsofpressureforimmediate
structuralchangesnotonlyoneconomicandpoliticalspheres,butalsoonsocial
policies.Sarneytriedtorespondtothosepressuresbyimprintingthelabel“Tudo
PeloSocial”(everythingforthesocialpolicy)asthetoppriorityofhis
administration.Therequisiteofacomprehensiveandinclusiveagendaofreform
couldbenoticedinthepoliticalmanifestoofTancredo-Sarney,called“commitment
tothenation,”whichenumeratedthemainpolicyconcernsoftheirelectoral
campaignonsocial,political,andeconomicpolicies.Theall-encompassingfeatureof
theinclusiveagendaoftheNewRepublicgeneratedtoomuchexpectationandsoon
revealedthelimitsthataheterogeneouscoalitionlikethatwithapolitically
vulnerablepresidentcoulddeliver.
Inordertodemonstratethegoodwillandthathisgovernmentwouldactina
democraticfashion,PresidentSarneydecidednottomakeuseofunilateraldevices,
suchasdecreeandurgencypowers,untilanewconstitutionwaswrittenand
approved.Congresscametooccupythepowervacuumleftbyapoliticallyfragile
president.Givenhisrelativelypoliticalweakness,Sarneyalsodecidedtokeepthe
cabinetchosenbyTancredoNeves.Thisdecisioncausedcontradictoryviewsof
24
whatpolicydirectionthegovernmentwaspursuing.Ontheonehand,the
governmenthadpromisedtoaddressthecountry’sdifficultsocialagenda.
TheMinisterofPlanning,JoãoSayad,whopressuredforaheterodox
economicpolicy,somehowsupportedthispolicydirection.Ontheotherhand,the
MinisterofFinance,FranciscoDorenelles,anephewofTancredoNeves,wasafiscal
conservativeandputforwardanorthodoxapproachthroughdomesticfiscaland
monetaryausterityestablishinga10percentcutinpublicspending,atwomonth
suspensionofallgovernmentbanklending,andone-yearfreezeofallpublicsector
hiring.
Aftertwenty-oneyearsofdictatorship,themajorityoftheCongress,
includingtheleaderofthePMDBUlyssesGuimarães,wasverydisappointedwith
suchpolicies.Theywantedtodemonstratetotheirconstituents,especiallypriorto
theNovember1986elections,thattheywereresponsivetovoters’expectationson
socialinclusion.AccordingtotheFolhadeSãoPaulo(January14,1986),only20
percentoflegislatorsdemonstratedsupporttotheSarney'sadministration,55.5
percentwerepoliticallyneutral,and24.5percentwereclearlyhostiletohim.
Brazil,despiteresurgenteconomicgrowthin1985,wasthenconfronting
annualinflationratesexceeding200percent.Dailylifewasinherentlyconstructed
aroundwaystominimizethereallossesinherentinsuchcircumstances.The
poorest,ofcourse,intheabsenceofinterestpayingbankdeposits,couldnotavoid
theinflationarytaxontheirmeagercashbalances.Inastruggletoimposehis
authorityandpoliticalleadership,SarneydecidedtoreplacetheMinisterofFinance
appointedbyTancredoNeves,FranciscoDornelles,byDilsonFunaro,anactive
25
businessmanoftheSãoPauloFederationofIndustry-FIESPwhofavoredgrowth
overfiscalausterityandusedtobeverycriticalofIMFdemandsforadjustments.
FunarohadalsoservedasthepresidentoftheNationalBankofEconomicandSocial
Development-BNDESinthefirstmonthsofSayney'sadministration.
SubsequenttotheintroductionoftheAustralPlaninArgentina,the
heterodoxPlanoCruzadowasenactedbydecreeattheendofFebruary1986.The
planquicklyachievedbothitseconomicandpoliticalobjectives:ittamedthe
inflation,ontheonehand,anditwasabletostopthebleedingofthepresidencyand
itsgoverningcoalition,ontheother.TheCruzadoplan,whichwasdesignedto
reducetheinflationviaacombinationofpriceandwagefreezes,boostedthe
presidentialpopularity,calmeddownthepoliticalcriticismsandreunifiedthe
DemocraticAlliance.However,theredistributionofincomecontainedintheprice
freezeledquicklytoanexplosivedemandforconsumergoodswhichoverheadthe
entireeconomy.Businesssectorreactedbyreducingthesupplyandintensifying
theirpoliticalpressure.
AfterthissuccessfulstartthePlansoondisappointed.Thepricefreezehadto
beshort-livedsothatpricescouldagainhelptoallocateresources.However,the
cominggeneralelectionofNovember,whichwasalsoscheduledtoelectlegislators
whowouldformtheConstituentAssembly,placedenormouspressurefor
postponingpricerealignment.ThepoliticalsuccessoftheCruzadoplanpaidoffby
generatingamassivevictoryforthePMDB,whichwonalltheelectoralracesfor
governor,exceptthestateofSergipe,andthemajorityoftheChamberofDeputies
(53percent)andintheSenate(63percent).Still,in1986,underthevergeofthe
26
neweconomicplan,thePMDBheldanunprecedentedmajorityincongress.Itwas
thefirstandtheonlyperiodinrecentdemocracythatasinglepartyhadthecontrol
oftheexecutiveandwasasinglemajoritypartyinlegislature.Itwasthelargest
electoralvictoryeverwonbyapoliticalpartyinaproportionalrepresentation
multipartysystem.ThisstorywearetellingiswelldecribedinFigure2.
Figure2here
Thenecessaryadjustmentswerepainfullyimplementedjustafterthe
electioninanabruptway,whichsuggestedaclearlyopportunisticelectoral
maneuverfromgovernmenttowinthegeneralelection.Theimpactofthe
adjustmentpackage,whichwasnamedCruzadoPlanII,upontheauthorityand
popularityofSarneywasverynegative.Thegeneralmoodofoptimismgeneratedby
theCruzadoplanIwastransformedindisillusionmentasvotersfelttheywere
cheatedwiththeCruzadoIIwhichhadbeendesignedbeforetheelectionbutmade
publiconlyafterwards.Sarney'spoliticalcapitalerodedquicklyandhewasno
longercapableofunifyinghisDemocraticAlliancecoalition.
In1989,thePMDBfinallygrantedUlyssesGuimarães-thecraftsmenof
transitiontodemocracy–aspottoruninpresidentialelections.Thefirstdirect
presidentialelectionsoccurredunderanowfragmentedlegislatureandtherewas
nottwo,rathertwenty-twoofficialcandidates.Amongthosecandidates,Collor,a
veryyoungnortheastpolitician,sellingliberalideasandrepresentingthenopolitician(althoughmemberofalong-lastingoligarchy),andLula.Collorwonthe
27
election,LulawastherunnerupandUlysseshadmelancholic4.73%ofthevotes.
EventhoughthefigureofUlysseswasstillrespectful,thePMDBpaidthepriceof
Sarney’s(awful)administrationandthe1986‘electoralburglary’episodeof
unfreezingthepricesonedayafterthegeneralelections.
TheinaugurationofFernandoCollorgeneratedgreatexpectationandhope.
Populationbelievedthatthefirstcivilianlegitimatelyelectedpresidentafter29
yearscouldofferadefinitivesolutiontotheproblemofhyperinflation,toendemic
corruptionandtofulfillvoters'expectationsofeconomicdevelopment.Thispositive
expectationcanbecapturedbythehugepopularsupportCollorachieved(70
points)atthebeginningofhisadministration.
However,Collorseemedtointerpretthispopularsupportasafreeticketto
ridethepoliticalrollercoasterwithouttakingintoaccountthenecessityof
politicians'support.Collorpreferred,therefore,todevelopdirectconnectionwith
votersinsteadofmakinguseoftraditionalpoliticalinstitutionssuchasCongress,
politicalparties,orbuildingasustainablemajoritycoalition.
AlthoughCollorinitiallyenjoyedenormouspopularsupport,hewas
handicappedbyhislackoflegislativesupport.Hispoliticalpartyheldlessthan10
percentoftheseatsinCongress.Infact,Collordecidedtobuildapost-electoral
minoritylegislativecoalitionthatconsistedofonlythreepoliticalparties(PMDB,
PFL,andPRN).Collor’scoalitionbeganinMarch1990with245seatsonly,which
wasabout49percent.InOctoberofthesameyear,thePMDBdecidedtoleave
Collor'sgoverningcoalitionandthePDSwasincorporated.Hisnominalsupportin
Congressdroppedto29.6percent.InJanuary1992Collor'sownparty,PRN,was
28
extinguishedandhiscoalitionshrunkevenfurtherto26percentofseatsinthe
ChamberofDeputies.
Anewunexpectedevent,however,couldhavesignificantlychangethePMDB
history.InMay1992Collorwasaccusedbyhisyoungerbrother,PedroCollor,of
involvementinacorruptionschemeofinfluencepeddling.FederalPoliceand
Congressbeganindependentinvestigationssoonafter.OnAugust26,1992,thefinal
congressionalinquiryreportwasreleased;asaresultofthisreport,apetitionwas
presented,formallyaccusingPresidentCollorofhavingcommittedcrimesof
responsibility(theBrazilianequivalentof"highcrimesandmisdemeanors")
warrantingremovalfromofficepertheconstitutionalandlegalnormsregulating
impeachmentproceedings.Onthatformalpetition,impeachmentproceedingswere
initiatedintheChamberofDeputies,thelowerhouseofCongress.OnSeptember29,
1992,Collorwasimpeachedbyavoteof441forand38votesagainst.
OnOctober2,1992,PresidentCollorreceivedformalnoticefromthe
BrazilianSenatethattheChamberofDeputieshadacceptedthechargespresented
againsthimandthathewasnowadefendantinatrialofimpeachmentthatthe
Senatewouldconduct.PertheBrazilianConstitution,uponreceiptofthat
notification,Collor'spowersweresuspendedfor180days,andVicePresident
ItamarFrancobecameactingpresident.Facingalmostcertainconvictionand
removalfromofficebytheSenate,CollorresignedonDecember29,1992justasthe
trialwasunderway,inthelastdayoftheproceedings.
WithCollor’sremoval,hisvice-president,ItamarFranco,aquirkyand
relativelymarginalpoliticalfigure,succeededCollorinofficeinauguratinginakind
29
of“salvationgovernment.”WiththeexceptionoftheWorker'sParty(PT),that
preferrednottooccupyformalpositionsinthegovernment,allpoliticalpartiesthat
supportedCollor’simpeachmentdecidedtotakepartofFranco'sgoverning
coalition.Franco’sadministration,therefore,re-establishedthecoalition-based
presidentialism.Thisdecision,somehow,helpedtorebuildbridgesbetween
executiveandlegislativebranchesthathadbeenbrokenunderCollor's
administration.
Hereiswhenhistory,again,makethepresidencyfallintheleapsofthe
PMDB,inaveryerraticway.Franco,electedbythePRNwasnowaPMDBpartisan.
Onceagain,aPMDBpresidentwasincharge,onceagain,hewasnotdirectlyelected
andonceagainhewasfarfrombeingacentralfiguretotheparty.Evenwiththat
chance,thePMDBwasnotabletodevelopaviablecandidacyintheforthcoming
elections.Thepartydidnotgiveupthemajoritariangamehoweverandin1994the
candidatewasOrestesQuercia.The4.38shareofvotesobtainedbyQuerciawasa
symbolicendforlastpresidentialcandidatethePMDBhad.
Figure3here
ThePMDBstrategyofplayingthemedianlegislatorinsteadofinsistingin
havingacandidatewasnotadecisionmadefromthedaytonight,aswecansee.
Thisdecision,however,aspredictedbyourtheory,canbeaconsiderablycostlyone.
IntheparticularcaseofthePMDB,thetwoconsecutivedefeatsthepartyfacedin
thepresidentialelectionsof1989and1994werealsorelativedefeatsatthelocal
level.EventhoughthePMDBremainedtheoveralllocalwinner,itsmunicipality
30
shareconsistentlydecreasedinthenextlocalelections.Ontheotherhand,thePSDB
andthePTdramaticallyincreasedtheirnumbersofcontrolledmunicipalitiesinthis
period(Figure3).Obviously,notparticipatinginthegoverningcoalitionhasaneven
worseeffect,butgivingupthemajoritariangamemightbedangerous.The
DEM/PFLispayingthepriceofplayingbothgames,givingupasinglecandidacyand
beinganoppositionparty(Figure2).
Theelectoralevidenceofthosetwocyclesunveilsanoftenhiddencostof
playingthemajoritariangame.Usuallysmallpartieshavecandidatesinnational
electionsevenknowingthatavictoryisimplausible.Thosesmallpartiesdoasbest
astheycanintheelectionsinordertoextractbiggerrentsfromtheirsupportto
presidentialcoalitioninthefuture.Withbigpartieswhatsoeveritcanworkthe
otherwayaround.Theexpectedreturnforplayingthemajoritariangameinthecase
ofbigpartiesisrelativelyhigh,soamajordefeatinnationalelectionscanimplya
decreasedbargainpowerwithincoalitionandashrinkingshareofmunicipalitiesin
thefuture.
Thefirstanddecisivetrackchangeoccurredin1998,whenthepartydecided
nothavingacandidate.AtthattimethePMDBwasstillthebiggestpartyincongress
andbyfartheonewithmoremunicipalitiesunderitspoliticalcontrol.ThePMDB
wassatisfiedinplayingasupportingroleforthePSDBandPFL/DEMwhatsoever.
In2002thePMDBplayedthegameofthe‘embarrassedmedian’,theylostthe
vice-presidentelectionsbutafteronlyoneyearrapidlyjoinedthePTwinning
coalition.ThereaftertheirparticipationinPTcoalitionswasconsolidatedandthe
contractionwasstanched.
31
LookingforPMDB-likepartiesacrosstheworld:ThePMDBIndex
Inoursearchforapartywiththeaforementionedcharacteristicsofthe
PMDB,wedevelopedameasureofproximity.Wewerelookingforlargecoalition
partnerwithnoambitiontocontroltheexecutive,whichhasampledistributionin
thenationalterritoryofthecountry,bygoverningseveralmunicipalitiesandmany
statesandbyholdingasubstantialnumberofseatsinCongress,ideologically
amorphous,withoutaclear-cutpoliticalagendaorplatform,andwithmanyregional
leaderstryingtomaximizetheirownpoliticalinterests.Ourobjectivewasto
accountforresemblancebetweenthePMDBandpartiesacrosstheworld.This
measurewasbasedoneightindicatorsconcerningeightdifferentpartyattribute
dimensions.Theseeightindicatorsweregivenvaluesfrom0to1,where0isthe
mostdistantfromthePMDBand1istheclosesttothePMDB.
Dataonpartieswasgatheredthroughaexpertsurvey,conductedwith74
specialistsonLatinAmericanpolitics.2Thespecialistswereabletochooseacountry
theywouldliketorespondandansweredfewquestionsconcerningpoliticalparties
inthatspecificcountry.WecomparedthentheiranswerstoaPMDBbenchmarkon
eachquestion,andappliedaformulatogenerateanindexgoingfrom0to1oneach
dimension.DimensionsD1toD4haveobservablebenchmarkvalues.Ondimensions
D5toD8,valuesforthePMDBweregivenbytheauthors(table1).
Table1Here
2ThefirstwaveofsurveysconsideredonlyLatinAmericancountries.Therewere37complete
responsesamongthe74.
32
Wedecidedtotakeintoconsiderationonlydatapointswiththreeormore
responsesandwherespecialistsconsistentlyagreedontheirevaluations,whichis,
thecoefficientofvariationontheaggregateresponseswaslowerthan50%.3Here
weplotonlythebest-fitforPMDBineachcountrywehavedatafor(Figure4).The
PDCinChileisbyfarthemostsimilarpartytothePMDBinLatinAmerica,followed
bythePRIinMexico.Allthepartiesconsideredtendtoplaythemedianrole,havea
nationaldistributionandacenterideology.Thedifferencesappearontheother
dimensionsandoneofthemhasthemostintriguingandstrikingresult:candidateto
executive.NoPMDB-likepartyinLatinAmericadecided,asthePMDBdid,togiveup
fromaleadingmajoritarianroleinpresidentialelections.Whatcouldexplainsucha
puzzle?Thefearofplayingthemajoritariangamewithanexpectedlowprobability
ofwinseemsapossiblereason.
Figure4here
Previoustheoreticaldevelopmentsinthispapermentionedaspacefor
PMDB-likepartiesinfragmentedenvironments.PlottingthePMDBIndexagainsta
fragmentationmeasure(liketheeffectivenumberofparties)amongLatinAmerican
countriescangiveusanideaofhowthistheoryholdsornot(Figure5).Thereisan
interestingcorrelationbetweenthePMDBIndexandtheleveloffragmentation.
CountrieswherethePMDB-likepartyhasthehighestvalueonthePMDBindexare
usuallythesamecountrieswheretheleveloffragmentationishigh.Although
censoreddatastilllimitouranalyticalstrength,thiscorrelationpartiallysupports
theideathatafragmentedenvironmentwouldgeneratesuchanimalslikethe
3Completeresultsannex.
33
PMDB.Causalityisstillaconcernwhatsoever.Eventhoughthereisaclear
theoreticalexplanationtosupportcausality,moresophisticatedempiricalstrategies
arewaitingtobedeveloped.
Figure5here
Twomainreasonsexplainwhysuchacorrelationissostrong.Thefirstoneis
relatedtotheneedofacooperationanchorunderover-fragmentedlegislatures.In
theabsenceofthisanchor,systemwouldbecomedysfunctional,soinorderto
defenditselfthesystemwouldgeneratesuchparties.Thesecondonehastodowith
Sartori(1976)predictionsforfragmentedsystemsencompassinga“centrifugal
competitivepattern”.Thecenterofthedistributionbecomesaveryappealing
positioninwhichpartiescompete,strugglingforexpansionandcontrolover
policies,themorefragmented,thebiggerthestruggle.
Theproblemnowis:howtofindacounterfactualforBrazil?Itmightbethe
casethatthesingularityofthePMDBhastodowithBrazilianpoliticalsystem
singularities.Inthissense,ourempiricalsearchforapartycanbeelusive.Wewill
neverfindit
PoliticalDifficultiesofmanagingthemedianlegislatorinthecoalition
Weassumethatthepresidentmaximizepoliticalsupportinthelegislature,
butwiththelowestpossiblecost.Therefore,thechiefexecutivemustdefinehow
manyandwhatpartieswilltakepartofhiscoalitionandthepowerandresources
willbesharedwithpartners.Basedonthesechoices,thecoalitionparticipants
34
achieveagreaterorlesserdegreeofsatisfactionthat,inturn,hasthepotentialto
generatehigherofsmallergovernabilitycost.
Animportantaspectofourmodelistounderstandhowthepresident,asthe
coalitionmanagerinafragmentedmultipartyenvironment,allocatesherpolitical
andmonetaryresourcestocoalitionpartnersinexchangeforpoliticalsupportin
Congress.Astrategicpresidentwhoisconcernedaboutpolicyoutcomesandabout
hervariousmanagementfunctionswillconsiderthesecostsinworkingtowardan
optimalstrategy.Onceelected,thepresidentfacesatleastthreeinterconnected
exogenousconstraints:(1)thelevelofpartyfragmentationinthelegislature;(2)the
sizeofthepresident’spartyrelativetothesizesofotherparties;and(3)the
ideologicaldistancesbetweenthepresident’spartyandtheotherpoliticalpartiesin
thelegislature.Workingwithinsuchconstraints,theexecutivemakesdecisions
aboutthesizeandideologicalheterogeneityofhiscoalitionandtheproportionality
ofrewardsofcabinetseatsandfinancialresources.
Raileetal.(2015)demonstratethatgoverningcostsincreasewithcabinet
disproportionality,ideologicalheterogeneity,andcoalitionsize.Specificallywith
regardtothislastcomponent,theyassumethatthegreaterthenumberofcoalition
allies,thehigherthegovernabilitycost.Thetheoreticalrationaleoftheirhypothesis
isthatpresidentswouldfacehighercoordinationproblemsmanagingacoalition
withalargernumberofparties;therefore,highercosts.
However,itisalsoreasonabletoinferthatalargecoalitionally,especiallyif
itisthemedianlegislator,couldleadtomoregovernabilitycostsforthepresident.It
mightbecheapertobuyabunchofsmallpartiesratherthanalargeone.Thatis,the
35
presidentwouldfacehigherriskoffacingholdupproblemsfrombeingtoocloseor
toodependentonalargemedianpartner.Therefore,inordertoavoidthispotential
vulnerabilitythepresidentwouldprefertobuildanumericallyverylargecoalition.
Ontheotherhand,italsoreasonabletoinferthatsmallerpartiescould
extractahigherpremiumrelativetotheirsize.Theirinclusioninthecoalition
generallymeansthatpartyisnecessaryforthepresidentand,asaconsequence,
suchapartymightbeabletoextractdisproportionaterewards.Forthemanagerof
thecoalition,therefore,itmightbecheapertobuysmallpartiesintheretail(Varejo)
ratherthantobuythemedianlegislatorinthewholesale(atacado).Theexecutive
couldalsofellthreatenedbyastrongmedianlegislativepartnerthatwouldhavethe
capacitytochallengetheexecutivebyswitchingtothemajoritariantrackand
offeringapresidentialcandidateinthenearfuture.
Inordertoinitiallyaccessthestatusofthisrelation,weestimateabasic
correlationtest,consideringmonetarytransfers(individuallegislativeamendments
totheannualbudget)toparties,politicaltransfers(cabinetpositions)topartiesand
seatshare(thepercentageofseatsheldbyeachparty)inthechamberofdeputies.
Weoperationalizedbothmonetaryandpoliticaltransferswithregardtothesizeof
theparty.Thus,wehavebeenabletohaveaglimpseifpoliticalandfinancial
rewardswereproportionallydistributed.
Figure6here
Thecorrelationsaresignificant.However,whiletherelativeamountof
resourcesdirectlyspentbythepresidentintheformofporkincreaseswhenparty
sizealsoincreases,thecabinetsurplusobtainedbythepartiesdecreasewhenparty
36
sizeincreases.Therefore,itmightbethecasethatbiggermedianlegislatorparties
arecheapertobuyoutwithpoliticaltransfers,whilesmallerpartiesarecheaperto
buyoutwithmonetarytransfers,suggestingthusasubstituteeffectbetweenthose
twogoverningcurrencies(Raileetal2011).Inotherwords,thereareeconomiesof
scalewhenitcomestomonetarytransfersanddiseconomiesofscalewhenitcomes
topoliticaltransfers.
However,thestrengthofthoserelationsmatterandthenegativecorrelation
inthiscaseisfarmoreconsistent.Figure6showstherelationbetween“SeatShare”
intheChamberofDeputiesand“CoalitionSurplus”.CoalitionSurplusmeasuresifa
coalitionpartyisunderoroverrewardedbythepresident.4ThehighertheSurplus,
thegreaterapartywillbeoverrewardedvis-a-visitscontributiontothegoverning
coalition.
Lookingattheoverallpicture,thefirstnoticeablefactisthattherehasbeena
verystrongandnegativecorrelationbetweenSeatShareandCoalitionSurplusover
time.Thatis,thebiggertheparty,thelowertherelativepoliticalrewarditwill
receivebythepresident.ThedataforBrazilisfairlyconsistentandsuggeststhat
smallerpartiesextractahigherpremium.Wecanalsoinferthatthestrengthofthis
relationincreaseswhiletheSeatSharedecreases,observingthenarrowingofthe
confidenceinterval.
4TheCoalitionSurplusofpartyp(CSp)formulaisdefinedbyCSp=mp/jm -sp/scwherespaccountsfor
j
thenumberofseatspartypholds,scaccountsfortheoverallnumberofseatsthecoalitioncholds,mp
isthenumberofministriesoccupiedbythepartypandjmjisthetotalnumberofavailablecabinet
positions.
37
Thiscorrelationresultlendssupportthehypothesisthatthepresidentwill
facehighergoverningcostsifshedecidestohaveacoalitionwithmanysmall
partiesratherthanrelyingonthesupportofabigmedianlegislator.
Thesecondaspecttohighlightisthatdifferentpresidentsindifferentterms
haddifferentstrategies.FewbigpartiestookpartofpresidentCardoso’scoalitions
mostofthetime.Ontheotherhand,manysmallpartiesformedLulaandRousseff’s
governingcoalitions.Asaconsequence,itisreasonabletoexpectthatPT
governmentstoaccountformorepressureonthedistributionofpoliticalgoods,
sincethosesmallpartiesmightexpecttoreceivemorerewardsinordertoachievea
surplus.
Conclusion
Tobewritten
38
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41
Figures
Figure1:PartisanChoicesonConsensual(Proportional)Systems
Winner
Majoritarian
(winner)
(10)
Majoritarian
Majoritarian
(Opposition)
(4)
Loser
Embarrassed
Median
Nature(election)
(2)
Majoritarian
Median
Legislator
Median
Legislator
(6)
42
Figure2:Supportingroleparties(PMDBanPFL/DEM)performanceafterredemocratization,Brazil,1982-2015
43
Figure3:Leadingmajoritarianroleparties(PTandPSDB)performanceafter
re-democratization,Brazil,1982-2015
44
Table1:PMDBIndexDimensions
Dimension
Coalitionparticipation
D1
frequency
D2 Ideology
D3 Crediblecandidate
D4 Post-seatdifferential
D5 Medianrole
D6 Internalcohesion
Abilitytopass
D7 legislationorvetothe
executive
D8 Nationaldistribution
Question
Howoftendoesthepartyparticipateinthegoverning
(presidential)coalition?(0%to100%)
Howwouldyouplacethefollowingpartiesabout
theirideologicalposition?(1to10)
Inthelastfiveelections,hasthispartylaunchedany
crediblecandidatetothepresidencywithreal
chancesofwinning?(0to5)
Usuallyincoalitiongovernmentstheexecutive
distributecabinetsaccordingtothenumberofseats
thatpartiesholdintheCongress.Consideringthis,
whatistherelationbetween[CabinetShare(%)-
SeatShare(%)]ofthesespartieswhentakingpartin
governingcoalitions?(+100to-100)
Doesthepoliticalpartyplayamedianvoterole?That
is,howwouldyouconsiderthepoliticalpartyin
termsofavoidingextreme-leftorextreme-right
policydecisions?(0to6)
Towhatextentmembersofthosepoliticalparties
havepresentedinternalpartycohesion?(1to10)
Howdoyourankthepartiesconcerningthe
ability/powertovetoandpasslegislation
(constrainingtheexecutive’spreferences)?(1to10)
Concerningthedistributionofvotersand
sympathizers,wouldyouconsiderthepoliticalparty
tobe?(1to10)
PMDB
85%
5.5
0
-15
3
2
9
10
45
Figure4:ThePMDBIndex,LatinAmerica
46
Figure5:PMDBIndexandFragmentation,LatinAmericanParties
47
Figure6:PartyRewardsandSeatShare-BrazilianChamberofDeputies-1995
to2015
48
AnnexI
PMDBIndexvalues
country-
D1
D2
D3
D4
D5
D6
D7
D8
Bra-PMDB
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Chi-PDC
0.94
0.99
0.50
0.69
1.00
0.63
0.80
0.94
Mex-PRI
1.00
0.98
0.22
0.57
1.00
0.57
0.80
0.97
Chi-PD
0.93
0.81
0.58
0.70
0.85
0.56
0.67
0.96
Arg-PJ
0.77
0.97
0.20
0.65
0.98
0.73
0.67
0.91
Arg-UCR
0.40
0.97
0.50
0.92
1.00
0.69
0.46
0.91
Chi-PS
0.93
0.78
0.40
0.84
0.80
0.51
0.66
0.93
Mex-PAN
0.86
0.72
0.39
0.84
0.80
0.63
0.70
0.73
Chi-RN
0.43
0.81
0.54
0.93
0.80
0.56
0.59
0.99
Arg-FPV
0.86
0.85
0.21
0.46
0.89
0.46
0.77
0.94
Uru-FA
0.53
0.80
0.07
0.78
0.89
0.52
0.86
0.93
Uru-PN
0.64
0.79
0.34
0.88
0.85
0.56
0.45
0.82
Uru-PC
0.69
0.76
0.47
0.88
0.81
0.61
0.39
0.62
Chi-UDI
0.43
0.68
0.52
0.94
0.68
0.40
0.59
1.00
Ven-AD
0.34
0.95
0.60
0.65
0.96
0.56
0.24
0.90
Ven-COPEI
0.25
0.91
0.60
0.65
1.00
0.78
0.24
0.66
Ven-PSUV
0.91
0.63
0.00
0.39
0.68
0.42
0.80
0.98
Mex-PRD
0.37
0.75
0.44
0.82
0.80
0.77
0.35
0.50
Ven-UNT
0.21
0.91
0.57
0.65
0.92
0.54
0.24
0.36
party
49