JOINT SERVICES
COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
DEFENCE RESEARCH
PAPER
By
Wg Cdr S AUSTIN RAF
ADVANCED COMMAND AND
STAFF COURSE
NUMBER 15
SEPT 11 - JUL 12
[Intentionally Blank]
Defence Research Paper
Submission Cover Sheet
Student Name:
Wg Cdr Stephen J Austin RAF
Student PIC Number:
11-3266
DRP Title:
Following the cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4
and the resultant capability gaps in the ability to
undertake the military tasks envisaged in the
Strategic Defence and Security Review, to what
extent should the regeneration of a wide-area
maritime patrol capability be a priority for UK
Defence and National Security?
Syndicate:
B5
Syndicate DS:
Lt Col D Hardy RM
DSD DRP Supervisor:
Dr Christina Goulter
Essay submitted towards psc(j) and KCL MA
MOD Sponsored Topic:
NO
Word Count:
14,998 (excluding Abstract, Glossary and Annexes)
I confirm that this Essay is all my own work, is properly referenced and in accordance
with Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) T10.
Signature:
Date: 30 May 2012
[Intentionally Blank]
UK Student Disclaimer
“The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent those of the UK Ministry of Defence, or any other department of Her Britannic
Majesty’s Government of the United Kingdom. Further, such views should not be
considered as constituting an official endorsement of factual accuracy, opinion, conclusion
or recommendation of the UK Ministry of Defence, or any other department of Her Britannic
Majesty’s Government of the United Kingdom”.
“© Crown Copyright 2012”
[Intentionally Blank]
To what extent should the regeneration of a wide-area
maritime patrol capability be a priority for UK Defence
and National Security?
Wing Commander Stephen J Austin Royal Air Force
ADVANCED COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE
NUMBER 15
(Word Count: 14,998 words)
i
[Intentionally Blank]
ii
Abstract
The cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) was one of the most
controversial decisions of the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, and has consequently
led to widespread criticism regarding the resultant capability gaps in the UK’s ability to ensure
maritime security for the UK national interest. The Government maintains that the use of other
assets is being maximised to cover the gaps, and that the risk is therefore ‘tolerable.’ This paper
examines those capability gaps by assessing the importance of the maritime environment to the
UK, the threats that the maritime environment presents, and the ability of the UK to mitigate those
threats with current assets. By reviewing existing documentation and critically analysing evidence
presented to the House of Commons Defence Committee, this paper will conclude that the
Government’s position is flawed; the UK national interest is vulnerable to maritime threats, both
within UK waters and in areas of interest overseas, and the regeneration of a wide-area maritime
patrol capability should be a high priority for UK Defence. This paper also examines the potential
options for filling this gap, and concludes that for the foreseeable future, the only capability which
can fill the current gap is a manned MPA.
iii
[Intentionally Blank]
iv
Glossary and Abbreviations
MCT
Merlin
MOD
MPA
MQ-9
MR2
MRA4
A
AEW&C
Airseeker
AIS
Akula
ASTOR
Astute
ASuW
ASW
Airborne Early Warning and Control
UK designation for RC-135 Rivet Joint
Automatic Identification System
Class of Russian SSN
Airborne Stand-off Radar (UK)
Class of UK SSN
Anti-Surface Unit Warfare
Anti-Submarine Warfare
N
B
BAMS
BBC
MV
NATO
Nimrod
nm
nm²
NMIC
NSS
Broad-Area Maritime Surveillance (US)
British Broadcasting Corporation
C
C-130J
C-17
CASD
CBRN
CDS
Chinook
CTF
Tactical transport aircraft (UK)
Strategic transport aircraft
Continuous At-Sea Deterrent
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
Chief of the Defence Staff (UK)
UK Heavy-lift Support Helicopter
Combined Task Force
P
P-3 Orion
P-8 Posiedon
PJHQ
R1
Doctrine and Concepts Development Centre
E
E-3D
EEZ
EIA
ELINT
EO/IR
ESM
EU
EUNAVFOR
RADAR
UK AEW&C aircraft
Exclusive Economic Zone
Energy Information Administration
Electronic Intelligence
Electro-Optical / Infra-Red
Electronic Support measures
European Union
European Naval Force
RAF
RC-135
Reaper
RFA
Rivet Joint
RN
RNZAF
Ro-Ro
RPV
RUSI
F
F-35C / F35B
FRE / FRES
ft
Carrier / STOVL variants of JSF
Fleet Ready Escort / Ship
feet
SAR
SBS
SDSR
SEAD
Sentinel
Gross Domestic Product
Class of Argentine SSK
H
HALE
Harrier
HAV
HC-130J
HCDC
HCESC
Hercules
HMS
hr(s)
High-Altitude, Long-Endurance (RPV)
UK STOVL Carrier-Borne Fighter Aircraft
Hybrid Air Vehicle (airship)
US Coastguard version of C-130J Hercules
House of Common Defence Committee
House of Commons European Security
Committee
See C-130J
Her Majesty’s Ship
hour(s)
Sentry
SIGINT
SLOC(s)
SRR
SSBN
SSK
SSN
I
IMB
IRA
ISR
ISTAR
International Maritime Bureau
Irish Republican Army
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition
and Reconnaissance
Joint Doctrine Publication
Joint Personnel Recovery
Joint Strike Fighter (F-35)
STOVL
Trident
TSO
Type-206A
Type-209
Type-23
UAV / UAS
UK
kilometres
square kilometres
knot(s) – nm/hr
L
LNG
m
MAD
MCA
UKBA
US
USS
Liquefied Natural Gas
V
metre(s)
Magnetic Anomaly Detection
Maritime and Coastguard Agency
W
M
Search and Rescue
Special Boat Service
Strategic Defence and Security Review
Suppression of Enemy Air Defence
UK ground surveillance aircraft – airborne
element of ASTOR
See E-3D
Signals Intelligence
Sea Line(s) of Communication
Search and Rescue Region
Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
(NATO Designator)
Diesel-electric-powered hunter-killer
submarine (NATO Designator)
Nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine
(NATO Designator)
Short Take-off & Vertical Landing
UK Nuclear Ballistic Missile (carried by SSBN)
The Stationary Office
German-built SSK
German-built SSK
UK ASW Frigate
U
K
km
km²
kt
Reconnaissance Mark 1
(Nimrod – SIGINT/ELINT variant)
Radio Detection and Ranging
(note: ‘radar’ is used throughout)
Royal Air Force
US SIGINT/ELINT aircraft
See MQ-9
Royal Fleet Auxiliary
See RC-135
Royal Navy
Royal New Zealand Air Force
Roll-on, Roll-off (Ferry)
Remotely Piloted Vehicle (aka UAV/UAS)
Royal United Services Institute
T
J
JDP
JPR
JSF
US-Built MPA
US MPA (replacing P-3)
Permanent Joint Head-Quarters (UK)
S
G
GDP
Guppy
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
UK MPA
nautical mile(s)
square nautical miles
National Maritime Information Centre
National Security Strategy
R
D
DCDC
Maritime Counter-Terrorism
Type of ASW Helicopter (UK)
Ministry of Defence
Maritime Patrol Aircraft
Armed ISTAR-capable RPV
Maritime Reconnaissance Mark 2 (Nimrod)
Maritime Reconnaissance and Attack Mark 4
(Nimrod)
Merchant Vessel
Vanguard
WWII
v
Unmanned Air Vehicles / Systems
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
UK Border Agency
United States
United States Ship
UK Class of SSBN
World War II
[Intentionally Blank]
vi
Introduction
On 19 October 2010 the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron, delivered his
statement to the House of Commons on the Strategic Defence and Security review (SDSR), during
which he stated:
‘Getting to grips with procurement is vital. Take the Nimrod [MRA4] programme for
example. It has cost the British taxpayer over £3bn. The number of aircraft to be
procured has fallen from 21 to 9. The cost per aircraft has increased by over 200 per
cent and it’s over 8 years late. Today we are cancelling it.’1
The Government’s decision not to bring the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft2 (MPA) into
service has subsequently proved to be one of the more controversial decisions of the SDSR,
resulting in widespread criticism from current and former senior military figures3, respected
independent military commentators4 and members of parliament5. At the heart of this criticism is
concern over the risks that the loss of capability presents to the UK’s security and national interest.
Indeed, in their review of the SDSR and the National Security Strategy (NSS), the House of
Commons Defence Committee (HCDC) concluded:
‘We deeply regret the decision to dispense with the Nimrod MRA4 and have serious
concerns regarding the capability gaps this has created....This appears to be a clear
example of the need to make large savings overriding the strategic security of the UK
and the capability requirements of the Armed Forces.’ 6
Consequently, in February 2012, the HCDC launched a ‘major new inquiry into the contribution of
the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and UK Armed Forces to the UK’s future requirements for maritime
surveillance.’7
The fact that the MRA4 programme had been subject to significant delays and cost overruns is not
in dispute, nor is the fact that the Nimrod ‘brand’ had been tainted since the tragic loss of a Nimrod
1
Prime Minister’s statement to the House of Commons on the SDSR, 19 October 2010.
2
Versions of the Nimrod have fulfilled the UKs MPA requirement since the early-1970s. The Nimrod MR2 was withdrawn from service
in March 2010; its replacement, the MRA4, was due to enter service in April 2011.
3
For example: “Scrapping RAF Nimrods 'perverse' say military chiefs,” BBC News: 21 December 2001,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-12294766 (accessed 27 February 2011).
4
For example: “Mind the Gap: Strategic Risk in the UK’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Capability,” RUSI,
http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4D4C20CB26473/ (accessed 27 February 2012).
5
Hansard, “Commons Debate: 26 January 2012,” House of Commons,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120126/debtext/120126-0002.htm#12012667001285 (accessed 13
March 2012).
6
UK. HCDC. The SDSR and the NSS: Sixth Report of Session 2010–12. HC761. (London: TSO, 2011), para137.
7
HCDC, “New inquiry: Future Maritime Surveillance,” http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commonsselect/defence-committee/news/new-inquiry-future-maritime-surveillance/ (accessed 9 February 2012).
1
MR2 over Afghanistan in September 2006 and the findings of the subsequent ‘Nimrod Review.’8
However, the first MRA4 aircraft had been delivered to the RAF in order to commence crew
training9 and, as such, the UK was on the verge of regaining this strategically-important capability
which had been gapped ‘at risk’ since the early withdrawal of the MR2 in March 2010. There was
no suggestion within the NSS or the SDSR that the capability itself was no longer required, only
that the MRA4 would not be brought into service. Furthermore, whilst the facts stated by the Prime
Minister clearly illustrate the failings of defence procurement within the UK, they alone did not
justify cancellation of this programme; after all, none of the costs incurred were recovered and,
despite the significant investment, no capability was achieved. So why was the decision taken to
cancel the programme?
Like many of the SDSR decisions, the reason for cancelling the MRA4 was purely financial described by the Government as ‘an unwelcome consequence of the Nation’s financial position’10 and was taken in order to save an estimated £200 million per year in support costs.11 However,
unlike any other decision taken as a result of the SDSR, the decision to cancel the MRA4 resulted
in the loss of true capabilities required for UK defence and national security, namely long-range
wide-area maritime patrol. Other decisions taken through the SDSR were difficult and will have
direct implications on how the UK conducts future operations. For example, the decision to retire
the Harrier Force early has resulted in the loss of a carrier strike option, which may impact the
viability of potential courses-of-action for future contingency operations. However, this decision is
mitigated by two factors: first, the UK retains a combat aircraft capability which can conduct the full
range of associated air power roles; and second, the decision to retire the Harrier was taken in the
full knowledge of an agreed and funded programme for its replacement. Neither statement can be
made with respect to wide-area maritime patrol.
Therefore, this paper will examine the capability gaps that have resulted from the cancellation of
the MRA4, and will determine to what extent the regeneration of a wide-area maritime patrol
capability should be a priority for UK defence and national security. This will be achieved through
five sections.
The first two sections will focus on the importance of maritime security to the UK national interest
and the achievement of the NSS core objectives, followed by an analysis of the maritime-related
threats which the UK must be able to mitigate or defeat. Section three will provide the reader with
an understanding of the typical roles of a modern MPA, and the bespoke sensors which are
8
XV230 crashed with the loss of all 14 crew after escaping fuel led to an explosion. The subsequent ‘Nimrod Review’ by Charles
Haddon-Cave QC was highly critical of the MOD and the Nimrod Safety Case.
9
It should be noted that additional costs would still have been incurred to bring the aircraft up to its initial operating capability.
10
UK. HCDC. The SDSR and the NSS: Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report of Session 2010–12: Ninth Special
Report of Session 2010–12. HC1639. (London: TSO, 2011), para 28.
11
HCDC. The SDSR and the NSS, para127.
2
required to achieve them. The fourth section will argue that the tasks required for maritime security
previously undertaken by the Nimrod are not actually being fulfilled by other assets or allies, and
that the risk to the UK national interest is ‘intolerable’. The final section will conclude that the
regeneration of a wide-area maritime patrol capability should be a high-priority for the UK, and that
the only asset which can fill the current gap for the foreseeable future is a manned MPA.
The research for this paper included a review of relevant documentation, critical and informed
analysis of current commentaries, and semi-structured interviews. Unfortunately, much of the
official discussion surrounding the current capability gaps and their implications for the security of
the UK remains classified and cannot be included. However, where such views have been
expressed in public or presented to the HCDC, they have been included to provide rigour to the
arguments presented. In order to be of utility, this paper also aims to cut through some of the
agendas which are apparent, both in terms of defending the SDSR decisions and the potential way
forward.
For the purposes of this paper, maritime surveillance is concerned with the detection of contacts in
the area of interest, whereas maritime ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance)
includes the identification and interrogation of those contacts to determine whether they represent
a potential threat. Maritime patrol, however conducted, achieves maritime ISR and, in many
cases, provides the initial capability to prosecute identified threats.
Whilst much of the public discussion surrounding the withdrawal of the MRA4 has focused on the
loss of long-range Search and Rescue (SAR) capability, and the ‘overland role’ which the MR2
successfully conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan, these roles are not considered significant in the
argument for the regeneration of a wide-area maritime patrol capability to provide maritime
security.
3
Section 1: The Importance of Maritime Security to the UK National Interest
This first section will consider the ongoing importance of maritime security for the protection of the
UK national interest, as detailed in the NSS. This will be achieved by examining the extent to
which the UK is still dependent on a secure maritime environment and sea lines of communication
(SLOCs) for economic trade and the projection of power through expeditionary operations.
The United Kingdom National Interest
‘In a world of startling change, the first duty of the Government remains the security of
our country.’ 12
The Government defines the UK national interest as comprising the security, prosperity and
freedom of the state, and recognises that these elements are interconnected and mutually
supportive.13 In order to protect this national interest, the NSS sets out two core objectives: first, to
ensure a secure and resilient UK by ‘protecting our people, economy, infrastructure, territory and
way of life from all major risks that can affect us directly’; and second, to shape a stable world by
conducting ‘actions beyond our borders to reduce the likelihood of specific risks affecting the UK or
our direct interests overseas’.14 The Government also has a responsibility to extend this security to
the 5.5 million Britons who now live overseas, and to provide assistance in times of individual or
host-nation crisis.15 At the larger-end of the scale this can involve non-discretionary operations to
evacuate British nationals, as occurred in Lebanon (2006) and Libya (2011). Furthermore, in
addition to the home nations, the UK’s responsibility also includes 14 overseas territories, 12 of
which are islands, such that the UK and its dependencies have a combined maritime Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) of over 2.5-million square-miles, the fifth-largest in the world.16
Most nations are dependent on the freedom of the seas to preserve their national interest, but
none more so than an island nation such as the UK.17 Therefore, maritime security and the
protection of sea routes are vital if the UK is to achieve the NSS core objectives identified above.
For example, to achieve a ‘secure and resilient UK’ not only requires forces capable of defending
the UK from conventional military attack, but also requires the preservation of economic trade, the
prevention of illegal weapons and drugs trafficking, the prevention of illegal immigration, and the
12
UK. Cabinet Office. A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy. (London: TSO, 2010), 3.
13
ibid., 22.
14
ibid., 10-11.
15
ibid., 21.
16
UK. DCDC. British Maritime Doctrine. JDP 0-10. (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2011), 1-3.
17
Christina Goulter, “The Ebb and Flow of Maritime Aviation,” in British Air Power, ed. Peter Gray (London: TSO, 2003), 90.
4
prevention of terrorist activity.18 Similarly, the ability to conduct ‘actions beyond our borders’, such
as the projection of power by sea and the undertaking of expeditionary operations, requires the
protection of deployed maritime assets and their SLOCs. The NSS identifies a number of threats
to the UK national interest, including malicious attack by both states and non-state actors such as
terrorists and organised criminals, and details fifteen generic priority risks.19 The mitigation of nine
of these risks will depend, inter-alia, on maritime security within UK waters or control of the sea for
the protection of UK trade routes and deployed UK forces:
-
International terrorism affecting the UK or its interests;
-
An international military crisis between states which draws in the UK and its allies;
-
An attack on the UK or its overseas territories by another state or proxy using chemical,
biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons;
-
A large scale conventional attack on the UK by another state;
-
A significant increase in the level of terrorists, organised criminals, illegal immigrants and
illicit goods trying to cross the UK border to enter the UK;
-
A disruption to oil or gas supplies to the UK, specifically as a result of regional conflict, but
also, through implication, by malicious acts by state or non-state actors;
-
A conventional attack by a state on another NATO or EU member to which the UK would
have to respond;
-
An attack on a UK overseas territory;
-
The short to medium term disruption to international supplies of resources essential to the
UK.
Whilst current doctrine and policy identifies the need for maritime security, successive defence
reviews since the end of the cold war have repeatedly reduced the ‘means’ with which to achieve
it. This is compounded by the tendency to compartmentalise capabilities based on the Service
which operates them, rather than taking a holistic view of the capabilities required to achieve the
task. As such, simultaneous but uncoordinated reductions have been made in the capabilities of
both the Royal Navy (RN) and the RAF, which have reduced the UK’s ability to enforce maritime
security to a far greater extent than the sum of the individual reductions. For example, in 1990 the
RN had a fleet which included 25 attack/patrol submarines and more than 50 destroyers and
18
ibid.
19
UK, NSS, 25-27
5
frigates. However, despite the significant number of tasks detailed within the SDSR which the RN
will still be required to achieve, these figures have been successively reduced to just 7 and 19
respectively (see Figure A-1).20 Whilst such reductions might have been mitigated to some degree
by the ‘force multiplying’ capabilities provided by a wide-area maritime patrol capability, the RAF’s
Nimrod fleet, which numbered 32 in 1990, was also reduced in size and now, as a result of the
SDSR, has been removed completely (see Figure A-2). Somewhat ironically, the mitigation
provided in the SDSR for withdrawal of the MRA4 is to ‘depend on other maritime assets to
contribute to the tasks previously planned for [the MRA4]’.21 It is significant that this mitigation
recognises that other maritime assets will only be able to contribute to the tasks planned for the
MRA4, rather than undertake them completely. In order to fully understand the implications of
these decisions, it is first necessary to examine why the maritime environment is so important to
the UK.
Maritime Security and the UK Economy
In today’s globalised and interconnected world it is perhaps all too easy to forget that the UK is an
island nation, dependent on the free movement of maritime traffic and highly reliant on the wider
security of the globalised world and its trading routes22. As such, the security of the UK and its
national interest are inextricably linked to the sea. However, as one former First Sea Lord
concluded: ‘...the nation as a whole has forgotten its maritime tradition and nature of existence’.23
The oceans cover approximately 70% of the earth’s surface, are all connected to each other, and
provide access to most parts of the globe both for legitimate purposes and those of our potential
enemies.24 Over 150 nations are coastal states sharing a total coastline of 356,000km25, and many
of these nations have established EEZs which extend their economic jurisdiction out to sea by
200nm. With nearly 80% of the world’s population living within 100nm of the coastline, this means
that most human maritime enterprise and a significant proportion of the world’s economic and
political activity is conducted within a narrow strip of sea and land no wider than 300nm, referred to
as the littoral environment.26
Maritime trade has been at the forefront of global development and, due to the growing efficiency
of shipping as a mode of transport, it will remain the principle means by which materials are
20
UK, MOD, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, London: TSO, 2010. 21.
21
ibid., 27.
22
DCDC, British Maritime Doctrine, 1-2.
23
Admiral Sir Jonathon Band – speech to ACSC15, 24 October 2011.
24
Jonathan Band, “Maritime security and the terrorist threat,” The RUSI Journal 147, no. 6 (2002): 26.
25
CIA FactBook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2060.html (accessed 5 March 2012).
26
DCDC, British Maritime Doctrine, 1-6.
6
transported between states.27 Around 90% of world trade is carried by the international shipping
industry, without which it would not be possible to conduct the import and export of goods on the
scale necessary to support today’s globalised world.28 However, as much as 75% of global sea
trade passes through ten recognised strategically-important maritime chokepoints which are,
therefore, vital to the global economy.29 Most significantly, over half of the world’s oil consumption
of 88-million barrels-per-day is transported by sea through six of these chokepoints, and 35% of
this has to pass through the world’s most important oil chokepoint – the Strait of Hormuz.30 The
international energy market is therefore totally dependent upon these trade routes, as the blockage
of a chokepoint, even temporarily, can lead to substantial increases in energy costs and shortage
of supply. In addition, chokepoints leave oil tankers vulnerable to deliberate terrorist attack, piracy,
and political unrest resulting in conflict or hostilities.
Continued access to the ‘global commons’ and global markets will be a requirement for virtually all
states, and the security of global supply chains, including sea trade routes, will be a priority for the
international community.31 Whilst some would argue that the UK is no longer a great power, it
continues to act as one through its policy of intervention and its aspiration to shape a stable
world.32 Furthermore, as the world’s sixth largest economy33 and a permanent member of the UN
Security Council, the UK remains a global player with responsibilities to support the international
system, including the maintenance of good order at sea.34 However, it is more than just the
potential impact on the global economy which defines Britain’s interest in a secure global maritime
environment.
As an island nation, the UK is more dependent on imports by sea than any other European
nation.35 For over a century the UK has relied on food imports to meet the needs of its population
and currently imports 40% of all its food requirements, the majority of which is transported by sea.36
27
ibid., 1-8.
28
Round Table of International Shipping Associates, “Shipping and World Trade,” Maritime International Secretariat,
http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts//worldtrade/index.php (accessed 4 March 2012).
29
Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Bab el-Mandab, Bosporus Straits, Strait of Gibraltar, English Channel, Cape Horn, Cape of Good
Hope and the Suez and Panama Canals.
30
US EIA, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” US Department of Energy, http://www.eia.gov/cabs/world_oil_transit_chokepoints/full.html
(accessed 8 March 2012).
31
UK. DCDC. Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040. (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2010), 40.
32
Lee Willett, “British Defence and Security Policy: The Maritime Contribution,” RUSI, 2.
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/BDSP_MaritimeContribution.pdf (accessed 29 February 2012).
33
2010 GDP figures published by the World Bank:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf (accessed 29 Fabruary 2012).
34
Willett, “The Maritime Contribution,” 2.
35
British Shipping, “Protecting UK trade and the UK way of life,” British Chamber of Shipping, http://www.britishshipping.org/uploaded_files/Trade%20security%20leaflet%20CoS.pdf (accessed 7 December 2011).
36
The UK is 60% self-sufficient in all foods and 74% self-sufficient in foods that can be produced in the UK.
Figures from: “Rethinking Britain’s Food Security,” City University London,
http://www.soilassociation.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=wCYoHYSHsy8%3D&tabid=387 (accessed 3 March 2012).
7
In 2004, the UK became a net importer of energy, and by 2011 was required to import over 42% of
its primary energy requirements.37 With respect to crude oil, official figures for 2011 show a record
increase in crude oil import to 39% of the UK’s net requirement.38 Meanwhile, twice a week, two
huge tankers make the 7,000nm journey from the Middle East to the UK, through five of the ten
recognised maritime chokepoints, to deliver their cargo of 200,000 cubic metres of liquefied natural
(LNG).39 Not only are these supplies vital to the UK, but the amount of LNG that the UK imports by
sea is increasing rapidly, and is expected to reach 35% of the UK’s total energy requirements by
2030.40 Furthermore, according to the British Chamber of Shipping, 92% of the UK’s international
trade and 24% of its domestic trade is moved by sea.
To service these requirements, the UK is utterly dependent on the major sea-trade routes which
cross the Atlantic to the Americas, route through the Suez Canal or round the Cape of Good Hope
to the Middle and Far East, and cross the English Channel or North Sea to the rest of Europe.41
Therefore, the preservation of the UK’s economy and way of life are highly-dependent on the
security of these maritime trade routes, and those which sustain the wider global economy.
Indeed, in the current climate of world recession and financial instability, the need to maintain the
freedom of maritime manoeuvre may never have been stronger.42
Sea Control: Military Capability and Force Projection
The Government’s responsibility for the security of the country is predicated on its ability to
maintain control, exercise jurisdiction and uphold recognised international law throughout its
territory, including territorial waters.43 As an island nation, the maritime environment presents
numerous opportunities for hostile or criminal activity to threaten the UK national interest and, as
such, the security of UK waters is vital. Therefore, government agencies, including the police,
intelligence services, UK Border Agency (UKBA) and the MOD, must maintain the capability to
exploit the maritime domain in order to identify, deter and, if required, defeat such threats. For the
military, the conventional forces which operate within the maritime environment are required to
37
DECC, “Energy trends: Section 1: Total Energy,” DECC, http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/stats/publications/energytrends/3939-energy-trends-section-1-total-energy.pdf (accessed 4 March 2012).
38
DECC, “Energy trends: Section 3: Oil and Oil Products,” DECC, http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/stats/publications/energytrends/3943-energy-trends-section-3-oil.pdf (accessed 4 March 2012).
39
RN, “Keeping the Sea Lanes Open,” http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/Operations/Maritime-Security/Keeping-the-Sea-Lanes-Open
(accessed 8 March 2012).
40
British Shipping, “Protecting UK trade.”
41
ibid.
42
Peter Greenwood, “Maritime Security – The Underwater Threat,” The Naval Review 97, no. 2 (2009): 119.
43
A Hogben, “Future Maritime Homeland Security of the United Kingdom” (Defence Research Paper, JSCSC, 2010) 4.
8
safeguard the UK’s shores against all threats on or below the surface, and constitute the first line
of defence of the nation’s shoreline.44
In order to achieve the core objectives of the NSS, the UK will also be required to undertake
operations at great distances from the UK mainland. These operations may be non-discretionary,
such as the defence of an overseas territory or the evacuation of UK entitled personnel, or socalled ‘wars of choice’ involving intervention and/or stabilisation to prevent distant conflicts
adversely affecting the UK national interest. Examples of such operations include the Falklands
Conflict (1982), the Gulf War (1991), Kosovo (1999), Sierra Leone (2000), Afghanistan (2001
onwards), Iraq (2003-11) and Libya (2011). Most future contingent operations will involve some
degree of maritime force projection - the deployment of naval combat vessels in order to influence
events from the sea through the threat, or use, of force. A deployed task force may be used to
gather intelligence, establish local sea control, enforce a naval blockade, or project force ashore
using a combination of amphibious forces, embarked aircraft, land-attack weapons and special
forces.45 Even in situations where naval combat power is not utilised directly, sealift will often be
the only practicable method of sustaining the deployed force. For example, over 85% of the
materiel required to support the enduring operation in Afghanistan, a land-locked country, is moved
into theatre by sea.46 Therefore, whist the ability to project military capabilities overseas remains a
vital insurance policy for the country, in most situations it is the use of the maritime environment
which underwrites this policy.
Finally, the UK maintains an independent nuclear capability to deter nuclear-weapon states and
state-sponsors of nuclear terrorism from threatening the UK national interest or deterring the UK
from undertaking operations to maintain regional security.47 Since 1998 the UK’s nuclear deterrent
has been based entirely on the Vanguard-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) and
their Trident payload. Furthermore, the current Government has committed to maintain a
continuous submarine-based deterrent and proceed with the renewal of both the Trident system
and the submarine replacement programme.48 Therefore, the UK’s strategic deterrent will, for the
foreseeable future, depend on the maritime environment.
44
RN, “Maritime Security,” RN, http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/Operations/Maritime-Security (accessed 8 March 2012).
45
UK, British Maritime Doctrine, 2-14.
46
ibid., 2-2.
47
ibid., 2-23.
48
UK, SDSR, 38.
9
Section 2: Maritime Threats to the UK National Interest
Having identified the vital importance of maritime security to the UK national interest, this section
will now consider the maritime-related threats which the UK must be able to mitigate or defeat,
including hostile naval forces, terrorism, piracy and criminal activity.
Terrorism
The number of terrorist attacks at sea has, to date, been small compared with those on land or in
the air. However, the list of uncovered, unsuccessful and successful maritime-related terrorist
attacks over the last decade is significant, and it would be foolish to overlook the continued threat
of such activity. The successful capture of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the head of al-Qaeda maritime
operations and the alleged mastermind behind the attacks on the USS Cole49 and the MV
Limburgh49, has led to a greater understanding of this threat and shown that the terrorist network
understands the vital role of sea transport.50 Limited only by their imagination, the terrorist aims to
stay one step ahead of the security forces, such that the more secure our airports become, the
more likely it is that the terrorist will turn to the maritime environment both for potential targets and
as a means to cross our borders. Furthermore, al-Qaeda has a long-held desire to maximise the
impact of its attacks through the use of CBRN weapons51, and it is widely acknowledged that the
maritime environment presents the best opportunities for the transport of such a device.52
Failure to control the maritime environment will result in unregulated space which can be exploited
for terrorist activity. For example, in 2002, authorities at the Italian port of Gioila Touro discovered
a well-equipped al-Qaeda operative ‘travelling’ inside a container which had been furnished as a
make-shift home,53 whilst in 2004, two Palestinian suicide bombers concealed inside a container
caused an explosion at the Israeli port of Ashdod, near Tel Aviv, which killed 10 workers and injured
18.54 However, perhaps the gravest example of the consequences of a lack of governance and
regulation at sea occurred in November 2008, when Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists carried out 11
coordinated attacks across the Indian city of Mumbai, killing 164 people and injuring 308.
According to the official investigation, the terrorists boarded a merchant vessel in Karachi and
travelled to the edge of Indian territorial waters, whereupon they hijacked an India fishing vessel
49
For details see: Martin Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism (Abbingdon: Routledge, 2007), 46.
50
Michael Richardson, “Maritime-Related Terrorism,” Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/PDF/maritime-related_terrorism.pdf (accessed 8 March 2012).
51
UK, NSS, 28.
52
Band, “Maritime security,” 28.
53
Richardson, “Maritime-Related Terrorism.”
54
ibid.
10
which they used as a ‘mothership’ to approach the coast. Once within range, they abandoned the
fishing vessel and came ashore using small rubber dinghies.55
With respect to the UK mainland, the threat of maritime terrorism presents numerous challenges
due to the sheer number of potential targets and the porous nature of the maritime flank. The
coastline is over 11,000 miles long with a significant number of ports, harbours and river systems,
whilst the EEZ covers nearly 300,000 square-miles of ocean and includes all of the UK’s oil and
gas energy resources (See Figure B-1). Through this passes a significant number of merchant
vessels, passenger ferries, cruise ships, and pleasure craft, carrying huge quantities of freight and
passengers. As such, the UK is no stranger to the threat which maritime-related terrorism can
pose. During the 1980s, it is estimated that 120 tons of arms and explosives were supplied to the
IRA by sea from Libya in one year alone. 56 In August 2002, a full scale alert was triggered at
Felixstowe when it was feared that a cargo containing high explosives and radioactive material, a
so called ‘dirty bomb’, was being imported.57 Similarly, On 21 December 2001, the 500ft cargo
vessel MV Nisha was intercepted off the Sussex Coast in a joint police, MOD and customs
operation. The ship, which was suspected of carrying ‘terrorist material’ linked to al-Qaeda, was
heading for the Tate & Lyle sugar refinery near to the Thames Barrier, and there were concerns of
a significant and imminent attack on London.58 The MOD contribution included the Frigate HMS
Sutherland and an assault force of SBS personnel, delivered by rigid inflatable boats and RAF
Chinook helicopters.59 Additionally, a Nimrod MR2 was scrambled to locate and track the vessel
as it approached UK waters, whilst a second was used to support and coordinate the actual
assault in accordance with well-practices Maritime Counter-Terrorism (MCT) procedures.60
Following an extensive search of the vessel, it was concluded that the ship had not been carrying
any ‘terrorist material’; however, this was a clear demonstration of the capability required to ensure
protection from such a threat.
Piracy and Criminal Activity
The maritime environment has been exploited for criminal activity such as piracy and smuggling for
hundreds of years. However, the sharp increase in piracy since the late 1990s, particularly off the
coast of Somalia, fuelled by increased publicity in today’s interconnected world, has elevated the
issue to one which can impact the global economy and influence governments. According to the
55
Press Information Bureau, Government of India: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=45446 (accessed 29 February 2012).
56
Hogben, “Maritime Homeland Security,” 4.
57
Band, “Maritime security,” 28.
58
BBC, “Terror alert as police seize cargo ship,” BBC News: 21 December 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/21/newsid_2539000/2539557.stm (accessed 5 December 2011).
59
The Special Boat Service, “Incident On The High Seas: The MV Nisha,” The SBS,
http://www.specialboatservice.co.uk/raid-on-mv-nisha.php (Accessed 5 December 2011).
60
Mike Blackburn, “Air power in the Maritime Environment” (Defence Research Paper, JSCSC, 2009), 13.
11
International Maritime Bureau, there were 58 incidents during the first 4 months of 2012, resulting
in 12 hijackings and 188 hostages taken by Somali pirates.61 In 2011 alone, maritime piracy off the
coast of Somalia is estimated to have cost the global shipping industry $5.6bn, whilst high-profile
incidents such as the kidnapping of a British couple in 2010 bring the issue into the public’s living
rooms and onto the political agenda. Whilst there are a number of international anti-piracy forces
operating to reduce the threat, the area of operation has expanded significantly over the last few
years and still presents an enormous challenge (see Figure C-1).
For all the positive benefits that the maritime environment brings for global trade, the sheer volume
of materiel being moved by sea and the number of vessels transiting between countries presents
numerous opportunities for drugs smuggling. For example, the majority of the cocaine entering the
UK comes by sea from South America and the Caribbean, via Spain or West Africa (See Figure
C-2).62 The drugs are initially moved by small ‘go-fast’ speedboats or otherwise-inconspicuous
fishing vessels to rendezvous points in the Caribbean Sea, where they are transferred to larger
merchant vessels for transit across the Atlantic. Once the drugs arrive in Spain or West Africa,
they are normally split into smaller shipments for final delivery throughout Europe. Therefore, the
best opportunity to indentify and intercept the larger shipments is often in the Caribbean itself,
which requires maritime commitments by the international community. The NSS recognises the
risks that piracy and criminal activity such as drug smuggling present to the UK national interest.
Indeed, whilst speaking about decisions for the security of the country prior to the SDSR, David
Cameron stated: ‘...we've got to think about piracy in the Gulf, we've got to think about drug
running in the Caribbean’.63 Unfortunately, the subsequent capability decisions in the SDSR cut
the UK’s ability to contribute to these efforts.
Conventional Military Threats
As an island, the UK is particularly vulnerable to conventional military attack from the sea. Whilst
this might appear unlikely, it is a NSS priority risk which the UK must be capable of defending
against. Additionally, and perhaps more likely, conventional military forces might be used to
threaten UK trade routes, deployed forces and their SLOCs, or even negate the UK’s strategic
deterrent.
Whilst a naval blockade such as that experienced during WWII is unlikely, deliberate disruption of
the UK’s trade routes would still enable a state to exert significant pressure on the UK without
61
IMB, “Piracy News & Figures,” ICC, http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures (accessed 22 May 2012).
62
BBC, “Flow of Drugs to UK,” BBC In-Depth, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/drugs_uk/drugs_map/html/#
(accessed 15 April 2012).
63
David Cameron on the AM Show, 3 Oct 10: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/andrew_marr_show/9454665.stm (accessed 15
April 2012).
12
resorting to direct conventional attack against the UK itself. Furthermore, international tensions
and regional conflict can result in foreign states taking action to disrupt the trade routes on which
the globalised world depends. For example, in December 2011 Iran threatened to close the Strait
of Hormuz if further sanctions were imposed, and then held a naval exercise in the Strait the
following month as a ‘show of force’.64 Even if such a blockade could not be maintained, Iran
clearly has the capability, including fast-attack craft and diesel-electric submarines (SSKs), to
cause significant disruption to supplies in the short term, and long-term increases in global oil
prices 65
Conventional military forces can also threaten deployed UK naval forces, particularly when
operating in the littoral environment adjacent to hostile states. In addition to conventional air and
surface threats, the littoral environment is particularly suited to small, fast-attack craft and SSKs,
which can simply loiter in familiar home waters and wait for targets to approach.66 Furthermore,
such threats may not be limited to the belligerent states themselves as the mere presence of
western naval vessels, which are easily associated with their state of origin, presents targets of
opportunity for neighbouring state and non-state actors with grievances against the west.
Perhaps the greatest concern is the threat posed by conventional submarines, exacerbated by the
difficulty of conducting Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) operations in the littoral environment due to
the high ambient noise, complex underwater profiles, and complicated salinity and temperature
profiles. Over forty countries include submarines in their naval inventory, and over thirty of these
are non-Western countries who, between them, operate over 200 conventional submarines.67
Even if a country has only one submarine, this can be used as significant force multiplier in the
same way that special forces enhance a convention army.68 This effect was clearly demonstrated
by both sides during the Falklands Conflict. For the British, the sinking of the General Belgrano by
an otherwise undetected submarine compelled the entire Argentine surface fleet to retreat into port
and play no further part in the conflict. From the Argentine perspective, their two operational
diesel-electric submarines caused the British task force to remain on the defensive at all times.
During the battle to retake South Georgia, the threat posed by the Guppy-class SSK Santa-Fe
forced the RFA Tidespring carrying the main invasion force of Royal Marines to move 200nm from
the Island. Even after the Santa-Fe had been attacked and captured, the more capable Type-209
SSK San Luis remained on patrol around the Falklands and was one of the reasons which forced
64
The Guardian, “Iran threatens to block oil exports through Hormuz strait in sanctions row,” The Guardian: 27 December 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/27/iran-oil-exports-hormuz-sanctions (accessed 30 December 2012).
65
See: Caitlin Talmadge, “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,” International Security 33, no. 1 (2008).
66
Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd, 2004) 255-257.
67
2002 figures: Kenneth Weiss, “The Enemy Below - The Global Diffusion of Submarines and Related Technology,” Centre for Global
Security Research, https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/241497.pdf (accessed 10 April 2012).
68
Steven Harper, “Submarine Operations during the Falklands War,” (Research Paper, US Naval War College, 1994) 17.
13
the carrier battle-group to maintain a stand-off posture outside of the Falklands littoral environment.
It has since emerged that the San Luis was able to conduct three separate torpedo attacks against
British vessels; however, none was successful due to technological failures.69 Despite these
failures, this single submarine was responsible for tying up a significant proportion of the task force
on ASW operations including one ASW carrier, eleven destroyers, six submarines and over 25
helicopters.70
Whilst the loss of a carrier was avoided, the task force losses included six ships sunk and a further
13 damaged. Whilst these losses were the result of air attacks, but for technical problems with the
Argentine torpedoes the submarine threat would have accounted for at least two more ships.
Indeed, in many of the potential scenarios for future contingent operations, the threat posed by
diesel-electric submarines would be far higher than that posed by hostile air forces, and provides
states with political and military leverage. This is exacerbated by the potential deniability of
submarine operations, as occurred in March 2010, when the South Korean corvette Cheonan was
sunk by an underwater explosion with the loss of 46 crew. Whilst the official investigation
concluded that the ship was sunk by a torpedo fired from a North Korean submarine, this has
never been conclusively proven and North Korea still denies responsibility.71
Force protection for expeditionary operations must also be extended to the SLOCs required to
support the operation, particularly where these routes pass through vulnerable chokepoints or
close to hostile nations’ territorial waters. The extent to which the conduct of expeditionary
operations is dependent on sealift was clearly demonstrated during Operation GRANBY, the UK
contribution to the 1991 Gulf war. Whilst the majority of troops were deployed by air, sealift was
responsible for the movement of over 260,000 tons of general cargo, 102,000 tons of ammunition
and 16,900 vehicles. This was followed by a further 19,000 tons of cargo per week once the land
campaign commenced. Whilst airlift was far quicker, the total contribution was only 53,000 tons
over the whole period.72 Given this dependency on sealift, any disruption to the SLOCs could have
had severe consequences for the conduct of operations on the ground. During the Falklands
Conflict, the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor and her cargo, which included three heavy-lift Chinook
helicopters and a portable landing strip for the Harriers, significantly altered the tempo of the land
operation and narrowed an already small margin of success for the campaign. Similarly, the loss
of a Ro-Ro ferry or container ship supporting UK expeditionary operations is likely to have a
significant operational and political impact, both in terms of equipment lost and public support.
69
ibid., 10-11.
70
ibid., 18.
71
UPI, “Seoul still bristles over Cheonan sinking,” www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2012/03/27/Seoul-still-bristles-over-Cheonansinking/UPI-88371332844200/ (accessed 11 April 2012).
72
Till, Seapower, 253.
14
Finally, naval forces could pose a significant threat to the UK’s independent nuclear deterrent if the
location of the SSBN was compromised. In order to remain credible, the SSBN providing the
Continuous At-Sea Deterrent (CASD) must remain undetected throughout its patrol; therefore, if
potentially hostile force elements were able to establish themselves in the vicinity of the SSBN it
would no longer constitute a valid deterrent.73 Counter-detection by a hostile submarine presents
the greatest risk, particularly during the transit phase where it will try and establish itself in the trail
of the SSBN. Therefore, as part of the commitment to the deterrent, the UK must maintain ASW
forces which are capable of continuously tracking hostile submarines loitering in wait for the SSBN,
and deploying to ‘de-louse’ the SSBN at short notice. This was one of the primary roles for the
Nimrod MR2 until its withdrawal from service in March 2010. Unfortunately, the threat to the
deterrent remains and, given the determination of the Russian Government to restore their military
capabilities and the aspiration of emerging nations such as China to develop ‘blue water’ naval
capabilities, is likely to increase. Two ‘incidents’ in 2010 clearly illustrate the threat: in August, a
Russian Akula nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine (SSN) attempted to track one of the
Vanguard SSBNs and record its acoustic signature,74 whilst in October two US P-3 Orion MPA
were diverted from a NATO Exercise to hunt for another Akula operating somewhere in the North
Sea.75 Ironically, to the delight of potential adversaries, the decision to scrap the MRA4 has itself
increased the threat to the UK’s independent strategic deterrent.76
To summarise this section, it is clear that the maritime environment presents many threats to the
UK national interest, from both state and non-state actors. To mitigate these threats, the UK
requires the capabilities to maintain an accurate intelligence picture both above and below the
surface, and to respond to identified threats, both within UK waters and overseas areas of interest.
Before considering the gaps in these capabilities which have resulted from the withdrawal of the
MRA4, it is necessary to understand the capabilities which a modern MPA can provide.
73
Sqn Ldr Forbes: written evidence to HCDC ‘Future Maritime Surveillance,’
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/1918/fms05.htm (accessed 11 April 2012).
74
Thomas Harding, “Russian subs stalk Trident in echo of Cold War,” The Telegraph: 27 August 2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/7969017/Russian-subs-stalk-Trident-in-echo-of-Cold-War.html (accessed 27
February 2012).
75
Dr S Robertson: written evidence to HCDC ‘Future Maritime Surveillance,’
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/761/761vw15.htm (accessed 14 April 2012).
76
Con Coughlin, “Russia will be delighted by Nimrod decision,” The Telegraph: 27 January 2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8285013/Analysis-Russia-will-be-delighted-by-Nimrod-decision.html (accessed 11
March 2012).
15
Section 3: Roles and Capabilities of Modern Maritime Patrol Aircraft
Much of the public debate regarding the scrapping of the MRA4 has focused on the loss of SAR
capability; this is not surprising as the classified nature of the aircraft’s primary roles prevented
widespread disclosure within the RAF, let alone the general public. Therefore, the aim of this
section is to provide the reader with a generic understanding of the typical roles of a modern MPA
and the bespoke sensors which are required to achieve them.
ASW is a very specialised form of warfare requiring the ability to detect, localise, identify, track and,
if required, destroy hostile submarines. The effectiveness of a submarine depends on its ability to
remain hidden at all times whilst carrying out its mission. 77 However, the propulsion system, onboard machinery and movement of the submarine through the water all generate noise which can
be detected. Even a SSK, which is virtually silent when operating on batteries, needs to run its
diesel engine periodically to charge the batteries which not only creates noise, but requires a
‘snorkel’ to be raised above the surface to draw in oxygen for the engines; this, along with the
requirement to raise a periscope whenever the submarine wishes to observe its target, presents
radar detection opportunities. It is these weaknesses which a MPA and its sensors are designed to
exploit.
All MPA are fitted with a maritime surveillance radar with specific characteristics designed to
reduce background sea clutter and enhance radar returns from very small targets such as exposed
periscopes78. Additionally, because submarines periscopes and masts are temporary targets, ASW
radar displays are designed to enable a trained operator to instantly detect when a small target has
appeared or disappeared, such as a periscope being raised or lowered. However, to ensure that
the radar has the best chance of detection, the aircraft also has to be flown at a specific altitude
which is determined by the environmental factors such as sea state and swell. Due to the risk of
detection, a submarine will try and detect the radar emissions from the aircraft before raising a
periscope or mast for any length of time. As such, the presence of an MPA is often enough to keep
the submarine submerged and prevent it from carrying out its mission, even if the aircraft does not
actually detect the submarine.
Once submerged, a submarine is tracked using acoustics, either by listening to the sound
generated by the submarine itself (passive acoustics) or by sending out a pulse of sound and
detecting the reflected echo from the submarine (active acoustics). For a maritime patrol aircraft,
both techniques are achieved through the deployment of sonobuoys, which are dropped into the
ocean and transmit the acoustic data back to the aircraft for analysis (see Annex D). The ability to
77
Tony Blackman, Nimrod: Rise and Fall, (London: Grub Street Publishing, 2011) 30.
78
Global Security, “ASW Patrol Sensors,” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/asw3.htm (accessed
28 February 2012).
16
carry and deploy sufficient sonobuoys is therefore essential for an airborne ASW asset, whilst the
success of acoustics is dependent on the accuracy with which those sonobuoys can be deployed,
monitored and analysed. Acoustics can be augmented by the used of the MPA’s Magnetic
Anomaly Detection (MAD) sensor, which detects anomalies in the earth’s magnetic field caused by
the presence of large ferrous objects such as submarines. The principle of operation is similar to a
metal detector, and requires the aircraft to be flown in tight, accurate search patterns at low level,
with minimum changes in flight path or power once over the likely target area.
Anti-Surface Unit Warfare (ASuW) was traditionally concerned with hostile surface combatants;
however, in the contemporary environment it is generally considered to involve the detection,
identification, tracking and prosecution of all contacts on the sea surface. When used in the ASuW
role, the radar operates as per any surface search radar; however, unlike a ship-based or coastal
system, the aircraft can exploit its altitude to increase the radar horizon to ranges of 200nm or
greater. Furthermore, additional high resolution displays allow specific target data to be gathered,
such as its length and shape, which can be used to assist in the classification of the target. The
characteristics which make the radar so good in the ASW role also make it ideal for detecting very
small surface vessels, such as dhows and ‘go-fasts’ which are often used for illicit purposes such
drugs and people smuggling.
Most MPA are also equipped with Electronic Support Measures (ESM) equipment, which detects
and analyses the radar emissions from ships, Electro-Optical and/or Infra-red (EO/IR) sensors
which are used to collect imagery of targets, and multiple lookout position which are utilised for
both visual intelligence gathering and photography. Finally, if the MPA is to be used to prosecute
identified threats, it will be capable of carrying weapons, including torpedoes and depth-charges for
ASW and stand-off anti-ship missiles for ASuW.
This comprehensive suite of sensors and weapons, fitted to a high-speed, long-range, highendurance airframe, and operated by a competent maritime-focused crew, results in a capability
which is highly-flexible and truly multi-role. As Rear-Admiral Corder informed the HCDC:
‘The uniqueness of the MPA is in its accumulation of a number of attributes. It is about
persistence to a degree, by comparison with a helicopter for example, but it is also
about speed and altitude, and the capability that it can carry is significant. It is about
the intelligent use of that capability, because of the crew you have on board. That is
the totality of what an MPA brought to the equation.’79
As such, the RAF’s Nimrod fleet participated in every major UK conflict from the 1973 ‘Cod wars’
until their withdrawal from service in 2010. Following Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands
79
Rear-Admiral Corder, Comd (Ops) CINCFLEET: oral evidence to HCDC ‘Future Maritime Surveillance,’ 17 April 2012.
17
in 1982, the Nimrods were the first aircraft to be deployed, and flew 111 sorties during the nineweek conflict providing vital intelligence and situational awareness for the task force and
contributing to the deterrence of offensive action by the Argentine naval forces.80 During the 1991
Gulf War, Nimrods supported the UN blockade of Iraq and then conducted ASW/ASuW in support
of the US carrier groups in the Gulf. From 1992-2001 the focus shifted to the Adriatic and naval
blockades in support of operations in the Balkans. Finally, following the 9/11 attacks, the Nimrods
were continuously deployed in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq until their withdrawal.
Throughout this time, Nimrods continued to patrol UK waters and conduct ‘peacetime’ operations
such as the protection of the strategic deterrent, fisheries protection, MCT operations, international
diplomacy through the patrol of other nations’ EEZs, and counter-drugs operations, both within UK
waters and with the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force in the Caribbean.
Finally, the UK’s Search and Rescue Region is huge – covering 1.25 million nm² (see Figure B-3).
The Nimrod’s contribution to SAR throughout its service is well documented and has contributed to
saving many lives. Whilst this paper recognises that SAR is not a key argument for the MOD to
regenerate a MPA capability, the UK currently has no credible long-range SAR capability and can
therefore not fulfil its international obligations. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, it is
assumed that long-range SAR would be included in a cross-government requirement for maritime
patrol, and that the regeneration of a MPA capability would provide such a capability.
Section 4: What is the Capability Gap and to what Extent can it be mitigated?
There are two capabilities which are fundamental to maritime security. The first is the capability to
maintain maritime situational awareness, which the European Security Commission defines as ‘the
effective understanding of activity associated with the maritime domain that could impact the
security, safety, economy, or environment of the European Union and its Member States.’81 In
practice, this is the ability to identify the normal from the abnormal and locate, classify and track
vessels of interest both on and below the surface. The second is the capability to prosecute
identified threats in a timely manner and prevent them materialising. Not only are both of these
capabilities required, but the means by which they are achieved will determine the level of
deterrence which can be delivered.
Whilst these two fundamental capabilities are often provided by a mix of assets, the MRA4, like its
predecessor and most MPA, would have significantly contributed to both by providing wide-area
80
Blackman, Nimrod: Rise and Fall, 144-163.
81
House of Commons European Security Committee, “Towards the integration of Maritime Surveillance,”
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmeuleg/5-x/5x14.htm (accessed 13 May 2012).
18
ISR and the ability to quickly respond to identified threats, either to deter, defeat or shadow until
other assets could be deployed. Since the SDSR, the Government has acknowledged that ‘there
is currently no single asset or collection of assets that fully mitigate the resulting capability gap,’ but
insisted that the integrity of UK waters will be maintained by ‘maximising the use of other assets
such as Type-23 Frigates, Merlin Helicopters, Sentry and C-130 to contribute to ASW, SAR and
MCT where possible.’82
Other Maritime Assets
Whilst the use of other maritime assets to mitigate the loss of MPA capability might seem logical,
there are two issues which undermine this approach: first, the lack of wide-area surveillance
capability which they can provide; and second, their limited availability given the lack of assets and
ever-increasing tasking.
Surface ships provide the ultimate in persistent surveillance within their immediate vicinity and,
through replenishment at sea, have potentially unlimited range and endurance. However, the area
of sea which they can search at any given time is limited by the radar horizon of their surveillance
radar, which is determined by the height of the radar above the surface (See Figure E-1).
Furthermore, a ship’s slow speed restricts both its ability to respond to threats quickly, and the area
which can be searched in a given time. For example, in December 2011, HMS York was
‘scrambled’ to intercept the Russian flagship Admiral Kuznetzov and her carrier group as they
transited close to the UK en-route to the Mediterranean. However, whilst able to provide constant
monitoring once ‘on-scene’, it took three days to complete the 1000-mile journey from Portsmouth
and intercept the Russian fleet, by which time they had taken shelter from bad weather in the
Moray Firth.83 Only by exploiting the air domain is it possible to overcome these limitations through
assets which can be deployed quickly to emerging threats and provide a wide-area search
capability.
A simple comparison using the laws of physics shows that a frigate with a search radar mounted
30m above the surface will have a radar horizon of just 12nm; even at the ship’s maximum speed
of 28kt, the area of sea which can be searched is only 1,124 nm² per hour (see Annex E).
Conversely, an MPA flying at a modest 6,500ft has a radar horizon of 100nm, such that at a typical
cruise speed of 240kt the search area increases to 83,416 nm² per hour. Therefore, it would take
the frigate over three days at its maximum speed to search the same area that the MPA can cover
every hour. Whilst the employment of embarked helicopters can extend the radar coverage, the
82
HCDC, The SDSR and the NSS, para 28.
83
MOD, “HMS York monitors Russian aircraft carrier 'Admiral Kuznetsov',” MOD News: 15 Dec 2011,
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/HmsYorkMonitorsRussianAircraftCarrieradmiralKuznetso
v.htm (accessed 11 March 2012).
19
range and endurance of these helicopters is significantly limited compared to a typical land-based
MPA. For example, the RN’s Merlin helicopter is limited to 3-hours ‘on-task’ when operating within
a 50nm range of the ship, reducing to just 1½-hours at a range of 200nm.84 Furthermore, with
capacity for only one helicopter on most RN warships, it is impossible to provide continuous
coverage; even the ability to launch back-to-back sorties by conducting rotors-running-refuel
results in an ‘off-task’ period whilst the helicopter returns to the ship, refuels and transits back to
the on-task area. The MRA4, on the other hand, had an unrefueled endurance of over 14-hours
and a range of over 6,000nm; even at a range of 400nm, the aircraft would be able remain ‘on-task’
for up to 12-hours, such that two aircraft could provide 24-hour coverage over a vast area and
respond to identified threats. It is therefore not surprising that the HCDC were informed during a
visit to Northwood that ‘one Nimrod is the equivalent of 12 ships in terms of our capacity... to look
forward [and] gather information.’85
With respect to the number of maritime assets available, it must be recognised that maritime
security is not the responsibility of the military alone, but requires a cross-Government approach;
indeed, whilst the military has traditionally provided much of the intelligence, they would not be the
lead agency in dealing with many of the maritime threats identified within UK waters. This led to
the establishment of the multi-agency National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) at Northwood
in 2010, to act as the ‘single point of contact for UK national maritime surveillance information data
exchange with EU and other key partners.’86 However, this focuses very much on the
dissemination of information and, despite this cross-Government approach, the UK has only a
limited number of assets available to conduct surveillance and/or deal with identified threats. For
example, the UKBA has no aerial surveillance capability and a fleet of just five cutters, which are
‘deployed on a risk-led or intelligence-led basis to control general maritime traffic throughout UK
waters.’87 Despite maintaining two crews per vessel in order to conduct near-continuous
operations, each cutter is effectively responsible for the daily patrol of 2200 miles of coastline and
the corresponding territorial water out to the 12nm limit (see Figure B-2). For dedicated fisheries
protection, Direct Flight Ltd operates four Cessna F406 surveillance aircraft under contract with the
Maritime Management Organisation and Maritime Scotland to provide aerial surveillance, whilst the
RN provides three River-class off-shore patrol ships. Whilst these assets all contribute to maritime
situational awareness, and provide specific capabilities to deal with certain threats, a significant
amount of water surrounding the UK is left for the military to patrol. Furthermore, the military is the
84
Naval Technology, “Merlin,” naval-technology.com, http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/merlin-asw/ (accessed 27 February
2012).
85
“Oral Evidence taken before the Defence Committee on Wednesday 8 June 2011,” Q509,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/761/11060801.htm (accessed 12 March 2012).
86
HCESD, “Integration of Maritime Surveillance.”
87
UKBA, “Our Fleet of Cutters,” http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/aboutus/organisation/cutters/ (accessed 13 May 2012).
20
only agency with the capability to respond to military threats, or provide maritime security for
overseas operations.
However, as previously identified, the RN surface flotilla is smaller than ever, including just 13
frigates and six destroyers. At the time of writing, five frigates were deployed on operations outside
the UK, three were undergoing pre-deployment work-up, and five were undergoing upkeep in
port.88 The force disposition for the destroyers was similar, with the RN unable to maintain a major
warship in either the South Atlantic or the Caribbean in support of overseas territories. There is
therefore very limited capacity to provide a presence within UK waters, or to support contingency
operations, without impacting other tasks. In order to provide the naval assets required for
operations off Libya, the RN had to pull ships from patrolling the South Atlantic and conducting
counter-piracy, having already announced that they could not fulfil the Caribbean patrol task.89
Additionally, for the first time in 30 years, the RN was unable to allocate a ship to the Fleet Ready
Escort (FRE) task for maritime security in UK waters.90 In their summary of the UK maritime
contribution in Libya, the HCDC concluded that:
‘...important tasks, such as the Fleet Ready Escort and counter drugs operations, were
not able to be carried out due to meeting the Libya commitment. Given the continued
high levels of standing maritime commitments it is likely that this type of risk taking will
occur more frequently as the outcomes of the SDSR are implemented.’91
Quite simply, the RN operates some very capable assets, but there are not enough of them to
conduct all of the tasks required of them, let alone mitigate the loss of the MPA capability. In fact:
‘the fewer assets you have, the more important it is to have effective, wide-area persistent
surveillance.’92
Other Airborne Assets
Given the advantages that the air domain provides, it is unsurprising that other long-range, highendurance aircraft have been included in the list of assets which would be used to mitigate the loss
of the MRA4, specifically the E-3D Sentry and C-130J Hercules. However, it is difficult to replicate
a maritime surveillance capability with assets designed for land surveillance, due to the constantly
changing nature of the maritime environment which requires bespoke surveillance specifications
88
Figures from: RN, “The Fleet.” http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/Ships (accessed 13 may 2012).
89
Lee Willett, RUSI: oral evidence to HCDC ‘Future Maritime Surveillance,’ 17 April 2012.
90
The Telegraph, “No warships left defending Britain after Defence cutbacks,” The Telegraph: 1 November 2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8862215/No-warships-left-defending-Britain-after-Defence-cutbacks.html (accessed
13 May 2012).
91
HCDC, ‘Operations in Libya,’ http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/950/95007.htm#a26
(accessed 15 May 2012).
92
Rear-Admiral Tony Rix (Rtd), ex-COS NATO Maritime HQ: oral evidence to HCDC ‘Future Maritime Surveillance,’ 17 April 2012.
21
and skills.93 Consequently, there are a number of significant capability deficiencies with these
aircraft, and some generic issues associated with conducting maritime patrol as a secondary role,
which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
The RAF’s E-3D Sentry aircraft are fitted with a comprehensive tactical control and
communications suite and the powerful APY-1/2 search radar which, whilst designed for Airborne
Early Warning and Control (AEW&C), does have a maritime mode for the detection and tracking of
surface contacts. However, the aircraft is designed to operate at high-altitude which, whilst ideal
for AEW&C, limits the radar’s maritime capability to the detection and tracking of larger vessels
only.94 Furthermore, the radar cannot discriminate between different types of maritime target, nor
is the aircraft fitted with EO/IR sensors or able to conduct visual/photographic intelligence
gathering. Therefore, whilst the Sentry can conduct surveillance of large vessels over a large area,
the actual intelligence which can be provided on maritime targets is severely limited. Finally, the
aircraft has no ASW capabilities at all.
It has also been stated on numerous occasions that the RAF’s C-130J Hercules will be used to
conduct tasks previously conducted by the Nimrod; however, whilst the aircraft has adequate range
and endurance, it is not fitted with any of the electronic sensors required for maritime patrol.95
Closer examination of the evidence provided to the HCDC indicates that the proposed use of the
Hercules would be limited to SAR only.96 However, other than the capability to drop liferafts, its
capability for conducting SAR is actually very limited. Whilst the HC-130J is successfully used by
the US Coastguard, these aircraft have been specifically modified for the role including the
installation of a surface-search radar, forward-looking EO/IR, a dedicated mission operator station
and a mission integrated communication system.97 The RAF aircraft do not have these capabilities
as their primary role is, and will remain, tactical air transport. Furthermore, with the fleet already
stretched to meet this primary tasking, C-130J availability for SAR operations and training is
limited. Indeed, when questioned about the loss of the Nimrod capability, HM Chief Coastguard
stated that for any SAR incident beyond the range of helicopter capabilities (~200nm) out to the
limit of the UK’s area of responsibility (~1200nm), the Maritime and Coastguard Agency would not
93
Lee Willett, RUSI, written evidence to HCDC ‘Future Maritime Surveillance.’
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/1918/fms06.htm (accessed 13 April 2012).
94
AVM A Roberts: written evidence to HCDC ‘Future Maritime Surveillance,’
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/1918/fms04.htm (accessed 7 May 2012).
95
The aircraft has a radar but this does not have a maritime surface-search mode.
96
ACM Stephen Dalton, CAS: oral evidence to HCDC ‘The SDSR and the NSS: Sixth Report of Session 2010–12,’ 11 May 2011.
97
USCG, “Coast Guard Accepts Third “Missionized” HC-130J Aircraft,” USCG,
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg9/newsroom/updates/c130j052708.asp (accessed 19 April 2012).
22
rely on a UK-based asset but would ‘go to an asset that is based in Ireland, France, Iceland, the
US or Canada.’98
Perhaps the most significant issue with relying on other airborne assets to conduct maritime tasks
as a secondary role is the lack of capacity to actually conduct regular overt maritime patrols. With
limited aircraft numbers and reducing training budgets, the priority for these scarce assets will
always be their primary role, such that any employment of the aircraft in the maritime role will be
reactionary in response to a threat which has already materialised.
Conversely, the primary day-to-day task for an MPA is to patrol the country’s territorial waters, and
this is achieved even when training. Not only does the regular and overt presence of such patrols
demonstrate the country’s ability and willingness to patrol its waters, thus acting as a deterrent to
potential perpetrators, but the sight of an MPA overtly ‘gathering intelligence’ and/or photographing
vessels becomes a normal occurrence. As such, MPA are able to gather intelligence on vessels
suspected of illegal activity without arousing suspicion, simply by carrying out that same task on all
vessels in the area and ‘acting as normal.’ If the intelligence confirms the vessel as a target of
interest, the vessel can then be tracked covertly and handed over to the appropriate agency. Even
if the UK had an alternative platform with the required capabilities which could be diverted from
other tasks to gather intelligence on such a vessel, this is likely to be ‘out-of-the-ordinary’ and
therefore alert the target vessel. Furthermore, much of the intelligence within the maritime
environment is gathered from visual observation of activity. In the same way that soldiers become
attuned to their operating environment and can recognise combat indicators from the normal
‘pattern-of-life’, an experienced maritime crew can spot the ‘presence-of-the-abnormal’ or the
‘absence-of-the-normal’, particularly with respect to illegal activity. It is simply not possible to
maintain this level of capability on a part-time basis.
Finally, despite MOD insistence that Sentry and/or Hercules aircraft will be utilised for some
elements of the UK’s maritime patrol requirements, there is no evidence to suggest that any of
these assets have been tasked on dedicated maritime patrol missions since the SDSR, nor have
their crews received specific training in the role.99 It is therefore concluded that these limited
‘maritime capabilities’ exist on paper only, and are unlikely to be employed unless in times of crisis,
and only then if not required for their primary role.
Reliance on Allies
Recognising that the withdrawal of the MRA4 has resulted in capability gaps which cannot be filled
by existing UK assets, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) stated that the UK will have to rely on
98
Rod Johnson, HM Chief Coastguard, MCA: oral evidence to HCDC ‘Future Maritime Surveillance,’ 17 April 2012.
99
Discussion with HQ 2 Gp personnel.
23
its allies ‘to compensate for areas that we might not have, but other countries have’ and that this
was one of the reasons why the UK has ‘enthusiastically entered the Anglo-French arrangement.’
100
However, whilst the Anglo-French treaty on security and defence outlines many areas of
cooperation, there is not a single reference to maritime patrol or surveillance.101 Even if
cooperative arrangements were agreed, there are a number of inherent difficulties with such an
approach.
First, regardless of bi-lateral agreements and special relationships, allies cannot be relied upon to
provide capabilities when their own national interest does not align with that of the UK. For
example, the Nimrod provided a key element of the Falkland Islands reinforcement plan through its
ability to rapidly deploy to the Islands and provide both wide-area surveillance and deterrence
against both ASW and ASuW threats. Despite their special relationship with the UK, even the US
is unlikely to provide such a capability, given the latter’s position of neutrality over the sovereignty
of the Falklands.
Second, whilst is it conceivable that NATO allies would deploy MPA to the UK in response to a
threat once identified, this would be purely reactive; they cannot be expected to provide a
continuous capability to patrol UK waters and provide surveillance and deterrence in lieu of the
UK’s own capability. This is especially so in the current financial climate with pressure on defence
budgets. For example, whilst the US has reversed its previous under-investment in maritime patrol
aviation and is replacing its P-3 Orion fleet with the modern P-8 Poseidon, the US defence budget
is currently facing a $500bn reduction over the next decade, which could double if sequestration
comes into force in 2013. Furthermore, with its strategic ‘pivot to the Pacific’, the US is
increasingly looking for Europe to provide a greater share of the burden, particularly with respect to
European security. Similarly, whilst the implications for the French defence budget and AngloFrench cooperation following the change of government are yet to materialise, it is unlikely that the
French tax-payer would accept the cost of providing a maritime patrol capability for the UK,
especially given that the UK cut the capability to preserve its own credit rating while that of France
was downgraded.102
Third, national security will prevent disclosure of certain information, such as that relating to MCT
operations or details relating to the UK Vanguard SSBNs, as to do so would jeopardise the
credibility and independence of the strategic deterrent. Therefore, foreign MPA will not be able
100
General David Richards, CDS: oral evidence to HCDC ‘The Appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff.’ 17 November 2010.
101
HM Government, “UK-France Summit 2012 – Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation,” Number10,
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/uk-france-declaration-security/ (accessed 11 March 2012).
102
The Telegraph, “Eurozone back on the brink as France has credit rating downgraded,” The Telegraph: 13 January 2012,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9014579/Debt-crisis-Eurozone-back-on-the-brink-as-France-has-credit-ratingdowngraded.html (accessed 7 May 2012).
24
contribute to UK MCT operations or provide the level of security for the UK strategic deterrent
previously provided by the Nimrod.
Finally, even when operating within an alliance with members who are able and willing to contribute
MPA, assets are likely to be scarce and prioritised along national lines. In Libya, for example,
there were only three MPA - provided by Canada and Spain - barely sufficient to provide 24-hour
surveillance. The Chief of the Air Staff subsequently admitted that:
‘...the availability of Nimrod would have helped in securing the northern coastal waters
of [Libya]. It could have been deployed there very quickly. It could be maintained
there, because it is a long-range, long-endurance aeroplane, and it had the sensor
suite that would have allowed us to have the perfect picture.’103
Specific Capability Gap: ASW
In addition to the lack of wide-area ISR and the ability to respond to identified threats quickly, the
withdrawal of the MRA4 has left some gaps in the UK’s war-fighting capabilities, the most
significant of which relates to ASW.
The UK requires a credible ASW capability to counter the increasing submarine threat and to
enable the RN’s core strategic contributions to UK defence policy – the deterrent, carrier strike,
amphibious operations, and Tomahawk land attack.104 An effective ASW capability is built around a
layered approach, which provides a total ASW effect which is greater than the sum of the individual
layers. Consequently, the removal of a layer can have a disproportionate effect on the overall
capability.105 Whilst the RN still maintains capable ASW assets such as the Type-23 Frigates,
Merlin helicopters and the Astute SSNs, the Nimrod MPA provided both an overall layer and the
glue which held the other layers together.106 This overall layer been removed, such that the
overstretch of other layers now results in actual holes rather than potential risks.107
One of the key attributes of an MPA, particularly against the SSK threat, is the ability to maintain
the pressure on the submarine by conducting a detect/deter radar search over a wide area. During
the final debrief at the end of Exercise DOGFISH 2001, the world’s largest yearly ASW exercise,
the captain from the German SSK U-25 stated that ‘unless the weather conditions are such that
they entirely favour the submarine and, at the same time, are entirely detrimental to the MPA, it is
103
ACM Stephen Dalton, CAS: oral evidence to HCDC ‘The SDSR and the NSS: Sixth Report of Session 2010–12,’ 11 May 2011.
104
Willett, Lee, “Mind the Gap: Strategic Risk in the UK’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Capability,” RUSI,
http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4D4C20CB26473/ (accessed 27 February 2012).
105
ibid.
106
ibid.
107
Ibid.
25
impossible for a diesel-electric submarine to carry out its task under twenty-four-hour MPA
surveillance.’108 With the limited range and endurance of the Merlin, and a lack of available ships
from which they can operate, it is simply no longer possible for the UK to achieve this level of
deterrence against a credible submarine threat. As Air Chief-Marshall Stirrup explained to the
HCDC:
Anti-submarine warfare is one of the most difficult military tasks that the Armed Forces
carry out. It is very complex and requires a layered approach. That has been
demonstrated clearly over the years, and wide area surveillance is a very important
element within that...We have now lost that.’109
The Current Maritime Security Capability Gap
Since the SDSR, the Government has maintained that the capability gaps resulting from the
decision to scrap the MRA4 are a ‘tolerable risk.’ However, this is based on the premise that other
assets are being maximised to mitigate the gap, and this Section has clearly outlined that this is
not the case. As such, the UK has significant capability gaps with respect to the ability maintain
maritime situational awareness, respond to maritime threats and, specifically, conduct ASW.
Somewhat ironically, the capability gaps incurred as a result of the Nimrod decision are perhaps
best captured by the Secretary of State for Defence in his letter to the Prime Minister prior to the
SDSR:
"Deletion of the Nimrod MR4 will limit our ability to deploy maritime forces rapidly into
high-threat areas, increase the risk to the Deterrent, compromise maritime CT (counter
terrorism), remove long range search and rescue, and delete one element of our
Falklands reinforcement plan."110
108
Captain of Type-206A SSK FGS U-25 (S-174), verbal debrief at end of NATO Exercise DOGFISH 2001, 15-28 February 2001
(author present). For Exercise info see: http://www.manp.nato.int/exercises/Dogfish2001/Dogfish2001.htm
109
Air Chief-Marshall Stirrup, ex-CDS: oral evidence to HCDC, ‘The SDSR and the NSS,’ 18 May 2011, Q276.
110
The Telegraph, “Defence cuts: Liam Fox's leaked letter in full,” The Telegraph: 28 September 2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8031385/Defence-cuts-Liam-Foxs-leaked-letter-in-full.html (accessed 12 March
2012).
26
Section 5: To what extent is the Regeneration of a Wide-Area Maritime Patrol
Capability a Priority, and what are the Potential Options?
Having determined that the UK faces significant capability gaps in its ability to achieve maritime
security, this section will examine to what extent the regeneration of this capability should be a
priority for the UK, and discuss some of the potential options.
Discussions with PJHQ staff have identified that the UK faces a number of capability gaps against
the ‘full spectrum defence capability’ which is deemed necessary to carry out the seven military
tasks identified in the SDSR. These include the maritime patrol and carrier-strike capabilities
already discussed, a gap in the UK’s signals/electronic intelligence (SIGINT/ELINT) capability due
to the retirement of the Nimrod R1, a lack of Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) capability,
and the inability to conduct Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR). Of these, the requirement for
maritime security is the only one which is required all-day, every-day, regardless of whether the UK
is engaged in hostilities or not. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that SEAD and JPR
capabilities will only be required during intervention operations which are likely to be discretionary
and/or conducted as part of an alliance, whilst the replacement capabilities for SIGINT/ELINT and
carrier-strike are fully-funded and will enter service in 2014 and 2020 respectively. It is therefore
concluded that the lack of a wide-area maritime patrol capability is the most significant gap, and
that the regeneration of this capability should be the highest priority for UK defence. Whilst there is
still enormous financial pressure on the Government, the MOD has reportedly balanced the
budget, not only securing those capabilities already identified for Future Force 2020, but also
including an ‘additional £8bn of funding over the next ten years which is unallocated...to respond to
emerging equipment requirements.’111 It is therefore recommended that serious consideration is
given to filling the gap left by the MRA4 which, ironically, was scrapped to save just £2bn over ten
years. Unfortunately, it is likely that the recent decision by the Government to revert to the
STOVL112 variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and not fit the new carriers with ‘cats and
traps’113 will be detrimental to any decision on future maritime surveillance in two ways. First,
whilst the SDSR did not state that the UK no longer needed an MPA capability, just that the MRA4
would not be brought in to service, any decision to subsequently procure an MPA will be portrayed
as another Government U-turn; having recently made a U-turn over the JSF, this is now even more
unlikely, at least before the next SDSR. Second, the lack of ‘cats and traps’ severely restricts
future options for carrier-based maritime surveillance and/or patrol, be that manned or unmanned.
111
MOD, “Defence Secretary balances MOD budget,” MOD News: 14 May 2012,
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/DefenceSecretaryBalancesModBudget.htm (accessed
18 May 2012).
112
Short Take-off, Vertical Landing
113
Catapult and arrestor gear for launching/recovering fixed-wing aircraft from aircraft carriers; without it aircraft/RPV must be STOVL.
27
With respect to the potential options available to fill the gap, this paper has already identified that
relying on other current assets is unrealistic; however, it has been suggested that the required
capabilities could be installed on an existing asset. For example, Raytheon UK has provided
written evidence to the HCDC suggesting that the radar fitted to the Sentinel aircraft could be
modified to provide a maritime surveillance mode, including the capability to conduct ‘wide-area
submarine threat detection.’114 However, even if this was possible, the airframe has limited
potential for further significant modification and would not therefore have the capabilities required
to prosecute a submarine once detected. Furthermore, with respect to ASuW, the Sentinel would
be constrained by the same limitations facing the E-3D Sentry previously highlighted. It should
also be noted that the Sentinel is due to be withdrawn ‘once it is no longer required for operations
in Afghanistan.’ 115 It is therefore concluded that the proposal to modify the Sentinel for the
maritime role is aimed more at securing a future for the aircraft rather than a credible attempt to
mitigate the current maritime patrol capability gap.
New technologies are becoming available which will assist in the maintenance of maritime
situational awareness. For example, the Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a transponderbased tracking and identification system fitted to ships which works by electronically exchanging
data directly with other nearby vessels and shore-based stations or, more recently, indirectly via
satellite. The AIS transponder transmits the vessel’s position, course and speed, as well as other
data such as the ship’s, name, flag state and destination. Primarily aimed at collision avoidance,
the system can also be used to assist with maritime security. NATO is currently developing
algorithms which will monitor the AIS feed and automatically identify abnormal activity. However,
there are limitations with AIS and it would be foolish to become over-reliant on such technology
alone. First, it is not mandatory for AIS to be fitted to vessels less than 300 gross tonnage which
leaves a sizeable void in the maritime picture. Second, other than navigational information, the
data transmitted simply reflects that put into the system by the crew and provides little insight into
the actual cargo being carried or the crew’s intent. A clear example of the vulnerability of the
system occurred in July 2009 when the Russian cargo vessel Arctic Sea ‘disappeared’ after
transiting thought the English Channel. The official Russian investigation claims the vessel was
previously hijacked off the coast of Sweden and forced to sail to Africa; the counter-view is that this
story itself is a cover for illegal weapons-smuggling by Russia.116 Either way, the vessel passed
through the English Channel without suspicion before switching off its AIS, and then remained
undetected for three weeks until intercepted by a Russian frigate off the Cape Verde Islands.
114
Raytheon, written evidence to HCDC ‘Future Maritime Surveillance’ and ‘Operations in Libya,’
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/1918/fms09.htm and
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/950/950vw07.htm (accessed 15 May 2012).
115
UK, SDSR, 27.
116
For details see: The Telegraph (12 August 2009) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/6016534/Hijacked-Arctic-Seafeared-to-be-carrying-secret-cargo-of-drugs.html or the Guardian (24 September 2009)
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/24/arctic-sea-russia-pirates (both accessed 12 May 2012).
28
Whilst AIS has been retro-fitted to MPA for a number of years, and is likely to be fitted to satellites
and Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) in the future, it should be regarded as a complementary
capability rather than a substitute for more direct ISR.
The capabilities of satellites, RPVs and Hybrid Air Vehicles (HAVs) are continuously improving, and
it is likely that at some point in the future they will form part of the asset mix required for maritime
security. However, whilst these technologies provide advantages, particularly with respect to
persistence, there are a number of disadvantages which have yet to be resolved. The
disadvantages of satellites include the cost, obscuration of sensors due to poor weather, lack of
responsiveness, and the need for full access to the intelligence which is not guaranteed.
Furthermore, current development is predominantly focused on the collection of AIS data and
fusion of that data with satellite imagery, although it is possible that technologies such as synthetic
aperture radar and hyper-spectral imaging will be developed to provide maritime ISR capability in
the future. High-Altitude, Long-Endurance (HALE) RPVs are more responsive than satellites and
provide greater flexibility with respect to payload, but are generally subject to the same advantages
and disadvantages. Most significantly, satellites and HALE RPVs remain unseen and unarmed,
and therefore, unlike surface or airborne maritime patrol assets, provide no capability for the
deterrence, interrogation or prosecution of potential threats.117
Medium altitude, ‘tactical’ RPVs have proven their utility for providing ISTAR in the overland
environment and, led by the US, they are starting to reach into the maritime domain. For example,
the Mariner is a maritime version of the successful MQ-9 Reaper RPV which was proposed for the
BAMS programme but not selected. However, these air vehicles have proved vulnerable to
adverse weather conditions, and simply do not have the available payload to incorporate the
sensors and/or weapons required to conduct ASW/ASuW. It is also worth noting that the
endurance for many of these systems is not significantly greater than that for a modern MPA and, if
required to operate at distance, the ‘on-task time’ actually favours the latter. Finally, capable RPVs
are expensive, and challenges with the certification and integration of these systems within civilian
airspace still exist.
Therefore, for the foreseeable future, no combination of satellite or RPV/HAV technology can
provide a cost-effective or even practicable alternative to the capability provided by a manned
MPA; even the US, with the most advanced satellite and RPV technology in the world, is still
spending over $25bn on a fleet of 117 new P-8 Poseidon MPA. This position is reflected by the
MOD team looking at the long-term mitigation for the loss of the MRA4: ‘if the MOD decides to fill
the gap, it would need to buy an aircraft. The question of whether the MOD actually wants to fill
117
Admiral Woodward; written evidence to HCDC ‘Future Maritime Surveillance’
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/1918/fms03.htm (accessed 18 May 2012).
29
that gap has not been answered, and we see that as being part of the SDSR 2015 time frame
decision.’118 This paper has already demonstrated that the capability gap in wide-area maritime
patrol needs to be filled, and supports the MOD conclusion that this can only be achieved through
the regeneration of a MPA capability. Such a decision would not be at odds with the majority of
major maritime nations. For example, of the 20 countries with the longest coastlines in the world,
the UK is the only nation without an MPA capability; furthermore, over half of those nations are
currently in the process of upgrading their MPA fleets.119 Within Europe, both France and Spain
have significantly smaller coastlines and EEZs to patrol than the UK, yet both maintain a fleet of
over 25 MPA.
The MOD should also learn from the experience of the New Zealand Government who, in 2001,
conducted a Maritime Patrol Review which concluded that ‘it is hard to justify the retention of a
comprehensive military maritime surveillance capability in New Zealand’s sea areas.’
120
This led
to the decisions not to upgrade the RNZAF’s ageing fleet of six P-3K Orion MPA and to de-scope
their role. Fortunately, the aircraft were retained and in 2004 the decision was reversed; the
contract for the upgrade programme was signed in 2005 and the first aircraft commenced
operational test & evaluation in 2011. Interestingly, cross-Government consultation with agencies
such as Fisheries, Customs and Immigration led to the development of a ‘single’ maritime
surveillance role which, along with the specific military requirements, will be met by the upgrade
programme.
121
There are a number of potential MPA which could be purchased ‘off-the-shelf’’, from the high-end
Poseidon to the smaller, but still very capable, Airbus CN-295-MPA. A comparison of the relative
capabilities of these aircraft is not relevant within this paper; what is important is that the capability
is regenerated quickly to minimise the ever-increasing risk and skills fade associated with an
enduring capability gap. This means prioritising capability and timescale above the needs of British
industry, and following a similar ‘off-the-shelf’ approach to that used to procure the RAF’s C-17 and
Reaper capabilities. Indeed, another option might be to follow the example of the Airseeker
programme, whereby the UK is purchasing three RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft to replace the Nimrod
R1, but has effectively ‘bought into’ a joint US/UK fleet. Whilst the aircraft can still be employed on
national tasking, both nations benefit from the economies-of-scale which the larger fleet brings.
118
Air Vice-Marshal Green, Director Joint and Air Capability and Transformation: oral evidence to HCDC ‘Future Maritime Surveillance,’
17 April 2012.
119
Dr Sue Robertson; written evidence to HCDC ‘Future Maritime Surveillance’
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/1918/fms10.htm (accessed 18 May 2012).
120
Government of New Zealand, Maritime Patrol Review: available at
http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/all/files/publications/maritime_patrol_review.pdf (accessed 12 May 2012).
121
RNZAF, “Maritime Patrol Force,” http://www.airforce.mil.nz/about-us/force-elements/maritime.htm (accessed 12 May 2012).
30
A significant element of any credible maritime patrol capability is the skill-set of the crew.
Therefore, in order to retain a cadre of personnel with the skills-set required to regenerate a
maritime patrol capability in the future, the RAF has embedded 20 ex-Nimrod personnel within
allied nations’ MPA forces where they will maintain their skills.122 However, this ‘seedcorn initiative’
will only maintain the individuals’ skills for a few years, such that a decision to proceed with a
replacement MPA programme needs to be made sooner rather than later if this investment is not to
be wasted.
Fundamental to the regeneration of this capability will be appropriate sponsorship and ownership
of the requirement, which has traditionally sat across a number of ‘desks’ within MOD. This is
exacerbated by current military doctrine, which barely recognises that the air domain needs to be
utilised for effective maritime patrol. For example, British Maritime Doctrine (JDP 0-10) barely
mentions the use of the air domain for the conduct of wide-area maritime operations. Similarly,
whilst AP3000123 defines the fundamental roles of air power, the description of ‘intelligence and
situational awareness’ is focused entirely on the land environment, whilst the description of ‘attack’
includes just a single sentence on each of the ASW and ASuW roles. Within AP3002124, the
emphasis remains clear; twenty pages are devoted to counter-land operations, whist counter-sea
attracts just a single paragraph. Sadly, this reflects the neglect and lack of investment that has
befallen the role of maritime aviation for many years, and was almost certainly a contributing factor
to the decision to scrap the MRA4. Unfortunately, a review of the written evidence provided to the
HCDC by ex-senior officers reveals that whilst there is unanimous agreement that the withdrawal
of MPA capability has resulted in significant gaps which should not be accepted, single-Service
bias is clearly evident in some of the proposed solutions.
Therefore, if the UK is going to consider the case for the regeneration of a wide-area maritime
patrol capability in the 2015 SDSR timeframe, the first challenge is to ensure that the capability
does not, once again, fall between the cracks of single-Service in-fighting. Which Service ‘owns’ or
‘operates’ the future capability is far less important than ensuring that the UK actually has the
capability at all. The UK should therefore start with the cross-Government development of a UK
Maritime Security Strategy which, as this paper has outlined, will confirm the specific importance of
the maritime environment to the UK national interest and the threats which the maritime
environment presents. This will direct the cross-Government requirement for maritime situational
awareness which, when combined with the military capabilities required to conduct ASW and
122
Hansard, “Commons Debate: 24 November 2011,” c548W
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111124/text/111124w0003.htm#11112476001267 (accessed 19 May
2012)
123
British Air and Space Doctrine, 4 Ed.
th
124
Air and Space Warfare, 2 Ed.
nd
31
ASuW, will determine which aircraft provides the most cost-effective solution and how this should
be integrated into the force mix.
Conclusions
This paper has clearly articulated the vital importance of a secure maritime environment to the UK
national interest and the achievement of the NSS core objectives. In particular, the extent to which
the UK is dependent on maritime trade for its economy and essential resources has been
highlighted, as has the importance of sea control for the conduct of expeditionary operations,
including the protection of overseas territories. Furthermore, this paper has also outlined the
significant and increasing threats which the maritime environment presents to the UK national
interest, including terrorism, piracy and conventional military attack, particularly the asymmetric
threat posed by diesel-electric submarines. Quite simply, the UK remains a maritime nation. Yet
despite the fact that mitigation for nine of the fifteen priority security risks identified by the NSS will
require maritime security, the SDSR has significantly reduced or removed the capabilities required
to achieve this task.
In order to achieve maritime security within UK waters and beyond, the UK requires the capability
to conduct wide-area maritime ISR to maintain maritime situational awareness both above and
below the surface, and the capability to prosecute identified threats in a timely manner.
Throughout its forty-year service, the Nimrod MPA provided the UK with rapid, long-range and
persistent wide-area maritime surveillance, combined with the ability to prosecute threats, both
around the UK and in support of maritime operations worldwide. The Nimrod MRA4 would have
provided even greater capability for many decades had it been brought into service. Whilst the
MOD has acknowledged that the UK currently has no asset, or collection of assets, which can fill
this void, it has repeatedly stated that the UK is maximising its use of other maritime and airborne
assets, such that the loss of MPA is a ‘tolerable risk’ which can be accepted. Consequently, the
MOD does not, at present, see a need to fill the gap. However, this paper does not support this
position, based on clear evidence that the tasks required for maritime security previously
undertaken by the Nimrod are not actually being fulfilled due to either a fundamental lack of
capability, or a lack of available assets. Therefore, the risk to the UK national interest due to the
lack of a wide-area maritime patrol capability is ‘intolerable’.
Whilst it is likely that other assets such as RPVs or HAVs will contribute to maritime security in the
future, these capabilities will not be available for many years and, even then, will be biased
towards persistent maritime surveillance, rather than ISR or the ability to prosecute threats rapidly.
32
As such, this paper agrees with the MOD position that the only capability which can fill the current
gap for the foreseeable future is a manned MPA. This position is reinforced by the many MPA
programmes being maintained and upgraded throughout the world.
Given the UK’s vulnerability to maritime threats, which will only increase as the capability gap
endures, and the limited window of opportunity to exploit the retention of maritime skills afforded
through the ‘seedcorn’ initiative, it is the conclusion of this research paper that the regeneration of
a sovereign MPA capability should be the highest priority for UK defence and national security.
Given the current financial constraints, and the Governments recent U-turn on the carrier strike
capability, such a decision is not realistic before the next SDSR in 2015. However, much can be
achieved in the meantime; for example, a holistic agreement of the capability required for UK
maritime security, both within the MOD and across Government, will ensure that this vital capability
does not, once again, fall between the gaps of single-Service in-fighting. Fundamental to this will
be the clear articulation of the requirement for maritime patrol within joint doctrine, and appropriate
‘ownership’ of the requirement, potentially utilising the newly created Joint Forces Command.
The current position resulting from the decision to scrap the MRA4 was succinctly captured in
written evidence provided to the HCDC following the SDSR:
‘...the SDSR has accepted inappropriate capability gaps which we believe cannot
stand. We are confident that they will be changed before the next defence review in
2015: they will be changed either by courageous decision and frank admission of error
or they will be changed more cruelly by events, with all the risk which that implies.’125
It can only be hoped that the inappropriate capability gap with respect to wide-area maritime patrol
is changed by courageous decision, before events conspire to prove beyond doubt that the gap
accepted as a ‘tolerable risk’ was indeed a ‘gamble which did not pay off’.
125
Vice-Admiral Blackham, ex-DCDS(Cap), and Professor Prins, LSE: written evidence to the HCDC ‘The SDSR and the NSS,’
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/761/761we02.htm (accessed 12 March 2012).
33
[Intentionally Blank]
34
Annex A to
AustinSJ/ WgCdr/ACSC15/DRP
Dated 30 May 12
Reduction in UK Major Maritime Assets since 1990
Figure A-1: Reduction in RN Major Warship Numbers 1990-2012.1
Figure A-2: Reduction in RN Major Warship Numbers 1990-2012.2
1
Save the Royal Navy, “Royal Navy Warship Numbers: Falling off a Cliff,” http://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/wordpress/royal-navywarship-numbers-falling-off-a-cliff (accessed 6 May 2012).
2
Graphic compiled by author; figures from Defence Reviews, National Audit Office Reports and discussions with HQ 2 Gp personnel.
A-1
[Intentionally Blank]
A-2
Annex B to
AustinSJ/ WgCdr/ACSC15/DRP
Dated 30 May 12
The United Kingdom Maritime Environment
900nm
800nm
United Kingdom:
Exclusive Economic Zone:
Extent: 200nm
Area: 773,676 km2 / 298,717 sq mi
Length of Coastline:
Great Britain plus its principle islands: 19,491 mi
Great Britain (main island only): 11,073 mi
700nm
600nm
500nm
400nm
300nm
200nm
100nm
100nm
200nm
300nm
400nm
500nm
600nm
700nm
Figure B-1: The United Kingdom Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).1
1
Numbers from: The Sea Around us Project, “EEZ Waters of the United Kingdom,” http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/826.aspx
(accessed 6 May 2012); and The British Cartographic Society, “How long is the UK coastline?”
http://www.cartography.org.uk/default.asp?contentID=749 (accessed 6 May 2012).
B-1
Figure B-2: The United Kingdom Marine Administrative Boundaries.2
2
Joint Nature Conservation Committee. “UK Offshore Marine Area.” http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/page-4552 (Accessed 13 May 2012).
B-2
United Kingdom Search and Rescue Region (SRR):
Extent: 30W (up to 1200nm)
Area : 1.25 million square nautical miles Maritime SRR
Aeronautical SRR
(where different)
Figure B-3: The United Kingdom Search and Rescue Region.3
3
Maritime and Coastguard Agency, “The Role of HM Coastguard,” http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/mcga07-home/emergencyresponse/mcgasearchandrescue/mcga-theroleofhmcoasguard.htm (accessed 6 May 2012).
B-3
[Intentionally Blank]
B-4
Annex C to
AustinSJ/ WgCdr/ACSC15/DRP
Dated 30 May 12
Use of the Maritime Environment for Piracy and Criminal Activity
Figure C-1: Expansion of piracy operations in the Indian Ocean.1
Figure C-2: Major cocaine routes into the UK.2
1
BBC, “Somalia conflict: Why should the world help?” BBC News: 21 February 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16970982
(accessed 15 April 2012).
2
BBC, “Flow of Drugs to UK,” BBC In-Depth, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/drugs_uk/drugs_map/html/# (accessed 15
April 2012).
C-1
[Intentionally Blank]
C-2
Annex D to
AustinSJ/ WgCdr/ACSC15/DRP
Dated 30 May 12
Principles of Passive and Active Acoustics1
Maritime Patrol Aircraft
Data transmitted to MPA for processing
Sonobuoy
Hydrophone
(detects sound)
Submarine
(Noise Source)
Sound Propagation
Figure D-1: Principle of passive acoustics; hydrophone detects noise emitted from the submarine
and this data is transmitted by the passive sonobuoy up to the MPA for processing and analysis.
Maritime Patrol Aircraft
Data transmitted to MPA for processing
Sonobuoy
Transducer
(transmits and receives sound)
 Reflected sound wave
Submarine
Transmitted sound wave 
Figure D-2: Principle of active acoustics; transducer transmits ‘pulse’ of sound energy, and detects
the energy reflected by the submarine - data transmitted to the MPA for processing and analysis.
1
Drawings by author.
D-1
[Intentionally Blank]
D-2
Annex E to
AustinSJ/ WgCdr/ACSC15/DRP
Dated 30 May 12
Comparison of Surface-Search Capacity for Typical Maritime Assets1
h
(Radar Altitude)
R
(Radar Horizon)
R( nm )  1.23 h( ft )
Figure E-1: Increase of radar horizon with increasing radar altitude.
ASW
Very Small
(Periscope)
Asset
Frigate
Helicopter
MPA
Role and Target Size
ASuW
Small
(Fishing Vessel)
Large
(Warship/Merchant)
Radar
Height /
Altitude
Ground
Speed
Radar
Horizon
Search
Area
per Hour
Radar
Horizon
Search
Area
per Hour
Radar
Horizon
Search
Area
per Hour
(ft)
(kt)
(nm)
(nm²/hr)
(nm)
(nm²/hr)
(nm)
(nm²/hr)
98ft
28 (max)
12
1,124
12
1,124
12
1,124
<500ft
120
28
9,183
6,500ft
130
100
57,416
500ft
220
1,600ft
240
6,500ft
260
100
83,416
26,500ft
400
200
285,664
28
14,783
50
31,854
Table E-1: Radar horizon and search area per hour for typical maritime assets.
(note: shaded cells indicate that the altitude / radar horizon would not be appropriate for the target size)
1
It must be noted that the figures included here are intended to provide a comparison of the search capabilities of typical maritime
assets derived from the laws of physics, and do not necessarily reflect actual capabilities or detection ranges.
E- 1
Radar Footprint (dark area only) Search Area (total shaded area) Calculation of Search Area per Hour
R = Radar Horizon (nm)
D = Distance travelled in one hr (nm) (equal to speed in kt)
Radar Footprint = πR² (nm²)
Search Area = πR² + 2RD (nm² / hr)
D
R
Key
900nm
Anti‐Surface Unit Warfare (ASuW) Radar Search Area per hour
Anti‐Submarine Warfare (ASW) Radar Search Area per hour
800nm
Note: Type 23 search areas indicated are at max speed of 28 kts; actual ‘cruise’ speed is likely to be 18kts (ASuW) or 12 kts (ASW)
Note: Speed for airborne assets is still‐air ground speed
MPA at 26,500ft / 400kt
Search Area: 285,664nm²/hr
700nm
Type 23 at max speed (28 kts)
Search Area: 1,124nm²/hr
600nm
MPA at 6,500ft / 260kt
Search Area: 83,416nm²/hr
500nm
400nm
Helo at 6,500ft / 130kt
Search Area: 57,416nm²/hr
300nm
Type 23 at max speed (28 kts)
Search Area: 1,124nm²/hr
200nm
Helo at 500ft / 120kt
Search Area: 9,183nm²/hr
100nm
MPA at 500ft / 220kt
Search Area: 14,783nm²/hr
100nm
200nm
300nm
400nm
500nm
600nm
700nm
Figure E-2: Graphical comparison of search area per hour for typical maritime assets.2
2
Diagram by Author
E- 2
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