The “Commander of all forests” against the “Jacobins” of Brazil: The Cabanada, 1832-1835
Marcus J. M. de Carvalho (UFPE)
Between late 1832 and 1835 there was a rebellion in the frontier of the provinces of
Pernambuco and Alagoas, Brazil, involving runaway slaves, peasants, Indians and a handful of
landlords. They demanded the return of Pedro I, who left the throne of Brazil in April 7th, 1831.
After the rebellion was crushed, the major leader of the movement fled to the forests where he
founded a community with hundreds of followers. They resisted against the encroachments of the
landed aristocracy until the final of arrest of their leader in 1850. Thus, there was resistance after
the rebellion.
One of the side results of rebellions, such as the Cabanada, is the construction of very strong
bonds among men of different backgrounds and personal interests. Rebellions also forge leaders.
Some of the men who come to the forefront of politics in times of distress, would never do that in
more peaceful times. Another side result of rebellions, is the production of documents about the
subalterns, that would not exist if it were not for the need to crush them. Rebellions as such are not
the result of spontaneous immediate reaction against the ruling elites or the state apparatus. Rather,
they are usually preceded by several acts of resistance. Collective action requires some kind of
consciouness. That takes time to build up, even if it is an utopian one, as in the case of the Cabanos,
who were fighting for the return of the Brazilian Emperor. The Cabanada and its aftermath also
helps us to understand how the subalterns turned clientelistic networks to their advantage during the
process of state formation in Brazil.
The Cabanada spread throughout the South Zona da Mata following a three day barracks
uprising in the capital city of Recife, the Abrilada, of April 14, 1832. The Abrilada was led by
military officers who had been discharged from their posts after the abdication of Pedro I a year
before. Among its supporters, there were plantation owners and the Portuguese-born poor. The
Abrilada actually triggered the Cabanada. The Cabanos were those who lived in cabanas, forest
huts. They were also called in the sources as “gente das matas”, people of the forest. The restoration
of Pedro I was the professed motivation of the rebels in both cases. But the restoration of Pedro I
had different meanings for those who participated in those two events.
The Abdication of Pedro I had a considerable impact in Brazil. Unable to control the
Parliament, he left for Portugal, leaving behind his five year old son who would become Pedro II in
1840. Liberals in Pernambuco felt more confident than any time before, since the seccecionist 1824
rebellion.1 After the Abdication, the Regency at Rio de Janeiro discharged from office the
Presidents of several provinces and scores of officers of the army and bureaucracy. The Abrilada is
usually interpreted as part of the struggle between liberals and absolutists, who wished to restore
Pedo I in the Brazilian throne. (Quintas, 1985: 201-202. Andrade, 1965: 34-38). But it also involved
different interests and class positions. As one "liberal" paper stated, there were men who had
participated in the liberal 1824 rebellion who, by 1831, were siding with the absolutists and
restorationists. What united them was that they all lost jobs and privileges with the fall of Pedro.
The Abrilada also found some support among the urban free-poor. Portuguese clerks and
artisans were one such group, for nativism had increased after the downfall of Pedro. In November
of 1831, there was a barracks uprising, led by Brazilian-born soldiers and lower-rank officers who,
with the support of the urban crowd, demanded that the poor Portuguese immigrants should be
expelled (Pereira da Costa, 1983-1985: 251, 274). But in the following months, the Regency
decided to diminish the size of the army. Scores of soldiers also supported the Abrilada, for they
had been dismissed without compensation and roamed the streets of Recife.2 One of the officers
arrested in the Abrilada was the Major of the corps of black freedmen of Pernambuco (the
Henriques).3
1
Army officers involved in the Abrilada also resented the fact that they had not been invited
to the recently created Municipal Guard, which was in charge of police work in the province.4 It
was commanded by civilians, although all army officers were summoned to enlist, or lose their
wages.5 In January 17th, 1832, army officers lost their privilege to be tried by military courts in case
of political crimes (Werneck Sodré, 1965: 120). When the Abrilada rebels failed to seize the major
fortresses of Recife, the mutiny was doomed. The remaining rebels, a couple of hundred people,
marched to the countryside, where they found protection among some cattle ranchers and plantation
owners. The major restorationist leaders in the countryside were captains and sergeants major of the
colonial Ordenanças, who had plantations in the border of Pernambuco and Alagoas provinces.6
They had lost part of their prestige due to the reforms of 1828-31, that created the justice of peace
and the National Guard, who would perform most of the tasks of former captains and sergeants
majors.
One them was Captain Major Domingos Lourenço Torres Galindo (Pereira da Costa, 198385: 487. Aragão, 1983: 146), a plantation owner who had lost the 1829 elections for the local justice
of peace. He had lost the Nevertheless, in 1830, he still kept his armed retinue and behaved as if
there were no justice of the peace in his area of influence to do the necessary police work. He
arrested and released people at his will.7 After the fall of Pedro I, the provincial government dared
to confront him.8 Restorationist manifestoes were circulating in Vitória in February, 1832.9 It was
Galindo who recruited a modest rancher in the district of Panelas, Antônio Timóteo de Andrade,
who would become a Cabano leader. Called a "nigger" (negro) by state official,10 Timóteo was
soon killed in combat. But his brother, João Timóteo, became one of the major rebel leaders
(Andrade, 1965: 49). They brought the Indians and peasants around the district of Panelas to the
rebel (Callado, 1981: 136, 181).11
In the frontier between Pernambuco and Alagoas, there were many planters who supported
the Abrilada. The Army that Pedro I had sent from Rio de Janeiro to crush the 1824 liberal rebellion
disembarked there. Planters who helped the imperial army were compensated by the Crown with
land grants and other benefits. Sergeant Major Manoel Affonso de Mello received a medal for his
bravery then.12 His enemies said he seized the opportunity to grab land and property from those
who supported the 1824 republican government.13 Lieutenant Colonel João Batista de Araújo also
helped to assemble troops near the frontier of Pernambuco and Alagoas. He had been dismissed
after the downfall of Pedro I. Araújo also received a medal from the Crown in 1824.14 Mello and
Araújo assembled hundreds of men and were also in contact with the Indians of Jacuípe.15
The troops who were sent from Recife to fight them were led by two men who had
supported the 1824 liberal rebellion.16 Most if not all of the planters who went to fight against the
"restorationist" rebels had lands in the area of the conflict, including the new Comandante das
Armas, Major José Joaquim da Silva Santiago, who had also been a rebel in 1824. In 1832, he
would finally have a chance to fight again against his local enemies.17 From April to August, 1832,
the Abrilada leaders were hunted down by a small army of more than a thousand well armed men.18
By late 1832, Araújo, Affonso de Mello and other leaders had been arrested.
By late 1832, there was not much left of a restorationist rebellion led by army officers and
plantation owners. However, Indians, peasants, and slaves who were involved swarmed over a wide
area of Southeast Pernambuco and Northeast of Alagoas. That was the Cabanada. Its major leader
was Vicente de Paula, a son of priest, whose past is shadowy. He had been brought to rebellion by
Antônio Timóteo, the rancher mentioned above, who, in turn, had become a rebel under the
influence of Captain Major Galindo.19 Many cabanos used shirts dyed to the color of red wine
(camisas tintas).20 They fought bravely and seldom left their dead on the battlefield. Ostensibly they
were fighting to restore Pedro I. But they continued to fight even after Pedro died in Portugal in
September, 1834. By then, the army was employing a scorched-earth policy against them. By mid
1835, with the help of the Bishop and several priests, and a promised amnesty to rebels (except the
leadership and slaves), the Cabanos finally gave up the fight.
2
The Cabanada cannot be understood without reference to the existing clientelistic networks.
Peasants, squatters, landless workers and Indians joined those networks as a strategy to have access
to land, or to keep those they already had. Neither the rural nor the urban clientele obeyed for free.
Obeyence had a price. Clientelism is not a given, but a relationship. Both sides have their
motivations to participate in the game. Landowneres pushed as far as they coud. But the rural poor
resisted, held on to their traditional rights or tried to conquer new ones. The reforms of 1827
through 1831, which created the Justice of Peace and National Guard help us to understand
clientelism. Holding one of those positions could make a difference in local politics, but it was very
important to be a member of the ruling faction at the provincial level. For example, it was useless to
complain about João Batista de Araújo, as long as his allies were in power in Alagoas. However, as
soon as Araújos allies fell, troops were sent against him. The case of Torres Galindo is similar. As a
powerful landlord, he could pose as captain major, in spite of the elections for the justice of peace
and the formal disappearance of his post. But as soon as his enemies rose to power, much stronger
forces from Recife were sent against him.
There is no reason to believe the Cabano leaders escaped the clientelistic networks. Vicente
de Paula, the major leader of the slave runaways and the “people of the forests” involved in the
Cabanada, had been a sergeant in the Ordenanças. He may have been a subordinate of Ordenanças
Captain Antônio Timóteo, who was the man who convinced him to rebel. As for Timóteo, he was
brought into the insurrection by Domingos Torres Galindo, a Captain Major, the highest officer in
the Ordenanças hierarchy. Later, Vicente would sigh his manifestoes an correspondence as
“General” of the Cabanos, but he refered to his troops as "Ordenanças," thus maintaining the
colonial militia hierarchy throughout the rebellion.21 The fact that he became a “General”, in his
own words, is part of the dynamics of clientelism. Although the relationship between the client and
the patron is unequal, it is not a given. It is a dynamic relationship. The frontier, eventually, may
move in favor of the client, who may become a political boss himself.
Not even the Indians escaped that network. Throughout the colonial era they had been
employed and paid to fight against maroons and other enemies of the landed aristocracy. In
Pernambuco, they had helped to defeat both the Dutch, in 1654 and the Palmares quilombo in 1695.
Indians had their own "captains," who were subordinated to local civilian authorities. According to
the President of Pernambuco, in 1827, they were extremely poor and divided into several small
groups. He also observed that they had participated in the political events of recent years, fighting
for both contending factions. This only served to further "corrupt" them further, for they learned to
steal and kill as they followed the different factions (Pereira da Costa, vol. 9: 238-239).22 The
Indians of Jacuípe fought on the Crown side in 1824. Their captain received a medal. This helped
them to keep their land and the surrounding forests safe from the expansion of the plantations
nearby.23 In 1832, their clientelistic networks would lead them to ally with local power bosses such
as Araújo, Mello, and Timóteo.24 Trops were sent against them, in order to draft all men aged
eighteen to twenty-five. The Indians rose in rebellion.25 Thereafter, the Jacuípe Indians became the
most "ferocious" Cabanos. 26
The troops that went to fight against Araújo, Timóteo, Galindo and Mello were commanded
by local landowners who seized the opportunity to evict the rural population and the Indians from
their lands. In spite of constant requests, no significant number of National Guardsmen from
faraway plantations participated in the war against the Cabanos. Landlords who could not expand
their holdings in the area of the Cabanada had no incentive to send their retainers to fight the rebels.
For that reason, the Provincial Assembly of Pernambuco was right to say that, in April of 1835, one
of the major reasons for the war, was the presence of the troops themselves.27 Not all Cabanos were
evicted peasants, but a large number of them were expelled by the invading army from Recife, with
the support of local planters.
Once the Cabano had been mobilized by local power bosses, they were the first victims of
the invading army of landlords with their National Guardsmen. The state financed their troops,
cavalry, and weapons. At least until early 1833, few army units were employed against the
3
Cabanos. The personal retainers of local landlords and the Municipal Guard from Recife were the
core of the invading troops, who amounted to 1,240 men in the Jacuípe River Valley, in September,
1832.28 In the following year, a full battallion of army soldiers, who were serving prison sentences
at Fernando de Noronha island, joined the fight against the Cabanos. Army troops from Rio de
Janeiro and Ceará also arrived in early 1833. By June, 1833, roughly 800 army troops were fighting
against the Cabanos, but the private retinues of landlords had increased to more than 3,000 men.29
Those troops were very unreliable. They often deserted, carrying their weapons with them,
proving that clients chose to disobey when the risks were too high. In some cases they deserted not
to their homes, but to join the Cabanos. Drafted very near the area of the rebellion, the “guardas
nacionais” were reluctant to fight against the rural poor who could as well have been themselves.
By late 1832, landlords complained it was becoming increasingly difficult to muster troops. Nobody
wished to fight against the Cabanos, unless they were paid the same wage the President of
Pernambuco was paying to the Municipal Guard of Recife, which had increased from 400 réis in
December, 1831, to 500 réis in April, 1832, and finally to 600 réis per day in December, 1832.30
Eviction was another reason for rebellion for the legislation did not grant any protection to
those who lived in public lands. Many peasants may also have lost their lands and were pushed into
the forests. The best ecological conditions for sugar cane was in the southern Zona da Mata. Sugar
plantations occupied most of the land near the coast, and in the valley of the major rivers, up until
where they were navigable by the rafts which brought sugar boxes to the coast. Nevertheless, it was
precisely in the frontier of Pernambuco and Alagoas, near the Jacuípe Valley that the plantations
could still advance in the late 1820's. This was demonstrated in 1829, when a member of the
Council of Government of Pernambuco, gave a formal legal opinion about the need to bring
Europeans immigrants to Pernambuco. He stated that the only area that still had available fertile
lands for the expanding plantations was in the Jacuípe Valley.31 Incidentally, the man who wrote
these words, Manoel Zeferino dos Santos would become president of Pernambuco in October, 1832,
exactly when the fight was becoming most intense. It is worth mentioning that both the families of
Santos and Colonel Santiago, the Commander of Arms during Santos' government, owned land at
the site of the Cabanada.32
In 1829, the slave trade was about to become illegal, according to the treaties between Brazil
and England. According to the President of the Province, Thomaz Garcia de Almeida, the best
solution for the coming scarcity of labor was to replace slaves with Indians.33 In the following year
he repeated the same argument in his inaugural address.34 After the fall of Pedro I, President
Francisco de Carvalho Paes de Andrade, leader of the liberal faction, repeated the message.35
Neither Presidents indicated in their speeches if they intended to enslave the Indians or to employ
them as free workers, but according to Abbey Luís Ferreira Portugal, also a member of the Council
of Government of Pernambuco, in 1830, Indians needed protection. In several instances they were
being forced to work in Pernambuco as if they were slaves.36
In the following years, the sugar industry invaded the area where the Cabanada started. In
1846, the President of Pernambuco requested the Minister of the Empire to make Água Preta, on the
northern limit of the forests, a separate county. He recalled many people there had been Cabanos
and were still "savages", in his words, in 1846. Some of the greatest battles of the Cabanada were
fought nearby, but once the Cabanos were crushed, the area had grown relatively wealthy.37 In
1846, Eisenberg counted at least 44 engenhos there (Eisenberg, 1974: 242). In the early 1830's the
district of Água Preta was occupied by subsistence farmers and forests, while the plantations were
mostly nearer the coast.
Some planters in the area of the conflict were among the best known opponents of the
Cabanos. Feliciano Joaquim dos Santos, José Antonio Correia Pessoa de Mello, José Pedro and his
nephew Pedro Ivo Veloso da Silveira, and Luís Beltrão Mavignier, commanded troops against the
Cabanos. The clans of Manoel Zeferino dos Santos, President of the Province after November 1832,
and of the Commander of Arms, Colonel José da Silva Santiago, also owned engenhos in the area.
4
They did not get along well, to the point that both asked the Regency at Rio de Janeiro to fire each
other. In those letters, the President of Pernambuco complained that the Commander of Arms was
using the Cabanada as an excuse to attack and plunder an engenho of his family.38
During the rebellion, the Cabanos were not just raiding engenhos. They actually attempted
to conquer sites which were nearer the coast and outside the forests. The forests offered them
protection, but in some instances they acted as if they had been pushed into the forest by the first
incursions of the "liberal," or “jacobin” troops as Vicente de Paula referred to the landowners army
in 1832. The troops pushed the Cabanos into the forests in order to starve them. But it was fruitless,
for they soon learned to live off lizards and mushrooms.39
In summary, the sequence of events is as follows: First, the attacks of the government troops
were directed against Torres Galindo in Vitória and Pau d'Alho, and on the frontier between
Pernambuco and Alagoas against Manoel Affonso de Melo and João Batista de Araújo (Andrade,
1965: 48).40 However, Araújo, Melo, and Galindo soon moved to Panelas, where they joined
Thimóteo and found a more defensible position.41 In September they were already moving through
the jungle from Panelas to Jacuípe and Água Preta, where they could hide and benefit from the hills
and forests, and later return in their sorties southwest of the forests, in the plantation areas of Rio
Formoso and Porto Calvo.42 In October, the authorities decided to draft the Indians of Jacuípe. Their
reaction to the compulsory draft was a perfect excuse to evict them. Those Indians rose in open
rebellion. By November, Araújo, Mello and Galindo had been arrested and most of the senhores de
engenho gave up the fight for the restoration of Pedro I.
Nonetheless, it was after November 1832, that the fight became bloodier. Thereafter the
reports to the Comando das Armas started to mention constant attacks of "savages" and "bandits"
against the headquaters south of the forests. At this point, Vicente de Paula became infamous, not
only for his obvious expertise as a commander, but also for “stealing” slaves from the engenhos in
the vicinity of the forests. Slaves are not cattle. They are people who may choose, or not, to be
“stolen”. There is no evidence that Vicente de Paula ever sold any of the so-called stolen slaves who
fought on his side. If he had done that, he would have become a rich man. His most faithful troops
during the Cabanada, the “papa-méis”, was formed of slave runaways and stolen slaves. Actually, it
is difficult to differentiate them. Scores of slaves fled from plantations near the area of the conflict
in order to join the Cabanos. During the Cabanada his few allies who were landowners never felt
comfortable about his leadership. Serafim Soares, maybe the last landowner to give up the fight,
told the commander of the government troops that he did not like Vicente de Paula´s leadership, for
"he had never enjoyed the company of niggers" (nunca gostou da companhia de negros).43 Vicente
de Paula continued to “steal” slaves after the defeat of the Cabanada. But, according to, to Frei
Messina, a Friar who met him in 1842, he was a very poor man (Andrade, cap. VII, passim).44
Throughout the rebellion, the Cabanos tried to conquer the site in the Jacuípe valley where
the government troops established its headquaters. Within a few months, they were hiding further
into the hills and forests in the province of Alagoas, where they were not always followed by the
troops.45 They also attacked the villages of Barra Grande and Porto Calvo, but their major target
was the Jacuípe-based headquaters. The Jacuípe river valley was the home of the Indians who
followed Vicente de Paula. The Cabanos seized and subsequently lost that position several times
through the war.46 According to the authorities, they always returned.47
The strategy of the Cabanos was clear: They attempted to reconquer the lands in the fringes
of the coastal plantations, and later hid in the forests and hills further west.48 By late 1832 few of
the Cabano landowners, such as “Colonel Barrinhos” (Manoel Joaquim de Barros) and “Major
Vicentinho” (Vicente Ferreira de Santana), were still commanding troops. There were others who
still helped the Cabanos, but the major leader was already Vicente de Paula, a poor man. It is fair to
assume that landowners who supported Vicente de Paula did so as a means to check their local
enemies, but most Cabanos were defending themselves against the draft and eviction.
5
The authorities were not capable of winning a clear victory. In March, 1834, they changed
the strategy and put 4,000 troops around an area stretching from Porto Calvo to Sirinhaém, in the
coast, until roughly sixty kilometers inland (ten leagues) in Água Preta. They spread proclamations
ordering the people to settle elsewhere, or otherwise be treated as Cabanos. Those who appeared at
Água Preta and gave up their weapons were forgiven. Hundreds of starving women and children
were “forgiven”, but left unattended. In March, the government troops started to operate in the area,
shooting at anybody on sight and destroying all food crops they found.49 Nevertheless, in May
1834, the Cabanos were still able (for the last time) to seize the Jacuípe Arraial.50
By January, 1835, 862 men, in addition to an uncounted number of women and children,
had given up the fight and showed up at Água Preta.51 However, many did not. In May, 1835, the
commander of the government troops claimed that he had made 1,072 prisoners, and killed 2,326
since June 1834, in addition to an uncounted number of Cabanos who died of hunger and illness in
the forest.52 The remaining Indians of Jacuípe had showed up and given up the fight in April of
1835, in addition to another 398 people.53 Several priests were already in the area trying to to
convince the “people of the forest” to give up the fight, for Pedro had died. In March, he Bishop of
Pernambuco arrived in the area of the conflict and stayed there until the end of July, preaching to
the people who came out the forests.54 The amount of 4,000 réis being paid to those who gave up
their guns, a very cheap price according to the commander of the government troops, but alluring
nonetheless, for all the Cabanos who showed up were ill or suffering from malnutrition.55 In June,
Barrinhos, João Timóteo, Serafim Soares and other Cabano commanders gave up the fight, totalling
another 1,021 men.56 Amnesty had been offered to Vicente de Paula in 1834. But he chose not to
surrender, for the state authorities did not comply with his only two conditions: One, freedom to the
slaves who followed his lead. Two, permission to all his followers to keep their weapons.57 In
1835, the state authorities wished to capture or kill him. His worst crime was to “steal” slaves. In
1833/34, military commanders said that Vicente de Paula led a personal retinue of 600 men, but
Vicente, in 1833, claimed that he commanded over 3.550 men.58 When he fled to the forests of
Alagoas with his slave runaway troops, the authorities estimated that he led only 50 to 150 men.59
The area which had been surrounded had been cleared of Cabanos. The plantations nearby could
expand without problems.
The Cabanada, as long as it lasted, involved landowners, peasants, slave runaways and
Indians. It was an enduring alliance throughout the rebellion. To say that the Cabanos were
involved in a broader clientelistic network is not to say they were incapable of thinking for
themselves. What it means is that the affiliation of the rural poor to different factions of the elites
was a necessary condition for having access to land in the zona da mata of Pernambuco. The
problem was that they were often found on the losing side.
Throughout the Cabanada, the elites emphasized that the peasantry and Indians who rose up
did not do it for ideology, but to steal cattle, horses and food.60 It is fair to assume that for the
“gente das matas”, stealing from their enemies was at least as legitimate as eviction. The landlords
and their troops did much worse to the Cabanos. They burned their harvests and huts, and killed
their animals. They probably did not steal much, for the Cabanos were usually very poor. But that
was not the limit of the Cabanos' political ideas. In their manifestoes, they stated that they were
fighting for the restoration of Pedro I to the Brazilian throne. Andrade and Lindoso disagreed over
the motivations of the rebels. Why were dislocated Indians, slave runaways and peasants fighting
for the sake of an Emperor who had done nothing to improve their lot?
For Andrade the Cabanada was "sui generis," because peasants, Indians and escaped slaves
comprised its cadres, but its professed aims were reactionary. He explains that was an apparent
paradox because there was no chance of upward mobility for those men, at a time when the elites
were failing to maintain the balance of power among themselves. Once the rebellion started, it was
the fear of retaliation and the strong leadership of Vicente de Paula which kept the Cabanos fighting
(Andrade, 1965: 197-212). For Lindoso, the contradiction between the cadres of the rebellion and
their stated purposes was not a real one. Rather it was a result of the ideological nature of the
6
sources left by those who quashed the insurrection. For Lindoso, their restorationist purposes was a
way to disguise the real intents of the rebellion, which, for him, was abolitionist and antilatifundium (Lindoso, 1983: 80-81). For Lindoso that apparent contradiction was resolved in
practice, because, after the rebellion, the Cabanos created an alternative space, where they revived
Indian traditions mixed with African ones, creating a unique society.
As noted by Gledhill (2007), the literature on resistance tended to ignore “popular
movements that appeared to be reactionary by traditional Left standards”. Maybe that explains why
it was so difficult to come to grips with the said purposes of the Cabanos: to restore Pedro I in the
Brazilian throne. In his manifestoes and letters, Vicente de Paula made clear this restorationist
intent and his opposition to the “Jacobins”, who, for him, were against the king and the cross. Under
the leadership of the “Comandante” or “General” of all forests (“todas as matas”), or even more
pompous, Comandante Geral do Imperial Exército de Sua Majestade Imperial Dom Pedro I,61 the
Cabanos fought so bravely that, there is no reason to believe Vicente de Paula was lying to deceive
his enemies from his true intentions, that he professed a restorationist ideology just for the lack of a
discourse of his own. Rather, restoration for the Cabanos had a particular meaning, which was not
the same as that of the Abrilada officers and landowners. Vicente de Paula was not a Bachelor of
Laws but he could write, however poorly. Years later, a President of Alagoas who met him,
admitted that he was not as ignorant as his enemies had portrayed. Vicente's manifestoes confirm
that. Contrary to landowners, who were appointed to high posts in the militias according to their
wealth, Vicente rose to power through personal bravery, military skill and personal charisma. He
ended the Cabanada as de facto general of all the people of the forests, the “gente da mata”,
although he was never an officer in the militias or in the Ordenanças. Very often his enemies called
him a “caudilho. The Cabanos understood local and national politics in their own terms, and they
were able to state that through the manifestoes signed by Vicente de Paula.
It is fair to assume that, for the Cabanos, the return of Pedro I had a different meaning from
that of the Abrilada army officers. The Abrilada rebels wished to keep the jobs, prerogatives and
privileges they had had during the reign of Pedro I. Vicente de Paula, on the other hand, identified
the "jacobinos" as the men who had brought havoc to the area where he lived. As he said in a letter
to one of his allies, the so-called Jacobins were the ones who burned the houses of the peasantry.62
The men who seized power after the fall of Pedro I benefitted from the reforms of 1827-1831,
which created the justice of peace and the national guard. Thereafter, law was in the hands of local
power bosses. At the time, that was considered a conquest of the liberal House of Representatives
against the Crown (Flory, 1981). Even the army had almost been eliminated as the ultimate source
of authority against seigneurial justice. Instead the peasantry would now be drafted into the
National Guard and do all the police work – certainly an additional burden.
The long standing local political arrangements had been broken after the fall of Pedro I. The
men who seized the government of Pernambuco saw the Abrilada as an opportunity to settle their
account with their enemies in the frontier between Alagoas and Pernambuco. This also meant that
the Indians who had fought against them would also be punished. After the downfall of Pedro I,
even the forests were not protected any longer, as they had been since colonial times when, as
Lindoso observed, the woods were a royal monopoly for naval construction (Lindoso, 1983: 99101). Following an old argument of Barrington Moore, one can say that the Emperor had been
eliminated as the last resort against the encroachments of the landed aristocracy (1967: 21).
However vague that protection could be, the old times – when the common forests still had some
legal protection, when the rural poor were not being pushed into these forests, when peasants had to
do obeisance to a few captains major instead of scores of justices of the peace – seemed to have
been better. For the Indians, their cooperation with the crown in 1824 had been advantageous to
them until the fall of Pedro I. Thereafter, they were facing the draft and eviction from the Jacuípe
valley. The troops sent against them in 1832 were mostly formed by the retinues of landowners who
were interested in seizing lands in the area of the conflict. According to the Commander of the
7
troops employed against the Cabanos, the rebels were also expecting further compensation from
Pedo I, after his restoration.63
Rather than withdrawal from society the evidence points that the Cabanos actually wished to
intervene in politics and change it, for they made alliances with merchants in town, who sent them
ammunition, and planters in the countryside. After the defeat of the rebellion, Vicente de Paula still
had an important role in Alagoas politics, as the works of Andrade and Lindoso have demonstrated.
Local power bosses asked his help in their political quarrels. They knew he had a strong following
of men who had learned to fight. Most of the times, however, he was referred by state and local
authorities as a bandit, a slave thief.
Since slaves are people, not cattle, stealing a slave is a very specific type of crime, for the
slave may choose to be stolen or not. A slave who is taken at gunpoint could try to come back to his
or her legal owner. Also, the slave thief, in such cases, would probably try to sell the merchandise to
make a profit. However, slaves fled to join Vicente de Paula, not the other way around. Riachão do
Mato, the community he founded harbored runaway slaves. There is no indication, those “stolen”
slaves were resold. That would be easily done in Pernambuco, if that were the purpose of Vicente
de Paula, who was a powerful political boss, but a poor men up until his arrest in 1850. Thus, even
admitting that slaves were probably assimilated to his community as persons of low statuses, they
were not chattels in Richão do Mato. They could probably climb the social ladder, for the papaméis, the black men battalion, were his best troops.
It would be very romantic to portray Riachão do Mato as an utopia. There were certainly
many problems regarding the co-existence of Indians, ruaway slaves and free peasants. The
Cabanos certainly had their “own politics” (Gledhill, 2007). It is extremely difficult to know the
details of it. But Frei Messina, who visited Riachão in 1842, leaves a clue when he portrayed a
community which included blacks and Indians, living in peace. They were fervorously Catholic,
according to him, but also in their own terms, for they easily divorced when the marriage was not
satisfactory to any of the parties involved. Their leader, Vicente de Paula, may have approached the
social bandit model as described by Eric Hobsbawm (Hobsbawm, 1981: 9-11, 58, 131-142). He was
a thief for the landed aristocracy, but a hero for the slaves he "stole" and the population that lived in
Riachão do Mato, the community he founded after the Cabanada. But that does not mean, their
movement was pre-political, or anything like it. Rather the contrary. The Cabanos were tuned to
local and national politics in a very specific way. They had their own interpretation of the facts. The
return of Pedro I had a specific meaning, which led them to action.
In 1841, to the surprise of the local and state authorities, Vicente de Paula sought a formal
post in the National Guard as the commander of the area where he lived.64 He therefore wished to
be absorbed into the formal hierarchy of the state. That does not mean he abandoned his vocation as
an emancipator. The contrary is true, he continued to "steal slaves" to the point that, in 1845, the
Pernambucan government offered 1:000,000 réis (one million réis) for his capture, the greatest
price put on a head in Pernambuco in the first half of the nineteenth century. If a slave arrested or
killed Vicente, he should be freed and receive that reward, although deducting his own value from
that amount.65 Nobody ever got the prize. That does not mean, there were not people interested.
Even former allies desired that prize. The problem was that Vicente had become a power boss, a
caudillo himself. It was not easy to capture or kill him.
The request of Vicente de Paula, to become a commander of the National Guard, indicates
that the Brazilian national state may have changed in the eyes of the former Cabano leader. That can
be explained by the fact that in 1840, Pedro II, the son of Pedro I, finally became king. The
“Jacobins” had been defeated in the Court in Rio de Janeiro. The Regency had fallen. The Crown
had been restored. The elites denied Vicente de Paula his request for a post in the National Guard
but they sought his help in settling the political quarrels of Alagoas in 1844, when he invaded the
capital town of the province with a cavalry 400 men, changing the balance of power to one of the
local factions (Andrade, 1965: 193-194). Again, in 1848, when landowners in Pernambuco started
8
yet another war between themselves for the local government, both factions sought his support,
writing deferential letters to a man they had constantly called a thief.66 Obviously each party later
alleged how dishonest the other had been in calling on such a "bandit." (Andrade, 1965: 194-195
Pessoa de Mello, 1849: 123-124. Melo Rego, 1899: 34. Figueira de Mello, 1850: 128). However,
Vicente preferred to remain a "thief of slaves" until his final arrest in 1850, which was only possible
because the President of the Province promised him amnesty, luring him into a trap. He was
attracted to a meeting that supposedly would serve to regularize his situation and that of his
dependents, although it was never said exactly how. The fact that he accepted the meeting, indicates
that the Brazilian state had become stronger, hegemonic. Even former enemies, such as the Cabano
leader, accepted the rules of the political game. Like so many other popular leaders, he was
betrayed, but at least he was not killed (Melo Rego, 1899: 175-178).67 He spent eleven years on the
prison island of Fernando de Noronha, where he would lead a rebellion of prisioners in 1853.68 He
was finally released in 1861, and returned to Pernambuco as a seventy-year-old man (Melo Rego,
1899: 212).
Riachão do Mato had peasants and Indians, in addition to “stolen” slaves. Vicente de Paula
was not a maroon leader. It is significant to note again that throughout the Cabanada and in the
following years, government sources refer to him with contempt not only as a bandit but also as a
caudilho. As such, in 1848 he had a chance to legalize his situation by alleging with the
conservative party leaders, when they sought for his support against the Praieira Rebellion. But he
chose not to help. Rather he used the opportunity to attack and rip off engenhos, steal cattle and take
slaves with him (Rego, 1899: 76).69 As a unique type of caudilho he seemed to be fairly well
acquainted with local and national politics, or at least as well acquainted as most landowners at the
time. Vicente de Paula was a free man who commanded over a multi-ethnic population which may
have exceeded a thousand people in the early 1840's.
Sources usually refer to the population he led as the “gente da mata” (people of the forest), a
precise term for a mélange of former slaves, Indians and free and freed poor men and women. Due
to the extreme violence employed against the Cabanos, it is difficult to say all of them were actually
forest dwellers before the Cabanada. It is perfectly possible that many were pushed into the forests
by the troops that hunted them down. One way or another, although they did not attack again
Jacuípe, Porto Calvo and Barra Grande, they were able to keep their way of life – including their
particular marriage and divorce practices – and their lands in the province of Alagoas, where the
railroads took longer to be built. The area where the former Cabanos lived in Pernambuco, however,
the forests of Água Preta, started to be conquered by the plantations economy soon after the
rebellion was crushed. In the late 1850´s the railroad built its way through the forests, from the
capital town of Recife to Água Preta, finally winning the war against the forests and its people. In
the late 19th century, the plantation economy had reached that district. The hills up west, however
were not appropriate for larger plantations. Today, one can still see parts of the forests where the
“gente das matas” dwelled.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Andrade, Manuel Correia de. A Guerra dos Cabanos, Rio de Janeiro, Conquista, 1965, pp. 34-38.
Aragão, José. História de Vitória de Santo Antão, Recife, FIAM/CEHM, 1983.
Cabral de Mello, Evaldo A outra Independência, o federalismo pernambucano, 1817 a 1824, São
Paulo, Editora 34, 2004.
Callado, João Pereira. História de Lagoa dos Gatos, Recife, FIAM, Centro de Estudos de História
Municipal, 1981.
Costa Porto, José da. O Sistema Sesmarial no Brasil, Brasília: UNB, n.d.
Diegues Júnior, Manoel. O Banguê das Alagoas, Rio de Janeiro, Instituto do Açúcar e do Álcool,
1960.
9
Eisenberg, Peter. The Sugar Industry in Pernambuco: Modernization Without Change, 1840-1910.
Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of Berkeley Press, 1974.
Figueira de Mello, Jerônimo Martiniano. Crônica da Rebeliao Praieira: 1848-1849, Recife: 1850;
reprint ed., Brasília: Senado Federal, 1978.
FLORY, Thomas. Judge and Jury in Imperial Brazil, 1808-1871: Social Control and Political
Stability in the New State. Austin e Londres, University of Texas Press, 1981.
Gledhill, “Recognizing Resistance”, Paper presented to the Seminar Paper to be presented at the
conference “Rethinking Histories of resistance in Brazil and Mexico”, Salvador,2007.
Hobsbawm, Eric. Bandits, New York, Random House, 1981.
Lindoso, Dirceu. A Utopia Armada: Rebeliões de Pobres nas Matas do Tombo Real, Rio de Janeiro,
Paz e Terra, 1983.
Mello Rego, G. A Revolução Praieira, Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa Nacional, 1899.
Montenegro, João Alfredo de Sousa. (1976) Ideologia e Conflito no Nordeste Rural, Rio de Janeiro,
Tempo Brasileiro.
Moore Jr., Barrigton. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the
Making of the Modern World, Boston, Beacon, 1967.
Pereira da Costa, Francisco Augusto. Anais Pernambucanos. Recife: Fundarpe, 1983-1985, vol. 9.
Pessoa de Mello, Urbano Sabino. Apreciação da Revolta Praieira em Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro,
1849; reprint ed., Brasília: Senado Federal, 1978.
Quintas, Amaro, "O Nordeste, 1825-1850", in Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (Ed.), História Geral da
Civilização Brasileira, São Paulo, Difel, 1985, vol. 2, tomo II, pp.---.
Melo Rego, G. A Rebelião Praieira, Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa Nacional, 1899.
Werneck Sodré, Nélson. História Militar do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, Civilização Brasileira, 1965.
1
After Pedro I closed the Brazilian Constitutional Assembly, in 1823, a group of liberals seized the government of
Pernambuco. They defended federalism. Pedro I sent the navy, closing Pernambuco´s harbour and landed an army in
the frontier between Pernambuco and Alagoas. The Pernambucan liberals declared their independence, forming the
Confederação do Equador, which did not have the support of all the local aristocracy. The rebellion was crushed.
Pedro´s allies were granted noble status and received several other benefits from the crown. (Cabral de Mello, 2004)
2
"Correspondência Oficial," 04/17/1832, in Diário de Pernambuco (Recife), 04/26/1832. ANRJ (Arquivo Nacional, Rio
de Janeiro), Ministério do Exército, IG1 270, 04/17/1832.
3
ANRJ, Ministério do Exército, IG1 270, 04/17/1832.
4
APEJE (Arquivo Público Estadual de Pernambuco, Jordão Emerenciano), Atas do Conselho de Governo 2,
01/11/1832, 01/18/1832.
5
Ordem do Dia of 02/09/1832 in Diário de Pernambuco (Recife), 02/16/1832.
6
All healthy men from the age of 14 to 65 were enrolled in the Corpos de Ordenanças, and could be summoned in time
of war.
7
APEJE, Atas do Conselho de Governo de Pernambuco 2, 03/30/1830. Juízes Ordinários 2, 04/20/1830. Diário de
Pernambuco (Recife), 05/13/1831. Diário de Pernambuco (Recife), 07/06/1831.
8
APEJE, Ofícios do Governo 34, 02/27/1832.
9
APEJE, Ofícios do Governo 34, 02/29/1832, 04/09/1832.
10
ANRJ, Ministério da Justiça, IJ1 694, 09/24/1832.
11
BNRJ (Biblioteca Nacional, Rio de Janeiro), Seção de Manuscritos, I-32, 11, 2, 08/13/1832, 09/14/1832, 09/28/1832.
12
Publicações do Arquivo Nacional (Rio de Janeiro), 1931, 22: 344-349.
13
APEJE, Correspondência da Corte 32, 03/14/1831.
14
Publicações do Arquivo Nacional (Rio de Janeiro), 1931, 22: 344-349.
15
"Correspondência Oficial," 06/02/1831 in Diário de Pernambuco (Recife), 07/02/1831. Ibid., 07/12/1831, 08/04/1831.
ANRJ, Ministério do Império, IJJ9 280, 06/20/1831. APEJE, Presidentes de Província 8, 05/02/1832.
16
ANRJ, Ministério do Exército, IG1 270, 04/19/1832, 04/20/1832, IG1 05/05/1832. Diário de Pernambuco (Recife),
05/04/1832.
17
ANRJ, Ministério do Exército, IG1 270, 04/19/1832, 11/22/1832. APEJE, Atas do Conselho de Governo 2,
08/07/1832.
18
APEJE, Presidentes de Província 8, 07/05/1832.
19
Diário de Pernambuco (Recife), 12/08/1832.
20
BNRJ, Seção de Manuscritos, I-32, 11, 2, 11/28/1833. ANRJ, Ministério da Justiça, IJ1 694, 02/20/1833.
10
See for example: ANRJ, Ministério do Exército, IG1, Portarias of 09/01/1833 and 11/20/1832.
The Indians chose who they would support, according to their own interests. When they chose the winning side, they
could keep their lands and gained favors from the provincial government. The Indians of Barreiros district, for
example, fought against the Cabanos to their own advantage (Carvalho, 1996).
23
Publicações do Arquivo Nacional (Rio de Janeiro), 1931, 22: 344-349.
24
APEJE, Presidentes de Província 8, 08/27/1832, 09/04/1832, 10/24/1832. ANRJ, Ministério da Justiça, IJ1 694,
08/29/1832, 11/03/1832. BNRJ, I-32, 11, 2, 09/11/1832, 09/14/1832.
25
ANRJ, Ministério da Justiça, IJ1 694, 11/03/1832.
26
ANRJ, Ministério do Exército, IG1 94, 04/04/1835.
27
ANRJ, Ministério do Exército, IG1 94, 04/30/1835.
28
APEJE, Presidentes de Província 8, 09/19/1832. In addition to that corps there were also several garrisons throughout
the counties of Rio Formoso and Água Preta. ANRJ, Ministério do Exército, IG1 65, 12/10/1832, 12/19/1832.
29
ANRJ, Ministério do Exército, IG1 65, 02/25/1833, 04/15/1833, 05/15/1833, 08/25/1833, 08/31/1833. BNRJ, I-32,
11, 2, "Proclamação" of 03/16/1834; 02/01/1834.
30
APEJE, APEJE, Correspondência da Corte 12/03/1831; Atas do Conselho de Governo 2, 04/26/1832. ANRJ,
Ministério do Exército, IG1 65, 05/29/1832 12/10/1832.
31
"Parecer", in APEJE, Atas do Conselho de Governo de Pernambuco 2, 08/11/1829.
32
ANRJ, Ministério do Exército, IG1 65, 05/25/1833. Diário de Pernambuco (Recife), 10/13/1832.
33
"Relatório a Assembléia Provincial," 12/01/1829, in O Cruzeiro (Recife), 167: December of 1829.
34
IAHGPE (Instituto Arqueológico, Histórico e Geográfico Pernambucano, Recife), estante A, gaveta 12, "Relatório a
Assembléia Provincial," 12/01/1830.
35
"Relatório a Assembléia Provincial," 12/01/1831, in Diário de Pernambuco (Recife), 12/05/1831.
36
APEJE, Atas do Conselho de Governo de Pernambuco 2, 04/01/1830.
37
APEJE, R 7-1, Ministério da Justiça, 04/15/1846.
38
ANRJ, Ministério da Guerra, IG-1 270, 07/13/1833, 07/25/1833; IG-1 65, 02/27/1833, 15/05/1833, 25/05/1833,
06/12/1833, 07/27/1833.
39
BNRJ,I-32, 11, 2, 09/28/1832, 01/15/1834. ANRJ, Ministério do Exército, IG1, 05/01/1834, 05/24/1834.
40
BNRJ, I-32, 11, 2, 05/09/1832.
41
BNRJ, Seção de Manuscritos, I-32, 11, 2, 09/14/1832.
42
ANRJ, Ministério da Justiça, IJ1 694, 09/17/1832.
43
ANRJ, Ministério da Guerra, IG1 94, 05/24/1835.
44 IAHGPE, Estante A, Gaveta 16, 26/11/1842.
45
BNRJ, Seção de Manuscritos, II-32, 2, 2, 12/10/1832.
46
BNRJ, Seção de Manuscritos, I-32, 11, 2, 12/13/1832, 03/03/1834.
47
BNRJ, Seção de Manuscritos, I-32, 11, 2, 03/21/1834.
48
See for example: BNRJ, Seção de Manuscritos, I-3, 2, 09/11/1832, 11/05/1832, 01/17/1833, 04/21/1833, 05/31/1833,
06/17/1833, 08/26/1833, 08/31/1833, 12/28/1833, 01/12/1834, 02/21/1834.
49
ANRJ, Ministério da Guerra, IG1 270, 05/07/1834; IG1 94, 05/24/1834.
50
ANRJ, Ministério da Guerra, IG1 94, 05/18/1834.
51
ANRJ, Ministério da Guerra, IG1 270, 05/07/1835; IG1 94, 05/24/1834, 01/05/1835.
52
ANRJ, Ministério da Guerra, IG1 65, 05/19/1835; IG1 94,
53
ANRJ, Ministério da Guerra, IG1 94, 04/03/1835, 04/13/1835, 04/24/1835, 05/15/1835.
54
ANRJ, Ministério da Guerra, IG1 94, 04/04/1834; IG1 270, 07/31/1835.
55
ANRJ, Ministério da Guerra, IG1 94, 04/24/1835.
56
ANRJ, Ministério da Guerra, IG1 270, 06/11/1835.
57
ANRJ, Ministério da Guerra, IG1 94, 04/04/1835.
58
BNRJ, I-32, 11, 2, 10/08/1833.
59
ANRJ, Ministério da Guerra, IG1 270, 06/22/1835; IG1 94, 08/11/1835, 10/20/1835.
60
O Harmonizador (Recife), 03/12/1832. Diário da Administração de Pernambuco (Recife), 04/12/1833.
61
See letter of Vicente de Paula in ANRJ, Ministério da Guerra, IG1 94, 09/01/1833.
62
BNRJ, Seção de Manuscritos, I-32, 11, 2, 08/10/1833.
63
ANRJ, Ministério da Guerra, IG-1 270, 13/07/1833.
64
APEJE, Polícia Civil 4, 10/30/1841, 10/14/1841, 11/29/1842.
65
APEJE, R 1-2, Reservados, 08/28/1845.
66
See documents in Autos do Inquérito da Revolução Praieira, Brasília, Senado Federal, 1979, pp. 40, 313. APEJE,
Ofícios Reservados, R 18-5, 02/11/1849.
67
Diário de Pernambuco (Recife), 05/05/1850.
68
APEJE, Seção de Impressos, "Relatório do Presidente José Bento da Cunha Figueredo a Assembléia Provincial em
1854."
69
See also APEJE, "Relatório do Presidente da Província Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão à Assembléia Provincial,"
05/18/1850.
21
22
11