A Motor Theory of Bodily Action?, Hong
Yu Wong
From: 2013-04-10 To:2013-04-10
Activity previously assigned to the now archived group MLAG (2013 - 2015)
Research Line: Modern & Contemporary Philosophy
Research Group: Mind, Language & Action
Published At: 30/11/-0001
MLAG Research Seminar - Invited Session
Hong Yu Wong (Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, Tübingen)
A Motor Theory of Bodily Action?
10 de Abril, 14.30h - 16.30h, Sala de Reuniões
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto
Abstract:In this talk I will argue against all major accounts of action in the philosophical literature. The unifying theme will be
that all extant accounts either failure to capture the intrinsic agentive character of bodily action (the standard causal
accounts; Davidson and followers) or attempt to assimilate it to some form of mental action (volitionism and trying theory;
Hornsby 1980, McCann 1998). I will then explore whether examining the operation of the motor system itself - something
philosophers have not yet done - might give us some insight into the agentive character of bodily action. Finally, I will
compare aspects of this motor theory of bodily action with theories of action which also hold that action is intrinsically
agentive, but which understand this in terms of the exercise of self-conscious capacities (Thompson 2010; McDowell 2011).
Contacto: Mattia Riccardi, [email protected]