Slides to Accompany:
Agenda Power in Brazil´s Câmara
dos Deputados, 1989 to 1998
(World Politics 2003)
Octavio Amorim Neto
Graduate School of Economics
Getulio Vargas Foundation
Praia de Botafogo 190
Rio de Janeiro, RJ 22253-900
Brazil
Gary W. Cox
Department of Political Science
University of California, San Diego
La Jolla, Ca 92093-0521
Mathew D. McCubbins
Department of Political Science
University of California, San Diego
La Jolla, Ca 92093-0521
Comparing Predictions of the Relationship
Between Roll Rates and Distance for
the Floor Agenda Model and
Cartel Agenda Model
Legend: (1) O-L, Left Opposition Party; (2) O-M, Moderate
Opposition Party; (3) O-R, Right Opposition Party; (4) G-L, Left
Government Party; (5) G-M, Median Government Party
O-L
G-L
G-M
O-M
Cartel Agenda Model Predictions
Floor Agenda Model Predictions
O-R
Roll Rate
President Sarney (PMDP)
48th Legislature
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Pres. Sarney
PT
PDT
PSDB
PMDB
Party
PTB
PFL
PPB
Roll Rate
President Collor (PRN)
48th Legislature
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Pres. Collor
PT
PDT
PSDB
PMDB
Party
PTB
PFL
PPB
Roll Rate
President Cardoso (PSDB)
49th Legislature
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Pres. Cardoso
PT
PDT
PSDB
PMDB
Party
PTB
PFL
PPB
Roll Rates
President Cardoso (PSDB)
50th Legislature
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Pres. Cardoso
PT
PDT
PSDB
PMDB
Party
PTB
PFL
PPB