Mini-Curso de Economia Política
EESP-FGV, Julho 2014
Filipe Campante
Associate Professor of Public Policy
Harvard Kennedy School
O curso busca expor os alunos ao instrumental básico do campo moderno de Economia
Política, e a aplicações empíricas ilustrando elementos da fronteira de pesquisa atual. A ideia
central é explorar a diversidade de temas estudados por meio dos métodos da Economia
Política, dos efeitos de incentivos eleitorais aos da evolução de normas culturais, passando por
corrupção e impacto de tecnologias de mídia.
Horário: A definir (3 horas de aula diários, num total de 15 horas)
Avaliação: A definir
Livros de referência básica:
Besley, T. Principled Agents: Selection and Incentives in Politics, Oxford University Press,
2006.
Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001) Special Interest Politics, MIT Press.
Persson, T. e G. Tabellini, Political Economics: Explaining Economic Outcomes, MIT Press,
2000.
PROGRAMA
Parte I – Métodos Básicos
1. Modelos básicos de competição eleitoral (Aula 1)
1.1. Framework básico
Teoria do voto, ganhador de Condorcet, equilíbrio do eleitor mediano
Persson e Tabellini, Cap. 2
1.2. Políticos “office-seeking”
Modelo downsiano, modelos de voto probabilístico.
Persson e Tabellini, Cap. 3
1.3. Políticos partidários
Políticos partidários, modelos de cidadão-candidato, identidade dos políticos
Persson e Tabellini, Cap. 5
Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate, (1997), “An Economic Model of Representative
Democracy," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(1), 85-114.
2. Modelos de Agência e Grupos de Interesse (Aula 2)
2.1. Modelos de Agência
Persson e Tabellini, cap. 4
Besley, cap 3 e 4.
2.2. Lobby e Gastos de Campanha
Persson e Tabellini, cap. 7
Grossman e Helpman cap 7, 8 e 9
3. Evidência Empírica (Aula 3)
Eleitor mediano
Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee (2010) “Determinants of Redistributive Politics: An
Empirical Analysis of Land Reforms in West Bengal, India” American Economic Review.
Husted and Kenny (1997), “The effects of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of
government”, Journal of Political Economy, 105: 54-81.
Miller, G. (2008), “Women's Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in
American History”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123:. 1287-1327.
Partidos importam?
Pettersson-Lidbom, Per (2008), "Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes: A RegressionDiscontinuity Approach," Journal of the European Economic Association, 6: 1037–1056.
Ferreira, Fernando and Joseph Gyourko (2009) "Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from
U.S. Cities" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124: 399-422.
Lee, David S., Enrico Moretti, and Matthew Butler, (2004), ”Do Voters Affect or Elect
Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119: 807-860.
Levitt, S. (1996), "How do senators vote? Disentangling the role of voter preferences, party
affiliation, and senator ideology", American Economic Review 86: 425-441.
A identidade dos políticos importa?
Chattopadhyaym, R. and E. Duflo, ”Women as policy makers: Evidence from a Randomized
Experiment in India”, Econometrica 72: 1409-1443.
Pande, R. ”Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for
Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India”, American Economic
Review 93: 1132-1151.
Agência
Dal Bó, Ernesto and Martin Rossi (2011), “Term Length and the Effort of Politicians”,
Review of Economic Studies 78
Ferraz, Claudio e Finan, Frederico. (2011), ”Electoral Accountability and Corruption in Local
Governments: Evidence from the Audit Reports of Local Governments”, American
Economic Review, 101: 1274-1311.
Akhmedov, A., and Zhuravskaya, E. (2004). “Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young
Democracy Setting.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 1301-1338.
Lobbying
Ansolabehere, S., Figueiredo, J. and J. Snyder (2003), “Why is There so Little Money in
U.S.Politics,” Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Blanes i Vidal, Jordi, Mirko Dracaz and Christian Fons-Rosenx (2010), “Revolving Door
Lobbyists”. American Economic Review, 2012, 102: 3731-3748.
Mian, Atif, Amir Sufi and Francesco Trebbi (2010), “The Political Economy of the US
Mortgage Default Crisis”, American Economic Review, 100:1967-98.
Gastos e Contribuiçōes de Campanha
Levitt, Steven (1994) "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign
Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House," Journal of Political Economy, 102:
777-98.
Campante, Filipe and David Yanagizawa-Drott (2014), “Do Campaign Contribution Limits
Matter? Evidence from the McCain-Feingold Act.” Harvard Kennedy School (mimeo)
Parte II – Tópicos em Economia Política
1. Mídia, Informação e Política (Aula 4)
Besley, T. & A. Prat (2006) “Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and
Government Accountability,” American Economic Review 96(3): 720-736.
Campante, Filipe and Quoc-Anh Do (2014), “Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability and
Corruption: Evidence from US States,” American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Campante, F., R. Durante & F. Sobbrio (2013), “Politics 2.0: The Multifaceted Effect of
Broadband Internet on Political Participation,” NBER WP 19029.
Della Vigna, S. & E. Kaplan (2007). “The Fox News Effect,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 122(3): 1187-1234.
Gentzkow, M. (2006).“Television and Voter Turnout,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
121(3): 931-972.
Gentzkow, M. & J. Shapiro (2006). “Media Bias and Reputation,” Journal of Political
Economy 114(2): 280-316.
Gentzkow, M. & J. Shapiro. (2010). “What Drives Media Slant?” Econometrica 78(1): 35-71.
Mullainathan, S. & A. Shleifer (2005). “The Market for News,” American Economic Review
95(4): 1031-1053.
Prat, A. & D. Stromberg (2013). “The Political Economy of Mass Media,” Advances in
Economics and Econometrics: 10th World Congress of the Econometric Society, Vol. II,
Ch. 3.
Snyder, J & D. Stromberg (2010). “Press Coverage and Political Accountability,” Journal of
Political Economy 118(2): 355-408.
Stromberg, D. (2004) “Radio's Impact on Public Spending,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
119(1): 189-221.
2. Cultura (Aula 5)
Guiso, L., P. Sapienza, and L. Zingales (2006) “Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23-48.
Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier (2000), “Beyond the Melting Pot: Cultural Transmission,
Marriage, and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 115: 955-988.
Becker, S. and L. Wolssman (2009) “Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of
Protestant Economic History” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124: 531-596.
Tabellini, G. (2008) “The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 123: 905-950.
Tabellini, G. (2010) “Culture and Institutions: Economic Developments in the Regions of
Europe”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 8: 677–716.
Campante, F. and D. Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) “Does Religion Affect Economic Growth and
Happiness? Evidence from Ramadan”, Harvard Kennedy School (mimeo).