UFRGSMUN 2011
ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM
INTRODUCTION
Created in 1994, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF)
was established as a pan-Asiatic multilateral forum for security issues. Today, the ARF is
one of the most important forums for the international security agenda. Its 27 members
consist of all the participants in the security environment of the Asia-Pacific. As such, it is
perhaps the main hub for confidence building in the region, with Track I and Track II-level
meetings in which defense and foreign ministers participate in rounds of discussion
regarding the major obstacles to peace and stability in Asia.
The Forum comprises now far more members than its parent organization, the
ASEAN. Its 27 members are the ten nations of the ASEAN—Brunei Darussalam,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—plus Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, the
People’s Republic of China, the European Union (with a single representative), India,
Japan, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste and
the United States of America.
The ARF is a forum suited to carry out negotiations where other fora have failed. Its
decisions are made by consensus, further increasing its appeal for the concerned parts.
Thus, the Forum has interesting aspects that differentiate it from other regional and
international organisms. While its creation is an initiative from a regional forum, the wide
array of participants assures the possibility of having debates with conclusions that
transcend the boundaries of Southeast Asia.
UFRGSMUN’s ARF proposes two thrilling and noteworthy topics to be debated by
the delegates. Both of them have large impacts on regional and international security with
effects that go well beyond ASEAN. The first of them is the case of the Korean Peninsula
for the stability in Northeast Asia, which is place of one of the longest contemporary
conflicts—the Korean War—. On the other hand, the second issue deals with stability and
security within ASEAN itself: the situation in Myanmar.
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TOPIC A: Stability in Northeast Asia: the Case of the Korean Peninsula
Bruno Magno, Rômulo Barizon Pitt e Pedro Vinícius Pereira Brites
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1.1 Early History
Due to its strategic location—situated between the Japanese archipelago, Manchuria,
and central China—the Korean Peninsula has been coveted by its powerful neighbors
throughout its history. Even though division had been regularly imposed by conflicting
powers or native rival dynasties, cultural affinities were consistently highlighted in the face
of foreign threats and the Korean people came to stand as a distinct social group with a
rich millennia-old common history.
The Korean history is deeply marked by its relations with Chinese and Japanese
centres of power. As such, foreign influence always played a major role, being represented
as the expansion of ideals such as Confucianism or as the common enemy which unified
Korean interests. Even though Korean governments fought against Chinese forces
regularly, they were being increasingly influenced by Chinese culture, particularly by
Confucianism and Taoism. It is only with the increasing importance of Confucian elements
that a new class emerged, comprised of scholars employed by the ruling aristocracy. The
invention of the Hangul, Korea’s unique alphabet, is attributed to these official scholars.
When Buddhism was introduced into the peninsula in the 4th century, it soon got adopted
as the state religion in an effort of the elites to stand outside the Chinese cultural sphere of
influence. In fact, the Korean ancién regime can be described in its beginning as heavily
feudal, with little to no commerce and with the major part of the population working for
the land-owners (slavery was also present).
As stated before, the Chinese have had great influence over the Korean peninsula.
However, it has managed to retain its independence while displaying respect to its powerful
neighbour. For many centuries, Korea remained largely within the Chinese sphere of
influence. While its boundaries with Manchuria make Korea much closer to Beijing than to
Japan, its overseas neighbour started to tip the balance of regional power by the second
half of the 19th century. In 1876, Japan forced a commercial treaty with Korea, imposing
the first unequal treaty, while Chinese prestige was on a steady decay with the increasingly
ambitious European presence in East Asia.
Japans control over the peninsula was reinforced after the First Sino-Japanese War
(1894–1895), in which the country defeated China, and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–
1905). By the end of the latter, when Japanese troops moved through Korea to attack
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Manchuria, Japan achieved victory and turned Korea into its protectorate in 1905, with the
Eulsa Treaty. Before it, Korea had been shut from the outside world (LEE, 2006). The
Japanese protectorate oversaw the signature of unequal treaties with Japan and, also, with
the USA, which accepted Japanese domination, in exchange for recognition of the similar
influence of the United States over the Philippines (LEE, 2003). .
In 1910, Japan formally annexed the country as its colony and abolished the Joseon
dynasty, the last and longest ruling dynasty in Korea. As the occupation became more and
more harsh and exploitive for the native populace, the society—and more importantly, the
young and educated leaders—became divided between those that chose to collaborate, and
those that chose to resist in armed struggle, however, this Japanese rule introduced vast
social and economic changes, with the construction of modern industries and railroads
(DUDDEN, 2005). The Korean peninsula was ruled by Japan from 1910 until the end of
World War II (WWII). The Japanese colonization was a watershed in Korean history, and
can be credited in great part for setting the social elements that caused the Korean War
(CUMINGS, 2010)
After 1919, a partially recognized provisional Korean government-in-exile, under
Syngman Rhee1, a U.S. educated nationalist leader, was established at Shanghai. Meanwhile
in Northeast China, the Revolutionary Army and the Communist People’s Liberation Army
helped organize patriotic Korean refugees against the Japanese army, who already occupied
parts of China. Led by Kim Il-sung2 the Communists fought the Japanese in Korea and
Manchuria The process culminated with the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. After the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the war merged into the greater conflict of World
War II as a major theatre, known as the Pacific War.
The aftermath of the WWII in East Asia left the country deeply divided. The armed
resistance to Japanese occupation was put forward mainly by the Northeast Anti-Japanese
Alliance, made by communist Chinese and Koreans, while many elements of the scholar
elite were co-opted by the foreign occupants. When the Japanese were defeated, two
governments emerged: One led by Kim Il-sung in the North, associated with the antiJapanese guerrillas, and one in the South, with weaker government framework, that
depended on the administration system left by the Japanese (CUMMINGS, 2010). This
further augmented the divide between the northern and southern regions of the peninsula.
With the end of the war approaching, the USSR declared war against Japan on August 9,
1945. On August 10, the Red Army occupied the northern part of the Korean peninsula, in
accordance with its policy of not allow to any country use Korea as a platform for an attack
Syngman Rhee would become the first president of the Republic of Korea.
Kim Il-sung was a member of the Communist party of Korea, and participated of the ant
Japanese guerrilla. Later, he would become the leader of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
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against it, and halted at the 38th parallel (JONGSOO LEE, 2006). One month later, the
United States established its occupation zone in the south. In a set of events unpredicted
by the Cairo Conference, the country was divided by its new occupants in North and
South. Great economic hardship resulted when trade was blocked, since the regions were
economically interdependent: Industry and trade were concentrated in the North and
agriculture in the South. Also, the Korean participation in the Japanese “Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere”3made its economy but a part of an organic whole.
In December 1945 a joint commission was established by the Moscow Conference.
Its aims were to promote an independent Korea after a five-year trusteeship action
facilitated by both regimes. South Korea convened its first national general elections in
1948, which were boycotted by the Soviets, insisting that the United States should honour
the agreed at the Moscow Conference, Later, in a controversial election process, Syngman
Rhee was elected (although barely), on July 20. The USSR, in turn, supported the
establishment of a communist government in North Korea, led by Kim Il-sung
(BLEIKER, 2005). The main ideas put forward by the joint commission were, then,
completely discarded.
Both Syngman Rhee and Kim Il-sung were determined to reunify Korea under their
own political system. Although reunification talks had continued in the months before the
war, tensions were clearly intensifying, and cross-border conflicts and small incursions took
place along the 38th Parallel.
1.2. The Korean War
After a tense period of constant skirmishes and mutual threats, war erupted in June
25, 1950. Even today it is not clear who made the first move. The fact is that both
governments were preparing for a decisive war that would result in a unified Peninsula.
What is known is that the North organized first a full-scale manoeuvre, and what ensued
was the evident unpreparedness of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA).
The War had three moments: I) the war in the South, when the North was on the
offensive; II) the war in the North, as the United States forces entered the conflict en
masse and pushed the North Korean armies close to the Manchurian border; and III) the
stalemate along the 38th parallel after the entry of China in the conflict and the subsequent
push back of the American-led UN forces.
The guerrilla origins of the northern government made its troops much more
combat-experienced than the disorganized southern forces. Not only the ROKA had an
This concept was created in Japan and determined a wish of establishing a “bloc of Asian nations
led by the Japanese and free of Western powers”.
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acute misconception about the balance of forces in the Peninsula, but also MacArthur’s
command held inaccurate ideas of the situation in Korea.4 Soon after the beginning of the
declared conflict, a great part of the southern forces collapsed due to inability and
unwillingness to fight for the Syngman Rhee’s regime (CUMMINGS, 2010). The offensive
only stopped in the Pusan perimeter, where the forces under direct American control
managed to fend off the attackers. In June, 1950, the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) decided to intervene in order to restore the status quo ante in the Peninsula, with
UNSC Resolution 82.5 In September, the southern government began a counter-offensive
alongside UN forces. In the same month, they easily arrived in Incheon, near Seoul, and a
few hours later, entered the occupied city. Exactly three months after the onset of
hostilities, Seoul was regained by the UN forces.
The discussion, then, came to be whether or not to continue with the campaign
against the Korean People’s Army (KPA). Truman and MacArthur were confident that
neither China nor the Soviet Union would risk an all-out war with United States solely for
the Korean Peninsula, and so the decision was made to use the momentum to end the
communist regime of the North (CUMMINGS, 2010). While the UN forces were
exceeding its attributions, the KPA was unaware that the United States would spare so
much in the conflict, and soon found itself in a position of numeric and tactical
disadvantage. So began the “Great Strategic Retreat”, in which Kim Il-sung’ forces made a
continued retreat up to the Yalu river basin, while pledging for Chinese support.
As the American-led forces were closing up on the Chinese border, the People’s
Republic of China entered the conflict decisively, dealing a major blow to MacArthur’s
forces. Soviet air support was sought, but to no avail: Stalin had reportedly stated that he
would not risk a direct war with the United States over the Korean Peninsula
(CUMMINGS, 2010). He would only provide aerial support in the case the UN forces
crossed the Chinese border.
In fact, the Korean War left a clear impression to the fledgling communist
government in mainland China that it could not count on the Soviet Union for support
when needed. Whereas the Peninsula was (and is) of great strategic importance to Beijing,
due to its proximity with the industrial Manchuria, Moscow did not see such value in the
region—or at least not enough to validate an engagement with the American-led forces.
Despite the incredulity of the United States, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) did indeed entered the conflict, without Soviet support, and pushed back the
Douglas MacArthur was a general of the US army and commandant of the UN forces in the
Korea.
5 The USSR could have used its veto Power, nevertheless was boycotting the UNSC due to the
inclusion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) as a permanent member.
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American offensive back to the 38th parallel, where the period of trench warfare began. But
as soon as Chinese troops intervened, MacArthur ordered that a wasteland be created
between the war front and the Yalu River border, destroying from the air “every
installation, factory, city, and village over thousands of square miles of North Korean
territory” (CUMMINGS, 2010, p. 40).
In fact, the amount of explosives used by the air force exceeded the total used in
WWII against the Japanese (CUMINGS, 2010). Massive use of napalm6 against villages was
made in order to, facing the improbability of ending the Northern regime, at least cripple it
beyond recuperation. In addition, according to reports of the local population, the UN
forces, under MacArthur’s command, used a variety of chemical and biological weapons,
ranging from performing gas attacks to sending disease-ridden supplies to northern
refugees.
But such massacres did not take place only in the North. Guerrilla warfare also
happened in the South, and the American-led armies were vulnerable to infiltration and
sabotage by communism sympathizers. As such, southern villages were evacuated or even
destroyed upon the mere suspicion of communist presence. Some massacres gained worldwide attention, as western journalists investigated reports of war crimes being conducted by
the ROKA and the US Army. The most famous are the No Gun Ri and Geochang
massacres. Most of such massacres were conducted by the South, under the fear of further
infiltration of communists behind South’s lines, against the waves of refugees that were
trying to escape from the war front. Also, both regimes conducted extensive political
persecutions in their occupied areas, so as to ensure that any local opposition would be
vanquished.
The Korean War is one the most tragic and striking event in modern East Asian
history, and one of the bloodiest conflicts of the Cold War, being rivalled only by the
Vietnam War. In a succession of military campaigns that involved the US and its allies,
both Koreas and communist China, the whole region was locked into a bitter conflict
where not only millions of lives were lost (estimates, including military and civilian
personnel, range in average from 3.5 to 5 million (CUMINGS, 2010), but also the
countries’ infra-structure (mainly the North’s) were targeted in massive bombardments
(LEE, 2003).
For almost three years, the Korean people were involved in a brutal fratricidal war
raging on both sides. The UN forces, instead of promoting peace, engaged in destructive
warfare. Without UN authorization, its forces acted against critical civilian structures, what
Napalm is a powder that mixed with gasoline can be used as tactical weapon (Fire bomb fuel gel
mixture). It serves to remove the vegetation cover and to cause panic in human targets. This
chemical solution adheres to the surface, making it potentially flammable.
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brought grave difficulties that are felt even today (HARRISON, 2002). Perhaps the best
example of the American-led forces’ determination to systematically obstruct any chances
of post-war recuperation was the continued bombing of the Su’pung hydroelectric dam.
Constructed by the Japanese, it was for many years one of the biggest dams in Asia, and
was responsible for a large share of the Korean energy production (MALKASIAN, 2001).
On June 23, 1953, the peace negotiations process began. The negotiations resulted in
an agreement signed in Panmujon, on July 27, 1953. The only result was a cease-fire, with
no peace treaty being signed. This agreement established a military demarcation line, and
both sides should withdraw two kilometers from this line, defining, thus, the demilitarized
zone between the opposite forces. This Armistice maintains its validity nowadays, but the
absence of a peace treaty persists.
1.3. The Post-War
As defined by the Korean armistice, in 1954, a conference was held, in Geneva, to
discuss the future of the peninsula. However, the conference has not changed the scenario,
and the establishment of two Koreas, Republic of Korea (ROK) and Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) was confirmed. The boundary was stabilized along a line
crossing the 38th parallel called “Korean Demilitarized Zone” (DMZ). Throughout the
1950s and 1960s, thousands of soldiers were poised on each side of the demilitarized zone.
There have been occasional shooting incidents in the area.
It was in the post-War that the Juche ideal emerged in the North. Juche refers to a
political thesis of Kim Il-sung, and identifies the Korean masses as the masters of the
country’s development. As such, it is a set of principles that the government uses to justify
its policy decisions (SCOBELL, 2005).
In the first decades, the North maintained its position as the most industrialized
government of the Peninsula, a situation inherited from the Japanese colonization. But
from 1960 on, the South was marked by rapid industrialization, as a result of economic
policy changes and heavy investment from Japan and the United States. This period of
rapid economic development was marked by the emergence of the chaebols: Analogous to
the Japanese Zaibatsu, they are big business conglomerates controlled by key families and
heavily supported by the government. The government-chaebol cooperation, alongside the
great volume of foreign investments fomented by the post-Rhee government, made South
Korea one of the “Asian Tigers” and a role model of national development.
Also in the context of the Cold War, there have been annual massive joint military
exercises between South Korea and the United States since 1976, called “Team Spirit”
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(nowadays called “Key Resolve”). Such exercises were and are, even now, a reason for the
North’s combative stance.
However, the seventies were also marked by a less hostile attitude of both Koreas,
mainly in due to the emergence of the Nixon Doctrine. The main proposition of this policy
was to structure a regional security architecture based on countries of the capitalist bloc
with friendly relations with the US. Thus, more responsibility was granted to the local
actors over the management of the regional security problems. In 1971 negotiations
between North and South Korea provided the first hope for peaceful reunification of the
peninsula. In November of 1972, an agreement was reached for the establishment of
shared mechanisms aimed towards a future unification. Meanwhile, the rapprochement of
continental China and the United States further established an environment where peace
talks were possible.
The countries met several times during the 1980s to discuss reunification, and in
1990 there were three meetings between the prime ministers of North and South Korea.
These talks have yielded some results, such as the exchange of visits organized in 1989. The
problems blocking complete reunification, however, continued to be substantial. Two
incidents of terrorism against South Korea were widely attributed to North Korea: in 1983,
a bombing that killed several members of the South Korean government and in 1987, the
destruction of a South Korean airliner over the Thailand-Myanmar border.
With the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international scenario was much more
favourable to an end of hostilities in the Peninsula than ever before. But such opportunity
was not taken, for the nuclear issue took the foreground of inter-Korean relations. Another
key element in the post-Kim Il-sung history for North Korea is the establishment of the
“Songun” as the state policy by the administration of Kim Jong-il. Songun stands for
“military first”, in which the Army constitutes the factor that binds the society together,
against the continued external threat. The fact is that during the most part of the 1990s,
North Korea was under what can be called a “prolonged deathwatch”, so common and
confident were predictions of its demise (STARES & WIT, 2009).
2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
As stated previously, the Korean Peninsula underwent many distresses with Japanese
imperialism and the Cold War dynamics. The heritage of these events not only exacerbated
the ancestral differences between North and South regions, but became a serious threat to
international peace and stability. Thereunto, in this section the main issues, problems and
situations regarding North Korea and inter-Korean dialogue are going to be described.
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2.1. The end of the Cold War
With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
lost her main sponsor. This event brought new hope to the reconciliation of the people and
governments of the peninsula, this new impetus for dialogue has resulted in the historical
“Agreement on Reconcilation, Non-agression, Cooperation, and Exchange Between North
and South”. Still in 1991 both Koreas were accepted as full members of United Nations.
This opened a new door for negotiations between North and South.
That agreement laid the bases for the future Inter-Korean negotiations, such as the
non-interference on internal matters by both sides, the recognition of the present nature of
the division of the peninsula was temporary. Even the problematic question of different
regimes has been incorporated affirming the necessity for respect for the government
system on both sides, besides this stated that the relationship between north and south was
a temporary and special one and not between two states and recognized the will of both
sides of reunification through dialogue and peaceful means.
This ambient of dialogue contributed to the evolution of North’s proposal of a
Korean Confederation or Koryo Confederal Democratic Republic with the publication of
the 10 point Programme for the Reunification of the Country in 1993 by the President
Kim Il-sung. This document claims for the coexistence of the two systems under a united
pan-national country. Meanwhile South’s President Roh Tae-woo also encouraged the
dialogue for Korean Unification and made great progress by setting a basis for interKorean dialogue and nuclear issues, ensuring the 1991 agreement and strengthening the
rapprochement with North’s side.
However, a series of negative factors contributed to a setback in the reunification
process. First, the closed and crippled North Korean economy, which did not manage to
modernize its system after the fall of USSR. Second, the north Korean nuclear program,
which was born to supply the severe deficit on energy producing and the threat of a
South’s nuclear program. Third, the death of the “Great Leader” , who was giving signals
of cooperation with the Western Powers . And finally the interference of other countries in
the process (HARRISON, 2002).
At this point it is important to remember the importance that foreign powers has on
intra-peninsular dynamics. As stated in the Historical Background, China and Japan have
exerted great influence over Korea since ancestral times, followed by Russia in 19 th century
and United States in 20th century. After the Cold War all these countries still have interests
and exert great influence over the Korean process of reunification.
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2.2. Reunification Policies
As stated above, conversations about reunification occur in some degree since the
1970s. But in 1998 with the ascension of Kim Dae-jung7 to South Korea presidency a new
posture was adopted by the country in inter-Korean relations. It was the beginning of the
Sunshine Policy. It consisted more of deepening the North–South economic and cultural
exchange rather than focus in a specific reunification policy. The objective was to turn the
north’s regime more open and friendly and to recover DPRK’s economy and only then to
start direct negotiations about reunification.
The most significant result of Sunshine Policy was the North-South Joint
Declaration of June 2000. This document was signed in Pyongyang at June 15, 2000, by
Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il, Kim Il-sung’s son and successor. The two parts agreed on
resolving the question of reunification independently, to settle pending humanitarian
questions8 and the novelty introduced by Sunshine:
[...] to consolidate mutual trust by promoting balanced development
of the national economy through economic cooperation and by
stimulating cooperation and exchanges in civic, cultural, sports,
health, environmental and all other fields (JOINT STATEMENT,
2000).
This document generated a series of programs and projects aiming the confidencebuilding and mutual trust among the parts involved. It included reunions between the
families divided by the DMZ and even joint delegations for sport events. But the pinnacle
of the policy was the projects of economic cooperation that aimed to recover and to start a
process of aperture of the North’s economy. The most famous projects are the
Kŭmgangsan Tourist Region, implemented by President Kim Dae-jung, and the Kaesong
Industrial Park (KIP), opened by Dae-jung’s successor Roh Moo-hyun in 2004.
The Kŭmgangsan Tourist Region consists of a small region in DPRK established to
welcome tourists from ROK to visit Mount Kŭmgangsan. This project was expected to be
the symbol of inter-Korean cultural exchange and the start of a series of integrated
economic and development projects. The Kaesong Industrial Park is an industrial complex
built and managed by Hyundai Asan5 in the DPRK near the DMZ along with both North
and South governments. The KIP was meant to help to recover and modernize North’s
economy and to start a process of economic and political opening besides to provide ROK
companies cheap labour. It was expected that KIP would employ around 100,000 workers
Due to his efforts in favor of inter-Korean dialogue, Kim Dae-jung was granted the Nobel Peace
Award in 2000.
8The main humanitarian issue pending between both sides stills the problem of the families
separated by the war and the DMZ.
5 Hyundai Asan is a subsidiary of the Hyundai Group one of the most powerful chaebols of South
Korea. It controls both projects. However, their private controlling is sometimes appointed as one
of the motives of the stagnation of these shared enterprises.
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in its initial stage and about 700,000 by 2012 (REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 2005), but by the
end of 2010 the KIP had only 47,000 North Korean employees (HYUNDAI ASAN, 2009:
online).
Today the KIP albeit still being an important source of income to North
government, does not reach the objectives proposed by President Roh Moo-hyun in 2004.
Now the KIP is practically only an assembly complex for labor-intensive manufacturing
process with raw materials and intermediate goods from South Korea. The partial failure of
the KIP project can be associated with the end of Sunshine Policy with the election of Lee
Myung-bak who assumed office in February of 2008 and stated that “any expansion of the
economic cooperation at the Kaesong Industrial Region would only happen if the North
resolved the international standoff over its nuclear weapons” (AP, 2008).
From now on the North’s nuclear program became the central issue in the interKorean dialogue and the relationship between the both sides chilled again. The Lee
administration started a new round of confrontation between North and South which
resulted in missile launch tests and in a nuclear explosion in 2009. Besides that, there was
the sinking of the ROK’s corvette Cheonan in March 2010. In November of the same year
the White Paper of the Ministry of Unification declared the Sunshine Policy a failure and
officially ended the peaceful engagement with the North side. As a response, the DPRK
perpetrated the bombardment of the Yeonpyeong Island still in November, killing two
South Koreans and injuring at least 18 (TWO, 2010).
The present instance of South’s policy for unification is to only renew the North–
South cooperation after the Peninsula’s denuclearization. This precondition was declared
on August 15, 2010, on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the Liberation of Korea.
This is a part of Lee Myung-bak’s three step plan to Korea Unification. They are: a “peace
community”, which includes the peninsula denuclearization, an “economic community”
and a “community of Korean Nation”, which would mark the complete unification of the
Peninsula (CHEONG, 2010).
2.3. The Nuclear Issue
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nuclear program is presently the biggest
impediment to inter-Korean dialogue. However, this program began in mid-1960s with
Soviet cooperation9 in the Yongbyon atomic energy research complex. In 1977 Pyongyang
signed an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) permitting the
Agency to inspect its reactors. By the 1980s the DPRK started a program to develop
There are suspicions that Myanmar and Syria have somehow cooperated with DPRK’s nuclear
program. However, there is no hard evidence of that.
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nuclear weapons, as a way to confront the South’s (CUMMINGS, 2004), but in 1985
North Korea acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The South Korean
nuclear programme started by the 1970s in response to Nixon Doctrine of self-defense for
its allies. Following the withdrawal of American troops the south government established a
Weapons Exploitation Committee which decided to acquire nuclear weapons. In 1975,
under United States pressure, South Korea signed the (NPT), however the programme
continued clandestinely until the end of Park Chung Hee government (HYNUNG-A,
2004). In 1992 the two sides signed the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the North signed the nuclear safeguard agreement with
the IAEA in that same year.
Therefore, in early 1990s the nuclear question in Korean Peninsula seemed to be
solved. The need to develop a peaceful nuclear program by the North, which started to
suffer from a serious energy production shortage after the Soviet debacle, encouraged
Pyongyang to cooperate with the South and the international community.
However, with the end of President Roh Tae-woo’s term and the ascension of hardline Kim Young-sam, for the first time Pyongyang threatened to withdraw from the NPT.
DPRK used the “Team Spirit” military exercises between South Korea and the US—which
enact a nuclear war scenario—as a pretext for that (CUMMINGS, 2004). Still, with the
beginning of the Clinton administration, the US adopted a new posture towards DPRK.
Even though the tensions continued until 1994, year of the death of Kim Il-sung, the
DPRK and the US managed to reach an agreement. The results are the Joint Statement
between US and DPRK of 1993 which laid down the bases for the Agreed Framework of
1994 also between the DPRK and US. These agreements confirmed the desire of the two
countries of a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula. Additionally, American government
also compromised to supply technology and equipments to build a Low Water Reactors
(LWR) in order to replace the graphite-moderated10 ones along with a regular supply of
crude oil. In return the DPRK would completely dismantle its nuclear program.
In 1995 a consortium between Japan, the United States, ROK founded KEDO—
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. Later on, other countries also
joined the organization, such as Australia, New Zealand, European Union, Canada,
Indonesia, Chile, Argentina, Poland, Czech Republic and Uzbekistan. KEDO’s mission
was mainly to implement and supervise the completion of the 1994 Agreed Framework.
However, with the Bush administration (2001–2009) the US posture towards DPRK
shifted towards confrontation, ignoring the ROK’s Sunshine Policy active since 1998. After
The basic difference is the cooling process and the moderation process. The first one is cheaper
and safer than the second one.
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the non-observance of the 1994 Agreed Framework by the US, which delayed the supply
of oil and did not deliver the LWRs to DPRK, President Bush in the 2002 State of the
Union address added the North Korean government in the so-called “Axis of Evil” and
returned to threat DPRK with nuclear weapons, violating the 1953 armistice
(CUMMINGS, 2004). The tensions surrounding the North Korean nuclear program
culminated in 2003 with the DPRK withdrawal from the NPT, which coincided with
South’s presidential elections and the start of Roh Moo-hyun’s term.
These events resulted in a new framework to discuss the nuclear issue, this time
bringing officially the People’s Republic of China, Japan and Russia to the negotiation
table. It was the beginning of the Six-party talks (SPT). The main objective of the SPT was
to find a way to resume the agenda of the 1994 Agreed Framework. By 2005 the SPT
reached some success, it was agreed that the question of the LWR would be discussed “at
an appropriated time” (JOINT STATEMENT, 2005) and the commitment with the
denuclearization of the Peninsula was reassured, as stated on the 1992 Korean Peninsula
Denuclearization Declaration.
However, after the freezing of North Korean assets in Macau, and other financial
centres in due to the pressure made by United States the DPRK government realized its
first nuclear test on July 5, 2006. This act resulted in the UNSC resolution 1718 with the
first UN sanctions against DPRK, which already suffered a comprehensive embargo
imposed by the United States and its allies due the state of war between these countries,
and inclusion of DPRK on the list of states sponsors of terrorism. The SPT would reach
new achievement only in 2007, when the North agreed to shut down its main nuclear
facility of Yongbyon in exchange for 500 tons of heavy oil fuel. The closure of the
Yongbyon facility was confirmed by the IAEA and in the last round of negotiations was
agreed that the DPRK was complying with its part of the agreement. Moreover, the
shipment of heavy oil fuel would be increased by 1000 tons and the US would remove
DPRK from the states sponsors of terrorism list and lift the embargo imposed due to the
state of war.
Nonetheless, only a reduced amount of heavy oil fuel was delivered (LEE, 2006).
Besides that, in 2008 Lee Myung-bak assumed the presidency in South Korea, ending the
Sunshine Policy and declaring that ROK will only return to negotiation after the complete
dismantling of the North’s nuclear program. These setbacks resulted in 2009 North’s
missile and subsequent nuclear test that was followed by the UNSC resolution 1874. The
conversations about the nuclear issue have been stalled since then.
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2.4. Economic Conditions
With the end of Soviet Union the North Korean economy suffered a major setback,
because it lost its main trade partner. This, combined with the modest economy of China
in the 1990s, North’s second partner, the continuous droughts that generated the great
1995 famine and the restrictions imposed by the US “Trade With the Enemy Act”
(TWEA) provoked a serious blow on an already fragile economy.
These events made the North seek the normalization of relations with the US and
South Korea and the deepening the economic bonds with China. The results of these
efforts are the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and DPRK, the Sunshine Policy in
South Korea, and the North’s special economic zones (SEZ).
Notwithstanding that, the problematic relationship with the US and the failure of the
Sunshine policy has turned China DPRK’s main trade partner (NANTO & MANYIN,
2010). The subsequent nuclear embroil had also prevented any kind of improvement in the
relations with US and its allies. The DPRK’s composition of trading partners is not
confined to China, despite being the largest one. The ROK is the second major partner,
including being the main destination for DPRK’s exports in the recent years (NANTO &
MAYIN, 2010). This interdependence has increased recently; China and ROK have grown
in terms of participation in trade composition (BAJORIA, 2010).
Concerning the United States, it was only in 2008 that the TWEA restrictions on
North Korea were lifted (US TREASURY, 2011). However, the North’s regime was then
framed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the National
Emergencies Act. These, alongside US executive actions11, have practically the same effects
that the TWEA, including multinational economic embargoes against governments in
armed conflict with US at discretion of the President (US, 1977).
Besides the sanctions and embargoes imposed by the US and its allies, there are also
the UNSC resolutions 1718 and 1874, of 2006 and 2009 respectively (UN, 2006; 2009).
They demand all United Nations members to ban the export of military equipment, nuclear
and missile development goods or dual-use goods, referent to the latter. The resolutions
also prohibit the export of luxury goods to DPRK, but the countries are free to set their
own lists of what they consider to be luxury goods (UN, 2006). Thus, some countries even
ban the export of TV sets, computers and beverages to DPRK, classifying them as luxury
goods (CUMINGS, 2004).
All these sanctions have a major effect on North’s economy which is basically
composed by industry and services. These two sectors respond for about 75 percent of
Among these executive orders stands out the 13446, 13551 and 13570. These orders defined
blocks to property and financial transactions with DPRK.
11
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North Korean economy (CIA WORLD FACT BOOK, 2010). Due to the poor agricultural
land and to large mineral reserves, since the beginning of the 20th century the northern
region of the Korean Peninsula has specialized in the industry and services sectors. But the
present sanctions impede the modernization of North Korea’s industrial park, by
difficulting the import and the financing of capital goods such as new machinery and
softwares. Thus, the normalization of DPRK relations with the rest of the world is of the
uttermost importance to alleviate its economic conditions, and this normalization passes
not only by solving the nuclear issue, but also by reaching a Peace Treaty between US,
ROK and DPRK to finally exterminate the embargoes and impediments to North Korea
of being a full member in the international community.
2.5. Humanitarian Conditions
The humanitarian situation is one of the greatest problems faced by the DPRK. Over
the last 15 years, it is estimated that 10% of the DPRK’s population died of starvation and
hunger-related illness (Global security). In addition, the country suffers from the
restrictions of medicines and medical supplies that allow the growth of various diseases
such as tuberculosis, malaria and typhus. This situation contributes to the fear of massive
refugee inflow in case the situation worsens (LEE, 2006).
The humanitarian crisis began in the mid-1990s, when there was the first great wave
of deaths due to hunger. 12 Despite a relative improvement in the early 2000s, the situation
was getting worse after 2004, with the failure of economic reforms (WORLD FOOD
PROGRAMME, 2008). Thus, food prices continued to rise and food rationing remained.
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported that between 2007 and 2008 the
food deficit that has persisted since 2001 has doubled.
The DPRK faces regular food stringency, and has one of the highest rates of
malnutrition in Asia (WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, 2011). In accordance with FAO,
one third of all children under five years are chronically malnourished or stunted. The last
winter was bitter what increased the spread of diseases, mainly tuberculosis, and the gap of
food (WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 2011).
2.6. Perspectives
On the last decade other relevant issues arose in the Korean agenda such as the
maritime border disputes on the Western Sea. Heritage from the War period the present
maritime border line between North and South was unilaterally imposed by the US
12
This great famine was known as the “arduous March”.
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Command on August 30, 1953. Also known as Northern Limit Line (NLL) the western
maritime border between the two Koreas began to be contested by the North side in 1973.
But it was only in 1999 that the conflict on the NLL began, with the first battle of
Yeonpyeong that resulted in around 30 deaths and approximately 70 wounded and a North
torpedo boat sunk. From 1999 to this day another several incidents occurred around this
line culminating with the sinking of the ROK Cheonan corvette and the bombardment of
Yeonpyeong Island in 2010.
These events deteriorated even further the fragile relationship between North and
South. From now on the South begins to demand apologize for the Cheonan sinking
alongside the full freezing of North’s nuclear program as a precondition to return to the
negotiation table. This shows the importance of the settlement of the maritime west border
to enhance further inter Korean dialogue.
Nevertheless, this year has also marked a turning point for the North’s regime with
new attempts of economic aperture. After a series of visits to China and one visit to Russia
by the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, a series of economic agreements was signed,
including the implementation of a new SEZ on China–North Korea border and the
construction of a pipeline from Russia to South Korea.
13
Even famous American
companies, such as Coca Cola and the Kentucky Fried Chicken, and internationally
renowned news agencies, such as Reuters and the Associated Press, may now operate in
DPRK (HAE-IN, 2011). Also as a result of these visits and from the last ARF the North
regime declared last August during Kim’s visit to Russia, that want an early resumption of
the Six-party talks without any precondition and it was disposed to freeze its nuclear and
missile program in order to achieve that. However, the South has not moved from its initial
position and still demands an apology for the Cheonan sinking as a precondition to return
to dialogues.
3. PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION
Since its creation the ARF was fundamental to promote confidence building and
dialogue between the parts involved in the Korean issue. It is important to remember that
ARF is one of the few regular forums that DPRK, ROK, USA, meet at the same time.
Previous ARF Chairman’s Statements had already mentioned the Korean Peninsula
question, mainly the nuclear issue. It is already a consensus for all ARF members that the
Korean Peninsula must be denuclearized. However, since the advent of the Six Part Talks
the ARF became a secondary floor to discuss Korean matters and with the 2007 North
13
This pipeline has been awaited since the 1990s (SCOBELL, 2005).
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Korea Denuclearization Action Plan it seemed that the reintegration of DPRK into the
International Community was only a matter of time.
But, with the end of the SPT and new nuclear tests made by North Korea, the ARF
returned to be the most important multilateral forum regarding security issues about
Korean Peninsula. In July 2011, in Indonesia occurred the 18th ARF and the Korean
nuclear issue was one of the highlights of the meeting. Besides recalling the ARF
commitment with a denuclearized Korean Peninsula the 18th ARF Chairman’s Statement
registered the first step towards the resumption of the SPT, a sideline meeting between
both Koreas SPT representatives.
According the statement the representatives recalled the importance of the interKorean dialogue and ARF to the resumption of the SPT. Although no concrete measure
was announced at the occasion the statement reaffirmed the central role that ARF must
have on next years to solve inter-Korean problems and promote dialogue.
4. BLOC POSITIONS
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea faces severe international pressure
on its nuclear program and its combative stance. It has been accused, in 2010, of the
sinking of the Cheonan, a South Korean corvette, by an international committee led by
South Korea. Furthermore, it has engaged South Korea militarily with the artillery shelling
of the YeonpyeongIsland, which is in disputed territory and is occupied by South Korea,
allegedly in response to the US–South Korea joint military drills in the Yellow Sea.
Currently, North Korea is under a comprehensive economic embargo led by the
United States, aimed at diminishing the nuclear capabilities of the North Korean regime.
Still, its greatest opponent is the current South Korean administration, which reversed the
SunshinePolicy to a hardliner stance. Even though it has the pacific unification of the
Korean Peninsula as one of the principles of its foreign policy, Pyongyang’s main aims are,
presently, the improvement of its deterrence capacities in face of the American apparatus
and to increase the international recognition of its regime, primarily through China. The
DPRK states that the Six-party Talks cannot resume as long as the embargoes remain and
as the US and South Korea militaries continue with the recurrent large-scale war games.
Another obstacle is the demand, by South Korea and the US, of the complete destruction
of its nuclear warhead producing capacities, inadmissible over the perception of menace
posed by the “Responsibility to Protect” argument used by NATO. 14 It should be noted
The principle of Responsibility to Protects is used by NATO to justify humanitarian
interventions. According to it, if a state is unwilling or unable to protect the civilians in its own
14
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that one of the main long-term objectives of North Korean negotiators is the signature of a
Peace Treaty to legally end the Korean War.
The Republic of Korea has recently abandoned the “Sunshine” elements of its
policy towards the DPRK, over the perception of being instrumental to the Northern
regime in its search for international recognition and economic aid. Its main objective is to
disarm the offensive capabilities of the North, which includes denuclearization. While in
the “Sunshine” years such goal was sought through economic aid and a more pro-China
stance, in the current administration it is sought through the fostering of ROK-US ties.
Currently, Seoul insists that the North should apologize for the Cheonan incident as
a preliminary step to reactivate the Inter-Korean talks, separating that demand from the
process of denuclearization. As the most vocal attacker of the Northern regime, it also has
an ambiguous relation with China, one of its greatest economic partners but also the main
supporter of the DPRK.
The United States of America supports the South Korean position, as the ROK is
one of its allies in the region, alongside Australia, Japan, Philippines and Thailand. The
main effort of the Obama administration, international security concerned, is progressive
denuclearization. As such, it strives to implement the 2005 Joint Statement and to bring
stability to the Peninsula through the nuclear disarmament of the North. The US has a
large military presence throughout the Asia-Pacific, and would certainly support the South
in the case of an invasion from the North. Although it has no land-based nuclear-warhead
missiles on the region, its naval capabilities fulfill the role of a nuclear deterrent.
Claiming that the North was not complying with the prescriptions of the Joint
Statement, the Bush administration halted the economic aid that was being given to the
DPRK and started imposing sanctions on the regime. The US affirms that it will end the
embargo once North Korea ends its military nuclear program irrevocably. It also strives for
the resumption of the SPT, and is currently pushing to send inspectors to the DPRK.
The People’s Republic of China partnership with the DPRK is based not only on
ideology, but also on strategy. North Korea sits in a key point to Chinese defence thinking
(ARF, 2010), given its geographic importance. Beyond the friendship between the two
communist parties, it is paramount that the situation in North Korea does not evolve into
chaos. Because of that, China supports Pyongyang and attempts to give it the means for
the achievement of economic development.
China promotes restraint in the actions of the parts involved. Although the DPRK–
PRC alliance has been a pillar of regional security, it is not of Chinese interest to have
territory against massive human rights violations, including but not limited to ethnic cleansing and
genocide, it is responsibility of the international community to do it (EVANS, 2002): to intervene.
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further polarization in the Peninsula. The objective of Beijing is to defuse the current level
of tension and to bring both Koreas back to the negotiation table.
For the resumption of the SPT, China proposes a three-stage process: Inter-Korean
talks, followed by bilateral talks between the US and North Korea, and eventually the
resumption of the Six-party talks. By offering up inter-Korean talks as the opening move,
the Chinese proposal isolates South Korea from the US and puts considerable pressure on
Seoul not to act as an impediment.
Even though the Russian Federation backs the US–ROK call for the
denuclearization of the North along the lines of the NPT and previous resolutions of the
UN, it shares some geopolitical preoccupations with China. Having borders with North
Korea means that a succession crisis or an economic meltdown in the neighbour country
would negatively affect Russia. As such, the Russian approach concurs with the US–ROK
objectives, but the country does not firmly support the increased securitization towards
Pyongyang (ARF,2010). Also, there has been an increasing strategic partnership with South
Korea in the Medvedev administration, covering not only security matters, but also
technology and research (JUNG; FEDOROVSKIY, 2010). Meanwhile, the relations with
China were shaken since the war in Georgia (RAHMAN, 2009).
Japan is a US ally and, in resemblance to South Korea, perceives the nuclear
program of the North to be a direct menace. Being on the frontline means that Japan
shares the positions of Washington and Seoul, but also tries to ease the tension when its
levels are dangerously high. Tokyo is concerned with the full implementation of the Joint
Statement of the Six-party talks, and that understands that advancing Japan–North Korea
relations is necessary for that end. The basis of its diplomacy towards the DPRK is the
Japan–North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, in which the issue of the abduction of
Japanese citizens by North Korean officials is highlighted by Tokyo (MOFA, 2004).
In line with the Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia, the
European Union has attached the utmost importance to denuclearization as a preliminary
need in order to achieve stability. The EU has repeatedly expressed strong support for the
Six-party talks and encouraged inter-Korean reconciliation (EEAS, 2011). Still, the EU
reminds of the importance of UNSC Resolution 1874 condemning the nuclear test
conducted by the DPRK in May 2009.
Australia and Canada participated in the international investigation which
concluded on the participation of North Korea in the sinking of the Cheonan. The
Australian position adds that the members of the ARF should increase their vigilance over
possible trans-shipment of goods through their jurisdictions that violate UN sanctions.
New Zealand also supports this position and has had a long standing commitment of
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military observers to the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission
(UNCMAC) in Korea.
Mongolia participates, alongside China, South Korea and Russia, of the Great
Tumen Initiative, a major joint mechanism in Northeast Asia supported by the UNDP.
Therefore, its approach on the subject of confidence-building in the region is that
economic possibilities can offer another way towards integration.
Malaysia associates the question in the Korean Peninsula with the nuclear
proliferation issue, and defends that in ensuring that the right to peaceful uses of nuclear
energy is not abused. The three main points are that States must: exercise full transparency
in nuclear programs; subject those programs to the full scope of the IAEA’s safeguards and
verification, including the Additional Protocol; and adhere to the provisions of the NPT.
Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam fear the destabilization effect of the
securitization in the Korean Peninsula and have taken a neutral stance on the subject.
Singapore perceives the mutual provocative actions in the Korean situation as disruptive of
stability in the entire region, and refrains from confirming the North Korean participation
in the Cheonan sinking. Indonesia reaffirms the importance of confidence-building in the
process of resumption of the SPT, in which the ARF should take a major role. Vietnam has
taken a passive stance and is waiting for initiatives or efforts brought forward by concerned
parties, a behaviour shared with Papua New Guinea.
Thailand and the Philippines are concerned with the relation of the elevated
tension and nuclear proliferation in the Korean Peninsula, both being US allies. Philippines
backing the American position on this issue could ensure American support on the issue of
Chinese presence in the South China Sea. Thai diplomacy focuses on the threats
represented by an ever more nuclearized Asia-Pacific.
India¸ Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka defend the immediate resumption of
the SPT as the worsening of the Korean situation could also affect South Asia. India, as a
rising global power, is expected to help the process in a mediator role—which, by itself,
calls the attention of Pakistan.
Myanmar’s main preoccupation is to legitimize its governmental democratic
process. Thus, it will utilize its opportunities of participation in multilateral dialogue as a
mean to secure international recognition of its regime.
In the line of other ASEAN countries, Brunei, Laos and Cambodia also call for the
resumption of the Six-party talks, as soon as possible, in order to prevent further escalation
of the tension which will endanger peace in the Korean Peninsula as well as in the whole
region of the Asia-Pacific. In addition, Laos will be paying attention to the global powers’
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game as it seeks their economic support. As Timor-Leste seeks to gain ASEAN
membership, it will also share the view of the importance of the SPT.
5. QUESTIONS TO PONDER
i.
How to best conduce confidence-building processes in order to bring both
governments in the Korean Peninsula back to the Six-party talks?
ii.
How to best increase confidence between the two governments in the Korean
Peninsula to limit the local arms race, and stop the often violent demonstrations of
force?
iii.
How to create a long-term solution to the North’s humanitarian and economic
problems and integrate the country to the international society?
iv.
Is it possible to finally reach a peace treaty in one of the longest conflicts of the 20th
century?
v.
Is it possible to create a common roadmap to solve the Korean unification question?
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TOPIC B: The situation in Myanmar
Marcelo de Mello Kanter e Bruno Kern Duarte
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The people of Burma descend from Mongol tribes who migrated to that region on
th
the 7 century. Theirs was an expansionist and imperialist state until a more effective
presence of the British, which started to happen in the second quarter of the 19th century.
In that time, the Burmese state overpowered the region of east Bengal, where they took
resources for the long war against Siam (nowadays Thailand). In this conflict, the Burmese
conquered de western part of the Malay Peninsula.
Frequent riots in the occupied region made the Burmese government believe that
the British were supporting these movements. Moreover, the court did not have knowledge
of the British real capacities. These factors led the Burmese to attack East Bengal, giving
rise to the first Anglo-Burmese war. The British, through the Indian Empire, replied to that
offensive, and then won this war. As a result of the conflict, they occupied much of the
Burmese State, namely the regions of Arakan, on the western coast, Assam, on the border
with India, and Tenasserim, on the southern coasts. High reparation had to be paid: The
Great Britain diplomacy thought that indulgence would lead to alignment (FIELDHOUSE,
1965).
Until 1880, the British had no prime political or strategic interests in Burma, so they
did not need an official occupation (FIELDHOUSE, 1973). From 1826 until 1840, the
British tried to impose administrative techniques then common in that region to deal with
indigenous states: The influence was exercised by a permanent resident at the court, which
advised the natives in matters of domestic policy, he would try always to protect the British
will and ensure that no other power would establish a potentially dangerous influence in
the reign. If this system worked as it had done in other states, there would be no need for a
tighter control. It would make the British have an ascendancy over the political decisions of
the Burmese State, determining their trading partners and political relations. However, the
English plan was not feasible due to the instability of the internal politics of the native
reign.
Since the system depended on the goodwill of the Burmese elite, which never
accepted the defeat in the war and the territorial concessions imposed by the British, they
by no means collaborated in all terms with the colonialists. The failure of the policy of
direct influence was evident in 1840, when the British withdrew their resident of the Court
of Ava (the Burmese court) and then broke up the diplomatic relations with the reign.
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Burma could not isolate itself from the world, since it still had great amount of trade
with other countries, mainly with the British. But the crisis took a time to happen, because
the British were primarily concerned with Afghanistan. The second Anglo-Burmese war
occurred in 1852 and emerged from a conflict between British merchants and the governor
of Rangoon over sovereign matters. The United Kingdom won this war too, conquering
low Burma. However, the Burmese court never accepted the territorial loss, and a peace
treaty was never signed.
In the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the relationship between the two
countries had grown up. The commercial exchange developed, jointly with the opening of
Upper Burma, what allowed a larger volume of British investment mostly through
agreements for the construction of a railway. It would connect the port of Rangoon with
the Chinese border and would, then, make China’s valuable products accessible for the
British. The establishment of these trade agreements and the permission for a permanent
resident stay at the Court of Ava seemed to satisfy all British interests in the reign and
seemed to create a basis for a future collaboration. Nevertheless, the relationship
deteriorated sharply after a dynastic transition in the native kingdom that changed their
attitude towards Great Britain.
The third Anglo-Burmese war took place in the last quarter of the 19th century, when
the British invaded upper Burma, overthrowing the monarchy and incorporating the
territory. This action was motivated by the dangerous approach of the Burmese court with
the French, but it might be considered as a consequence of the situation of that period,
since similar conquests were occurring in the French Indochina. The annexation only took
place due to that approach, changing the former posture of keeping the Asian state in their
sphere of influence, determining their foreign relations, but allowing some autonomy for
the indigenous court.
In the process of replacement of the Burmese monarchy for a new government
subordinated to Great Britain, new classes were formed and wildly changed the structure of
civil administration and of the society in general. The British invasion and the later
pacification program, together with the high influx of Chinese and Indian immigrants and
the organization of a separated administration controlled by local minorities, were a
traumatic experience to Burma’s society. It forced a “cultural disintegration” that is still
reflected nowadays (TROCKI, 2008).
The low areas of the country were being modernized under the direct rule of the
British. In contrast, on upper Burma, they gave the power to local minorities and exercised
control indirectly, which made the region much less economically developed. Burma’s
political center was displaced from Mandalay, the former capital from the Burmese state—
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which was placed on the highlands—, and relocated in Rangoon, situated on a coastal area,
where the British concentrated their actions.
The British used the same administration system that they had already used in India,
but this destroyed the traditional rural socio-political order in the region. The power was
given to sub-district officers that had as main tasks the hearing of cases and toll collection.
Other state’s functions, as education, sanitation and other responsibilities, were separated
on special departments and were not subordinated to the district officers (TROCKI, 2008).
Religion was the cause of many problems for the integration of the Burmese society.
The Buddhist monks used to have a key role in the traditional education and, when the
British started a modern schooling program, they rebelled against it. Still, as no other
institutions replaced the monarchy’s authority over the monks, they were not subordinate
to anyone. Thus, they eventually had conflicts with other social groups, especially the ones
that had been educated by missionaries brought by the British.
The subordination to the British Empire and the way that policies were made within
the country, led to the development of armed nationalist groups which in their turn started
to struggle for independence. The most important of these groups was the Burmese
Independence Army (BIA), which had Aung San and Ne Win as the leaders. In the Second
World War, the Japanese troops invaded Burma through Thailand. They were then
supported by nationalists groups, such as BIA. Japan achieved victory, but the war was not
as short as they had calculated: Many groups which backed the British occupation joined
allied forces against Japan.
During the occupation, Burma was formally independent, but Japan placed a
“puppet dictator” who acted according to Japanese interests. Thereby, the nationalists who
supported the Japanese invasion did not have what they expected with the expulsion of the
British, so they switched sides and began supporting the allies. This brought to prominence
nationalist movements and young leaders, such as Aung San and Ne Win, who would later
play an important role in Burmese politics.
At the end of the Second World War in 1945, much of the infrastructure and
industry of the country had been destroyed, mainly due to scorched-earth tactics employed
by the British on their withdrawal (and later by the Japanese as well). The impact was such
that only thirty years later the country returned to per capita income values equal to those
of the pre-war (STEINBERG, 2010). Social impacts were considerable either. The war
exacerbated tensions between different social groups, embroiling many massacres. This has
engendered alliances and enmities that have persisted until today.
Although the subordination to the United Kingdom remained until 1948, the
Japanese occupation sealed the end of the colonial era. After the independence in 1948,
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Burma has remained unified in the form of a federation, in an endeavor to develop a
parliamentary democracy in a multiethnic state. Thus, it was an experiment that aimed to
transpose a western democracy into a context of an eastern state still at formation. Each
constituent state of the federation had its own government where the minorities, such as
the Shan, Chin, Kachin and others, could elect their representatives. However, they were
still subordinated to the central government, which controlled the finances. So the Burman
majority, represented by the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), kept the
power. Furthermore, in this period, the military had an important role in maintaining the
independence and integration of the country, what made them respected and influent in the
society.
Nevertheless, the Burmese state unit was not achieved during the years of the civil
government. The integration of the different groups in Burma on the post-independence
was lower than in the colonial era (STEINBERG, 2010). The decline of the national unity
reflected in the increase of the riots in the country. Ethnic minorities committed riots
constantly, supported by foreign powers. China, the US, India, Pakistan, the UK and
Thailand interfered in internal issues of Burma, endorsing different rebel groups
(STEINBERG, 2010).
The Chinese civil war—which ended in 1949 with the victory of the Communist
Party over the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang)—had a destabilizing role in the
consolidation process of the Burmese state. Many remaining troops of the Chinese
Nationalist Party established themselves on the border with Burma and began cultivating
poppy to profit from drug trafficking. They were supported by the United States and also
secured an alliance with locals, which were not close to the central government
(STEINBERG, 2010). As a result, poppy cultivation for heroin production and exportation
spread all over the mountainous regions. Yet, the most important effect was the one
involving the military. Since the local administration was not able to control much of what
was under their responsibility, the army came to directly take care of many countryside
regions. This fact added to the belief that the military should govern the country, evidenced
by the emergence of the Caretaker Government nine years later.
In 1958, the military, faced with imminent disintegration of the AFPFL—the
coalition that had been ruling the country since 1948— and fearing civil war, proposed to
govern the country for some time to restore the order, to eliminate the insurgents, and to
prepare Burma for new elections. The Prime Minister U Nu had no choice and agreed with
the idea that the military should rule the country during this instability period. Thereafter,
the Caretaker Government was formed. It remained in power for eighteen months and
withdrew voluntarily after elections, which brought U Nu back into power. His second
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administration was weak and ineffectual, rebellions increased and it had a bad economic
performance. All of that made the military become concerned about the situation in the
country in the following years.
The reason given by the militaries for the coup of 1962 was the preservation of the
union of the country, which was threatened even more after the implementation of a law
that decreed Buddhism as the official religion of the country. Thus, the coup would be a
defense against an imminent dissolution of the state. On the other hand, the coup, in the
view of opponents, was just an arrangement to increase the power of the militaries. Besides
ensuring the union of Burma, the military intended to end the corruption, which had
spread in the civil government, to provide groundwork for a forward military hegemony in
the state, and to strengthen the socialist basis of the country’s economy by means of the
doctrine included in the “Burmese Way to Socialism”,.
This doctrine was set forth in a document published on 1962. This plan tried to do
an amalgam of socialism, Buddhist principles and humanism, in an attempt to be a doctrine
which intended to unite the country on a single cause. But the plan economically destroyed
the country, which could have become the richest one in Southeast Asia. The military
closed the country borders and ruled almost in a total isolation through the Burmese
Socialist Programme Party (BSPP).
Accordingly, immediately after the coup, the military dismantled all aspects of
institutional and personal power that could threaten their control. The repression against
students, who were in the forefront of nationalist and anti-colonial protests, was very
strong, which created, from the beginning of the military administration, a large opposition
by some groups inside the country.
Shortly afterwards, an internal debate about which government system would be
more effective, the federalist or the unitary state system, developed in the military. In the
constitution of 1974, it was determined that the Burmese State would be highly centralized.
This constitution was approved in a plebiscite in which the minorities voted massively
unfavorably, because they would lose their autonomy from the Burman majority.
The constitution was based on those from then authoritarian Eastern Europe: The
country came to be ruled by a single party, the BSPP, and its official name was changed to
“Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma”. Also, because they were centralizing the
power, without local autonomy, the relation between the regions with the ethnical
minorities and the Burman majority were increasingly tense.
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2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
2.1. The 1988 Coup and the SLORC
The decade of 1980 was marked by the economic collapse of Burma, to the point
that the government applied to be included in the category of least developed nation in the
UN, despite technically having a higher literacy level than would normally be allowed for
nations of that status, in order to be eligible to receive loans with high subsidies (GUO,
2007; STEINBERG, 2010). Although this fact was initially hidden from the population, it
did eventually become known, aggravating the popular opinion of the regime, already
damaged by the economic collapse and the political frustrations. The resulting tensions
came to a head starting in 1987, when several student demonstrations took place, and only
grew as a response to repressive efforts. As the protests grew, the government seemed
incapable of controlling the situation, and Ne Win resigned from office. The uprising
became widespread by August 1988 and, in the context of government changes in the
Philippines in 1986 and the Republic of Korea in 1987, the possibility of regime change
seemed very concrete. Fears of the dissolution of the state and foreign intervention, fueled
by the appearance of an US fleet off the coast and a large mobilization of the Chinese
military along the border, ultimately motivated the Tatmadaw (the military) to stage a new
coup d’état, to maintain its hold on power. As a result, in September 1988, the State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was instituted, led by Saw Maung (to be followed by
Than Shwe after 1992), with the promise of holding multiparty elections. The country
became then “the world’s only militant Buddhist state” (KHANNA, 2008, p. 293).
Amidst repression, the country’s name was officially changed to Myanmar in 1989,
reflecting a stance of attempting to represent all ethnic groups, Burma being perceived as
reflecting only the Burman population, unlike Myanmar, a purely geographical
denomination. In 1990, elections were prepared to take place, with the formation of
political parties. At this moment, Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Aung San, returned to
the country from her exile in Britain, founding the National League for Democracy (NLD).
Despite being maintained in house arrest during the electoral process, her party managed to
win 392 of the 485 chairs in the Assembly, notwithstanding some accusations of
intimidation (LIBRELOTTO, 2008). After this electoral victory, Suu Kyi was released, and
was widely expected to take office soon after. However, while the NLD attempted to
hasten the elaboration of a Constitution in order to take office as soon as was possible, the
SLORC signaled its unwillingness to let go from power immediately, even attempting to
negotiate Aung San Suu Kyi’s departure from the country, unsuccessfully. The NLD’s
refusal to limit its political activity led to a growing crackdown by the SLORC, including
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the renewed house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, whose resistance and criticism of the
SLORC’s policies earned her the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991.
The following years were marked by the repression of former protesters and efforts
to restore order. Chief among these was the establishment, in 1992, of the National
Convention in order to institute a new Constitution, counting with the participation of
representatives of ethnic groups and the NLD. In 1995, Aung San Suu Kyi was released
from home arrest, and, in the following year, the NLD left the National Convention due to
its alleged underrepresentation, soon followed by the adjournment of the Convention itself.
Another important initiative was the incorporation of a large number of young officers in
order to renew institutional cadres of the Tatmadaw. Regarding the ethnic groups, at this
time General Khin Nyunt, 1st Secretary of the SLORC, engineered the ceasefire policy,
establishing around twenty five agreements with local factions. Under these agreements,
local paramilitary groups would be entitled to varying degrees of control, from effective
military occupation by the government with little local autonomy, to almost complete local
authority, with some cases in which government troops may only enter if permitted
(STEINBERG, 2010).
On the regional level, in 1996 Myanmar joined the ASEAN Regional Forum, and, in
the following year, joined ASEAN; probably due to Gen. Khin Nyunt’s initiative. This
granted the country some necessary financial support, and recognition. On the other hand,
certain States, especially European countries and the USA, made it clear to the organization
that they were favorable to pressure being applied on Myanmar due to its poor human
rights record. These external pressures were mostly perceived as opposed to the policy of
non-interference in internal matters that characterizes ASEAN, but in the context of the
Asian economic crisis they had significant weight, being especially supported by Thailand.
However, in 1998, a new concept was coined: enhanced interaction. According to
this idea, internal problems with spillover effects and transnational problems should be
discussed within ASEAN. Even then, though, the members of ASEAN refused to
intervene in internal matters, as was made clear in an answer to an open letter by Aung San
Suu Kyi, conceiving that the enhanced interaction was precisely a way of avoiding
interventionism. To support and monitor the internal processes in Myanmar was perceived
by ASEAN as the most effective course of action (PARIBATRA, 1999; LIBRELOTTO,
2008). At the same time, relations with the People’s Republic of China were deepened,
influenced by Khin Nyunt, well known to be favorable to the Chinese (STEINBERG,
2010). Since the opening of the borders between both countries, commercial ties had
grown, and the government of Myanmar invested in a large scale modernization of its
military with large purchases from China. The Chinese government also invested in naval
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and aerial infrastructure development in Myanmar, and installed radars on the Coco islands,
supposedly to monitor missile launch facilities and navigation in the Indian Ocean (FAS,
1997).
In the same year in which Myanmar joined ASEAN (1997), the official government
organization was changed from the SLORC to the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC), presided by Than Shwe. In the year of 2000, Aung San Suu Kyi was once again
put under house arrest, precipitating the intercession of a UN special envoy, Razali Ismail,
who managed to warrant Suu Kyi’s release in 2002, with a permission to campaign in the
country’s countryside. These campaigns, in which Suu Kyi called on the West to impose
sanctions on the SPDC, caused a growing tension in the country, culminating in the March
2003 Depayin incident, in which an armed pro-government mob attacked a crowd of NLD
supporters, resulting in several deaths and the arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi. Afterwards, it
has been concluded that this incident had been premeditated, and it has also been
speculated that one of its targets may have been Suu Kyi (ALRC, 2004).
While the Chinese government maintained its pragmatic stance after the Depayin
incident, not altering its investments in Myanmar, the episode prompted intense debate
within ASEAN. This debate and the position defended by the Malay Ex-Prime Minister,
Mahathir Mohamed, that unless the SPDC released Suu Kyi, Myanmar should be expelled
from ASEAN, were effective in pressuring Than Shwe and Khin Nyunt into releasing a
program for a democratic transition, the “Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy”, even if not
having proposed dates for the steps in his program. Following the program, in 2004 the
Convention to elaborate the Constitution was reconvened, being interrupted soon
afterwards. In the same year, Khin Nyunt, Prime Minister since 2003 and Chief of Military
Intelligence, was deposed, arrested, accused on the grounds of corruption, and condemned
to 44 years of imprisonment. It is widely thought that his lack of support among the
troops, his control of intelligence and his cultivation of closer relations with China,
perceived as an undermining of autonomy by the nationalists led by Than Shwe, caused his
downfall (STEINBERG, 2010).
In 2005 Myanmar was counted among the “outposts of tyranny” in a
pronouncement by Condoleezza Rice, which was perceived in ASEAN as opposition to
Myanmar exercising its planned Presidency of the Association in 2006. In the Vientiane
Summit of Foreign Ministers, Myanmar announced that it would not be occupying
ASEAN’s presidency the following year, generating a positive response from fellow
associates. During the following year, Malaysia, then presiding ASEAN, proposed measures
to increase ASEAN’s leverage over Myanmar, which prompted positive responses from the
US Secretary of State Rice. On the other hand, all ASEAN members opposed or abstained
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from voting on a draft resolution regarding human rights in Myanmar at an U.N. General
Assembly meeting in 2006, demonstrating that a level of reluctance remained, in perceived
intervention on internal matters (UNGA, 2006).
On August 15, 2007, fuel prices were raised without previous warning, causing price
adjustments on other goods and services, such as food and public transport. These
adjustments resonated with deep seated resentment against chronic economic ills, having
immediate effects upon the poor and the monks, who were dependent on donations. The
great influence that the sangha—the monasteries—and the Buddhist monks have over the
society caused the violent reaction of the military to monks’ demonstrations in Pakokku to
heighten indignation. As protests spread to the capital Yangon1, they grew larger in size,
incorporated other social segments, especially students, and became increasingly political in
character, from silent marches at first, to flying the symbols of the NLD. These
manifestations became known as the Saffron Revolution—although noted by Steinberg
(2010) for having been neither Saffron nor a Revolution—in a reference to the colored
revolutions promoting regime change and democratic reform elsewhere in the world. The
government crackdown was swift, beating protesters, raiding and closing monasteries,
arresting supporters of the demonstrations, with a death toll estimated between 31 and
around 100 people.
The main importance of the Saffron Revolution was that, for the first time, violent
repression was visible, transmitted via television and the internet to homes throughout the
country, aggravated by being directed against the sangha. This may have damaged the
regime’s legitimacy irreparably, and it is likely that, due to the intensely devout character of
many in the junta’s leadership, this repression has caused internal rifts (STEINBERG,
2010). The violence of the repression even caused a hardened position from Singapore, at
the time exercising the presidency of ASEAN, insisting that moral pressure by its peers was
the most effective way to advance the cause of democracy. So dire became the situation
that a truce was negotiated to allow for direct talks between Than Shwe and Aung San Suu
Kyi. Yet, it must be noted that the ASEAN Charter, elaborated in 2007 reiterated the
principles of non-interference and sovereignty, being ratified by Myanmar in 2008
(NICKSH, 2007; LIBRELOTTO, 2008). The following year, in February 2008, the junta
set the referendum on the new Constitution to May 10, and elections to 2010.
However, on May 2, the country was struck by the Cyclone Nargis, causing the worst
natural disaster in Myanmar’s recorded history (FRITZ et al, 2009). Some 138,000 people
are estimated to have died, with damages likely being around US$ 2.4 billion, approximately
1
In 2007, the Tatmadaw inaugurated the new Burmese capital city: Naypyidaw. It is located “halfway
between Yangon and Mandalay, allegedly to mark the establishment of its dynasty, as past Burmese kings
have done […]” (KHANNA, 2008, p. 293).
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27% of the nation’s GDP in 2007. This forced the government to adapt the time of the
referendum. Yet, they proved insistent on the maintenance of the date, May 10, keeping the
date throughout the country, and postponing the election for two weeks, until May 24, in
the areas affected by the cyclone. As the government refused to allow foreign observers of
any sort to the election, this had the effect of preventing the access of any foreign aid
worker to the afflicted areas for over three weeks. Furthermore, the government failed to
offer large scale relief efforts, and sometimes even blocked the relief efforts organized by
the very people from unaffected areas, who mounted their own support teams, and were
frequently detained due to operating without government control. It must be noted that
there was a strong component of nationalism in the government reaction to the
international community at the time, claiming that Myanmar did not require foreign aid.
Also significant is the fears of the junta stemming from a near equation of foreign
intervention with a foreign invasion. From the perspective of the junta, the US government
has been actively promoting regime change in the country for around two decades, since
the threat of intervention in 1988. Thus, it may have seemed credible that a humanitarian
crisis might be used as a pretext for an invasion, despite the difficulties that starting a war
would pose for the US at the time. Despite these difficulties, the referendum proceeded,
approving the proposed Constitution by over 90% of the votes.
Among the most important measures included in the new Constitution by the
Tatmadaw is the reform of the administrative divisions of the country. This established that
the State is structured by local autonomy subsumed under the central authority of the
government. Three different divisions where established: regions, states and the territory of
the Union (MYANMAR, 2008). The territory of the Union is under the direct control of
the President, and the only such territory is the capital, Naypyidaw. The regions,
comparable to provinces, are seven administrative divisions in which the Burman ethnic
group constitutes a majority. The states, numbering seven, are similar to regions, but
having the other ethnic groups, which are minorities at national level, constituting a local
majority. Also noteworthy are the five self-administered zones and the self administered
division, which exist within the states or regions, but are autonomous within these units.
One of the zones, Naga, is located in the Sagaing region, and all the remaining zones and
the single self-administered division, Wa, are located in the Shan state.
Over the course of 2009 and 2010, the ruling junta tried to bring several of the ethnic
militias and paramilitary groups under greater central control, turning them into “Border
Guard Forces”. However, many of the strongest groups refused the proposition, fearful of
the potential loss of autonomy, with clashes taking place in parts of the country. At the
same time, some groups and parties were wary of taking part in the 2010 elections due to
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fears that their gains would be reduced, compared to the 1990 elections. These fears were
made more acute due both to articles in the 2008 Constitution specifying that 25% of
chairs in both chambers of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the Parliament, would be reserved for
members directly appointed by the military; and by the frauds in the 2008 referendum,
which made clear that the government held far greater control over the result of the
elections. The provisions in the Constitution forbidding anyone that possessed a foreign
citizenship or did not have military experience from running for the presidency were seen
as targeting Aung San Suu Kyi, due to her holding a British citizenship and not having gone
through military service (STEINBERG, 2010). Ultimately, these measures, along with the
continuation of Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest caused the NLD to boycott the elections.
On the other hand, several military leaders resigned from their military positions in
order to run as civilians in the elections. Foremost amongst these was Thein Sein, the
Prime Minister since 2007, who came to lead the Union Solidarity and Development Party
(USDP), the political arm of the Tatmadaw. On August 13, the election was announced for
November 7, drawing criticism for not giving enough time for opposition parties to
campaign properly. The election was canceled in parts of almost all the states, especially
those areas controlled by groups considered hostile by the government. The outcome of
the election confirmed the hold of the USDP on the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, holding over 50%
of both chambers, and, with the 25% reserved for military appointments, having a very
solid majority of over 75% of both chambers, ensuring the maintenance of the military
leadership over the political process.
In the aftermath of the election, Aung San Suu Kyi was released from her house
arrest and allowed to travel outside Yangon. In February 2011, the Presidential Electoral
College of the Parliament elected Thein Sein as President, being the first civilian President
of Myanmar in over 50 years. Thein Sein’s position as a moderate has been perceived by
the US, UN and some ASEAN members as an improvement, although much criticism was
directed at the electoral process itself, accused of intense frauds, intimidation, and blocking
important groups from participating. Thein Sein has sought to enhance the government’s
image, even having direct meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi on August 19, 2011. At the
same time, some of the opposition parties that took part in the election demonstrated
satisfaction for at least having a legitimate legal platform upon which they can express their
opinions widely, even if with certain limits, and ASEAN and ARF have expressed support
for the continuation of the “Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy”. But the clashes against
paramilitary groups in the Shan State served as a reminder of the difficulties on the road for
the consolidation of the Union of Myanmar.
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2.2. Myanmar’s Geopolitical Importance
Myanmar lies at the intersection between Sinic and Hindu cultures, and has long
been a powerful actor in local power dynamics. Its significant size, abundance of natural
resources and key strategic position allowed it to constitute a powerful state before its
colonization, quite capably expanding and incorporating territories of its neighbors. In
contemporary times Myanmar’s importance remains clear, and thus the country is the focus
of much political effort in the region, especially among ASEAN member states.
Myanmar is one of the countries capable of exerting control over the Strait of
Malacca—one of the most important sea lanes in the world, through which one third of
the world’s traded goods pass, along one quarter of all oil carried by sea (ZUBIR, 2004),
upon which several East Asian economies depend—. Furthermore, the Strait connects U.S.
bases on the Middle East and the Pacific, having global strategic significance. It is also
relevant that, due to the frailty of the Strait, China aims to build an overland pipeline
connecting Myanmar to its southern provinces, thus becoming theoretically independent
from the Malacca Strait. Such an endeavor has received firm opposition from the Japanese
government, which does not wish to see its main regional rival becoming independent of
the situation in the Strait of Malacca while itself would remain limited by this factor.
Since Myanmar is located between India, China, and US ally Thailand, it also needs
to act cautiously in the international scene, in order to avoid being the stage of a
confrontation among great powers. Aggravating this problem are its significant Indian and
Chinese populations, which have traditionally held great economic power, and significant
influence in the country. Especially significant is Chinese penetration in Myanmar, which
has caused policy shifts from India, which has increasingly supported Bangladesh in its
border disputes with Myanmar.
The country also possesses vast natural resources, such as one third of global teak
production2 (STEINBERG, 2010), along large mineral reserves and hydroelectric potential,
largely untapped. Also important is the economic potential of the Burmese population as a
consumer market, which has yielded significant profit to Chinese commerce
(LIBRELOTTO, 2008), even though international trade is rigidly controlled by the
government. These resources and markets, along Burmese political support, are coveted by
several neighbors, thus halting excessive criticism towards the ruling junta in Myanmar
(STEINBERG, 2010).
Myanmar has garnered increasing attention in recent years due to the difficulties its
population faces, and the humanitarian crises that often assail them. The lack of economic
Teak, Tectona grandis, is a species of tropical hardwood with several uses in furniture and culinary.
It is also very valued in the naval industry, due to the easy and low cost maintenance of teak decks.
2
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development exacerbates the difficulty that the Myanma state already has in effectively
facing the humanitarian difficulties. That, along with the government’s unwillingness to
allow contact with the outside world, can cause crises that reach cataclysmic proportions,
most famously when, in 2008, the Nargis hurricane hit the heart of agricultural production
in Myanmar, the Irrawaddy Delta, seriously threatening generalized famines, and the
government stalled and blocked humanitarian relief operations, and the delivery of aid
supplies, drawing sharp international criticism. Moreover, Myanmar’s economic and
humanitarian troubles also affect its neighbors, with large flows of refugees into
neighboring countries, often resulting in rising crime rates, increased rates of transmission
of diseases and economic and sexual exploitation of refugees in border areas.
Ultimately, as Librelotto (2008) argues, Myanmar’s international relevance is a result
from this country’s position within China’s global strategy. It was the closer relations
between Yangon and Beijing that caused ASEAN to accelerate Myanmar’s entry into the
Association, in order to counterbalance Chinese influence in the country, and, thus, in the
area as a whole. Moreover, Myanmar’s entry into ASEAN prompted US sanctions against
the country, to counter the perceived greater integration into the international system and
the legitimacy that ASEAN brought the junta. These events gave Myanmar not only an
objective importance, but a symbolic importance, for China, the USA and for ASEAN too.
For China, Myanmar has become a central piece in its global strategy, even causing its
intervention in the UN Security Council, where China exercised its veto power for the first
time since 1973 in a matter unrelated to Taiwan, so as to block a resolution concerning
Myanmar. For ASEAN, Myanmar is perceived as a neighbor to be protected, in order to
demonstrate both the autonomy and the capacity of the Association to encourage a
democratic transition process. Finally, for the USA Myanmar is a paradigm of disrespect of
human rights and democracy, where the humanitarian and democratic discourse can be
exercised consistently, without contradictions, at the same time confronting China
indirectly over its protection of the Myanmar.
2.3. Political and Securitarian Issues
2.3.1. The “Seven Step Roadmap for Democracy”, Democratic Transition and Political
Parties
The government of Myanmar has followed the “Seven Step Roadmap for
Democracy”, as laid down by Khin Nyunt and Than Shwe in 2003, as the basis for its
democratic transition process. The steps are as follows: 1) Reconvening of the National
Convention that has been adjourned since 1996; 2) After the successful holding of the
National Convention, step by step implementation of the process necessary for the
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emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system; 3) Drafting of a new
constitution in accordance with basic principles and detailed basic principles laid down by
the National Convention; 4) Adoption of the constitution through national referendum; 5)
Holding of free and fair elections for Pyithu Hluttaws (Legislative bodies) according to the
new constitution; 6) Convening of Hluttaws attended by Hluttaw members in accordance
with the new constitution; 7) Building a modern, developed and democratic nation by the
state leaders elected by the Hluttaw; and the government and other central organs formed
by the Hluttaw (MYANMAR, 2004).
This program has received the endorsement of ASEAN member states several times,
being seen as the basis for a constructive reform process. However, as of 2011, apparently
the 7th step has been reached, and the country still faces problems with its democratic
structure, prompting the debate over whether the Roadmap remains a valid program, or
should be superseded, after having been implemented.
Problems that could be noted are the absence of the largest and most influent
opposition party in the country, the NLD, from the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, having boycotted
the elections in order to demonstrate that it did not wish to lose its gains of the 1990
election. The rigging of the elections in favor of the USPD and the 25% of chairs reserved
for the military have also drawn intense international criticism, with U.S. President Barack
Obama accusing the election of having been “stolen”(OBAMA, 2010). And the problems
with the incorporation of ethnic minorities into the democratic process remain a
fundamental obstacle to the political evolution of the country: by forbidding certain ethnic
parties of running in the election, and canceling the elections in areas where junta power
was weakest, the states where the minorities’ paramilitary groups held greatest sway, the
Tatmadaw may have very well pushed these groups into a stronger commitment with armed
struggle, due to their exclusion from the legitimate political process.
On the other hand, from the military point of view, the Tatmadaw has a key place in
society, and it must remain an important player in the political process for as long as it
needs to, in order to avoid chaos and the disintegration of the State, the aims that have
permeated the discourse of the military since it first took power in the country. The
dominance of the military in both chambers of the Hluttaw serves well the purposes of the
Tatmadaw, in that it continues its central position over the political system, allowing for the
“discipline-flourishing democracy” that has been its aim (STEINBERG, 2010). This
position allows the military to control the participation and the influence of opposition
parties over the political system, avoiding the perceived problems of the 1990 elections,
which, if followed, would have led to the collapse of the military’s dominance over the
political system, and might, in the Armed Force’s perspective, have led to the disintegration
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of the State, since the military contains the ethnic insurgencies. Still, Thein Sein’s direct
meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi indicates that the Tatmadaw is willing to grant a certain
degree of visibility, legitimacy, and perhaps even participation, to the NLD. And regarding
the inclusion of ethnic groups into the political system, from the Tatmadaw’s point of view,
they shall only be accepted and tolerated inasmuch as they do not present a threat to the
integrity of the State, and are consequently willing to submit to central authority. Thus,
blocking the registration of some ethnic parties, canceling the elections in certain areas,
clashing with paramilitary ethnic groups, all are perceived as justified actions, in that they
extend the central authority to “insurgent” areas, ensuring the integrity of the State.
2.3.2. Minorities, Militias, the Ceasefire Policy, and Refugees
Myanmar has faced an often low level internal conflict ever since its independence.
The ethnic insurgencies on areas not controlled by the Burman ethnic group have been the
main cause of military insistence on its dominance over the political system, due to the risk
of disintegration of the State. After the institution of the SLORC, the central government
aimed at representing the whole of the country, thereby changing its official name to
Myanmar, a geographic designation, instead of Burma, a reference to the Burman ethnic
group. A similar symbolic move in this direction may have been the changing of the capital
city from Yangon to the planned city of Naypyidaw, in the central area of the country, and
on the edge of Burman territory.
A more practical result of this policy was the ceasefire policy, engineered by Khin
Nyunt, but continued after his ousting. Essentially, this policy allowed the ceasefire groups
to effectively become local governments, as long as they did not take up arms against the
central government, did not cultivate poppy, and recognized to be under the sovereignty of
Myanmar. It must be noted, however, that the ceasefires were never accepted by all groups.
There are three degrees of autonomy: De facto autonomous groups—the Wa are the most
important of these, in whose territory the Tatmadaw’s troops cannot go in without
permission, and even surrendering their weapons, and the Kokang used to be an important
group, until it was defeated in 2009 and accepted to run in the election—; groups under
military occupation, but with self government—the Rakhine state, and parts of the Kayah
and Karen states—; and the areas where there is a degree of coexistence—some Kachin
areas in the north, along with PaO, Mon and other Karen territories—.
A substantial change took place after the approval of the 2008 Constitution. Several
groups that had taken part in the 1990 elections were wary of taking part in the 2010
elections, fearful of worse results on the ballots. Also, the government had been pressuring
militias into becoming “border guard forces”, seen as an attempt to disarm and subjugate
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the ceasefire groups. Furthermore, some of the more powerful groups were unsatisfied
with the degree of autonomy that the Constitution granted them, refusing to take part in
the elections. This destabilized the ceasefire policy, and some clashes begun taking place.
Foremost among these was the Kokang incident, in August 2009, in which, over the course
of four days, the Tatmadaw defeated the Kokang group, prompting the flight of over 30,000
people across the border into China, and leading the Kokang to accept participating in the
election. In 2011, rebel groups in Kachin and Shan territories were also hit by Tatmadaw
campaigns, which seem to be attempting to bring restive areas under control.
However, the militias maintain contacts amongst themselves, preparing to ally in case
the Tatmadaw breaks the ceasefire policy against the larger groups. But the greatest
deterrent to greater military action is probably pressure from neighboring countries,
especially China. These clashes near border areas are extremely detrimental to Chinese
authorities, damaging Chinese infrastructure investments in the area, and causing massive
refugees’ influx into Chinese territory. Indeed, it has been noted that the Chinese
government rarely criticizes the positions of Myanmar’s central government, but it does so
energetically when violence causes spillovers, such as refugee flows into China. This is one
of the greatest pressures that Myanmar faces for a peaceful solution of the matter of the
ethnic militias.
2.3.3. Transnational Crime
Myanmar is an important link in the crime network that extends throughout
Southeast Asia, China and India. The Golden Triangle, a key area in the global poppy
cultivation, is the border between Myanmar, Thailand and Lao P.D.R. In colonial times, the
British stimulated the production of opium for Chinese markets, and over the course of the
XX century, the country was one of the main producers of heroin, mainly for western
markets (STEINBERG, 2010). But other types of contraband exist in the country,
including other drugs, armaments, humans, and natural resources such as woods, jewelry
and wildlife (WYLER, 2010).
While it is largely incorrect that the central government of Myanmar profits directly
from illegal activities, it is evident that in the areas where contraband is most common,
corruption is rampant, and local military officers are often conniving, if not directly
involved. The main perpetrators, however, are the ethnic groups and militias in peripheral
areas, which use contraband as a source of profit and weapons, to strengthen their
position. This, in turn, makes it nearly impossible for the government to eradicate
transnational crime, due to the ceasefire policy with some of the key groups involved in
criminal practices. This and the fact that the government often encourages drug lords to go
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over to legitimate activities, retire, and fund development projects while being protected
from prosecution, led other countries to accuse Myanmar’s government of complicity and
money laundering.
On the other hand, the government, under Khin Nyunt’s leadership in the 1990s,
began a program to eradicate poppy production in the country. Even though in the 1980s
the U.S. government aided the Burmese government in fighting opium production, after
the coup several U.S. congressmen adopted a harder stance, opposing aid to the opium
eradication program under the SPDC. However, Myanmar managed to reduce poppy
production in the country by almost 80%. Yet this reduction may prove ephemeral if an
alternative crop is not found for the farmers of the poorer areas that engaged in poppy
cultivation.
It must also be noted that even though opium production has decreased, the Wa
ethnic group has become one of the main methamphetamine producers in the area
(WYLER, 2010), selling most of its product to Thailand, from where it imports the
necessary chemicals for its operation. It is estimated that around 4% of the Thai population
use the drug, to the point where it has become a significant political issue (JOHNSON,
2003). In 2003, Thailand initiated a severe crackdown on drug dealers, resulting in some
thousands of extrajudicial killings. Since the United Wa Army group is the largest of groups
in Myanmar, and the Tatmadaw is unwilling to confront it, Thailand began arming a rebel
group, the Shan State Army South, in order to weaken the Wa (STEINBERG, 2010).
3. PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION
The member states of ASEAN have been consistently reluctant to censor Myanmar
strongly, in accordance with principles of non-interference. However, some member states,
particularly those that seek to maintain closer diplomatic ties with the United States, have
presented formulations allowing internal situations that affect neighboring countries to be a
cause of debate and participation within ASEAN.
In this line, the ASEAN Regional Forum has been limited in its criticism of
Myanmar. It usually endorses the Burmese regime’s efforts to achieve a political transition
and a representative government, referring also to the importance of economic reforms,
national reconciliation, unity and reconsolidation, and urging the release of political
prisoners, as noted in the Chair’s Statement 18th ARF (2011a, p. 5). The report of the
Senior Officials Meeting greeted the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, as it urged the
Parliament and the new Government to transition to democracy and enact a process of
national reconciliation which is indeed genuine (ARF, 2011b). The ARF has also
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consistently urged the government of Myanmar to work closely alongside the international
community, particularly ASEAN and the UN. (ARF, 2011a)
4. BLOC POSITIONS
Canada, Australia and New Zealand are concerned about the recent adopted
restrictive electoral laws that fall short of international standards. They urge Myanmar to do
what is necessary for free elections, such as allowing freedom of speech and releasing the
political prisoners so they can initiate a democratic opposition. They also defend that other
ethnic groups need to have a representative that will engage a dialogue aiming for the
national conciliation, and that must be made without any military resolution. Canada, such
as European Union and United States, has sanctions against Myanmar.
The strengthening of the United Nations remains a key element in the European
Union and the United States of America action toward Myanmar. The EU also focus on
the human rights situation in the country, maintaining their multi-track approach towards
this country: keeping restrictive measures, while providing humanitarian aid, as defined by
the Common Position of 2006 (EU, 2008). Both urge that the rights of the ethnic
minorities must be respected and the minorities ought to have a democratic
representativeness. They also demonstrate preoccupations with the economic situation in
Myanmar.
The United States of America believes that the political changes in Myanmar are not
enough for lifting the sanction as the ASEAN countries urge. The Obama administration
has just renewed the sanctions against Myanmar due “to actions hostile to US interests”, as
the president stated (MYANMAR, 2011), these actions according to a US State
Department spokesman would be the “large-scale repression of the democratic
opposition” (US, 2011). The US is worried about the possible cooperation in nuclear
technology that some evidences show to be happening between Myanmar and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Japan expects that Myanmar will further promote its movements of releasing
political prisoners and promote the democratization process, then strengthen its
relationship with international community. Japan is supporting projects to deal with the
problem of the illegal drugs, has been helping the monitoring of illegal cultivations in
Myanmar and support for the formulation of a strategy for enforcing drug control laws.
The Russian Federation bilateral relations with Myanmar are the strongest of the
isolated country. Russia is a part of the Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism and
Transnational Crime, with Myanmar and other ASEAN countries, and supports the
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Understanding beyond solutions. UFRGSMUN: beyond modelling.
UFRGSMUN 2011
government against the rebel groups who, the Russian argue, want the disintegration of the
country. Russia opposes the establishment of sanctions on Myanmar and support a policy
of dialogue. Russia agreed, in 2007, to build a controversial nuclear research center in this
country which will be monitored by the UN nuclear agency. Pakistan has also helped in
this endeavor, providing nuclear scientist. Pakistan is known to have supplied Myanmar’s
army with conventional weapons and to the effort of training Myanmar’s army on its own
territory.
Myanmar is a country of increasing importance for the People’s Republic of
China, both for energy security (China share hydroelectric plants in the border with
Myanmar) and sea access, insofar Myanmar sought foreign support. China has also made
intense investments in developing Myanmar’s infrastructure, such as port facilities,
hydroelectric plants, monitoring radars, roads and pipelines. Furthermore, Myanmar is seen
as a partner that could, through trade, further develop the Yunnan province, whose
development is below national average (KHANNA, 2008).
Nonetheless, the countries remain at odds over the increasing border tensions.
Beijing is concerned about the rising military operations in the borderland, on the
provinces of Kachin and Shan (which has Chinese minorities). These are aimed to unify the
various ethnic groups under Naypyidaw’s leadership, but threaten the Chinese interests.
Beijing is apprehensive because the fighting may cause a refugee influx into their territory.
The fighting could likewise reduce the trade between the Kachin province and the Chinese
province of Yunnan, what would affect a large number of infrastructure projects in that
region. Also passes through Myanmar’s northern provinces the Sino-Myanmar oil and
natural gas pipelines. These concerns are related to the Chinese endeavor for having
another access to Middle East, avoiding the troublesome South China Sea and Malacca
Strait.
Since the debacle of the Soviet Union, Mongolia has become increasingly closer to
the People’s Republic of China, which has become its biggest commercial partner.
Mongolia has also become mainly dependent on Chinese support for its closer integration
into Asian regional organizations. At the same time, the country has also retained a close
cooperation with the government of the Russian Federation. Therefore, Mongolia tends to
align with these countries in matters regarding Myanmar.
India’s relations with Myanmar are motivated by the desire to counterbalance
China’s increasing influence in this country, as well as to increase its own. India’s position
towards Myanmar has helped to diminish their international isolation and dependence on
China. Both nations are cooperating against drug trafficking and insurgent groups that
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work in the borderland between the countries. India stresses that it does not intend on
interfering in Myanma internal affairs.
Although having close links in religious, social and cultural matters, Bangladesh has
tensions in its relations with Myanmar. They have border quarrels and have not defined the
maritime zone frontier. Bangladesh also shelters a significant quantity of Muslim refugees
originally from Myanmar, the Rohingya. These are a source of tension between both
nations, as Myanmar refuses to grant the Rohingya citizenship, not recognizing them as
one of its several ethnic groups. This causes them to flee in large numbers across the
border into Bangladesh, which, in turn, attempts to repatriate them, with UN aid.
Sri Lanka and Myanmar share cultural, religious and historical links, having warm
relations. The shared experience of combat against ethnic insurgencies brought the two
countries closer, with Myanmar having congratulated Sri Lanka on the elimination of its
rebel groups. At the same time, Sri Lanka has been supportive of the current reforms in
Myanmar, and both countries have strived to increase commercial relations.
Relations between Myanmar and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are
marked by the attempt of assassination of the president of the Republic of Korea by
DPRK’s secret service, while he was visiting Myanmar. This situation led to a political
hindrance resulting in the breaking of the diplomatic relations between the two countries
from 1983 to 2007. Nowadays, both countries are cooperating in military scope. In 2007,
the US navy intercepted a North Korean cargo vessel en route to Myanmar which
supposedly was taking missiles manufacture technology. There are evidences of nuclear
technology cooperation between the countries as well. This cooperation brings concerns to
the Republic of Korea, which wishes to stop this dynamic through economic help for
Myanmar, while reiterating support for a pacific transition to a democratic government.
ASEAN member states—Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Cambodia, Vietnam and Brunei
Darussalam—have usually supported a democratic transition process in Myanmar, in the
molds of the “Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy”, and been reluctant to criticize
Myanmar in other international forums. Essentially, Myanmar has been a troublesome
neighbor at times, due to the criticism that it has often attracted, and thus, attracting
indirect criticism to ASEAN itself. However, supporting Myanmar has been also a chance
to demonstrate the pervasiveness of the non-intervention principle in ASEAN, an
opportunity to demonstrate the autonomy of the Association, and a situation in which it
demonstrates its capacity for accelerating reforms through pressure. On more particular
levels, governments more closely allied with the United States have usually tended to be
more critical of Myanmar, and traditionally been among those that considered adaptations
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UFRGSMUN 2011
of the non-intervention principle. Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines have
traditionally adopted this stance. Myanmar has attempted to cultivate closer ties with
Indonesia, Malaysia, and occasionally, Vietnam, in order to consolidate its partnerships
with ASEAN, and avoiding isolation within the Association, alongside the Tatmadaw’s
stated admiration for the model of participation of the Indonesian army in this country’s
political process.
Timor-Leste has a delicate position regarding Myanmar. On one hand, the East
Timorese government has rather consistently supported resolutions criticizing Myanmar’s
poor human rights record. However, in recent times, this position has grown more
restrained by the country’s bid to become a member state of ASEAN, which causes it to
attempt to cultivate closer relations with all members of the organization. Thus, reforms
and a commitment to democracy are encouraged by Timor-Leste without adopting a
confrontational stance.
Papua New Guinea has cultivated cordial relations with its neighbors, usually taking
moderate stances. Also, Papua New Guinea is an observer member of ASEAN, seeking to
eventually become a full member. Accordingly, it tends to have a position that does not
alienate it from member states of ASEAN, as it avoids distancing itself from other
neighboring countries. Among these, a key partner is Australia, on whom Papua New
Guinea relies on for obtaining economic aid
5. QUESTIONS TO PONDER
i.
Should the traditional ASEAN policy of non-intervention in internal matters be
maintained at all costs, or should it be applied selectively, in cases where internal
matters could be harmful to other countries, or even to the region as a whole?
ii.
In an unstable country, should the process of building a democratic government be
hastened, even if this could destabilize the region, or should a non-democratic
government be supported for the sake of regional stability?
iii.
How best to conduce a democratic transition process with the goal of creating a
stable, viable and representative civilian government, in an unstable environment,
with military institutions not interfering in political processes?
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