A oferta de educação
Pedro Telhado Pereira
WHAT PROPORTION OF NATIONAL WEALTH IS
SPENT ON EDUCATION? EAG – B2
• • In 2011, OECD countries spent an average of 6.1% of
their GDP on educational institutions; seven countries
(Argentina, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Korea, New Zealand
and Norway) spent more than 7%.
• • Between 2000 and 2011, expenditure on all levels of
education combined increased at a faster rate than GDP
growth in almost all countries for which data are available.
• • Since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008 and up to
2011, the GDP rose, in real terms, in half of the countries with
available data, while public expenditure on educational
institutions fell in only six countries. In the shorter period
between 2009 and 2011, GDP rose, in real terms, in most
countries, and public expenditure on educational institutions
fell in one-third of OECD countries, probably as a
consequence of fiscal consolidation policies.
Other findings
• • Expenditure on pre-primary education accounts for
nearly one-tenth of expenditure on educational
institutions, or 0.6% of the GDP, on average across OECD
countries. There are large differences among countries. For
instance, expenditure on pre-primary education is less than
0.2% of GDP in Australia and Switzerland but about 1% or
more in Denmark and Iceland.
• • Primary, secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary
education accounts for nearly two-thirds of expenditure
on educational institutions, or 3.8% of the GDP, on average
across OECD countries. Argentina and New Zealand spend
the most among OECD and partner countries, with 5% or
more of the GDP devoted to these levels of education, while
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, Latvia, the Russian
Federation, the Slovak Republic and Turkey spend 3% or less
of their GDP on these levels.
• • Tertiary education accounts for one-quarter of
expenditure on educational institutions, or 1.6% of
GDP, on average across OECD countries. Canada,
Chile, Korea and the United States spend between 2.4%
and 2.8% of their GDP on tertiary institutions.
• • Private expenditure on educational institutions as a
percentage of GDP is highest at the tertiary level, on
average across OECD countries. Its share is the
highest in Chile, Korea and the United States where it
ranges from 1.7% to 1.9% of GDP.
Overall investment relative to
GDP
• In 2011, expenditure on educational
institutions (all levels combined) relative to
GDP was greater than 6% in half of the OECD
and partner countries with available data, and
even above 7% in seven of them: Argentina,
Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Korea, New Zealand and
Norway. At the other end of the spectrum,
Hungary, Italy, the Russian Federation, the Slovak
Republic and Turkey spent less than 5% of their
GDP on education (Table B2.1).
• Portugal 5,5%
Effect of the financial crisis on public
expenditure on educational institutions
between 2008 and 2011
• Between 2008 and 2011, GDP (expressed in
constant prices) fell in more than one-third of
the countries with available data (15 out of
36), and by 5% or more in four countries:
Greece, Iceland, Ireland and Slovenia. As
more than three-quarters of education
expenditure in most countries comes from
public sources, how did the downturn in GDP
growth affect public spending on education?
Available figures show that the education
sector was still relatively untouched by
early budget cuts.
• Over the period 2009-11, public expenditure
decreased between 2009 and 2010, or
between 2010 and 2011, or continuously over
the two-year period in a larger number of
countries than between 2008 and 2009. Over
the whole period 2009-11, public
expenditure decreased in 10 countries (by
more than 5% in Hungary, Iceland, Italy,
Portugal and the Russian Federation),
while GDP increased in most countries.
Table B2.1. Expenditure on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP, by level of education (2011)
From public and private sources of funds1
Notes
OECD
Austria
Belgium
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
2
5
5
Pre- Primary, secondary and
Tertiary
primar post-secondary noneducatio
y
tertiary education
n
educat
ion (for All primary, secondary Primary Upper
PostAll
Tertiary- Tertiarychildre and post-secondary
and secondar secondar tertiary type B
type A
n aged non-tertiary education
lower
y
y non- educatio educatio education
3 and
secondar educatio tertiary
n
n
and
older)
y
n
educatio
advanced
educatio
n
research
n
programme
s
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
0,6
0,6
0,5
1,4
0,4
0,7
0,6
m
0,6
1,0
x(9)
0,5
0,8
0,4
0,5
0,7
0,4
3,6
4,4
2,9
4,4
4,1
3,9
3,1
m
2,6
4,9
4,6
3,1
3,4
4,0
4,9
3,4
3,7
2,3
1,6
1,8
3,1
2,5
2,6
2,0
m
1,5
3,6
3,3
1,9
2,5
2,7
3,3
2,4
2,6
1,3
2,8
1,1
1,3
1,6
1,3
1,0
m
1,0
1,3
0,9
1,2
0,8
1,3
1,6
1,0
1,1
n
x(4)
n
x(4, 6)
x(4)
n
0,2
m
0,1
x(4)
0,4
0,1
n
n
x(4)
n
m
1,5
1,4
1,4
1,9
1,9
1,5
1,3
m
1,0
1,2
1,5
1,0
m
1,8
1,7
1,3
1,4
n
x(6)
n
x(6)
n
0,3
0,1
m
n
x(6)
x(6)
n
m
n
x(6)
n
x(6)
1,5
x(6)
1,4
x(6)
1,9
1,2
1,2
m
0,9
1,2
x(6)
1,0
m
1,8
x(6)
1,3
x(6)
All levels of
education
combined
(including
undistribute
d
programme
s)
(9)
5,7
6,6
5,0
7,9
6,5
6,1
5,1
m
4,4
7,7
6,2
4,6
m
6,2
7,4
5,5
5,5
Notes
Preprimary
educatio
n (for
children
aged 3
and
older)
(1)
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
OECD average
OECD total
EU21 average
5
Primary,
secondary
and postsecondary
non-tertiary
education
All primary, Primary Upper
Postsecondary
and seconda seconda
and postlower
ry
ry nonsecondary seconda educatio tertiary
non-tertiary
ry
n
educatio
education educatio
n
n
(2)
(3)
(4)
0,5
0,8
0,9
0,7
0,2
0,4
0,5
2,8
3,8
3,2
3,9
4,0
4,7
3,7
1,8
2,7
2,5
2,6
2,6
3,7
2,7
1,0
1,1
0,7
1,3
1,4
1,0
1,0
0,6
0,5
0,6
3,8
3,6
3,6
2,5
2,5
2,4
1,2
1,1
1,2
All levels of
education
combined
(including
undistribute
d
All
Tertiary- Tertiary- programme
s)
tertiary type B
type A
educatio educatio education
n
n
and
advanced
research
programme
s
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
x(4)
1,0
x(4)
1,0
4,4
x(4)
1,3
x(6)
x(6)
5,9
a
1,3
0,2
1,1
5,5
n
1,7
x(6)
x(6)
6,3
x(4)
1,3
n
1,2
5,6
a
1,2
x(6)
x(6)
6,4
m
2,7
x(6)
x(6)
6,9
n
n
n
Tertiary
educatio
n
1,6
1,9
1,4
0,2
0,2
0,1
1,4
1,4
1,3
6,1
6,1
5,8
Função de produção do capital
humano
• O que é uma função?
• Um função é uma relação entre variáveis, sendo
uma dependente das restantes.
• Exemplos: y=f(x), a variável y é uma função da
variável x.
• y=x2
Vamos agora ver de que depende
o Capital Humano adquirido
• Todos temos diferentes habilidades (A) à
nascença, a qual é não observável. Esta
habilidade inata vai influenciar o capital
humano que adquirimos.
• O capital humano adquirido depende
positivamente dessa habilidade
• O tempo (S) que dedicamos a adquirir
capital humano (por exemplo o tempo que
passamos a estudar) influencia de modo
positivo o capital humano adquirido
• Os recursos (E) existentes na escola
frequentada (alunos/professor, qualidade
dos professores, biblioteca) também
influenciam o capital humano adquirido
• O ambiente familiar e social (H).
– O capital humano da família influencia
positivamente a aquisição de capital humano
– Os pares têm muita influência na aquisição
de capital humano.
• É mais fácil educar turmas de alunos “brilhantes”
Função de produção do capital
humano
• ΔH = f(A,S,E,H)
Formação das turmas: seleção
dos alunos, composição e tamanho
• Seleção dos alunos
• Dois modos de fazer uma escola de elite
– Testar os alunos e escolher os melhores.
• Custos
– Tempo dos alunos
– Tempo dos Professores
– Fazer a selecção via preço.
• Os mais hábeis que irão ter maior rendibilidade da educação
estarão mais dispostos a pagar
• Se existir um mercado financeiro que funciona perfeitamente
a selecção pelo preço é perfeita
Não havendo um mercado
financeiro perfeito
• A selecção pelo mérito é superior à
selecção pelo preço
• No entanto, o Estado não pode deixar de
apoiar os estudantes mais pobres
Se houver apoio pelo Estado e
liberdade de inscrição
• A melhor escola fica com os melhores
alunos
• A segunda melhor escola fica com os
alunos seguintes
• Assim sucessivamente até à pior escola
ficar com os piores alunos.
• Haverá uma segregação entre os
melhores e os piores alunos
Mas será a segregação eficiente
para a sociedade como um todo?
• Se o efeito marginal dos pares for
crescente então a segregação é óptima
• Se o efeito marginal dos pares for
decrescente então a segregação não é
óptima.
Efeitos intergeracionais
• A segregação faz com que os filhos das
famílias com mais capital humano
frequentem as melhores escolas e
obtenham por sua vez adquiram mais
capital humano
• Ao tornarem-se pais, a situação repete-se
• Estes efeitos levam a que os Estados se
oponham à segregação, obrigando a que
estudantes dos meios mais
desfavorecidos frequentem as melhores
escolas.
O tamanho da turma
• Vamos supor que
– cada aluno só está atento 98% do tempo da
aula.
– Para que aula seja produtiva é necessário
que todos os alunos estejam atentos
• Então se a turma tiver só um aluno, então
a aula é produtiva em 98% do seu tempo
• E se tiver n alunos?
• Se tiver dois alunos
– Tempo produtivo 0,982 = 0,96 do tempo
• Se tiver 20 alunos
– Tempo produtivo 0,9820 = 0,67 do tempo
• Se tiver 40 alunos
– Tempo produtivo 0,9840 = 0,45 do tempo
• Se tiver 100 alunos
– Tempo produtivo 0,98100 = 0,13 do tempo
• Se tiver n alunos
– Tempo produtivo 0,98n
A evidência empírica é ambígua
• Krueger (1999) – 11600 alunos afectos aleatoriamente a
classes de diferentes tamanhos entre 1985 a 1989 –
conclui que os alunos em classes mais pequenas têm
melhor resultados. (Krueger, Alan B. 1999.
“Experimental Estimates of Education Production
Functions,” Quart. J. Econ. 114:2, pp. 497–532).
• Krueger and Whitmore (2001) - alunos de classes
menores vão mais para a Universidade e têm resultados
melhores nos exames (Krueger, A.B. & Whitmore, D.M.
(2001). The effect of attending a small class in the early
grades on college-test taking and middle school test
results: Evidence from Project STAR. Economic Journal,
111, 1–28.)
• Hoxby (2002) – Não encontra efeitos significativos do
tamanho da classe (Hoxby, C. (2002) The power of
peers: How does the makeup of a classroom influence
achievement, Education Next, Summer. Vol 2 (2).)
• Woesmann and West (2006) – só encontram um efeito
negativo significativo do tamanho da classe no sucesso
escolar em 4 dos 36 países considerados.
(WOESSMANN, L., AND M. R.WEST (2006): “ClassSize Effects in School Systems Around the World:
Evidence from Between-Grade Variation in TIMSS,”
European Economic Review.)
Outras variáveis que podem
afectar o sucesso escolar
• Normalmente os resultados são ambíguos
• Apesar dos aumentos dos custos e da
qualidade da educação os resultados dos
estudantes não têm sido muito melhores
• O ambiente familiar e social parecem ter
efeitos maiores do que os recursos
utilizados na educação
• O resultado pouco significativo do
aumento de despesas em educação nos
resultados educativos pode ser devido ao
aumento de despesas ser para levar mais
estudantes de “baixa qualidade” a
entrarem no sistema o que pode levar até
a diminuição dos resultados dos testes.
No entanto, haverá um aumento do nível
de educação média da população.
Eficiência na utilização dos
recursos
• Será que podemos aumentar a produção
de capital humano sem aumentarmos os
custos?
• Ou
• Será que podemos obter a mesma
produção de capital humano diminuindo
os custos?
A solução óptima da minização dos custos
será a que resolve
Min p1 E1 + p2 E2 + p3 E3
s. a.
• ΔH = f(A,S,E,H)
• E = g(E1,E2,E3)
• Onde Ei são componentes do Ensino, por
exemplo professores, qualidade dos
professores, biblioteca, entre outros.
Porque não atingimos esta solução
óptima?
• O aumento de capital humano pode não
ser o único objectivo do sistema
educativo. Pode também ter como
objectivo aumentar o espírito de
cidadania, de cooperação, o sentido
estético. Não sendo estes objectivos
mensuráveis não podemos verificar se tal
se está a acontecer.
• Os professores estarem mais interessados em
terem o maior bem estar e não em obterem os
melhores resultados para os alunos ou os mais
baratos. Neste aspecto é importante o papel dos
sindicatos de professores.
• As escolas não terem autonomia suficiente para
tomarem as melhores decisões
– Professores do quadro que não podem ser mudados
de escola mesmo com a diminuição do número de
alunos.
• Concorrência entre escolas – o que
acontece se os alunos forem livres de
escolher a escola que desejam
– Financiamento aos alunos e não
directamente à escola
• Ensino obrigatório implicar que as escolas
devem estar próximo da residência dos
alunos
Eficiência versus equidade
• Há uma tendência para as despesas de
educação terem um efeito de igualdade
dando oportunidade para os elementos
menos favorecidos.
• Esta política pode ser menos eficiente do
que dar os recursos aos estudantes mais
hábeis e depois fazer a redistribuição
através dos impostos.
• Os mercados financeiros serem
imperfeitos justifica a intervenção do
Estado de modo a que os jovens de meios
mais desfavorecidos tenham capacidade
de frequentarem a escola que desejam.
• A intervenção do Estado não pode ser só
nos níveis mais elevados de educação,
pois não pode esquecer o apoio nos
níveis anteriores.
Clements, Benedict, (1999), The Eficiency of Education
Expenditure in Portugal, IMF Working Paper No. 99/179.
As despesas por aluno em PPC eram modestas
A despesa por aluno em relação ao PIB per capita é alta
Razões para a despesa por aluno ser alta
Os salários dos Professores
A eficiência das despesas de
educação
• A eficiência observa-se pelo modo como
os inputs se transformam em outputs da
educação.
• Pode-se utilizar uma estimação da
fronteira de produção – Free Disposal Hull
(FDH)
Um exemplo
País
Input
Output
A
100
200
B
150
180
C
200
250
D
250
320
Quais os países que estão a
produzir de modo eficiente?
• Estão todos com excepção do País B
• Porquê?
• Medida da eficiência no uso de inputs –
– 1 = Eficiente
– X(A)/X(B) < 1, não eficiente
• Medida da eficiência em termos da
produção
– 1 = Eficiente
– Y(B)/Y(A) < 1, não eficiente
Resultados empíricos
Eficiência das despesas em Educação
Reformas
Aumento do Ensino Pré-Primário
Consolidação do Parque Escolar
Aumento do Ensino Vocacional
Sugestões para reformas
Tópicos para investigação
Bronchi, Chiara (2003) The Effectiveness of Public
Expenditure in Portugal, Società Italiana di Economia
Pubblica, W. P. 198/2003
• Education outcomes do not match costs
• High outlays per student seem to result from
high educational staff salaries: in compulsory
education, the staff wage bill represents 90 per
cent of total spending on education.
• Geographical restrictions and the limited
responsibility of local authority spending have an
impact on school size and performance at the
compulsory school level. Pupils who are
residents in one municipality are not entitled to
go to school in another.
… while private returns to tertiary
education are high
• The public education system heavily subsidises tertiary
education in Portugal. Public university fees are very low
and deductible from the personal income tax.
• At the same time wage premia for people who have a
university degree are high and seem to have increased
during the 1990s
• Such heavy subsidisation seems debatable on equity
grounds, and because tertiary education tends to be less
prone to positive externalities than lower education
levels. Moreover, students from a favoured background
still account for an important proportion of participants in
public tertiary education.
Algumas sugestões para reforma
• Encouraging competition and extending market
signals
• User choice could be strengthened across
jurisdictions and between public and private
sectors
• An extended use of price signals could reduce
excessive demand for costly public provision
AFONSO (2005), ANTÓNIO and MIGUEL ST. AUBYN, NON-PARAMETRIC
APPROACHES TO EDUCATION AND HEALTH EFFICIENCY IN OECD
COUNTRIES, Journal of Applied Economics. Vol VIII, No. 2, 227-246.
PORTUGAL
RETHINKING THE STATE—SELECTED EXPENDITURE
REFORM OPTIONS
Gerd Schwartz, Paulo Lopes, Carlos Mulas Granados,
Emily Sinnott, Mauricio Soto, and Platon Tinios
January 2013
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Fiscal Affairs Department
EDUCATION SPENDING
A. Background
• 64. Portugal’s education system has long
underperformed relative to its EU peers, but recent
measures have begun to address this issue.
• Over the last two years, the Portuguese government has
been implementing significant reforms focused on
strengthening teaching in core subjects, raising
curriculum standards (metas curriculares), and improving
teacher and student assessments. In addition, to
improve cost efficiency and reduce disparities in input
indicators relative to other EU countries, the government
has also implemented a 10-percentage point reduction in
the number of educators.
• 65. The education system is somewhat more
fragmented than in other EU countries, with public
institutions covering the vast majority of students.
• As of 2012, there were 81 licensed charter schools
covering almost 46,000 students. Their per-student cost
is lower, and, on average, they produce better student
test scores.
• 66. There have been significant shifts in the
composition of demand for education services.
• Enrollment at the primary level is projected to shrink by
13 percent over 2010–20, and by 9 percent during
2020–30. Smaller primary school age cohorts will
impact on secondary enrollment a decade later, with
student numbers projected to fall by 10 percent over
2020–30, notwithstanding the 2011 increase in
compulsory schooling from grade 9 to grade 12 (i.e., up
to 18 years of age).
• 67. Falling student numbers will necessitate major
adjustments to the school network on top of the
rationalization that has already begun.
• For rural areas, the need for adjustment is most severe.
Already, the government successfully closed 536 rural
school facilities since 2010 and transferred their students
to new “school clusters”
• 68. Meeting an increasing demand for higher
education is a challenge, also given the limited scope
for student fees.
• University attendance in Portugal is still highly correlated
with family income and private returns to university
education are among the highest in the OECD,57 making
the impact of tertiary education spending highly
regressive (
• 69. Public school teachers have remained a relatively
privileged group within society in general and within
the civil service in particular.
• To date, their seniority privileges have not been curbed,
and, although there are possibilities for teacher
• mobility, there is no mechanism to forcefully redeploy
permanent teachers from overstaffed schools to schools
with shortages of teachers.
B. Key Issues
• 70. Portugal’s education system remains overstaffed
and relatively inefficient by international standards.
• Even a mildly ambitious education sector reform that
would bring student–teacher ratios closer to the
prevailing EU averages for primary and secondary
education (Table 6.3) would imply that 50–60,000 staff
(teachers and nonteachers) would have to be cut.
• 71. Prevailing rigidities in the education system
further aggravate the overstaffing problem.
• Under the system, it is not the more qualified teachers
who get redeployed to a position of their choice, but the
more senior ones.
• 72. To date, downsizing measures have not targeted
the lowest performing or most highly-paid teachers.
• With some exceptions of voluntary separations, the
remaining departures (8,300) were fixed-term contract
teachers who did not have their contracts renewed.
• 73. The current school financing model generates
wide disparities of per-student spending and of the
resources available across schools.
• In fact, some schools managed to score well in academic
tests although they spent less and served a student
population that faced more adverse socioeconomic
conditions
• 74. There is evidence that per-student costs are lower
in charter schools compared to public schools.
• The Tribunal de Contas study found that charter school
costs were lower by about €400 per student than for
regular public schools, while the subsequent MEC
working group study estimated the difference at only €50
per student after adjusting for expenditure cuts that have
been made since 2009/10.
C. Reform Options
• 75. A main challenge for Portugal's education
system is to enhance outcomes while reducing
costs, i.e., to do more with less.
• 76. Continuing the current approach for attrition and
school closures would only meet in part the
immediate fiscal consolidation goals.
• 77. Achieving larger savings would require policy
options that are geared toward making the
education system more flexible and limiting the
state’s role as a supplier of education services.
– Implement a simple formula-based funding framework that
allows money to follow the student.
– Apply the special mobility scheme for surplus teachers
– Increase student fees for tertiary education
• Archibald (2008) Robert B., David H.
Feldman, Explaining Increases in Higher
Education Costs, The Journal of Higher
Education, Volume 79, Number 3,
May/June, pp. 268-295 DOI:
10.1353/jhe.0.0004
• “We have shown that cost disease likely has played the
most significant role in driving the cost of higher
education per FTE student upward over the past 80
years. Thus, the problem over the whole time period has
been lagging productivity growth in personal services
relative to manufactured commodities. Lagging
productivity growth in personal services puts upward
pressure on the relative price of these services because
wage growth in this sector is not offset by higher labor
productivity. More recently, the rising wage premium for
highly educated workers has put additional upward
pressure on all personal services that rely extensively on
educated labor. Higher education is one such sector.”
• “Clearly, there are those who understand the need to
increase productivity in higher education, and there is an
active research agenda that seeks to find ways to use
information technology more effectively in higher
education (see Twigg, 2003). The National Center for
Academic Transformation has sponsored a program in
course redesign focusing on introductory courses across
the curriculum. The potential for quality preserving (or
quality-enhancing) cost decreases from more fully
integrating information technology into the delivery of
higher education may be the greatest in introductory
classes that service large segments of the student
population. Referring back to Figure 1, if integrating
information technology more fully into the design of
service delivery can yield productivity gains, then the
cost-quality locus shifts downward. Cost decreases could
be achieved without reducing quality, or alternatively,
higher quality is possible at constant costs.”
Financiamento da Educação
Pedro Telhado Pereira
HOW MUCH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION IS THERE?
EAG – B3
• • Public funding accounts for 84% of all funds for educational
institutions, on average across OECD countries. • Nearly 92% of the
funds for primary, secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary
educational institutions come from public sources, on average across
OECD countries; only in Chile and Colombia is this share less than
80%.
• • Tertiary institutions and, to a lesser extent, pre-primary institutions
obtain the largest proportions of funds from private sources: 31% and
19%, respectively. Public funding for educational institutions, for all
levels combined, increased between 2000 and 2011 in all countries
(except Italy) for which comparable data are available. However, with
more households sharing the cost of education, private funding
increased at an even greater rate in more than three-quarters of
countries.
Other findings
•
•
•
• Public funds are mainly allocated to public institutions, but also to private
institutions to varying degrees. For all levels of education combined, public
expenditure on public institutions, per student, is nearly twice the level of
public expenditure on private institutions, on average across OECD
countries. However, the ratio varies from less than twice for primary,
secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (1.8) and at the preprimary level (1.8), to nearly three times (2.9) at the tertiary level.
• The countries with the lowest amounts of public expenditure per student,
in public and private tertiary institutions, are also those with the fewest
students enrolled in public tertiary institutions, except Colombia, Mexico and
Poland.
• In most countries for which data are available, individual households
account for most of the private expenditure on tertiary education. Argentina,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic and Sweden are the
exceptions, where private expenditure from entities other than households
(e.g. private businesses and non-profit organisations) is more significant
than private expenditure from households, mainly because tuition fees
charged by tertiary institutions are low or negligible in these countries (with
the exception of Canada).
• Between 2000 and 2011, the average share
of public funding for tertiary institutions
decreased from 73.7% in 2000, to 69.1% in
2005 and then slightly to 68.3% in 2011 (on
average across the 20 OECD countries for
which trend data are available for all years)
(Table B3.2c). •is trend is mainly influenced
by some European countries, where
significant changes in tuition fees took place
and where enterprises participate more
actively in providing grants to finance tertiary
institutions.
Public and private expenditure on
tertiary educational institutions
• High private returns to tertiary education (see
Indicator A7) suggest that a greater contribution to
the costs of education by individuals and other
private entities may be justified, as long as there
are ways to ensure that funding is available to
students regardless of their economic
backgrounds (see Indicator B5). In all countries,
the proportion of private expenditure on education
is far higher for tertiary education – an average of
31% of total expenditure at this level – than it is for
primary, secondary and post-secondary nontertiary education (Table B3.1).
Educação e Externalidades
• Bens públicos
- não rivalidade
- não exclusão
• Bens privados
Externalidades do Ensino
Obrigatório
- Redução dos custos de transacção
- Utilização das novas tecnologias
- Natalidade e fertilidade
- Novos hábitos de saúde e de alimentação
- Atitudes organizativas e financeiras
- Hábitos de consumo
- Efeitos intergeracionais
Aumento da matéria fiscal no futuro
No entanto no Ensino Pósobrigatório
• As externalidades não são tão fortes
•
- não tem as características de um bem
público puro.
Imperfeições no mercado
- controle da qualidade
- problema da escolha intertemporal e de
informação
- os problemas dos empréstimos
mais utilizados pelos mais favorecidos
Os "quase-mercados" em
educação
- financiador - o Estado
- fornecedor - Privados
educação, saúde, segurança social, ...
política dos "vouchers" (cheques)
- objectivo - redução dos custos, eficiência
Desvios - selecção dos candidatos de modo a
minimizar os custos.
Financiamento do Ensino
Superior
- custos elevados
- custos de educação e de vida dos
estudantes
- custos de instrução dos
estabelecimentos de ES
- custos de oportunidade
- individual - salário perdido
- social - valor da produção não
realizada
Financiadores do ES
- os estudantes
- empresas
- Estado
- receitas de prestação de serviços
- formação de adultos
- rendimentos de investimentos
- ...
- mecenato
Financiadores dos Estudantes
- família
- Estado
- Empréstimos
- pelo Estado - não evita a pressão sobre o
orçamento
- privados
- empréstimo hipotecário - prazo curto - não atrai os
estudantes mais carenciados
acompanhados com bolsas
- empréstimo dependente do rendimento - a
amortização depende do rendimento - promove mais
a eficiência e a equidade
- imposto sobre o diploma
Ensino Superior
• Papel social dos Estudantes
– Estudante como um jovem cidadão num
processo de aprendizagem
• Bolsas substanciais independentemente da
condição financeira dos Pais
– Estudante como membro de uma família num
sistema de bem-estar limitado
• Bolsas pequenas dependentes da condição
financeira dos Pais. Pequena percentagem de
estudantes recebem bolsas.
– Estudante como membro de uma família num
sistema de bem-estar alargado
• Bolsas substanciais mas dependentes da
condição financeira dos Pais. Grande
percentagem de estudantes recebem bolsas.
– Estudante como investidores no seu futuro
• Sistema de empréstimo a serem reembolsados no
futuro
Financiamento do Ensino Superior
Público em Portugal
• Pereira, Pedro (2009) “Ensino Superior –
Valor Económico e Financiamento: Notas
de uma Leitura Pessoal”, in Políticas
Educativas - Discursos e Práticas, ed.
Liliana Rodrigues e Paulo Brazão,
Universidade da Madeira e CIE.
Exemplo
• Pensemos num bolo de mel que queremos distribuirpor 10
indivíduos, (5 com mais de 65 anos, reformados e 5 com menos de
65 anos e população activa)
• Vamos supor que existia um estudo que dizia que para ficarem
satisfeitos os maiores de 65 anos deviam comer 80g de bolo e os
com menos de 65 anos deviam comer 120g de bolo.
• Para os satisfazer necessitaríamos de um bolo 1000 g (= 5*80 +
5*120)
• Vamos agora supor que queremos compensar a população activa
aumentando a sua fatia de 25%, ou seja passando a 150g.
• O bolo terá que passar a 1150g
• O que fazer se só tivermos um bolo de 800g para distribuir?
Dois problemas
• 1) o tamanho do bolo e
• 2) o modo como é distribuído.
• São exactamente estes dois tipos de
problemas que temos com o
financiamento do Ensino Superior, ou seja
o do seu montante e de como é
distribuído.
Até 2006
• A fórmula era baseada em rácios
alunos/professores e docentes/não
docentes; e nos salários médios dos
docentes e não docentes.
• Depois eram utilizados factores de
qualidade e de eficiência.
• Estes dados eram usados para encontrar
custos de referência para cada área e
cada instituição.
7.2.3. Rationes de docentes e de não docentes
Ensino universitário:
Formação inicial
est/doc
est/ndoc
Medicina, Med Dent, Espectáculo
6.0
7.0
Medicina Veterinária
8.0
10.0
Ciência, Eng, Farm, Agr&Pescas
10.0
14.0
Arq, CComun, Psi, CEdu, CDesp, APlást
12.0
20.0
Matemática, FormProf
14.0
28.0
Línguas, Economia, Gestão, Ssociais
16.0
32.0
Letras, Csociais, Contabilidade
18.0
45.0
Direito, CPolíticas
20.0
50.0
Formação Avançada
est/doc
est/ndoc
Medicina, Med Dent, Espectáculo
5.0
6.0
Enfermagem, Med Vet, Tecn Saúde
8.0
10.0
Ciência, Eng, Farm, Agr&Pescas
8.0
10.0
Arq, CComun, Psi, CEdu, CDesp, APlást
11.0
22.0
Matemática, FormProf
11.0
22.0
Línguas, Economia, Gestão, Ssociais
11.0
22.0
Letras, Csociais, Contabilidade
11.0
22.0
Direito, CPolíticas
11.0
22.0
Ensino politécnico:
Formação Inicial
est/doc
est/ndoc
Espectáculo
5.0
6.0
Enfermagem, Tecn Dentários, Tecn Saúde
8.0
10.0
Ciência, Tecn, Agr&Pescas, APlást
11.0
18.0
Computação, FormProf
14.0
28.0
Gestão, Cont, Línguas, SSociais, Turismo
17.0
42.0
est/doc
est/ndoc
Espectáculo
5.0
6.0
Enfermagem, Tecn Dentários, Tecn Saúde
8.0
10.0
Ciência, Tecn, Agr&Pescas, APlást
8.0
10.0
Computação, FormProf
11.0
22.0
Gestão, Cont, Línguas, SSociais, Turismo
11.0
22.0
Formação Avançada
Após 2007
• Os rácios foram substituídos por factores
de custo.
• Mas estes factores são muito diferentes
dos de outros países
Problema com a fórmula até 2008
• Era a utilização do indicador de qualidade que
era a percentagem de Doutores.
• Este indicador está altamente correlacionado
com a remuneração média dos docentes a qual
já estava considerada na fórmula, o que muito
prejudicava o financiamento das Universidades
com menor percentagem de Doutores como era
o caso da Universidade da Madeira.
Revista Brasileira de Política e Administração da Educação
A correcção da fórmula
• permitiu à Universidade da Madeira ter um
aumento de orçamento de quase 16% de
2008 a 2009
Notes
EAG – A 7 – Estudante e Famílias
Year
Direct
costs
Foregone
earnings
Total costs
Direct
costs
(1)
(2)
(3)
(1)
Foregone
Total costs
earnings
(2)
(3)
OECD
Australia
2009
- 17 528
- 50 814
- 68 342
25,65%
74,35%
100,00%
Austria
2010
- 6 199
- 62 401
- 68 600
9,04%
90,96%
100,00%
Belgium
2010
- 2 780
- 37 528
- 40 307
6,90%
93,10%
100,00%
Canada
2010
- 20 529
- 36 423
- 56 952
36,05%
63,95%
100,00%
m
m
m
Chile
Czech
Republic
2010
- 5 029
- 25 719
- 30 748
16,36%
83,64%
100,00%
Denmark
2010
- 4 509
- 75 357
- 79 866
5,65%
94,35%
100,00%
Estonia
2010
- 3 924
- 14 951
- 18 875
20,79%
79,21%
100,00%
Finland
2009
- 1 873
- 56 911
- 58 784
3,19%
96,81%
100,00%
France
2010
- 6 963
- 47 182
- 54 145
12,86%
87,14%
100,00%
Germany
2010
- 5 813
- 55 093
- 60 906
9,54%
90,46%
100,00%
Greece
2009
- 690
- 43 715
- 44 405
1,55%
98,45%
100,00%
Hungary
2010
- 4 664
- 13 268
- 17 932
26,01%
73,99%
100,00%
m
m
m
Iceland
Ireland
2010
- 6 478
- 42 453
- 48 931
13,24%
86,76%
100,00%
Israel
2010
- 14 023
- 26 963
- 40 987
34,21%
65,79%
100,00%
Italy
2008
- 7 285
- 50 608
- 57 893
12,58%
87,42%
100,00%
Japan
2007
- 37 215
- 66 750
- 103 965
35,80%
64,20%
100,00%
Korea
2010
- 19 211
- 34 019
- 53 231
36,09%
63,91%
100,00%
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New
Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak
Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United
Kingdom
United
States
OECD
average
EU21
average
m
m
m
m
m
m
2010
- 14 646
- 95 834
- 110 480
13,26%
86,74% 100,00%
2010
2010
2010
2010
- 9 384
- 1 086
- 7 343
- 4 627
- 43 347
- 47 946
- 16 928
- 16 181
- 52 731
- 49 032
- 24 270
- 20 808
17,80%
2,21%
30,25%
22,24%
82,20%
97,79%
69,75%
77,76%
100,00%
100,00%
100,00%
100,00%
2010
2010
2010
2010
- 6 183
- 3 564
- 8 864
- 3 560
- 15 019
- 26 242
- 28 219
- 50 291
- 21 202
- 29 806
- 37 083
- 53 851
29,16%
11,96%
23,90%
6,61%
70,84%
88,04%
76,10%
93,39%
100,00%
100,00%
100,00%
100,00%
2005
m
- 1 061
m
- 9 402
m
- 10 463
10,14%
89,86% 100,00%
2010
- 20 162
- 47 655
- 67 817
29,73%
70,27% 100,00%
2010
- 61 135
- 44 678
- 105 813
57,78%
42,22% 100,00%
- 10 563
- 40 755
- 51 318
20,58%
79,42% 100,00%
- 6 258
- 41 078
- 47 335
13,22%
86,78% 100,00%
Notes
Estado
Year
OECD
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Chile
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
2009
2010
Foregone taxes on
earnings
Total costs
(1)
(2)
(3)
- 15 955
- 43 971
m
- 27 754
m
- 21 080
- 32 430
- 19 081
- 21 711
- 33 511
- 27 953
- 22 045
- 15 696
1
2010
2010
2010
2010
2009
2010
2010
2009
2010
m
2
2010
m
m
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
United Kingdom
United States
2010
2010
2005
- 3 020
- 8 869
m
- 2 945
m
2 849
- 20 100
- 1 241
- 4 391
- 5 799
- 13 996
2 032
- 2 625
- 25 625
- 14 670
- 32 919
m
- 21 051
m
2010
2010
2008
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
OECD average
EU21 average
Direct costs
- 18 975
- 52 840
m
- 30 700
m
- 18 231
- 52 530
- 20 323
- 26 103
- 39 310
- 41 949
- 20 013
- 18 321
m
- 794
- 1 409
- 10 264
m
- 2 923
m
m
- 26 419
- 16 079
- 43 183
m
- 23 974
m
m
- 28 879
- 22 264
- 38 967
- 19 278
- 26 371
- 2 153
- 4 017
- 16 326
- 5 994
- 2 429
- 31 032
- 26 281
- 55 292
- 25 272
- 28 800
- 14 722
- 874
- 15 596
- 19 303
- 18 107
- 29 675
m
- 4 776
- 6 815
- 843
- 6 505
m
- 4 551
- 26 119
- 18 950
- 36 180
m
- 9 327
- 19 434
4 949
- 14 485
- 34 048
- 3 381
- 37 429
- 24 121
- 24 831
- 4 535
- 4 414
- 28 656
- 29 245
Rendibilidade da
Educação
Pedro Telhado Pereira
WHAT ARE THE INCENTIVES TO
INVEST IN EDUCATION? EAG A7
• • Individuals completing tertiary education benefit from substantial
returns on investment: they are more likely to be employed and earn
more than individuals without tertiary education do.
• • On average across OECD countries, the financial return for
tertiary-educated people is around twice as large as for those with
an upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education.
• • Not only does education pay off for individuals, but the public also
benefits from a large proportion of tertiary-educated individuals
through greater tax revenues and social contributions.
• • The net public return on investment for a man with tertiary
education is over USD 105 000 across OECD countries – almost
three times the amount of public investment in his education. For a
woman, the public return is over USD 60 000, which is almost twice
the amount of public investment in her education.
Other findings
•
•
•
•
•
• Gross earnings benefits from tertiary education, compared with the income of a person
with an upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education, are USD 350 000 for
men and USD 250 000 for women across OECD countries.
• Gross earning benefits for an individual attaining an upper secondary or post-secondary
non tertiary degree, compared to benefits for an individual who has not attained this level of
education, are particularly high in Austria, the Netherlands (for a woman), Norway and the
United States. In these countries, they amount to at least USD 260 000 for a man and USD
160 000 for a woman.
• On average across the 28 OECD countries with available data, the public return (net
present value) for a man who completed upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary
education is about USD 39 000 compared with a man who did not complete that level of
education. For a woman, the public return is USD 24 000.
• With few exceptions, the net private returns related to attaining a tertiary education
exceed those related to attaining upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary
education. Only in Norway and Sweden does upper secondary or post-secondary nontertiary education bring higher returns to men.
• Across OECD countries, individuals invest about USD 50 000 to earn a tertiary degree. In
Japan, the Netherlands and the United States, average investment exceeds USD 100 000
when direct and indirect costs are taken into account.
Financial returns on investment in
education
•
•
This indicator provides information on the costs and benefits of education
and the incentives to invest in education. It assesses the economic benefits
of education for an individual by estimating the earnings premiums of higher
levels of education, taking into consideration the direct and indirect costs
and benefits of attaining those levels of education. Besides higher earnings
compared to individuals with lower education levels, the probability of
finding work, expressed in monetary terms by the variable called the
“unemployment effect”, is also a benefit (see Definitions section below).
Costs include direct costs, notably tuition fees, and indirect costs due to
higher income taxes, social contributions levies, loss of salary because of
delayed entry into the labour market, and fewer entitlements to social
transfers, such as housing allowances, family allowances or supplemental
social welfare benefits. In addition, social contributions and income taxes
account for a certain percentage of the income and tend to be higher for
individuals with more advanced education because they tend to earn more.
Table A7.3a. Private costs and benefits for a man attaining tertiary education (2010)
Notes
As compared with a man attaining upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education,
in equivalent USD converted using PPPs for GDP
OECD
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Chile
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
Net present value Internal rate of return
Year
2009
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2009
2010
2010
2009
2010
2010
2010
2008
2007
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2005
2010
(11)
(12)
152 892
171 029
122 584
161 982
m
242 373
102 460
179 059
169 020
200 812
210 821
70 128
257 785
m
454 224
157 304
155 346
143 018
266 298
m
m
131 787
78 290
122 289
285 745
195 937
215 783
231 488
120 546
78 094
m
64 177
248 322
9,0%
10,1%
11,9%
10,2%
m
18,6%
8,4%
20,6%
11,9%
11,4%
13,4%
7,5%
28,5%
m
29,9%
11,8%
8,1%
7,4%
12,8%
m
m
7,2%
7,3%
8,2%
24,6%
18,3%
21,4%
17,1%
11,2%
7,4%
m
19,3%
14,3%
Notes
Table A7.3b. Private costs and benefits for a woman attaining tertiary education (2010)
As compared with a woman attaining upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education, in equivalent USD converted using
PPPs for GDP
Net present Internal rate of
value
return
OECD
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Chile
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Year
2009
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2009
2010
2010
2009
2010
2010
2010
2008
2007
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2005
2010
2010
(11)
105 374
126 003
113 293
130 636
m
135 668
45 782
142 889
88 019
136 077
91 952
90 710
140 705
m
254 163
82 240
77 652
104 812
177 802
m
m
105 985
86 260
100 822
177 066
173 893
137 884
173 657
163 625
55 306
m
80 466
209 506
238 491
(12)
8,9%
9,0%
13,7%
11,4%
m
15,3%
6,5%
29,7%
8,8%
10,9%
8,5%
9,6%
24,6%
m
21,0%
8,6%
6,9%
7,8%
11,0%
m
m
7,0%
10,3%
9,6%
21,6%
22,0%
18,5%
15,3%
14,5%
7,1%
m
19,2%
12,3%
12,9%
-
Table A8.2. Private net present value for an individual obtaining tertiary education as part of initial education, ISCED 5/6 (2006)
In equivalent USD, converted with PPPs for GDP
Net present value
Country
Year1
Male
Austria
Internal rate of return
Female
Male
Female
158.074
84.570
9,1
7,4
114.944
100.068
11,7
14,1
Canada
149.373
87.280
9,6
8,8
Czech Republic
244.117
133.235
22,5
19,6
20.867
11.936
4,4
4,0
130.213
64.255
10,0
7,5
w
w
w
w
Germany
136.563
59.846
9,0
6,5
Hungary
217.845
86.021
17,7
12,8
Italy
308.299
51.634
11,5
6,6
113.951
173.963
9,4
12,9
Netherlands
104.499
57.278
6,6
5,6
New Zealand
50.544
32.907
7,2
6,5
Norway
79.580
77.873
6,6
8,3
Poland
213.382
127.974
20,4
19,2
Portugal
366.728
206.650
18,4
18,4
83.385
99.216
9,3
11,6
52.411
31.293
6,1
5,3
64.238
80.710
19,1
19,1
207.655
152.858
11,2
8,5
w
w
w
w
145.859
91.532
11,5
10,7
Belgium
-1
Denmark
Finland
France
Korea
Spain
w
-3
-2
Sweden
Turkey
-1
United Kingdom
United States
OECD average
w
Bibliografia Geral
• Nível Elementar
• Cabrito, B. G. (2002) Economia da
Educação, Texto Editora, Cacém
• Nível Avançado
• Checchi, Daniele (2006), The Economics
of Education – Human Capital, Family
Background and Inequality, Cambridge
University Press